Brian Sydnes v. Iowa Department of Human Services ( 2016 )


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  •                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 15-1862
    Filed November 9, 2016
    BRIAN SYDNES,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    vs.
    IOWA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Karen A. Romano,
    Judge.
    A father appeals a founded assessment of child abuse by mental injury by
    the Department of Human Services and his placement on the central registry.
    AFFIRMED.
    Tammy M. Westhoff Gentry of Parrish, Kruidenier, Dunn, Boles, Gribble
    Gentry, Brown & Bergmann, Des Moines, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and David Van Compernolle and
    Teresa M. Baustian, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
    Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
    2
    TABOR, Judge.
    Brian Sydnes appeals the district court’s ruling on judicial review
    upholding the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) founded assessment
    of child abuse by mental injury involving his daughter, J.S., and his placement on
    the central registry. He raises three claims: (1) the DHS violated his right to due
    process, (2) the DHS ruling is not supported by substantial evidence, and (3) the
    DHS gave “undue credence” to the prior child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA)
    adjudication.
    Like the district court, we reject all three challenges to the DHS actions.
    First, although the DHS did not provide Brian with statutory notice in a timely
    manner, this failure did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation because
    Brian received actual notice he was the target of the DHS investigation in time to
    provide a meaningful response. Second, substantial evidence supports the DHS
    ruling. Third, because our legislature has determined a CINA adjudication “may
    be determinative” in a contested case proceeding, the DHS gave the adjudication
    proper deference and weight.
    I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
    The child at issue in this case is J.S., the teenage daughter of Brian and
    O.S. J.S. and her two younger siblings experienced emotional distress related to
    the contentious divorce of their parents. The most serious manifestation of that
    distress occurred in July 2013, when J.S. attempted suicide by taking an
    overdose of ibuprofen. She was admitted to the adolescent psychiatric unit at
    the University of Iowa Hospitals.      Her treating physician, Dr. Eric Boyum,
    contacted the DHS and alleged a mental injury to J.S. caused by both parents.
    3
    After an investigation by child protection worker (CPW) Theresa Hirst, the
    DHS initial assessment, issued on August 9, 2013, determined the allegations of
    “mental injury” were unfounded. But after receiving Dr. Boyum’s written report,
    the DHS issued a founded assessment as to both parents in an August 16
    “mental injury” addendum. The DHS offered services to the family. In early
    November 2013, the DHS asked the county attorney to file a CINA petition
    alleging negative behavior by Brian and O.S. and expressed “concerns about
    whether [J.S.’s] emotional needs are being met in either parent’s home.”
    On November 25, 2013, the county attorney filed a CINA petition. The
    juvenile court held a contested hearing, and its February 28, 2014 ruling noted
    the guardian ad litem and J.S. herself favored the CINA adjudication. The only
    party contesting the determination was Brian.       The court noted Brian was
    “concerned how this ruling may affect his ability to obtain future employment with
    government contracts.” The court adjudicated J.S. as CINA under Iowa Code
    section 232.2(6)(c)(2) (2013) (regarding parent’s failure to supervise). The court
    found, based on clear and convincing evidence, J.S. had suffered emotional
    distress and was likely to suffer additional harm due to the argumentative and
    unhealthy relationship between her parents. The court ordered J.S. to be placed
    in foster care.
    Brian filed a motion under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2). On
    June 10, 2014, the court reaffirmed its ruling on Brian’s failure to supervise and
    made an additional finding relevant to this appeal—based on the evidence
    presented at the hearing, the State had proven by clear and convincing evidence
    4
    the   parents’   behavior    led   to   adjudication    of   J.S.   as   CINA       under
    section 232.2(6)(c)(1) (mental injury caused by the acts of the child’s parents).
    Brian appealed the CINA adjudication to this court, alleging he was “being
    blamed for the mother’s infliction of mental injury” on J.S. See In re J.S., No. 14-
    1014, 
    2014 WL 4938012
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 1, 2014). Upholding the
    juvenile court’s ruling, we noted Brian’s focus was misdirected because the
    question was not which parent was “more blameworthy” but whether continued
    DHS supervision was necessary to ensure the psychological harm to J.S. did not
    worsen.1 
    Id.
