State of Iowa v. Jason Devereus Gronstal ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 4-019 / 13-0131
Filed February 19, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JASON DEVEREUS GRONSTAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Stephen C.
Gerard II, District Associate Judge.
A defendant appeals his sentence claiming the district court considered
improper factors. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, Janet M. Lyness, County Attorney, and Anne M. Lahey, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Mullins, JJ.
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MULLINS, J.
Jason Gronstal appeals the sentence he received following his conviction
for indecent exposure. He claims the district court improperly considered the
department of corrections time calculation and parole policies in fashioning the
sentence. In sentencing Gronstal to one year in jail to be served consecutively to
the sentence he was currently serving, the district court stated, in part:
Based upon your criminal history, the nature of this offense,
the need to present a deterrent to others similarly situated who
might be inclined to commit offenses while they are in the custody
of the department because they think it won’t cause any additional
inconvenience to them, I believe that the maximum sentence
should be imposed.
I don’t know exactly what is going to happen, but I have a
pretty good understanding that imposing this sentence does not
mean you are going to be in prison for one year after you are done
with your immediate sentence.
There are many different things under the way that the
Department of Corrections determines good time, earned time,
work credits and the way consecutive sentences are considered
that I believe will not impair your ability to be paroled at the time
you earn that opportunity.
It will be the judgment of the Court that the Defendant be
imprisoned for an additional one year period.
This sentence shall be consecutive with the sentence being
presently served.
(Emphasis added.)
We review a district court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion.
State v. Thomas, 520 N.W.2d 311, 313 (Iowa 1994). “The use of an
impermissible sentencing factor is viewed as an abuse of discretion and requires
resentencing.” Id. The board of parole has the sole authority to determine a
defendant’s minimum sentence with its parole decisions. State v. Remmers, 259
N.W.2d 779, 785 (Iowa 1977). “It is inappropriate to circumvent parole
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considerations in a judicial sentencing decision.” Thomas, 520 N.W.2d at 313.
However, in this case we do not find the court’s comment, that it understood that
imposing the sentence would not mean Gronstal would have to serve another
year in prison or impair his ability to be paroled, was an attempt to circumvent
parole considerations.
Gronstal in his allocution to the court mentioned his concern that based on
the sentence he was currently serving he would not be eligible for parole for over
eleven years. He thought another year beyond this time was “extreme.” The
court’s reference to the current sentence’s effect on when Gronstal would be
eligible for parole was simply a response to this concern. See State v. Vanover,
559 N.W.2d 618, 635 (Iowa 1997) (noting the court did not impermissibly attempt
to lengthen the defendant’s sentence because of parole factors where it merely
responded to the defense counsel’s calculations as to the application of the
mandatory minimum and the court gave several cogent reasons for imposing the
sentence it chose).
In addition, there is no indication in the record that the court adjusted the
sentence in an attempt to circumvent the parole board’s authority. The court
admitted it did not know when Gronstal would be paroled, but it noted the
application of various department of correction’s credits would likely result in
Gronstal being paroled before the expiration of the one-year consecutive
sentence. In cases involving aggravated misdemeanor and felony cases, the
court is required to advise defendants that the application of these credits can
reduce the maximum term a defendant may serve. See Iowa Code
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§ 901.5(9)(a)-(b) (2011). While the court was not required to inform Gronstal of
the credits because he was sentenced for a serious misdemeanor, we can hardly
say the court’s mentioning of these credits amounts to the consideration of an
improper sentencing factor.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Gronstal.
We therefore affirm his conviction and sentence.
AFFIRMED.