In Re the Marriage of Jacque L. Ersland and Mitchell L. Ersland Upon the Petition of Jacque L. Ersland, and Concerning Mitchell L. Ersland ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 3-1258 / 13-1232
Filed February 19, 2014
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF JACQUE L. ERSLAND
AND MITCHELL L. ERSLAND
Upon the Petition of
JACQUE L. ERSLAND,
Petitioner-Appellee,
And Concerning
MITCHELL L. ERSLAND,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Franklin County, Colleen D.
Weiland, Judge.
An ex-husband appeals the district court’s dismissal of his rule-to-show-
cause application challenging his ex-wife’s compliance with the economic
provisions of their dissolution decree. AFFIRMED.
Dani Eisentrager, Eagle Grove, for appellant.
Thomas Lipps, Algona, for appellee.
Considered by Vogel, P.J., and Tabor and McDonald, JJ.
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TABOR, J.
Mitchell and Jacque Ersland divorced in 2002. A decade later Mitchell
sought to hold Jacque in contempt for not executing a promissory note for
$17,500, payable to him, as required in the dissolution decree. The district court
determined Jacque did not violate the decree because the property equalization
was settled between the parties by accord and satisfaction. Mitchell appeals the
district court’s determination. The district court’s dismissal of Mitchell’s rule-to-
show-cause application rests largely on its credibility findings; because we give
those findings significant weight, we affirm the order.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Jacque filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Mitchell on May 9, 2002.
Mitchell did not appear for the dissolution trial. The court entered a decree and
default judgment on September 18, 2002.
The decree provided for custody of the parties’ minor children, child
support, and a division of the parties’ property, including the marital home. The
decree awarded Jacque the home subject to the indebtedness. The parties were
purchasing the home on contract. At the time of the decree, their equity in the
real estate was $35,000—one-half of which was awarded to Mitchell. Jacque
was to execute a promissory note for $17,500 in favor of Mitchell, secured by a
mortgage. The decree ordered the promissory note due and payable one year
after the last payment was due on the real estate contract. Interest was to
accrue on the note at the rate of five percent per annum beginning January 1,
2003. The decree also directed each party to “retain the personal property,
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including the farm machinery and equipment, which is now in the possession of
that party.”
Mitchell acknowledged he received a copy of the decree and was aware of
the provision requiring Jacque to execute a promissory note for $17,500 in his
favor which was due after Jacque paid off the contract of the house.1
Jacque did not execute a note or mortgage and Mitchell did not demand
those documents in the ten years following the divorce. Mitchell testified: “just
never thought of it, I guess.” But Jacque contends after entry of the decree,
Mitchell chose to take machinery and personal property, which was in her
possession, in satisfaction of her obligation. Specifically, Jacque recalled that
after the divorce Mitchell took a 610 Bobcat skid loader, an ATV, a New Holland
manure spreader, an Inland snowblower, a fifty gallon upright air compressor, a
220-volt Lincoln welder, a stock trailer, a bean buggy, and a hay rake. Jacque
also presented evidence establishing that Mitchell allowed an acquaintance
named John Walzing to take a tractor, which was in Jacque’s possession, in
repayment of a debt owed Walzing.
On September 14, 2012, Mitchell filed an application for rule to show
cause claiming he never received the $17,500 he was owed under the decree.
Jacque filed a response to the application, as well as a petition for entry of an
order satisfying judgment and a request for attorney fees. On January 7, 2013,
Mitchell filed an answer to the petition to satisfy judgment. The district court held
a hearing on February 5, 2013. Both parties testified and both called an
1
Jacque testified she still owed approximately $36,000 on the contract at the time of the
show-cause hearing.
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additional witness to support their positions. The district court entered an order
on July 5, 2013, dismissing Mitchell’s show-cause application, finding the
judgment against Jacque and in favor of Mitchell was satisfied and released, and
assessing court costs to Mitchell. Mitchell now appeals.2
II. Scope and Standards of Review
Appellate review of contempt proceedings is “somewhat unique.” In re
Marriage of Swan, 526 N.W.2d 320, 326–27 (Iowa 1995). Mitchell is appealing
from the court’s refusal to hold Jacque in contempt under a statute that allows for
some discretion. Iowa Code section 598.23 (2011) provides: “If a person against
whom a temporary order or final decree has been entered willfully disobeys the
order or decree, the person may be cited and punished by the court for
contempt.” “A trial court is not required to hold a party in contempt even though
the elements of contempt may exist.” Id. at 327. Unless this discretion is
“grossly abused,” the court’s decision must stand. Id.Our review of the underlying question concerning the equitable doctrine of
accord and satisfaction in the context of a dissolution decree calls for a de novo
review. See In re Marriage of Farr, 543 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1996). We give
weight to the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when considering the
credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by them. Swan, 526 N.W.2d at
323.
2
When a defendant is found in contempt, review is by petition for certiorari; but when
the district court dismisses the application to punish for contempt, a direct appeal is
permitted. State v. Dist. Ct., 231 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 1975).