    Meanwhile, Brian challenged the founded assessment and his placement
    on the central registry—the basis for this appeal. A contested hearing before an
    administrative law judge (ALJ) occurred on October 7, 2014.2 Two months later,
    on December 5, the ALJ issued his proposed decision. The ALJ sustained the
    founded child abuse assessment and Brian’s placement on the central abuse
    registry under Iowa Code section 232.71D.            Brian appealed, and the DHS
    director’s December 24 final decision adopted the ALJ’s proposed decision,
    stating: “A reasonable and prudent person would not put their own conflicts with
    another adult before the medical needs of their own child.”
    1
    Noting the parents’ emotional battle was not new, this court observed:
    An Iowa DHS social worker testified, “All three kids expressed to the
    Department that the relationship between the parents is very contentious
    and conflictual and that’s causing them emotional distress.” The worker
    explained the mother lacks boundaries as to the information she shares
    with the children about her critical feelings toward the father and their
    ongoing custody issues.         The father, while less blatant, also
    communicates his negative feelings toward the mother to others, and the
    children are aware of those communications. The children are hesitant to
    talk to the DHS workers while in the company of their father.
    2
    An earlier hearing date was continued at Brian’s request.
    5
    Brian sought judicial review, and after hearing arguments, the district court
    affirmed the agency on October 13, 2015. Brian now appeals.
    II. Scope and Standards of Review
    The DHS is vested with discretion in the area of child abuse and
    placement of those who perpetrate abuse on the offender registry. See Grant v.
    Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 
    722 N.W.2d 169
    , 177 (Iowa 2006). “We apply the
    standards of judicial review set forth in the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act,
    Iowa Code chapter 17A, in our review of the agency’s findings concerning child
    abuse reports.” Taylor v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 
    870 N.W.2d 262
    , 266
    (Iowa Ct. App. 2015). “We review the district court’s decision to see if we reach
    the same conclusions.” 
    Id.
    On judicial review, we are bound by the agency’s findings of fact “if
    supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.” Meyer v. IBP, Inc.,
    
    710 N.W.2d 213
    , 218 (Iowa 2006). “In our fairly intensive review,” we consider
    “evidence supporting the challenged finding as well as evidence detracting from
    it.” Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 
    814 N.W.2d 512
    , 525 (Iowa 2012). But “courts
    should broadly and liberally apply” the agency’s findings of fact “to uphold rather
    than defeat the agency’s decision.” Taylor, 870 N.W.2d at 266 (citation omitted)
    (“It is the agency’s duty as the trier of fact, not the reviewing court, to determine
    the credibility of the witnesses, to weigh the evidence, and to decide the facts in
    issue.”). Record evidence “is not insubstantial merely because it would have
    supported contrary inferences.” Id. (citation omitted).
    Our review of agency action involving constitutional issues is de novo.
    Chiodo v. Section 43.23 Panel, 
    846 N.W.2d 845
    , 848 (Iowa 2014).
    6
    III. Due Process
    Brian contends the district court erred in upholding the DHS determination
    because he was not afforded procedural due process. Brian faults the DHS for
    failing to provide a timely notification letter as required by statute. He asks us to
    reverse the district court and vacate the founded child abuse assessment against
    him.
    Brian is entitled to procedural due process in this administrative
    proceeding. See Koelling v. Bd. of Trs., 
    146 N.W.2d 284
    , 291 (Iowa 1966). But
    “all the formalities of judicial proceedings are not essential to constitute due
    process of law in an administrative proceeding.”           
    Id.
       In the context of
    administrative agencies, “due process of law is not a term of fixed and invariable
    content.” 
    Id.
     We agree with Brian’s formulation of his right to due process—he
    must be provided “notice of the allegations against him in time to provide a
    meaningful opportunity to respond.”
    We turn to the assessment process utilized here.            See 
    Iowa Code § 232
    .71B(1)(a) (requiring the DHS to promptly commence an assessment if it
    finds a report is an allegation of child abuse). The DHS, “within five working days
    of commencing the assessment, shall provide written notification of the
    assessment to the child’s parents.” 
    Id.
     § 232.71B(2). “If a parent is alleged to
    have committed the child abuse, the notice shall inform the parents regarding the
    complaint or allegation made regarding the parent.” Id.
    UI Hospitals admitted J.S. on July 5, 2013. According to Brian, he then
    called the DHS hotline and reported his daughter’s suicide attempt, the emotional
    harm inflicted on J.S. by O.S., the physical fighting between O.S. and J.S., and
    7
    O.S.’s defiance of the court orders. Brian stated the DHS did not accept his
    report, finding his allegations did not “rise to the level of neglect or abuse
    necessary for assessment.”
