Anthony D. Bales and Wendy Bales v. Gary L. Shepard and Patricia K. Shepard ( 2015 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 14-0960
Filed May 6, 2015
ANTHONY D. BALES and WENDY BALES,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
GARY L. SHEPARD and PATRICIA K. SHEPARD,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Mills County, J.C. Irvin, Judge.
The plaintiffs appeal the district court’s dismissal of their petition to
establish a prescriptive easement. AFFIRMED.
Matthew G. Woods of Woods & Wyatt, P.L.L.C., Glenwood, for appellants.
Rick D. Crowl of Stuart Tinley Law Firm, L.L.P., Council Bluffs, for
appellees.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
We must decide whether the elements of a prescriptive easement were
satisfied.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Anthony and Wendy Bales and Gary and Patricia Shepard owned
adjacent homes in Glenwood, Iowa. A gravel path running between the homes
connected the properties to the street. The path was bisected by a strip of grass,
which the Bales believed to be the property line. Gary Shepard characterized the
path as “two separate driveways,” one on his property and one on the Baleses’
property. Wendy Bales, in contrast, characterized the path as a shared
driveway.
In time, the Shepards commissioned two surveys with a view to improving
their property. The surveys placed the grassy strip on the Shepards’ side of the
property line.
The Shepards poured concrete on their portion of the gravel path. They
also built a fence four inches inside their property line, which encompassed most
of the grassy strip. The fence impeded the ability of the Baleses to park on the
gravel path.
The Baleses filed a petition to quiet title, alleging they possessed an
easement by acquiescence. At trial, they dismissed this theory and proceeded
on a theory of an easement by prescription. Following trial, the district court
concluded the Baleses failed to satisfy the elements of a prescriptive easement.
The court also dismissed counterclaims filed by the Shepards and later denied
the Baleses’ motion to reconsider. The Baleses appealed.
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II. Easement By Prescription
A prescriptive easement is created “when a person uses another’s land
under a claim of right or color of title, openly, notoriously, continuously, and
hostilely for ten years or more.” Brede v. Koop, 706 N.W.2d 824, 828 (Iowa
2005). “The facts relied upon to establish a prescriptive easement ‘must be
strictly proved. They cannot be presumed.’” Id. (quoting Simonsen v. Todd, 154
N.W.2d 730, 736 (Iowa 1967)).
On our de novo review, we agree the Baleses failed to satisfy the
elements of a prescriptive easement. Although they used the grassy strip for
years, Wendy Bales acknowledged their usage was pursuant to “a mutual
understanding between neighbors” rather than a claim of right. At no time did the
Baleses demarcate a boundary or suggest their title extended onto or beyond the
grassy strip. They simply assumed the strip was the boundary line while at the
same time conceding the dimensions of the strip changed over time. According
to Gary Shepard, when he showed Anthony Bales one of the surveys he
commissioned, Bales “didn’t realize where [the property line] was located.”
Based on this evidence, we conclude the Baleses’ usage of any portion of the
gravel path titled in the Shepards’ name was purely permissive. See id. (noting a
claim of right must be shown by evidence independent of the use).
Our conclusion is not altered by the fact the Baleses mowed the grassy
strip and helped pay for gravel on the path. Their maintenance activities, while
neighborly, were insufficient to put the Shepards on notice of their easement
claim. See id. at 829 (stating Koops’s addition of gravel failed to establish
prescriptive easement).
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Nor did these maintenance activities create a prescriptive easement under
a relaxed standard applicable “in those situations in which the party claiming the
easement has expended substantial amounts of labor or money in reliance upon
the servient owner’s consent or his oral agreement to the use.” Id. at 828 (citing
Simonsen, 154 N.W.2d at 733). Wendy Bales testified to paying for part of a
gravel load and for snow plowing, but little else. There is scant if any evidence
the Baleses “expended substantial amounts of labor or money” in reliance on
their claimed mutual understanding of a right to use the Shepards’ portion of the
gravel path.
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Baleses’ petition. Costs are
taxed to the Baleses.
AFFIRMED.