Bill West and Evelyn West v. August Zieglowsky and Systems Unlimited, Inc. ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 3-1112 / 13-0507
Filed February 5, 2014
BILL WEST and EVELYN WEST,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
AUGUST ZIEGLOWSKY and
SYSTEMS UNLIMITED, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Carl D. Baker,
Judge.
Bill and Evelyn West appeal the jury verdict in this personal injury action
against August Zieglowsky and Systems Unlimited. AFFIRMED.
Howard E. Zimmerle of Warner & Zimmerle, Davenport, for appellants.
James P. Craig of Lederer Weston Craig PLC, Cedar Rapids, for appellee
Systems Unlimited, Inc.
Matthew Nagle of Lynch Dallas, P.C., Cedars Rapids, for appellee August
Zieglowsky.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
2
BOWER, J.
Bill and Evelyn West (West) appeal the jury verdict in this personal injury
action against August Zieglowsky and Systems Unlimited (Systems). West
argues the district court erred in admitting evidence of West’s history of
exaggerating the severity of his physical condition. We find the challenged
evidence was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
Bill West was injured in an automobile accident when the semi he was
driving was struck by a vehicle driven by August Zieglowsky. 1 West alleged
Zieglowsky was negligent in operating the motor vehicle and brought claims for
past and future medical expenses, past and future lost wages, loss of earning
capacity, past and future loss of function of mind and body, past and future pain
and suffering, and loss of spousal consortium.2
West argues the jury’s verdict was unfairly prejudiced by the presentation
of evidence concerning his prior injuries. More specifically, the evidence showed
West had, when previously injured, exaggerated and reported symptoms that did
not match objective medical observations.
After initially deciding to exclude the evidence, the district court admitted
the evidence as relevant on the issue of the existence and extent of West’s
injuries.
1
At the time of the accident, Zieglowsky was driving the vehicle in the course and scope
of his employment with Systems Unlimited.
2
Evelyn West also brought a claim for loss of consortium. Evelyn’s claim is not at issue
in this appeal.
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II. Standard of Review
“We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.” State v. Huston,
825 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Iowa 2013). We will reverse the decision of the district
court only where it impacts the substantial rights of the complaining party. Iowa
R. Evid. 5.103(a); McClure v. Walgreen Co., 613 N.W.2d 225, 235 (Iowa 2000).
III. Discussion
West argues admission of the evidence concerning his history of
exaggeration, when describing his physical condition, was improper because the
value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
When considering whether evidence should have been admitted or
excluded, we must answer two questions. Graber v. City of Ankeny, 616 N.W.2d
633, 638 (Iowa 2000). First, is the evidence relevant; and second, if it is relevant,
is the value of the evidence substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice. Id. West appears to concede the first question, whether the evidence
is relevant. We agree. The more important question is whether the value of the
evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Iowa. R. Evid.
5.403.
Our supreme court has approved the admission of evidence of past
injuries or sickness when the evidence helps the jury understand the extent of
the present injury. Pexa v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 686 N.W.2d 150, 158–59
(Iowa 2004). Recognizing all evidence will result in some prejudice, we are
directed to focus upon whether that prejudice is unfair; tending to lead the jury to
make determinations based upon an improper or emotional, basis. See id.4
We find the challenged evidence to be relevant both to causation and the
extent of West’s damages. The evidence was of greater importance on the loss
of consortium and pain and suffering claims, because part of the jury’s task was
to consider how West was able to enjoy life both before and after the accident.
See id.; Poyzer v. McGraw, 360 N.W.2d 748, 753 (Iowa 1985). Evidence of
West’s past injuries, and particularly the accuracy of his complaints, could assist
the jury in evaluating his present condition.
The evidence represents an attack on West’s credibility and therefore
carries a substantial danger of arousing the emotions of the jury. In this instance,
however, we find the evidence is not unfairly prejudicial, and the probative value
of the evidence is substantial for the purpose of assisting the jury in
understanding and evaluating West’s claims. We find the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged evidence.
West also argues the evidence should have been excluded because it
confused the issues and served to distract the jury. West relies upon
Mohammed v. Otoadese, 738 N.W.2d 628, 633 (Iowa 2007), where our supreme
court cautioned against district courts admitting evidence of prior, unrelated
claims. For the purpose offered here, we find the evidence is not confusing and
was not likely to lead to the consideration of collateral issues. The evidence did
not tend to negatively reflect upon West’s character as someone unreasonably
accident prone or litigious. See Nepple v. Weifenbach, 274 N.W.2d 728, 733
(Iowa 1979). The fact is West’s prior injuries were not presented to the jury, as in
Nepple, with no direction on how to use the information. Rather, the evidence
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was provided for a specific, easily understood, guided, and relevant purpose—to
assist the jury in understanding the extent of West’s injuries and to assess the
credibility of his injury claims. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the evidence for these purposes.
AFFIRMED.