    The assessment at issue commenced on July 12, 2013, when the DHS
    accepted a referral alleging “the mother [O.S.] and father [Brian] have caused a
    mental injury to the child [J.S.] by the manner in which they have treated and
    spoken to the child. Child is currently a patient at U of I Hospitals.”
    On July 15, CPW Hirst spoke to the hospital social worker and learned
    J.S., upon admission, was “in a state of depression, anxious, restless, somewhat
    oppositional, [and] regretful that her overdose wasn’t successful in killing her.”
    The social worker expressed concerns about both parents, telling Hirst each
    noted the other’s behavior as the cause of J.S.’s suicidal thoughts.
    A different child protection worker interviewed J.S. on July 16; the child’s
    condition had improved and she was agreeable to being discharged to her
    mother’s care but did not want to go to her father’s home. J.S. told the worker
    that in March, when her father was mad about the amount of time she spent on
    her iPod, he grabbed her by her arm, “drug her up the stairs,” and later smashed
    the device with a hammer. J.S. ran away to a friend’s house and later that
    evening went to her mother’s home. J.S. stated she did not live with Brian after
    the March 2013 incident.
    Four days after the assessment commenced, on July 16, Hirst called Brian
    and left a message asking him to call her about “an open child abuse
    assessment.” Brian did not return her call. On July 17, Hirst noted “historically,
    8
    any communication the father has had with the [DHS] has been through email.”
    Hirst planned to make further “attempts to interview the child’s father.”
    The hospital called Brian on July 18 to inform him J.S. was being released
    to her mother. On July 23, Hirst spoke to J.S. for the first time. J.S. said her
    father tries to communicate with her but “she just doesn’t want to talk to him.” On
    July 24, Hirst noted she still had not received any response from Brian.
    Hirst was able to speak with Dr. Boyum by phone on July 29. Dr. Boyum
    stated his belief that “both parents are causing mental injury” to J.S. and agreed
    to send Hirst a letter stating this opinion. Also on July 29, Hirst sent Brian a letter
    again informing him of the open assessment regarding J.S. and requesting Brian
    call Hirst to discuss the assessment and “any concerns you may have.” Neither
    Hirst’s initial phone message nor this letter informed Brian the assessment
    included allegations against him.
    Brian drafted a lengthy letter on August 2, stating he was concerned about
    the safety of J.S. and the two younger children, “especially in the care of their
    mother.” He stated the hospital personnel had attempted to intimidate him by
    saying “they were going to report to DHS emotional injury against both parents.”
    Brian concluded by stating he had retained an attorney to help him reinstate
    supervised visitation with the mother because, otherwise, he feared the mother’s
    “emotional and psychological abuse” of the children would only worsen. The
    DHS included the entirety of Brian’s letter in its assessment.
    9
    On August 4, 2013, Hirst sent another letter to Brian, provided him with
    two phone numbers, and stated:
    I have received your letter on August 2, 2013, regarding your
    concerns of the mental health status of [O.S.]. I need to further
    speak with you regarding how your actions and behaviors [m]ay
    have negatively impacted [J.S.], as the concerns received by DHS
    allege[ ] that both yourself and [O.S.] . . . have caused mental injury
    to [J.S.].
    I would like to schedule an appointment and meet with you
    to further discuss and assess the information that I have gathered
    thus far during the course of my assessment to gather additional
    information, clarification, and to provide you an opportunity to
    respond to the concerns as it involves yourself and your family.
    Thus, Brian learned on August 4 that the DHS assessment included allegations
    against him. This actual notice was more than five days after the assessment
    commenced on July 12, so the DHS did not meet the statutory timeframe.
    Brian replied in an August 7 letter, received by the DHS on August 9.
    Brian claimed he was misled by Hirst’s July 29 letter because she did not identify
    him “as the subject responsible for alleged child abuse.” Brian also objected to
    the lack of statutory notice.3 Brian requested “an opportunity to respond to the
    allegations of child abuse.” He asked for “a written response of all allegations
    from all sources which you have gathered in your assessment.” He stated “once
    this information has been provided, I will consider making an appointment to
    meet with you.” Brian also provided a timeline, e-mails, text messages, letters,
    Facebook conversations, and stated: “Prior to this I had little to no contact with
    [J.S.] since March 15, as [O.S.] has openly defied the court order regarding
    3
    The district court found: “As soon as Hirst was informed that Brian did not receive the
    parental notification, it was reissued.”
    10
    custody and visitation and refused to allow any direct contact. I have retained an
    attorney and will be filing Contempt of Court action.”
