State of Iowa v. Justin Krutsinger ( 2017 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 16-0963
Filed May 3, 2017
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JUSTIN KRUTSINGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Randy V. Hefner
(motion to suppress) and Paul R. Huscher (trial), Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction for homicide by vehicle while
intoxicated. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Genevieve Reinkoester, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and Bower and McDonald, JJ.
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BOWER, Judge.
Justin Krutsinger appeals his conviction for homicide by vehicle while
intoxicated. We find the district court did not err in denying Krutsinger’s motion to
suppress based on his claim he was denied the right to make a telephone call
and there was sufficient evidence in the record on the issue of causation. We
affirm Krutsinger’s conviction.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
On February 27, 2015, Justin Krutsinger went to the home of Keri Hanzlick
in Waukee at about 5:30 p.m. Krutsinger and Hanzlick had one to two drinks
before going to a restaurant for dinner, where Krutsinger had two or three bottles
of beer. On the way back to Hanzlick’s home, they picked up a twelve-pack of
beer and a bottle of vodka. Krutsinger had a few more drinks while they watched
a movie. Krutsinger fell asleep for a short time, and when he woke up, he started
crying. Hanzlick testified “he thought we were being watched, kept asking why
they were watching us.” Krutsinger became upset and a little agitated. He
gathered his belongings and left Hanzlick’s house at about 11:00 p.m.
At about midnight, Krutsinger, who was driving a Chevrolet Malibu, was
involved in a collision with a Pontiac Grand Prix driven by Heidi Harkrader on
Highway 6, just east of Adel. The crash data retrieval system in the Malibu
showed Krutsinger was driving 116 miles per hour at the time of the collision and
did not touch the brakes prior to the crash. Krutsinger drove into the back of the
Grand Prix, forcing it off the road, and it eventually hit a house. There was an
open can of beer in the center console of Krutsinger’s vehicle and a partially full
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twelve-pack of beer in the backseat. Harkrader died at the scene as the result of
injuries sustained in the collision.
A registered nurse, Diana Wenger, who was the first person on the scene
of the accident, testified Krutsinger had an odor of alcohol, was slurring his
words, and was agitated. Officers who were assisting in the incident also
testified Krutsinger had bloodshot, watery eyes, he had an odor of alcohol, and
he was agitated. The paramedic and emergency medical technicians (EMT) who
treated Krutsinger gave similar testimony. Krutsinger was taken by ambulance to
the hospital for an assessment of his injuries. Two public safety officers from the
hospital testified Krutsinger appeared to be impaired by alcohol. The emergency
room physician, Dr. Richard Sidwell, testified Krutsinger was verbally aggressive
and he believed Krutsinger was intoxicated. Krutsinger became so agitated at
the hospital he was handcuffed to the bed for a period of time for the safety of
medical personnel.
At about 1:30 a.m., State Troopers Jody Elliott and Corey Champlin of the
Iowa Department of Public Safety came to the hospital. Krutsinger was released
from the handcuffs shortly thereafter. He was given a Miranda warning. Trooper
Elliott asked for a preliminary breath test, and Krutsinger either asked if he
needed a lawyer or stated he wanted to call a lawyer. Trooper Elliott stated
Krutsinger could call a lawyer.1 Krutsinger immediately stated he would take the
preliminary breath test, so he was given the test. There was a telephone in the
1
There was also evidence Trooper Elliott told Krutsinger he could not give him legal
advice, but Krutsinger could call a lawyer if he wanted to.
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room, and Trooper Elliott stated, “I would have let him make any number of
phone calls that he wanted to make.”
During the course of the discussion, Krutsinger stated he wanted to call a
lawyer so he could leave the hospital. Trooper Elliott told Krutsinger, “You can
call a lawyer, but you’re not leaving.” Krutsinger was informed he was being
detained, and he then changed the subject and began talking about something
else. Trooper Champlin read Krutsinger the implied consent advisory. Trooper
Elliott asked Krutsinger if he wanted to call a friend, family member, or attorney
and Krutsinger said, “No.” Krutsinger was asked for a blood test; he refused but
agreed to a urine test. The urine test showed Krutsinger had an alcohol level of
.200, well above the legal limit of .08.
Krutsinger was charged with homicide by vehicle while intoxicated, in
violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(1) (2015). He filed a motion to suppress,
claiming he was denied his statutory right to make a telephone call, pursuant to
section 804.20. The district court found, as to the first exchange, Krutsinger
decided not to call an attorney but to submit to the preliminary breath test. For
the second exchange, the court found Krutsinger’s conduct conveyed the
message he did not wish to call an attorney. For the third exchange, the court
found Krutsinger affirmatively declined his right to call an attorney. The court
concluded Krutsinger did not invoke his right to call an attorney under section
804.20, and furthermore, even if he had previously invoked the right, he
knowingly and voluntarily waived it before providing the urine specimen.
The case proceeded to a jury trial. The State presented evidence to show
Krutsinger was intoxicated at the time of the incident. In addition to the evidence
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of Krutsinger’s alcohol level from his urine sample, several witnesses who had
contact with Krutsinger after the collision testified he appeared to be intoxicated.
The defense presented the expert testimony of Dr. Steven Bruce, a psychologist,
who testified Krutsinger has post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) arising from
his service in the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. Dr. Bruce testified Krutsinger’s
conduct on the night of the collision was consistent with being in a dissociative
state, where he was not conscious of his actions. Krutsinger’s former wife,
Raeann Krutsinger, testified to three previous episodes where Krutsinger was in
a dissociative state and stated none of these incidents involved the use of
alcohol. Krutsinger testified to his problems with PTSD. He stated he did not
remember anything between the time he was eating dinner with Hanzlick to when
he was in the ambulance. Krutsinger admitted it was not out of the question for
him to drink heavily on a weekend.
