In the Interest of C.M., Minor Child ( 2019 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 19-0334
    Filed June 5, 2019
    IN THE INTEREST OF C.M.,
    Minor Child,
    N.P., Father,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Jennifer S.
    Bailey, District Associate Judge.
    A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his two-year-old
    son. AFFIRMED.
    Travis A. Inghram of Inghram Law, PLLC, Burlington, for appellant father.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kathryn K. Lang, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Josh Schier of Cray Law Firm, Burlington, guardian ad litem for minor child.
    Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Tabor, JJ.
    2
    TABOR, Judge.
    Nathan challenges the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental
    relationship with two-year-old C.M. C.M.’s mother, Angel, and Nathan cared for
    C.M. until the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) intervened in April 2018.
    The juvenile court terminated Nathan’s parental rights in February 2019.1 Nathan
    appeals, seeking additional time to establish a relationship with C.M. and arguing
    termination will be detrimental to C.M. because of the close bond he and C.M.
    share. After our independent review of the record,2 we agree with the juvenile
    court’s conclusion termination is warranted.
    I.     Background Facts and Proceedings
    Nathan and Angel shared a nine-year relationship and had a child, C.M.,
    together in January 2017. When C.M. was born, Angel was still married to Joshua,
    making Joshua C.M.’s legal father.3 Nathan was incarcerated for the first six
    months of C.M.’s life. But when Nathan was released in July 2017, he “went
    straight to [Angel’s] apartment” and began playing an active role in C.M.’s
    1
    The order also terminated parental rights of Angel and Joshua, the child’s legal father.
    They are not parties to this appeal.
    2
    We review child-welfare cases de novo. In re M.W., 
    876 N.W.2d 212
    , 219 (Iowa 2016)
    (citing In re A.M., 
    843 N.W.2d 100
    , 110 (Iowa 2014)). We give weight to the juvenile
    court’s fact findings, particularly those regarding witness credibility, but we are not bound
    by them. 
    Id.
     (quoting A.M., 843 N.W.2d at 110). Termination must be supported by clear
    and convincing evidence—meaning we have no “serious or substantial doubts as to the
    correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” Id. (alteration in original)
    (quoting In re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 706 (Iowa 2010)).
    3
    Caseworker Amy Glasgow testified Angel remained married to Joshua because “they
    haven’t been able to pull together the amount of money or he hasn’t cooperated for Angel
    to be able to [end the marriage].”
    3
    caretaking.4 The DHS intervened5 after C.M. tested positive for amphetamine
    during a medical appointment in April 2018. The juvenile court granted the DHS
    request for temporary removal of C.M. based on concerns Angel and Nathan were
    using illegal substances while caring for C.M.6 C.M. has since been in foster care.
    At an early-May 2018 hearing, the juvenile court adjudicated C.M. a child in
    need of assistance (CINA) and directed Nathan to obtain DHS-recommended
    mental-health and substance-abuse evaluations, submit to random drug testing,
    and participate in Family Safety, Risk, and Permanency (FSRP) services, family
    team meetings, and visitation with C.M. For a short time after the hearing, Nathan
    accompanied Angel to visitations with C.M. and seemed amenable to DHS
    services. But toward the end of the month, Nathan stopped showing up for the
    scheduled visits. And when FSRP care coordinator Kimberly Young asked Angel
    where Nathan was, Angel said she hadn’t heard from him.7 Despite the DHS
    mailing communications to Nathan at the address he provided (his mother’s
    address), Nathan’s involvement with C.M.’s case came to a halt.
    In October 2018, the State petitioned to terminate parental rights. Then, in
    early December, Nathan resurfaced—he penned a letter to the DHS from the
    4
    Angel testified Nathan bonded with C.M., had a “cordial relationship [with Angel] centered
    around [C.M.]’s wellbeing,” “brought [C.M.] diapers and wipes,” and was involved with
    C.M.’s medical care.
    5
    While this marked the first DHS intervention related to C.M., the DHS was previously
    involved with the family after learning Angel permitted Nathan, a convicted sex offender,
    access to C.M.’s older half-sister and remained involved with the family due to Angel’s
    drug use. C.M. was born while Angel underwent drug treatment.
    6
    Nathan denied ever using methamphetamine but admitted to recreational marijuana use.
    7
    Later, Angel told caseworkers she thought Nathan might be in Fort Dodge, Iowa,
    attempting to evade an Illinois arrest warrant. Nathan later clarified no warrant was issued
    for his arrest until November 2018.
    4
    Hancock County Jail in Carthage, Illinois, asking the DHS to communicate with
    him about C.M.
