William A. Intriligator and Lisa H. Intriligator v. David R. Rafoth and Janie M. Rafoth ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0743
Filed February 8, 2017
WILLIAM A. INTRILIGATOR and LISA H. INTRILIGATOR,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
DAVID R. RAFOTH and JANIE M. RAFOTH,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Michael J.
Shubatt, Judge.
William and Lisa Intriligator appeal after the district court entered judgment
in favor of David and Janie Rafoth on claims the Rafoths made material
misrepresentations regarding the roof of a home they sold to the Intriligators.
AFFIRMED.
Rebecca A. Feiereisen of Arenson Law Group, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for
appellants.
Robert L. Sudmeier of Fuerste, Carew, Juergens & Sudmeier, P.C.,
Dubuque, for appellees.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Doyle and McDonald, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.
This appeal concerns the 2012 sale of a home from David and Janie
Rafoth to William and Lisa Intriligator. After the parties engaged in two
unsuccessful attempts to negotiate the sale, the third time was the charm; the
sale closed in August 2012. The Intriligators became less charmed by the home
itself, however, after its metal roof leaked in 2013 and again in 2014. Attempts to
repair the leaks led to the roof’s replacement and then to a second replacement
when problems persisted.
At the district court level, the Intriligators were self-represented litigants.
They filed a petition to recover the damages they incurred from the leaky roof.
They alleged the Rafoths violated the statutory disclosure requirements for real
estate sales, fraudulently misrepresented the roof’s condition, and breached the
purchase contract by failing to disclose defects in the roof. The crux of their
claims required proof the Rafoths failed to disclose information regarding the
roof’s condition that they knew or reasonably should have known. After a bench
trial, the district court found the Intriligators failed to prove this element of their
claims and entered judgment in favor of the Rafoths.
The Intriligators appealed. They claim the trial court erred in making
evidentiary rulings and in finding they failed to prove their claims of the alleged
statutory violation and breach of contract.
I. Expert Witness.
The Intriligators first challenge the trial court’s ruling excluding their expert
witnesses. We review the trial court’s decision on whether to allow expert
witness testimony for an abuse of discretion. See Donovan v. State, 445 N.W.2d
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763, 766 (Iowa 1989). We will not disturb the court’s ruling unless it was
exercised on a clearly untenable ground or to an extent clearly unreasonable.
See id.
The trial was originally set to begin in September 2015. For reasons not
revealed in the record, a notice of civil trial setting conference was entered on the
day the trial was to begin. About a week later, the trial was rescheduled for
January 2016. The order rescheduling the trial did not reset discovery deadlines
but indicated the deadlines “may be amended, without further leave of court, by
filing a Stipulated Amendment to Scheduling Order.”
In October 2015, the Intriligators, who had failed to designate any expert
witness by the May 2015 deadline provided in the original scheduling order,
moved to extend the expert designation deadline to November 22, 2015. The
district court “conditionally” denied the motion. In spite of this ruling, on
December 16, 2015, the Intriligators moved to designate two expert witnesses.
The district court denied the motion on January 7, 2016, stating:
The trial date was scheduled in mid-September, and trial is now
less than two weeks away. . . . Allowing another expert with result
in the [Rafoths]’ need to depose that expert and perhaps secure a
new expert of their own. And it may result in a continuance. The
[Intriligators]’ request to extend deadlines was denied on 10-14-15.
After considering the motion and the resistance, the motion is
denied.
The court also denied two motions seeking reconsideration of its ruling.
The district court properly exercised its discretion in excluding the expert
witnesses. The Intriligators missed the May 2015 deadline to designate their
expert witnesses. Their motion to extend the deadline, filed almost four months
after the deadline had passed, was denied. The Intriligators then moved to
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designate expert witnesses in December 2015—nearly a month after the date on
which they sought to move the deadline to designate their expert witnesses and
just one month before trial was scheduled to begin. The court’s concerns about
the untimely designation causing additional delays were not untenable or
unreasonable. Accordingly, we affirm.
II. Admissibility of Evidence.
The Intriligators next challenge an evidentiary ruling excluding certain
evidence from trial. We review any error in the admission of evidence for an
abuse of discretion. See Scott v. Dutton-Lainson Co., 774 N.W.2d 501, 503
(Iowa 2009). Reversal is only warranted if exclusion of evidence affected a
party’s substantial rights. See id.