The jury found Krutsinger guilty of homicide by vehicle while intoxicated.
He was sentenced to a term of imprisonment not to exceed twenty-five years.
Krutsinger now appeals his conviction.
II. Motion to Suppress
Krutsinger claims the district court should have granted his motion to
suppress because he was denied his right to call an attorney under section
804.20. He states he asked to call an attorney. Krutsinger claims the officers
should have informed him there was a telephone in the room and provided him
with a telephone book in order to give him a reasonable opportunity to call an
attorney.
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We review the district court’s interpretation of section 804.20 for the
correction of errors at law. See State v. Lamoreux, 875 N.W.2d 172, 176 (Iowa
2016). “We will affirm the district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress if ‘the
court correctly applied the law and substantial evidence supports the court’s fact-
finding.’” Id. (quoting State v. Walker, 804 N.W.2d 284, 289 (Iowa 2011)).
Section 804.20 provides:
Any peace officer or other person having custody of any
person arrested or restrained of the person’s liberty for any reason
whatever, shall permit that person, without unnecessary delay after
arrival at the place of detention, to call, consult, and see a member
of the person’s family or an attorney of the person’s choice, or both.
Such person shall be permitted to make a reasonable number of
telephone calls as may be required to secure an attorney. If a call
is made, it shall be made in the presence of the person having
custody of the one arrested or restrained. If such person is
intoxicated, or a person under eighteen years of age, the call may
be made by the person having custody. An attorney shall be
permitted to see and consult confidentially with such person alone
and in private at the jail or other place of custody without
unreasonable delay. A violation of this section shall constitute a
simple misdemeanor.
A defendant’s right to make a telephone call under section 804.20 “is a
limited one and only requires a peace officer to provide the suspect with a
reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney or family member.” State v. Hicks,
791 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Iowa 2010). “The statute does not require a police officer to
affirmatively inform the detainee of his statutory right; however, the peace officer
cannot deny the right exists.” Id.In the first exchange, after Krutsinger raised the issue of calling a lawyer,
the officers told him he could call a lawyer if he wanted to, and Krutsinger
immediately stated he would take the preliminary breath test. The district court
did not err in concluding Krutsinger’s conduct showed he did not want to call an
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attorney at that time. In the second exchange, Krutsinger stated he wanted to
call a lawyer “because he wanted to get out of here.” The officers stated
Krutsinger could call an attorney but he was not going to be released, and
Krutsinger then changed the subject. The district court did not err in finding
Krutsinger’s conduct again showed he did not want to call an attorney. In the
third exchange, when Krutsinger was specifically asked if he wanted to call a
family member, friend, or attorney, he responded, “No.” The district court did not
err in concluding “Krutsinger affirmatively declined to invoke his right to call an
attorney.”
We affirm the district court’s decision denying the motion to suppress.
III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Krutsinger was charged with violating section 707.6A(1), which provides,
“A person commits a class ‘B’ felony when the person unintentionally causes the
death of another by operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated, as prohibited by
section 321J.2.” “[I]t is the State’s burden under section 707.6A(1) to prove a
causal connection between the defendant’s intoxicated driving and the victim’s
death.” State v. Adams, 810 N.W.2d 365, 371 (Iowa 2012). Krutsinger claims
the State did not present sufficient evidence to show the victim’s death was
caused by operating while intoxicated. He states the collision was caused
because he was driving while in a dissociative state, which was a symptom of his
PTSD.
On claims concerning the sufficiency of the evidence, our review is for the
correction of errors at law. State v. Showens, 845 N.W.2d 436, 439 (Iowa 2014).
We will uphold a verdict if there is substantial evidence in the record to uphold it.
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Id. at 440. We “consider all of the record evidence viewed in the light most
favorable to the State, including all reasonable inferences that may be fairly
drawn from the evidence.” Id. at 439-40.
“A defendant may be found guilty of homicide by vehicle only if the jury
finds beyond a reasonable doubt that his criminal act of driving under the
influence of alcohol caused the victim’s death.” Adams, 810 N.W.2d at 371. We
consider “whether the victim’s death would have occurred in the absence of the
defendant’s criminal act—intoxicated driving.” Id. at 372; see also State v. Tyler,
873 N.W.2d 741, 748 (Iowa 2016) (discussing the principles of causation detailed
in Adams).
There was ample evidence in the record to show Krutsinger was
intoxicated at the time of the collision. The urine specimen showed Krutsinger’s
alcohol level was .200, above the legal limit. In addition, a disinterested
bystander, three officers, a paramedic, two EMTs, two hospital public safety
officers, and the emergency room physician all testified Krutsinger showed signs
of intoxication. Officer Anthony Yeager testified intoxication may cause a person
to drive very fast, which could support a finding Krutsinger’s speed of 116 miles
per hour at the time of the collision was caused by intoxication.
We recognize there was also evidence in the record to show Krutsinger
has PTSD and sometimes enters a dissociative state, during which he would not
be conscious of his actions. While Krutsinger and Dr. Bruce testified Krutsinger
may have been in a dissociative state at the time of the collision, the jury was
free to reject that evidence. See State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673 (Iowa
1993) (“The jury is free to believe or disbelieve any testimony as it chooses and
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to give weight to the evidence as in its judgment such evidence should receive.”).
Issues such as conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of witnesses, and the
proper weight of the evidence are matters are for the jury. State v. Hutchison,
721 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Iowa 2006).
We determine there was substantial evidence in the record to show a
causal connection between Krutsinger’s intoxicated driving and the victim’s
death.
We affirm Krutsinger’s conviction for homicide by vehicle while intoxicated.
AFFIRMED.