Carolyn Marcine Jenson v. Cummins Filtration-Lake Mills A/K/A Cummins, Inc., F/K/A Fleetguard, Inc. ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1733
Filed January 14, 2015
CAROLYN MARCINE JENSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
CUMMINS FILTRATION-LAKE MILLS
a/k/a CUMMINS, INC., f/k/a FLEETGUARD, INC.,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert B. Hanson,
Judge.
An employee appeals the district court’s decision affirming the Iowa
Workers’ Compensation Commissioner’s award of benefits. AFFIRMED.
Mark S. Soldat of Soldat, Parrish-Sams & Gustafson, P.L.C., West Des
Moines, for appellant.
Richard G. Book of Huber, Book, Cortese & Lanz, P.L.L.C., West Des
Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Bower, JJ.
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DANILSON, C.J.
Carolyn Jenson appeals the district court’s ruling affirming the Iowa
Workers’ Compensation Commissioner’s award of benefits and penalties for a
back injury and denying her claim for a right knee injury. Jenson maintains the
district court erred by affirming the commissioners’ denial of her knee injury
claim. Jenson also maintains the district court erred by entering a judgment not
in conformance with the commissioner’s award regarding her back injury claim.
Because we agree with the district court’s review of the commissioner’s denial of
Jenson’s knee claim and find no error with the judgment entered by the district
court, we affirm.
I. Discussion.
Iowa Code chapter 17A governs judicial review of the decisions of the
workers’ compensation commissioner. Iowa Code § 86.26 (2013); Mycogen
Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 463 (Iowa 2004). In reviewing a district court’s
decision on appeal, we apply the standards of chapter 17A to determine whether
the conclusions we reach are the same as those of the district court. Mycogen
Seeds, 686 N.W.2d at 464. Our standard of review depends on the aspect of the
agency’s decision that forms the basis of the petition for judicial review. Iowa
Code § 17A.19(10).
“Medical causation presents a question of fact that is vested in the
discretion of the workers’ compensation commission.” Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch.
Dist. v. Pease, 807 N.W.2d 839, 844 (Iowa 2011). Therefore, the
commissioner’s finding regarding medical causation may only be reversed if it is
not supported by substantial evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f).
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“Substantial evidence” is statutorily defined as, “the quantity and quality of
evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable
person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the
establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.”
Id. § 17A.19(10)(f)(1). When reviewing a finding of fact for substantial evidence,
we judge the finding “in light of all the relevant evidence in the record cited by
any party that detracts from that finding as well as all of the relevant evidence in
the record cited by any party that supports it.” Id. § 17A.19(10)(f)(3). “Our review
of the record is ‘fairly intensive,’ and we do not simply rubber stamp the agency
finding of fact.” Pease, 807 N.W.2d at 845 (quoting Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Caselman, 657 N.W.2d 493, 499 (Iowa 2003)). Thus, we review Jenson’s
allegations of error to determine if the factual findings of the workers’
compensation commissioner regarding causation are supported by substantial
evidence. See id.
Jenson also alleges the commissioner erred in application of the law to the
facts with his determination that Jenson’s injury did not arise out of and in the
course of employment. On this assertion of error, “we will disturb the
commissioner’s decision if it is ‘[b]ased upon an irrational, illogical, or wholly
unjustifiable application of law to fact.’” Jacobson Transp. Co. v. Harris, 778
N.W.2d 192, 196 (Iowa 2010) (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m))
In reviewing district court decisions regarding the validity of agency
actions, we only look to whether the district court has correctly applied the law.”
Miedema v. Dial Corp., 551 N.W.2d 309, 310 (Iowa 1996). A final agency
decision “should be affirmed by the district court and our appellate courts when
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there is no error of law and the decision is supported by substantial evidence in
the record as a whole.” Heatherly v. Iowa Dep’t of Job Serv., 397 N.W.2d 670,
670 (Iowa 1986). “Substantial evidence is that which reasonable minds would
consider sufficient to support the conclusions drawn.” Second Injury Fund of
Iowa v. Klebs, 539 N.W.2d 178, 180 (Iowa 1995).
A. Denial of Claim.
1. Causation. Jenson maintains the district court erred by affirming the
commissioner’s denial of her knee injury claim. The deputy concluded Jenson
failed to meet her burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she
suffered a knee injury that arose out of and in course of her employment. The
deputy concluded the cause of Jensen’s knee pain was due “to degenerative
disease exacerbated by poorly controlled diabetes” and Jensen’s weight. The
commissioner concluded “[t]he deputy’s decision was based largely on the
deputy’s assessment that claimant’s testimony was not credible or convincing as
to this issue. That credibility assessment and finding of the deputy is affirmed
without additional comment.”
