Paul Hendrickson v. Ihle Trucking, Inc. and Dakota Truck Underwriters ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1114
Filed April 16, 2014
PAUL HENDRICKSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
IHLE TRUCKING, INC. and DAKOTA TRUCK UNDERWRITERS,
Respondents-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Douglas F. Staskal,
Judge.
An employee appeals from a district court ruling upholding the Iowa
Workers’ Compensation Commissioner’s award limiting the employee’s claim to
a scheduled member loss. AFFIRMED.
Ryan T. Beattie of Beattie Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Michael S. Roling of Peddicord, Wharton, Spencer, Hook, Barron
& Wegman, L.L.P., West Des Moines, for appellees.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and Bower, JJ.
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DOYLE, J.
Paul Hendrickson appeals from an adverse ruling by the district court on
his petition for judicial review of the Iowa Workers’ Compensation
Commissioner’s decision limiting Hendrickson’s workers’ compensation award to
a scheduled member loss to his right hand. We affirm.
I. Scope of Review.
It must first be noted that our review of final agency action is “severely
circumscribed.” Greenwood Manor v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Health, 641 N.W.2d
823, 839 (Iowa 2002); Sellers v. Emp’t Appeal Bd., 531 N.W.2d 645, 646 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1995). Nearly all disputes are won or lost at the agency level; the
cardinal rule of administrative law is that judgment calls are within the province of
the administrative tribunal, not the courts. See id.In the realm of workers’ compensation proceedings, it is the workers’
compensation commissioner, not the court, who weighs the evidence and
measures the credibility of witnesses. Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Pease,
807 N.W.2d 839, 845 (Iowa 2011). This includes the “determination of whether
to accept or reject an expert opinion,” as well as the weight to give the expert
testimony. Id. “Because these determinations remain within the agency’s
exclusive domain and the “peculiar province” of the commissioner, we cannot
reassess the weight of the evidence. Id.; see also Robbennolt v. Snap-On Tools
Corp., 555 N.W.2d 229, 234 (Iowa 1996). In fact, “‘we are obliged to broadly and
liberally apply those findings to uphold rather than defeat the commissioner’s
decision.’” Pirelli-Armstrong Tire Co. v. Reynolds, 562 N.W.2d 433, 436 (Iowa
1997) (quoting Long v. Roberts Dairy Co., 528 N.W.2d 122, 123 (Iowa 1995)).
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“We are bound by the commissioner’s factual determinations if they are
supported by substantial evidence in the record before the court when that record
is viewed as a whole.” Mike Brooks, Inc. v. House, ___ N.W.2d ___, ___, 2014
WL 890152, *4 (Iowa 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
“Substantial evidence” is “the quantity and quality of evidence that would be
deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish
the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that
fact are understood to be serious and of great importance.” Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10)(f)(1) (2007). When we conduct a substantial evidence review of an
agency decision, it is not for us to make “a determination as to whether evidence
‘trumps’ other evidence or whether one piece of evidence is ‘qualitatively weaker’
than another piece of evidence. Arndt v. City of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 394
(Iowa 2007). “On appeal, our task ‘is not to determine whether the evidence
supports a different finding; rather, our task is to determine whether substantial
evidence . . . supports the findings actually made.’” House, ___ N.W.2d at ___,
2014 WL 890152, at *4 (quoting Pease, 807 N.W.2d at 845).
II. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Acknowledging the deputy commissioner “wrote an extensive and detailed
ruling that includes a thorough review of the evidence,” the district court
succinctly summarized the pertinent facts and proceedings as follows:
In December 2007, [Hendrickson] suffered an injury in the
course of his employment as an over the road truck driver. He was
placing a tarp in a compartment on his vehicle when he slipped and
fell. The compartment door fell onto his right hand, causing a
laceration, pain, and swelling. He did not seek immediate medical
attention because he was out of Iowa. He sought medical attention
when he returned to Iowa during the course of which it was
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discovered that the laceration had become infected and that his
right middle finger was broken. The infection was treated with
intravenous antibiotics and the fracture was repaired surgically.
[Hendrickson] has an extensive history of illnesses and
maladies both before and after the work injury. His medical history
before the accident and the course of his reported symptoms,
diagnoses and treatment after the accident are, as noted,
chronicled thoroughly in the deputy commissioner’s written ruling.
By the time of hearing before the deputy commissioner [in
October 2010], [Hendrickson] claimed that the December 2007
work injury caused permanent physical impairment to virtually every
part of his body, depression, and seizures/tremors. Thus, the
primary fact issue facing the deputy was what of [Hendrickson’s]
physical and psychological symptoms, conditions, and impairments
were caused by the December 2007 work injury. The deputy
concluded, as a matter of fact, that the December 2007 incident
caused only an injury to [Hendrickson’s] right hand, a scheduled
injury under the law, and she awarded benefits accordingly.
[Hendrickson] challenged the deputy’s conclusion by appeal to the
commissioner, who affirmed the deputy’s ruling.
Hendrickson’s petition for judicial review followed. The only issue presented was
whether substantial evidence supported the commissioner’s conclusion regarding
the extent of Hendrickson’s conditions causally related to the December 2007
fall.
We cannot improve upon the district court’s analysis:
It would be a waste of time and effort for the court to engage
in any prolonged discussion of the evidence and of the deputy’s
fact conclusions [as adopted by the commissioner]. As noted, the
deputy’s decision is detailed and exhaustive. She thoroughly
explained why she reached her fact conclusions, including her
assessment of the credibility of [Hendrickson] and of the opinions of
numerous physicians. She accurately set forth all of the legal
principles involved and properly placed the burden of proof on
[Hendrickson]. By the applicable standard of review set forth
earlier, her fact conclusions are, without question, fully supported
by substantial evidence in the record.
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The district court affirmed the decision of the Iowa Workers’
Compensation Commissioner. Hendrickson appealed, and his appeal was
transferred to this court on February 24, 2014.
III. Discussion.
We have carefully reviewed the record, the briefs of the parties, and the
district court’s spot-on and well-reasoned ruling. The district court’s ruling
identifies and considers all the issues presented. In applying the above
standard-of-review precepts, and in giving the due deference we are statutorily
obligated to afford the commissioner’s findings of fact, we approve of the reasons
and conclusions in the district court ruling. Further discussion of the issues
would be of no value. See Iowa Ct. R. 21.26(1)(b), (d), and (e) (2014).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision affirming the Iowa Workers’
Compensation Commissioner’s decision.
AFFIRMED.