State of Iowa v. Micah Lee Bates Jr. ( 2015 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 14-0007
    Filed January 14, 2015
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    MICAH LEE BATES JR.,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Paul L. Macek (plea)
    and Mark D. Cleve (sentencing), Judges.
    A defendant appeals his sentences on his convictions for being a felon in
    possession of a firearm, first-degree theft, and tampering with a witness.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
    Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant
    Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl A. Soich, Assistant Attorney
    General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Amy Devine, Assistant County
    Attorney, for appellee.
    Considered by Doyle, P.J., Tabor, J., and Scott, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015).
    2
    SCOTT, S.J.
    A defendant appeals his sentences on his convictions for being a felon in
    possession of a firearm, first-degree theft, and tampering with a witness. We
    determine the court did not abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive
    sentences.    We reverse the portion of the sentencing order requiring the
    defendant to pay costs associated with charges that were dismissed.           We
    remand to the district court for a correction of the sentencing order.
    I.     Background Facts & Proceedings
    Defendant Micah Bates Jr. was charged with Count I, robbery in the first
    degree; Count II, conspiracy to commit a forcible felony; and Count III, being a
    felon in possession of a firearm. The State also claimed Bates was a habitual
    offender. The State asserted Bates was involved in a drug deal and brandished
    a loaded firearm at a person. During the trial on these charges, allegations arose
    that Bates had attempted to pay certain witnesses not to testify. The trial was
    continued.
    The State amended the trial information to charge Count IV, theft in the
    first degree; and Count V, tampering with a witness. Bates entered into a plea
    agreement in which he agreed to plead guilty to Count III, being a felon in
    possession of a firearm as a habitual offender, in violation of Iowa Code section
    724.26 (2011); Count IV, first-degree theft (without the habitual offender
    enhancement), in violation of section 714.2(1); and Count V, tampering with a
    witness, in violation of section 720.4. The State agreed Counts I and II would be
    dismissed. Bates entered his guilty plea in open court on November 20, 2013.
    3
    The district court accepted his pleas. The court denied Bates’s pro se motion in
    arrest of judgment.
    The sentencing hearing was held on December 20, 2013.             The court
    sentenced Bates to a term of imprisonment not to exceed fifteen years on the
    charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm, ten years on the charge of
    first-degree theft, and two years on the charge of tampering with a witness. The
    court found Counts III, IV, and V constituted separate and distinct offenses, and
    determined the sentences would be served consecutively. Bates now appeals
    his sentences.
    II.    Standard of Review
    Our review of a district court’s sentencing decision is for the correction of
    errors at law. State v. Hennings, 
    791 N.W.2d 828
    , 833 (Iowa 2010). “We will not
    reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some
    defect in the sentencing procedure.” 
    Id. There is
    an abuse of discretion when
    the court’s decision was exercised on grounds or for reasons that were clearly
    untenable or unreasonable. State v. Bentley, 
    757 N.W.2d 257
    , 262 (Iowa 2008).
    III.   Merits
    A.     Bates first claims the district court abused its discretion in making
    his sentences consecutive, rather than concurrent. He asserts Counts III and IV
    arose out of the same factual incident, where he wielded a firearm in the course
    of effectuating a theft. He also claims Count V should run concurrently to the
    other sentences because he had a mistaken belief he could “settle” his criminal
    case with the complaining witnesses, similar to a civil action.
    The district court gave its reasons for consecutive sentences as follows:
    4
    The Court first determines that sentences of incarceration
    are appropriate on all three counts based on the factors that have
    been indicated already here by the Court in regards to the nature
    and extent of the defendant’s criminal history and the offenses
    themselves. The Court further determines that the sentences—or
    excuse me, the offenses that are set forth in Counts 3, 4, and 5
    constitute separate and distinct offenses, and that given the
    defendant’s extensive criminal history, criminal conviction history
    and taking into account the fact that these offenses took place little
    more than two months after the defendant’s last period of
    incarceration and the fact that a number of the offenses involve
    either crimes of violence or involved firearms, and taking that into
    account in connection with the existing offenses that are the subject
    of sentencing today, the Court determined that it is appropriate to
    impose consecutive sentences on Counts 3, 4, and 5.
    We conclude the district court gave adequate and proper reasons for
    imposing consecutive sentences.       The record shows Bates had a lengthy
    criminal history, repeatedly used firearms, committed the offenses of being a
    felon in possession of a firearm and first-degree theft soon after being released
    from incarceration, and committed the offense of tampering with a witness while
    on trial for the other offenses involved in this case. We determine the court did
    not abuse its discretion.
    B.     Bates contends the district court improperly taxed him with the
    costs of the charges that were dismissed. In the same order dismissing Counts I
    and II, the court states, “Defendant is ordered to pay all applicable court costs,
    surcharges, and fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court.” “[W]here the plea
    agreement is silent regarding the payment of fees and costs, that only such fees
    and costs attributable to the charge on which a criminal defendant is convicted
    should be recoverable under a restitution plan.” State v. Petrie, 
    478 N.W.2d 620
    ,
    622 (1991) (citing Iowa Code §§ 815.13, 910.2).
    5
    The State agrees a correction of the sentencing order in this case is
    required. We reverse the portion of the sentencing order requiring Bates to pay
    costs associated with Counts I and II, which were dismissed. We remand to the
    district court for a correction of the sentencing order.
    AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-0007

Filed Date: 1/14/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/14/2015