The district court affirmed, noting the deputy
found that Jensen’s testimony regarding her knee injury was not
credible, and although Dr. Kuhnlein attributed Jensen’s knee injury
to her work, the information on which Dr. Kuhnlein relied for this
conclusion was not correct. The deputy noted that the specific
twisting motion alleged to have caused the knee injury was not
mentioned before the IME with Dr. Kuhnlein, and was inconsistent
with the description of Jensen’ work area and work duties.
This case does not present a classic “battle of the experts” where the
commissioner chose between conflicting expert opinions. Cf. Pease, 807
N.W.2d at 850. Here, the commissioner relied upon the credibility findings of the
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deputy. The deputy did not disagree with the medical evidence that Jenson
suffered pain in her right knee and has a “possible medial meniscal tear.” The
question was whether it arose out of in the course of her employment.
2. Arising out of and in the course of employment. Whether or not an
injury arose out of and in the course of employment is a mixed question of law
and fact; thus, we review the agency determination for abuse of discretion. Iowa
Code § 17A.19(10)(m); Meyer v. I.B.P., Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 219 (Iowa 2006).
While application of the law to the facts is vested by law in the discretion of the
agency, if the agency exercises its discretion based on an erroneous
interpretation of the law, we are not bound by those conclusions. Stroup v.
Reno, 530 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Iowa 1995). If the claim of error lies with the
agency’s interpretation of the law, we may substitute our interpretation for the
agency’s. Clark v. Vicorp Restaurants, Inc., 696 N.W.2d 596, 604 (Iowa 2005).
“[W]e will disturb the commissioner’s decision if it is ‘[b]ased upon an irrational,
illogical, or wholly unjustifiable application of law to fact.’” Jacobson Transp. Co.,
778 N.W.2d at 196 (quoting Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(m)).
Our supreme court has explained compensability for injuries “in the course
of” and “arising out of” employment:
The element of “in the course of” refers to the time, place, and
circumstances of the injury. To satisfy this requirement, the injury
must take place within the period of the employment, at a place
where the employee reasonably may be, and while the employee is
fulfilling work duties or engaged in doing something incidental
thereto.
Lakeside Casino v. Blue, 743 N.W.2d 169, 174 (Iowa 2007) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted). The element of “arising out of” requires proof that
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a causal connection exists between the conditions of [the] employment and the
injury. Id. In other words, the injury must not have coincidentally occurred while
at work, but must in some way be caused by or related to the working
environment or the conditions of the employment. Id. Under the actual-risk
doctrine, an injury is compensable as long as the employment subjected the
claimant to the actual risk that caused the injury. Id. at 176 (citing 1 Arthur
Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s Workers’ Compensation Law § 3.04, at 3–5
(2007)).
Because the commissioner relied upon the deputy’s credibility findings
and assessment without further comment, we consider the commissioner to have
adopted the deputy’s reasoning. The deputy noted that Dr. Kuhnlein
“commented on claimant’s confusing and inability to provide a coherent medical
narrative.” Clearly, Jenson was unable to identify how or when her knee pain
began. At one point she thought she might have slipped on a deck. When asked
if that was at home, Jenson stated, “If that is what happened, we have a deck.”
The deputy also explained why Dr. Kuhnlein’s report was “problematic.”
The deputy stated that Dr. Kuhnlein’s explanation for concluding Jenson’s work
was a substantial factor for the knee injury was inconsistent with the motion
described by Jenson during job tasks. Dr. Kuhnlein asserted she planted her
right leg and twists in assembling parts. However, Jenson’s testimony suggested
very little leg force is needed and almost all of her work was between the
shoulder and the waist. The deputy concluded the Jenson’s pain in her right
knee was more than likely the result of a “degenerative disease exacerbated by
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poorly controlled diabetes and” her weight, which Dr. Kuhnlein acknowledged
were contributing factors.
Here, the commissioner, by adopting the reasoning and credibility findings
of the deputy, has sufficiently specified why the Dr. Kuhnlein’s testimony of
causation was rejected. We conclude the commissioner did not abuse his
discretion, the decision is not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable, and is
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. We agree with the
district court’s affirmance on this issue.
