Chavez Martez-Nash, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0017
Filed February 8, 2017
CHAVEZ MARTEZ-NASH,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Eliza J. Ovrom,
Judge.
Chavez Martez-Nash appeals from the denial of his postconviction-relief
application. AFFIRMED.
Blake D. Lubinus of Lubinus Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Des Moines, for
appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Mullins and Bower, JJ.
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MULLINS, Judge.
Chavez Martez-Nash appeals from the denial of his postconviction-relief
(PCR) application. On appeal, Martez-Nash argues the district court erred in
(1) finding his trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance and
(2) determining his sentence was not unconstitutional. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In 2012, the State charged Martez-Nash with murder in the first degree
and criminal gang participation. He was seventeen years old at the time of the
crime. Martez-Nash entered a plea agreement whereby he waived his right to
speedy trial and pled guilty to four lesser charges: (1) willful injury causing
serious injury, a class “C” felony; (2) intimidation with a dangerous weapon, a
class “C” felony; (3) reckless use of a firearm, a class “C” felony; and (4) criminal
gang participation, a class “D” felony. Prior to entering the guilty plea, Martez-
Nash discussed the plea agreement with his trial counsel. Counsel told Martez-
Nash when he may become eligible for release—estimating that he may be in
prison for two years and nine months—but did not make any guarantees as to a
particular date when his sentence would be discharged.
The district court accepted Martez-Nash’s guilty plea. Martez-Nash
requested immediate sentencing, and the district court sentenced him to the
maximum term for each count to run consecutively, totaling thirty-five years.
There was no mandatory minimum period of incarceration before Martez-Nash
would be eligible for parole.
Martez-Nash did not appeal his plea or sentence but instead filed this
PCR application after he learned it was unlikely he would be released from prison
3
after two years and nine months. He claimed he accepted the guilty plea based
on his attorney’s representations as to when he would be released from prison.
Martez-Nash also claimed his sentence was unconstitutional.
The district court denied all of Martez-Nash’s PCR claims. Martez-Nash
timely appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
The denial of a PCR application is generally reviewed for correction of
errors at law. See Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011). However,
PCR applications that raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim are
reviewed de novo. See id. Claims of illegal sentences are ordinarily reviewed for
the correction of errors at law, but “[w]hen, as here, the [applicant] mounts a
constitutional challenge to an allegedly illegal sentence, the standard of review is
de novo.” State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Iowa 2013).
III. Analysis
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Martez-Nash first claims his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
allegedly misinforming him about when his sentence would be discharged and in
failing to challenge the constitutionality of his sentence. To prove his ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim, Martez-Nash is required to prove by a
preponderance of evidence that “(1) his trial counsel failed to perform an
essential duty, and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice.” See State v. Shaw, 709
N.W.2d 128, 133 (Iowa 2006); accord Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688,
687 (1984). Failure to prove either element is fatal to the appellant’s claim. See
King v. State, 797 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Iowa 2011) (“The applicant must prove both
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elements by a preponderance of the evidence.”); State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d
860, 869 (Iowa 2003) (“A defendant’s inability to prove either element is fatal.”).
Thus, “[w]e can resolve ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under either
prong” without having to resolve the other. State v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550,
556 (Iowa 2015); see also Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 868 (Iowa 2015)
(“If we conclude a claimant has failed to establish either of these elements, we
need not address the remaining element.”).
To meet his burden under the prejudice prong, Martez-Nash is required to
show, “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 694. Martez-Nash’s claim involves a guilty plea, and thus, he is required
to show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [Martez-Nash]
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Straw,
709 N.W.2d at 138. Martez-Nash concedes he does not want to disturb the
guilty plea and proceed to trial, “[h]e merely wants the benefit of the bargain he
made with the State.” Martez-Nash has failed to show there is a reasonable
probability he would have proceeded to trial had his trial attorney not allegedly
misinformed him about the length of his sentence. See id.Additionally, the remedy Martez-Nash seeks here is unavailable to him.
Martez-Nash seeks to vacate his sentence “so that his discharge can be reset to
two years and nine months from the date of his sentencing,” or, in the alternative,
have this matter remanded so that he can receive a full hearing regarding
mitigating circumstances, such as his age. “[S]entences imposed without
statutory authorization are illegal and void.” State v. Louisell, 865 N.W.2d 590,
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597 (Iowa 2015). “[L]egislative determinations of punishment are entitled to great
deference.” State v. Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d 862, 872–73 (Iowa 2009). “[T]he
sentencing process is not the sole province of the judiciary. The legislature
possesses the inherent power to prescribe punishment for crime and the
sentencing authority of the courts is subject to that power.” State v. Iowa Dist.
