State of Iowa v. Dwight Deron Cooke ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0237
Filed January 11, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DWIGHT DERON COOKE,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Paul L. Macek,
Judge.
A defendant appeals his conviction. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
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VOGEL, Presiding Judge.
Dwight Cooke appeals his convictions for willful injury causing serious
injury, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(1) (2013), and domestic abuse
assault with intent or while displaying a dangerous weapon, in violation of Iowa
Code section 708.2A(2)(c). Cooke asserts the district court erred in denying his
counsel’s motion to withdraw and in admitting evidence regarding the victim’s
car. Because we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion on either
claim, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On January 23, 2015, Cooke met up with his former fiancé, Haley Ploog,
in order to give her belongings intended for their son. After picking up the items
from Cooke’s apartment, the two drove around for a short time, then parked on a
residential street and talked. Initially, the conversation was calm, but the two
eventually began arguing about various personal matters. Ploog testified that
Cooke got “madder and madder” as the conversation went on. She further
stated that he pulled out a small “X-Acto” knife and threatened to kill her. While
attempting to get out of the car, Cooke grabbed her by the waist and tried to stop
her. Ploog, falling to the ground, felt Cooke’s hand on her face; then, as blood
began running down her face, she knew she had been cut. Cooke jumped out of
the car and stood over Ploog.
Just then, Jacob Sanders and Katherine Polz drove by, noticed the
struggle, and stopped. Sanders asked if Ploog was okay; Cooke told them to
“leave her alone, we’re fine,” but hearing Ploog’s pleas, the two stayed to give
assistance. Cooke fled the immediate scene, but Ploog saw him standing
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nearby. She retrieved her purse from her car but left the engine running.
Sanders and Polz helped Ploog dial 911 and drove her to the hospital; she was
eventually transported to the University of Iowa Hospital in Iowa City, where she
underwent plastic surgery due to the depth of the laceration on her face.
Ploog’s car went missing that night. Three weeks later, it was recovered
by police outside Cooke’s apartment. When the car was returned to her, Ploog
identified several items she knew belonged to Cooke inside the car. A piece of
mail addressed to Cooke was also located inside the vehicle.
On March 19, the State charged Cooke with willful injury causing serious
injury and domestic abuse assault. Trial was set for June 1 with the speedy trial
date set to run on June 17. On May 22, Cooke’s counsel filed a motion to
withdraw claiming Cooke had refused to see him on multiple occasions and had
refused to cooperate in preparation for trial. A pretrial conference was held on
May 27, where the issue was initially discussed but not fully submitted. At the
start of trial on June 1, the district court heard additional argument detailing
Cooke’s troubled relationship with his counsel and the difficulties of assigning
new counsel because of speedy trial requirements. Cooke also filed a motion in
limine that sought to preclude the State from introducing evidence regarding
Cooke’s possession of Ploog’s car. The district court allowed the State to
present evidence regarding the vehicle so long as the evidence did not imply the
vehicle was stolen. Following trial, a jury convicted Cooke of both counts.
Cooke filed a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied. Cooke
appeals.
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II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s decision regarding counsel’s motion to
withdraw for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brooks, 540 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa
1995). We also review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. State v.
Huston, 825 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Iowa 2013).
III. Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw
Cooke argues the district court erred in denying his counsel’s motion to
withdraw prior to trial because a complete breakdown of the attorney-client
relationship had occurred, which justified substitution of counsel. The State
responds Cooke did not show such a breakdown in communication and Cooke’s
issues with his counsel had the indicia of a delay tactic.
District courts have substantial discretion when ruling on motions to
withdraw counsel, “particularly when the motion is made on the eve of trial.”
Brooks, 540 N.W.2d at 272. A defendant must demonstrate sufficient cause for
the withdrawal, such as “a conflict of interest, an irreconcilable conflict with the
client, or a complete breakdown in communications between the attorney and the
client.” Id. If sufficient cause is shown, a defendant must ordinarily also show
prejudice. Id.Here, Cooke claimed a complete breakdown of communications between
him and his counsel. In its ruling on the motion for a new trial, the district court
noted that it was Cooke who had caused the communications issues:
The defendant overlooks the fact that it was the defendant himself
who refused to meet with his attorney. This refusal occurred twice,
on May 13, 2015, and again on May 21, 2015. The defendant’s
election not to meet with his attorney was an election that he made.
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This attorney represents his clients well, as was evidenced by the
attorney’s participation in the trial and by these motions.
The court also included its observation that Cooke and his counsel
communicated well throughout trial and concluded that Cooke had not shown a
complete breakdown of communications. Further, the court emphasized that the
request came on the eve of trial, that Cooke had not waived speedy trial, and that
appointing substitute counsel would have been difficult. Our review of the record
indicates the district court’s observations about Cooke’s relationship with counsel
were sound and its concerns about appointing substitute counsel on the eve of
trial were valid. Further, from our review of the record, we agree that Cooke
received adequate representation from trial counsel. Therefore, we conclude the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Cooke’s counsel’s motion to
withdraw.
IV. Evidence Related to Ploog’s Car
Cooke asserts the district court erred by allowing the State to introduce
evidence related to his possession of Ploog’s car and the items that were found
in the car. The State claims this evidence was relevant to identifying Cooke as
the assailant and therefore properly admitted.1
Generally, evidence is admissible as long as it is relevant. Iowa R. Evid.
5.402. Evidence is “relevant” when it has “any tendency to make the existence of
any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable
or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.402.
The court limited the State’s use of the evidence to the issue of identity and
1
Although the State asserts Cooke failed to preserve error on his evidentiary claim, we
find it adequately, albeit marginally, preserved by the district court’s ruling in limine.
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warned against the implication Cooke had stolen the vehicle. Identity of Ploog’s
assailant was the main issue at trial, as Cooke claimed he was not the person
that attacked Ploog. Ploog identified Cooke as the attacker, and she also
testified that she last saw her car at the scene on the night she was attacked,
with Cooke standing nearby. Accordingly, locating Ploog’s car near Cooke’s
apartment with his belongings and mail inside linked him to the attack. Because
the evidence related to Ploog’s car was relevant to corroborate Ploog’s testimony
as to the identity of her assailant, the evidence was admissible, and the district
court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such evidence.
V. Conclusion
Because we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Cooke’s counsel’s motion to withdraw or in admitting evidence of the
location and contents of Ploog’s vehicle, we affirm Cooke’s convictions.
AFFIRMED.