B. Application of Penalty.
Jenson maintains the district court erred by misconstruing the
commissioner’s award when it converted the award into a judgment. Specifically,
Jenson maintains the district court misapplied the fifty-percent penalty awarded
by the commissioner when the court applied the penalty to only the unpaid
portion of the award rather than the total award. In other words, Jenson
maintains that the penalty should be applied to the gross amount of the weekly
benefits due for the period from December 8, 2009, through the date of the
arbitration hearing, January 7, 2011, which totaled $29,225.28.
In the decision, the commissioner ordered:
Defendant shall pay to claimant a running award of
temporary total/healing benefits from December 8, 2009 at the rate
of five hundred twenty-one and 88/100 dollars ($521.88) per week
until such time as such benefits shall cease pursuant to Iowa Code
section 85.33 or 85.34.
Defendant shall pay accrued weekly benefits with interest at
the statutory rate in a lump sum.
The credit and interest calculations of claimant . . . shows
the unpaid amount totaling nineteen thousand five hundred eighty-
two and 69/100 dollars ($19,852.69) as of the date of hearing.
These calculations are adopted.
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Defendant shall pay in addition to the weekly benefits
previously ordered an additional fifty (50) percent of weekly benefits
from December 8, 2009 through the arbitration hearing in this
matter [January 7, 2011].
In converting the commissioner’s decision to a judgment, the district court applied
the fifty-percent penalty to only the amount still owed to Jensen at the time of the
arbitration hearing, $19,852.69. This is the amount still owed to Jensen after
subtracting the amounts that were paid in short-term and long-term disability
benefits.
We find no error with the judgment entered by the district court. Iowa
Code section 86.13(4)(a) provides that “the workers’ compensation commission
shall award benefits in addition to those benefits payable under this chapter . . .
up to fifty percent of the amount of benefits that were denied, delayed or
terminated.” (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, “[t]he purpose or goal of the statute is both punishment and
deterrence.” Robbennolt v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 555 N.W.2d 229, 237 (Iowa
1996). Under Jenson’s argument, Cummins Filtration would be penalized the
same amount of money whether Jenson was denied benefits completely or
received only one dollar less than which she was entitled. We believe such an
application may defeat the statute’s purpose rather than advance the desired
result. See Faeth v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 707 N.W.2d 328, 333 (Iowa
2005) ([W]e consider the objects sought to be accomplished and the evils and
mischief sought to be remedied and seek a result that will advance rather than
defeat the statute’s purpose.”).
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In sum, we find the district court did not err in determining that Cummins
Filtration should only pay a penalty for the payments it was required to make less
credits for the disability payments paid. Cummins Filtration should only pay a
penalty pursuant to section 86.13 for the delayed payments it was required to
make. Thus, Cummins Filtration should only pay a penalty on that difference and
should not be required to pay a penalty for amounts paid from another source
pursuant to section 85.38(2).1 We affirm the district court on this issue.
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Iowa Code section 85.38(2) provides:
a. In the event the employee with a disability shall receive any
benefits, including medical, surgical, or hospital benefits, under any group
plan covering nonoccupational disabilities contributed to wholly or partially
by the employer, which benefits should not have been paid or payable if
any rights of recovery existed under this chapter, chapter 85A, or chapter
85B, then the amounts so paid to the employee from the group plan shall
be credited to or against any compensation payments, including medical,
surgical, or hospital, made or to be made under this chapter, chapter 85A,
or chapter 85B. The amounts so credited shall be deducted from the
payments made under these chapters. Any nonoccupational plan shall
be reimbursed in the amount deducted. This section shall not apply to
payments made under any group plan which would have been payable
even though there was an injury under this chapter or an occupational
disease under chapter 85A or an occupational hearing loss under chapter
85B. Any employer receiving such credit shall keep the employee safe
and harmless from any and all claims or liabilities that may be made
against them by reason of having received the payments only to the
extent of the credit.
b. If an employer denies liability under this chapter, chapter 85A,
or chapter 85B, for payment for any medical services received or weekly
compensation requested by an employee, and the employee is a
beneficiary under either an individual or group plan for nonoccupational
illness, injury, or disability, the nonoccupational plan shall not deny
payment for the medical services received or for benefits under the plan
on the basis that the employer’s liability under this chapter, chapter 85A,
or chapter 85B is unresolved.
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II. Conclusion.
Because we agree with the district court’s affirmance of the
commissioner’s denial of Jenson’s knee injury claim and find no error with the
judgment entered by the district court, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.