    Brian knew J.S. had attempted suicide on July 4 and was refusing to
    speak with him; knew from his conversations with hospital personnel that they
    were planning to report emotional injury against both parents; and knew from a
    July 16 phone message that the DHS wished to speak to him about an
    assessment involving J.S. Although the DHS did not provide timely statutory
    notice, Brian had actual notice from the DHS on August 4 that allegations had
    been made against him. The DHS issued its initial assessment of unfounded
    child abuse on August 9. Thus, Brian had several days after receiving actual
    notice to respond to the DHS. Brian responded in an August 7 letter. Under
    these circumstances, we cannot conclude the lack of statutory notice rose to the
    level of a constitutional violation of Brian’s right to procedural due process. Brian
    had a meaningful opportunity to present his viewpoint after he had actual notice
    of the allegations against him, and he chose to do so in writing.4
    IV. Substantial Evidence
    At the administrative hearing, Brian’s testimony, his exhibits, and the
    testimony of his witnesses pointed to the mother’s acts and omissions as causing
    4
    Brian raises a second due process challenge, claiming his rights were violated because
    he was not interviewed by the DHS. The relevant statute provides:
    The offer of an interview shall be made to the person prior to any
    consideration or determination being made that the person committed the
    alleged abuse . . . . The person offered an interview, or the person’s
    attorney on the person’s behalf, may decline the offer of an interview of
    the person.
    
    Iowa Code § 232
    .71B(4)(e). After our review of the record, we adopt the district court’s
    resolution: “This assessment did not include an interview with Brian because he chose to
    communicate in writing and did not take advantage of the opportunity to speak with
    Hirst.” Brian’s constitutional rights were not violated in this regard.
    11
    harm to J.S. On appeal, Brian claims there was not substantial evidence that his
    acts or omissions caused J.S.’s mental injury. During oral arguments, Brian’s
    counsel asserted the DHS twisted the sentiments in his August 2 letter to support
    its claim Brian was not concerned about his daughter and emphasized Brian
    composed the letter before receiving notice he was the target of the DHS child
    abuse investigation.
    Because we appreciate counsel’s point regarding the unfairness of the
    DHS using Brian’s August 2 letter to paint him in a negative light, we exclude any
    consideration of that letter when deciding if the record as a whole contains
    substantial evidence to support the agency’s determination. Even excluding that
    piece of evidence, we conclude the State met its burden to prove by a
    preponderance of the evidence that Brian’s acts or omissions caused J.S.’s
    mental injury. See 
    Iowa Admin. Code r. 441-175.21
    .
    Iowa Code section 232.68(2)(a)(2) defines child abuse involving mental
    injury as follows:
    Any mental injury to a child’s intellectual or psychological
    capacity as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment
    in the child’s ability to function within the child’s normal range of
    performance and behavior as the result of the acts or omissions of
    a person responsible for the care of the child, if the impairment is
    diagnosed and confirmed by a licensed physician or qualified
    mental health professional.
    “That section reveals a clear intention by the legislature that a finding of child
    abuse based on a mental injury to a child’s intellectual or psychological capacity
    may be proven if diagnosed and confirmed by a physician or mental health
    professional.” Taylor, 870 N.W.2d at 272.
    12
    In our review of the voluminous administrative record and the hearing
    transcript, we find the following information sufficiently undergirds the agency’s
    conclusion that Brian’s conduct toward J.S. constituted child abuse causing
    mental injury. The connection between Brian’s conduct and J.S.’s mental injury
    was suggested by J.S. in her suicide note. In the note, the teenager was critical
    of how Brian treated her and her siblings. J.S. begged Brian to change his
    behavior to be a better parent to her younger sister and brother. She told the
    hospital staff her father was ineffective in communicating with his children and
    “repeatedly threatened or destroyed his children’s electronic equipment.”
    Dr. Boyum, who treated J.S., named both parents in a report of mental
    injury filed with the DHS. During her treatment, J.S. told Dr. Boyum she was
    afraid of Brian after an incident in March 2013 when he reportedly dragged her
    upstairs to her room and threw her on the bed.5 J.S. told the doctor she then
    moved into her mother’s home, where she was subjected to verbal abuse and
    demoralizing criticisms. Finding a correlation between the behavior of both O.S.
    and Brian and J.S.’s mood and impairment, the doctor filed the report for mental
    injury and diagnosed J.S. with major depressive disorder and adjustment
    disorder with anxiety. The hospital discharge notes state:
    As the hospitalization progressed, [J.S.] remained rather
    easily tearful about her social situation, feeling that she did not see
    much hope in living with either parent. She said that “she would
    run away,” and “would be better off dead” [than] living with her
    5
    Twice during March 2013, J.S. told this version of the events to the police. But when
    the DHS investigated the incident, she changed her story, and the DHS labelled the
    incident “unfounded.” Thus, during her hospitalization, J.S. told Dr. Boyum the original
    version of the interaction with her father.