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III. Analysis
This appeal requires consideration of both the equitable doctrine of accord
and satisfaction and contempt principles. Mitchell contends Jacque willfully failed
to comply with economic provisions of the dissolution decree. Jacque contends
Mitchell agreed to an alternative means of compliance.
The 2002 decree obligated Jacque to execute a promissory note to
Mitchell for $17,500. She admits she did not do so. But she submits Mitchell
agreed to allow her to discharge the $17,500 obligation by substituting an
alternative form of consideration, thus settling her debt to him. The district court
accepted Jacque’s assertion of accord and satisfaction—believing her testimony
that Mitchell took equipment and personal property in place of the money she
owed him by the promissory note.
Accord and satisfaction is a way to discharge a preexisting obligation
where the parties agree to give and accept something different in settlement of
the claim and perform the agreement. Hengesteg v. N. Eng’g, Inc., 478 N.W.2d
307, 309 (Iowa Ct. App. 1991). The “accord” is the agreement, and the
“satisfaction” is its execution or performance. Id. The party advancing the
doctrine bears the burden to prove an accord and satisfaction by a
preponderance of the evidence. See id. The existence of “accord and
satisfaction” is “a pure question of intention.” Id. The creditor must understand
he is taking in full satisfaction of the debtor’s claim. Id. Proof of the required
intent may include the agreement itself, the parties’ words or actions, and the
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surrounding circumstances. Seidler v. Vaughn Oil Co., 468 N.W.2d 474, 475
(Iowa Ct. App. 1991).
In seeking a contempt ruling, Mitchell carried the burden to prove Jacque
had a duty to obey a court order and willfully failed to perform that duty. See
Amro v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 429 N.W.2d 135, 138 (Iowa 1988). Contempt
proceedings are quasi-criminal proceedings; therefore, Mitchell was required to
show Jacque’s willful disobedience by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See id.An individual’s conduct constitutes willful disobedience if it is “intentional and
deliberate with a bad or evil purpose, or wanton and in disregard of the rights of
others, contrary to a known duty, or unauthorized, coupled with an unconcern
whether the contemner had the right or not.” In re Marriage of Wegner, 461
N.W.2d 351, 354 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990).
The district court heard testimony from the parties. Jacque testified she
and Mitchell had a verbal agreement. She said Mitchell came to the farm after
the default decree was entered and she told him that he could have the
machinery instead of the $17,500 promissory note ordered in the decree. She
testified Mitchell picked up the machinery and personal property in more than
one trip, and when Walzing loaded up the tractor, “everything was satisfied.” A
neighbor corroborated the timing of the tractor being loaded. Mitchell denied he
retrieved any times from the farm, saying he “[j]ust walked away. Started over.”
He testified Walzing took the tractor before the divorce.
After hearing the parties’ conflicting versions of events, the district court
reached the following determination:
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The court finds Jacque’s account more credible and more
consistent with Mitchell’s failure to demand performance until he
recently became frustrated with the custodial arrangement.
Specifically, I find Mitchell did remove items of personal property—
mostly consisting of farm equipment-from Jacque’s real estate after
the decree [was] entered. Pursuant to the decree, those items
belong to Jacque. Mitchell told Jacque that he would take the
property in lieu of payment.
The court further found the value of those items exceeded $17,500.
Therefore, “an accord and satisfaction was reached between the two parties.”
The court also decided any failure on Jacque’s part to follow through on the
obligation was not willful. The court dismissed Mitchell’s application and
concluded the $17,500 obligation from Jacque to Mitchell was “SATISFIED and
RELEASED.”
In this case we have no written accord and satisfaction, only the parties’
words. The district court believed Jacque’s testimony that Mitchell took the
property in satisfaction of her obligation under the decree. We give “great
deference to the trial court on issues of witness credibility.” Christensen v. Iowa
Dist. Ct., 578 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa 1998). Moreover, other evidence in the
record supports the district court’s disregard of Mitchell’s version. See id. For
instance, we consider the timing of Mitchell’s claim—more than a decade after
the decree was issued and at a time he was frustrated with the custody
arrangement. In addition, Mitchell’s testimony indicated when the property was
in forfeiture, he took no steps to protect the equity he claims he was still owed.
Instead, he said it “wasn’t my responsibility.” Mitchell exercised visitation for
more than ten years, yet testified he had not talked with Jacque since 2000.
Given these circumstances, we defer to the district court’s witness credibility
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finding. Because evidence supports a finding Jacque honestly believed she and
Mitchell had agreed to an alternative means of satisfying her obligation under the
decree, the court properly declined to find willful disobedience.
Jacque requests appellate attorney fees. Generally, no claim exists for
attorney fees, absent a statutory or contractual provision allowing an award. In
re Marriage of McCurnin, 681 N.W.2d 322, 332 (Iowa 2004). Attorney fees may
be taxed against a party held in contempt of a dissolution decree. Iowa Code
§ 598.24. But section 598.24 does not provide for attorney fees for defense of an
unsuccessful contempt action. Id. The parties shall be responsible for their own
attorney fees on appeal. The costs of this appeal are taxed to Mitchell.
AFFIRMED.