    The court set the termination hearing for January 15, 2019.8 On January 8,
    Nathan moved to continue the termination hearing to allow time for his paternity
    test scheduled for January 17. The juvenile court denied Nathan’s motion, citing
    Nathan’s delay in obtaining paternity testing and failure to participate in hearings
    or services. After the hearing,9 the court terminated Nathan’s parental rights under
    Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (e), and (h) (2018).
    Nathan appeals the juvenile court’s termination order.
    II.    Analysis
    A. Additional Time
    Nathan contends he should have been given more time for reunification.10
    He points to his bond with C.M. and asserts he needed additional time to “receive
    paternity results and subsequently foster reunification with [Nathan] since efforts
    with [Angel] failed.”
    8
    The hearing was initially set for mid-December, but the court continued it to mid-January
    due to scheduling issues and concerns about whether Nathan received adequate notice.
    9
    While the hearing was held before Nathan submitted to paternity testing, the court did
    not issue its order until after it received the paternity test results on February 5. The court
    acknowledged Nathan’s status as biological father of C.M. in its order terminating his
    rights.
    10
    Nathan cites Iowa Code section 232.117(5) in his petition on appeal, arguing the
    statutory provision “allows the court to continue CINA adjudication rather than termination
    of parental rights in order to further attempt reunification.” But Nathan misses the purpose
    of section 232.117(5)—to give the court an option when it chooses not to terminate
    parental rights. Here, the court did terminate Nathan’s parental rights, so section
    232.117(5) does not apply. Because Nathan appears to argue on appeal the juvenile
    court should have continued placement for an additional six months as permitted by Iowa
    Code section 232.104(2)(b), we address that argument.
    5
    Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b) permits the court to:
    [e]nter an order pursuant to section 232.102 to continue placement
    of the child for an additional six months at which time the court shall
    hold a hearing to consider modification of its permanency order. An
    order entered under this paragraph shall enumerate the specific
    factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise
    the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child
    from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional
    six-month period.
    While Nathan insists the court should have allowed more time for him to
    reunify with C.M. after the completion of his paternity testing, Nathan ignores the
    fact he contributed to the belated determination. Nathan could have completed
    the paternity testing any time during the CINA proceedings. But even if we were
    to ignore the self-inflicted nature of the delays in establishing Nathan’s paternity,
    Nathan does not explain how the test results would alleviate the risk of the
    adjudicatory harm stemming from his abandonment of C.M.11                          Nathan
    acknowledged throughout the case he was C.M.’s biological father12. And he does
    not suggest the paternity test results would change the nature of their relationship
    or prompt him to engage in services recommended by the DHS. Although Nathan
    argues he debunked Angel’s allegation he was evading a warrant during his six-
    month absence, Nathan did not explain his departure from C.M.’s life. Nor did
    11
    In his close-bond argument, Nathan contends “Evidence has been offered that [Nathan]
    was not the legal father and was unable to have [C.M.] placed with him pending the
    outcome of paternity testing.” But during the termination hearing, Nathan acknowledged
    he could not presently care for C.M. because he was incarcerated—not due to his lack of
    legal status as C.M.’s father.
    12
    In an October 2018 permanency order, the district court stated: “The department did
    initially have contact information for Nathan and he does know how to reach the on-going
    worker, but he has never availed himself of paternity testing, nor participated in services.
    For all intents and purposes, [C.M.] has only one parent in his life, which is Angel.”
    6
    Nathan complete a mental-health or substance-abuse evaluation or comply with
    any other services offered by DHS and ordered by the court.
    C.M. should not have to continue waiting for permanency. See A.M., 843
    N.W.2d at 112 (“It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency
    after the State has proved a ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent
    will learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.”). We
    find no facts in the record    indicating a six-month delay would lead to safe
    reunification. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.104
    (2)(b).
    B. Exception to Termination.
    Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) permits the court to avoid termination
    when “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be
    detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child
    relationship.”
    Nathan argues termination will be detrimental to C.M. because Nathan “is
    the only father figure [C.M.] ever knew.” We are not persuaded by Nathan’s
    argument.    Glasgow, the family’s caseworker, testified C.M. was developing
    relationships with his current foster family and was “very comfortable” in their
    home. While we recognize Nathan and C.M. shared a bond early in C.M.’s life,
    the record does not suggest C.M. would be disadvantaged by termination or that
    the resulting detriment is great enough to outweigh the continuing risk of Nathan’s
    inability to provide a safe and stable home for C.M. D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709.
    We see no basis for reversal of the termination order.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-0334

Filed Date: 6/5/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021