    13
    father,[6] and remained hopeless that her mother would change in
    how she publically shamed [J.S.] and focused on negative
    behavior, which hurt [J.S.’s] self-esteem.
    A hospital social worker told CPW Hirst that the conduct of J.S.’s parents
    led to the girl’s depressive symptoms and each parent blamed the other for J.S.’s
    suicide attempt and mental health issues. According to the social worker, the
    parents saw no need for treating J.S. with medication recommended by the
    doctor, instead each parent asserted that placing sole custody with him or her
    would serve as a “cure” for J.S.’s diagnosed mental illness.
    In a July 29, 2013 phone call with Hirst, Dr. Boyum stated his belief “the
    parents’ behaviors and actions have led to [J.S.’s] depressive symptoms, poor
    school performance, and [J.S.] attempting suicide.” Dr. Boyum discussed his
    interactions with O.S. and Brian, stating each parent’s “main motivation is the
    external issues, the ongoing court battle regarding custody of the children,
    instead of meeting the emotional needs of the child.”
    CPW Hirst’s November 5, 2013 letter to the county attorney seeking a
    CINA petition discussed Brian’s behavior after the founded assessment and
    when the DHS was offering of services to the family:
    A family team meeting [FTM] was held on October 14, 2013 . . . .
    The father refused to answer many of the questions aimed at
    creating case plan goals and/or general questions about the family.
    He made statements to the effect that since he does not believe the
    [DHS] should be involved; there is no need for case plan goals. He
    was unwilling to discuss how to better communicate with [J.S.] and
    how to address her emotional needs, because he does not believe
    he has a poor relationship with his daughter. The father left the
    6
    Three days after her suicide attempt, J.S. attended an individual therapy session and
    stated she “does not want to go to her father’s house due to physical abuse problems in
    the past.” But she stated a willingness to work with a hospital program “to learn about
    healthy ways to manage her difficult emotions.”
    14
    FTM prior to its completion because he said there was nothing
    further to discuss . . . . In short, both parents seem oblivious to the
    impact their unhealthy actions and communications may have on all
    their children.
    . . . . The father . . . blame[s] the DHS, the provider, the
    mother, the mental health professionals, and the police for the
    current situation.
    . . . . [The] DHS does have concerns about whether the
    children’s emotional needs are being met in either parent’s home.
    (Emphasis added.)
    After her hospitalization, J.S. “basically refused to have any contact with
    her father. She did agree to see him on one occasion; the contact did not go
    well,” according to a February 2, 2014 DHS report. The DHS report recounted
    feelings expressed by J.S. that her father was “mean to her.” The DHS asked
    Brian to engage in anger management sessions; Brian said he needed additional
    information before he would do so. The report also noted J.S. agreed to therapy
    only “if her parents do not choose the therapist and if her parents do not go with
    her.” The report continued: “All three children report the conflict between their
    parents is a constant stressor and they often feel stuck in the middle. They all
    report that each parent blames the other for the divorce and for all of the
    children’s emotional issues.” Finally, the report concluded:
    In short, . . . there has been little progress in regard to the
    parents being able to set aside their own anger, feelings, and
    needs to adequately address the emotional needs of all three
    children. The parents’ relationship has remained contentious . . . .
    In some regard, the father is more discreet and covert [concerning]
    his disapproval of the mother, he [is] not continually say[ing]
    disparaging remarks about the mother directly to the children, but
    he does to others, and the children are aware of this . . . . [H]e
    exhibits extremely controlling behavior toward the mother, the
    children, the DHS, and the provider.[7]
    7
    The report addressed Brian’s interactions with the DHS and the provider:
    15
    ....
    The parents continue to blame each other for the children’s
    emotional issues, and although the parents are willing to allow the
    children to access therapy services, unless their behavior changes
    in regard to each other and toward their children, it would appear
    the emotional harm caused to the children will simply worsen.