Ct., 308 N.W.2d 27, 30 (Iowa 1981). The sentencing court cannot invade the
province of the legislature and executive branches. See State v. Remmers, 259
N.W.2d 779, 785 (Iowa 1977). A criminal sentence is null if the “sentencing court
departs—upward or downward—from the legislatively authorized sentence for a
given offense.” State v. Draper, 457 N.W.2d 600, 605 (Iowa 1990); see also
State v. Ohnmacht, 342 N.W.2d 838, 842 (Iowa 1983). The sentencing court is
authorized to set the maximum length the prisoner will serve, within the bounds
of the law, but it is the province of the parole board to determine the minimum
term of the defendant’s incarceration. See Iowa Code §§ 902.3, .9, 906.3 (2016);
see also Remmers, 259 N.W.2d at 783–85 (“In sentencing defendant . . . the trial
court was limited to selecting the maximum term of incarceration. . . . The
ultimate determination of the length of sentence this defendant will actually serve
within the maximum rests with the parole board.”). The court cannot order
Martez-Nash be sentenced to the determinate term as he requests nor can it
order a specific time for parole. See Remmers, 259 N.W.2d at 785.
Thus, on our de novo review, we determine Martez-Nash has failed to
prove his trial attorney’s conduct prejudiced him. We need not decide whether
Martez-Nash’s trial counsel’s conduct breached an essential duty. We affirm the
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district court’s dismissal of Martez-Nash’s claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel.
B. Illegal Sentence
Next, Martez-Nash claims his sentence was unconstitutional under both
the federal and state constitutions, citing State v. Lyle, 854 N.W.2d 378 (Iowa
2014), and subsequent cases.
In Lyle, the Iowa Supreme Court held “all mandatory minimum sentences
of imprisonment for youthful offenders are unconstitutional under the cruel and
unusual punishment clause in article I, section 17 of [the Iowa] constitution.” 854
N.W.2d at 400. But, the Lyle court made clear:
[T]he specific constitutional challenge raised on appeal and
addressed in this opinion concerns the statutory imposition of a
minimum period of incarceration without parole equal to seventy
percent of the mandatory sentence. The holding in this case does
not address the mandatory sentence of incarceration imposed
under the statutory sentencing schema or any other issues relating
to the sentencing schema.
Id. at 404 n.10. Additionally, the supreme court stated its holding “does not
prohibit judges from sentencing juveniles to prison for the length of time identified
by the legislature for the crime committed, nor does it prohibit the legislature from
imposing a minimum time that youthful offenders must serve in prison before
being eligible for parole.” Id. at 403.
Two of the charges to which Martez-Nash pled guilty—willful injury
causing serious injury, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4, and intimidation
with a dangerous weapon, in violation of section 708.6—are forcible felonies
under section 702.11(1) and are therefore ineligible for probation. See Iowa
Code § 907.3 (“Pursuant to section 901.5, the trial court may, upon a plea of
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guilty, a verdict of guilty, or a special verdict upon which a judgment of conviction
may be rendered, exercise any of the options contained in this section. However
this section does not apply to a forcible felony . . . .”). Martez-Nash argues his
ineligibility for probation creates a mandatory period of incarceration and thus his
sentence is unconstitutional under Lyle’s holding. Additionally, Martez-Nash
argues the district court erred in failing to give him an individualized hearing to
make specific findings with regard to his age. See Lyle, 854 N.W.2d at 403
(requiring that district courts, when the sentence contains a mandatory minimum,
“carefully consider all of the circumstances of each case to craft an appropriate
sentence and give each juvenile the individual sentencing attention they deserve
and the constitution demands”)
Martez-Nash’s sentences did not have mandatory minimums. “Our
appellate courts have declined to extend the individualized sentencing
requirement for juveniles to sentences without mandatory minimum terms.” State
v. Hudson, No. 14-1974, 2016 WL 530801, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2016).
A juvenile offender is not entitled to parole and “[t]he State is not required to
make such a guarantee.” State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 811, 839 (Iowa 2016).
Though two of the charges to which he pled guilty are ineligible for probation,
Martez-Nash’s sentences did not contain mandatory minimums; therefore, Lyle is
inapplicable and Martez-Nash’s sentences are not unconstitutional under that
holding. See State v. Means, No. 14-1367, 2015 WL 6509741, at *9–10 (Iowa
Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2015) (declining to extend the holdings of recent juvenile
sentencing decisions to cases in which juvenile offenders do not face any
mandatory minimum terms of incarceration); State v. Marshall-Limoges, No. 14-
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1610, 2015 WL 4936265, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2015) (rejecting
defendant’s request to extend the requirement to consider Miller factors to the
imposition of any prison sentence on a juvenile defendant). Nor was Martez-
Nash entitled to an individualized hearing on his age. See Means, 2015 WL
6509741, at *9; Marshall-Limoges, 2015 WL 4936265, at *1.1 Therefore, on de
novo review, we affirm the district court’s denial of Martez-Nash’s claim that his
sentence is illegal.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s denial of Martez-Nash’s PCR application.
AFFIRMED.
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The sentencing court recited the serious nature of the charges, the facts of the case,
and the plea agreement as reasons for the sentence. See State v. Thacker, 862 N.W.2d
402, 408 (Iowa 2015) (holding, when the reasons for the sentence “are obvious in light of
the [district court’s] statement and the record before the court,” a “terse and succinct”
statement as to the court’s reasons for the sentence is sufficient).