During David Rafoth’s cross-examination, the Intriligators attempted to
offer evidence concerning the International Residential Building Code. The
Rafoths’ counsel objected based on a lack of foundation, arguing:
[The international code has] not been demonstrated to in any way
be in force as to this property. It’s now being used and about to be
read from without any foundation that it represents any sort of
industry standard apart from governmental organization enactment
of some controlling code, so it shouldn’t be—the witness should not
be examined from it by a reading of it or the document otherwise
used in the examination.
The district court sustained the objection. The Intriligators claim the trial court
erred in determining evidence relating to the international code was inadmissible.
Although the Intriligators claim on appeal that “it is clear that the
international residential code is, in fact, controlling,” they failed to lay any
foundational basis for this conclusion at trial. After the district court found there
had “been no showing that it has any controlling effect,” the court allowed the
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Intriligators to make an offer of proof to lay the foundation for its admissibility.
That foundation was never established.1 Therefore, the trial court was within its
discretion to deny the evidence.
III. Substantial Evidence.
Finally, the Intriligators contend the trial court erred in finding they failed to
prove their claims against the Rafoths. We review the trial court’s decision for
correction of errors at law. See Brokaw v. Winfield-Mt. Union Cmty Sch. Dist.,
788 N.W.2d 386, 388 (Iowa 2010). In doing so, we review the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s judgment. See id. The trial court’s fact
findings have the force of a special verdict and are binding if supported by
substantial evidence. See id. This is also true concerning witness credibility.
See id. at 394.
The Intriligators claim the Rafoths are liable for their damages because
the Rafoths violated the provisions of Iowa Code chapter 558A (2015). This
chapter requires sellers of real estate to provide a disclosure statement that
makes good faith disclosures regarding the condition of the property. See Iowa
Code § 558A.2-.4. If the seller of real estate violates the provisions of chapter
1
The Intriligators claim, without citation, that the court should have given them “a
measure of procedural slack given their pro se status.” This statement is contrary to
clearly established precedent:
We do not utilize a deferential standard when persons choose to
represent themselves. The law does not judge by two standards, one for
lawyers and another for lay persons. Rather, all are expected to act with
equal competence. If lay persons choose to proceed pro se, they do so
at their own risk.
Kubik v. Burk, 540 N.W.2d 60, 63 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995) (internal citations omitted). See
also Conkey v. Hoak Motors, Inc., 637 N.W.2d 170, 173 (Iowa 2001) (“As a pro se
plaintiff, Conkey undertook responsibility for litigating his own cause. No part of that
obligation devolved upon the court.”); In re Estate of DeTar, 572 N.W.2d 178, 181 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1997) (“Substantial departures from appellate procedures cannot be permitted
on the basis that a non-lawyer is handling her own appeal.”).
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558A, the seller is liable to the purchaser for the amount of the purchaser’s actual
damages if the seller had actual knowledge of the inaccuracy in the disclosure
statement or failed to exercise ordinary care in obtaining the information. See id.
§ 558A.6.
The trial court concluded the Intriligators failed to meet their burden of
proving the Rafoths violated the provisions of chapter 558A because there was
insufficient proof that the issues with the roof existed prior to the home’s sale. To
the extent there was evidence the defect existed before the home’s sale, the
court concluded it was insufficient to put the Rafoths on notice of the defect,
which would trigger the disclosure requirement. Finally, the court also
determined the Intriligators failed to prove the Rafoths’ omission of the roof’s age
on the disclosure statement was a material misrepresentation, noting the
Intriligators made their final offer on the home a month after receiving the
disclosure statement. The trial court found credible the Rafoths’ testimony
regarding their lack of knowledge of any problems regarding the roof while they
lived in the house and noted the evidence established that the Rafoths were
“particular about the way they kept their home,” leading the court to conclude that
if there had been “any problem similar to those complained of by [the
Intriligators], it is not plausible that [the Rafoths] would have abided them rather
than having them remedied immediately,” especially because David Rafoth “was
in the sheet metal business and had connections in the roofing and construction
industries.”
Substantial evidence supports the district court’s findings. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the court’s judgment, the Intriligators failed
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to prove the Rafoths violated chapter 558A. Accordingly, we need not entertain
the Intriligators’ argument regarding the breach-of-contract claim, which
necessarily depends on the success of their chapter 558A claim. We affirm the
judgment entered in favor of the Rafoths on both claims.
AFFIRMED.