    In late April 2014, J.S. completed a psychological evaluation. During the
    evaluation J.S. reported “her father does not tell her things about her mother, but
    will still attempt to portray her mother in a negative light.” She described her
    father as “manipulative and controlling.” The testing suggested J.S. “likely feels
    overwhelmed by anxiety, tension, and depression” and also “suggests she is
    likely functioning at a very low efficiency level and minor stressors can lead to
    emotional deterioration.” The clinician noted a diagnostic impression of major
    depressive disorder and adjustment disorder with anxiety.                The clinician
    suggested continuing therapy, “but she would also likely benefit from anti-
    depressant medication.”       The clinician opined J.S. has “a vast amount of
    potential” and is experiencing “significant home stress.” The clinician hoped her
    parents “will begin to focus on all the positives she offers.”
    The ALJ’s lengthy decision accurately set out the contested hearing’s
    evidence in detail. The ALJ found the case “difficult and close,” believed the
    mother “was largely responsible for the conflict” in the family over the past
    Throughout the course of the family’s involvement with the DHS,
    the father has insisted that the DHS enforce [the Colorado order granting
    him physical care]. The DHS has consistently explained to the father,
    that unless the children are adjudicated by the juvenile court, and/or the
    DHS can prove an imminent risk of harm to any of the children in either
    parental home, the DHS cannot intervene in the custody issue. Even
    though this has been explained to the father on numerous occasions, he
    has continued to insist that the DHS is not enforcing the order and is
    allowing the mother to keep his daughter from him.
    16
    several years, and also believed the mother “has been in large part responsible
    for the mental injury that J.S. clearly suffers from.” Nevertheless, the ALJ found
    Brian contributed to J.S.’s condition by (1) his initial reluctance to seek therapy or
    other services for J.S., (2) his initial unwilling to discuss ways to communicate
    with J.S. and how to address her emotional needs, and (3) not aiming his
    communications with the DHS at “solutions and treatment, but rather on laying
    blame,” which “cannot be a parent’s focus.” The ALJ findings are supported by
    the record.
    Continuing, the ALJ found “two other important factors”—Dr. Boyum’s
    July 29, 2013 letter and J.S.’s CINA adjudication—support the DHS child abuse
    assessment against Brian. We discuss the CINA adjudication below. As to Dr.
    Boyum’s letter, like the district court, we conclude the letter provides support for
    the founded assessment and registry placement.           The district court decided
    substantial evidence supported the agency’s findings, pointing to information in
    the record showing Brian’s inability or unwillingness to accept “the past turmoil
    has continued to adversely impact J.S. as she enters her teen years to the point
    she attempted suicide.” The court also noted evidence that after J.S. left the
    hospital, Brian continued to focus on his “toxic relationship” with O.S. and not on
    J.S.’s needs. We reach the same conclusion as the district court.
    V. CINA Adjudication
    Brian argues the ALJ’s deference to the CINA adjudication constituted an
    application of the doctrine of issue preclusion “in all but name.” Brian claims
    consideration of the CINA adjudication “essentially swung” the case against him
    and an “overbroad reliance on the CINA proceeding moots the point of the
    17
    separate contested case proceeding,” constituting error by the agency and the
    district court. Brian relies upon Grant, 
    722 N.W.2d at 173-75
    , to support his
    issue-preclusion argument.
    In response, the State notes the legislature amended the code to
    “specifically authorize issue preclusion in appropriate cases.” See 2012 Iowa
    Acts ch. 1082, § 5 (amending Iowa Code § 235A.19(3)(d)). Under the amended
    statute, the department may defer the contested hearing until the conclusion of
    the adjudicatory phase of a pending CINA proceeding either on its own initiative
    or at the request of “any party to the contested case proceeding.” Iowa Code
    § 235A.19(3)(d). Thereafter, a CINA adjudication “in a district court case relating
    to the child abuse data or findings may be determinative in a contested case
    proceeding.”     Id.   Accordingly, under the plain language of the statute, the
    agency is authorized to give weight to a prior CINA adjudication of the same
    issue. See id.
    In resolving this challenge, the district court stated the ALJ had “noted the
    higher burden of proof of clear and convincing evidence required to adjudicate a
    child on the grounds of ‘mental injury caused by the acts of the child’s parent.’”
    The district court then found the CINA proceeding was fully contested, with Brian
    represented by an attorney who “was able to call witnesses and cross-examine
    witnesses.” Noting the ALJ “appears to have placed great weight on the CINA
    adjudication in his final determination,” the court concluded “the deference and
    weight given to the CINA adjudication by the agency was proper.” We agree.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 15-1862

Filed Date: 11/9/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021