State of Iowa v. Jaycie Sheeder ( 2021 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 19-1716
    Filed October 20, 2021
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    JAYCIE SHEEDER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jasper County, Thomas P. Murphy,
    Judge.
    Jaycie Sheeder appeals her convictions of murder, robbery, and accessory
    after the fact, and the sentence imposed for robbery. CONVICTION AFFIRMED;
    SENTENCE VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
    Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant
    Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Heard by Mullins, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
    2
    MULLINS, Presiding Judge.
    Jaycie Sheeder appeals her convictions of murder and robbery in the first
    degree and accessory after the fact, and the sentence imposed for robbery. She
    argues the State failed to prove she had knowledge that a codefendant intended
    to commit an assault, co-conspirator statements were improperly admitted, the
    prosecutor engaged in misconduct, and the district court failed to exercise
    discretion in sentencing.
    I.    Background Facts and Proceedings
    Prior to June 22, 2018, Sheeder and J.M. used drugs together and were
    engaged in a romantic relationship. At some point, that relationship ended, and
    Sheeder began a relationship with Jeffrey Stendrup.        In the past, Stendrup
    supplied methamphetamine to Sheeder and J.M. When J.M. became aware of the
    relationship between Sheeder and Stendrup, he allegedly stole property from both
    people, including cars, drugs, and cash. Sheeder and Stendrup attempted to use
    self-help to reclaim the items. J.M. eventually contacted Sheeder to tell her where
    some of the stolen property could be found.
    On June 21, an associate of J.M.’s contacted Stendrup to buy
    methamphetamine. Stendrup agreed to supply the drugs only if the associate
    would make sure J.M. was present for the exchange at the associate’s residence.
    The associate arranged for J.M. to come to the home and alerted Sheeder and
    Stendrup. J.M. arrived at the associate’s home around 11:00 p.m. Stendrup and
    Sheeder arrived around 1:30 a.m. on June 22. Stendrup entered the home but
    Sheeder did not.
    3
    Trial testimony was provided by multiple witnesses, none of whom provided
    consistent information.   The following facts are undisputed.     J.M. consumed
    methamphetamine prior to the incident and had a history of a heart condition. J.M.
    was beaten with a baseball bat in the residence, and the violent encounter between
    Stendrup and J.M. resulted in damage to the associate’s residence. Sheeder
    searched for property in a van J.M. occupied prior to the incident. Stendrup left
    with Sheeder following the encounter. When Stendrup left, J.M. was face-down in
    the living room and appeared to be breathing but was unresponsive when spoken
    to. Stendrup and Sheeder drove to Altoona. The associate called his girlfriend,
    who then contacted Sheeder and insisted that she return to help the associate.
    Sheeder returned to Colfax, and J.M. was still unresponsive. A neighbor was
    summoned to help Sheeder and the associate move J.M. into the van. Sheeder
    then drove J.M. to a restaurant near a gas station in Newton and contacted the
    authorities for help.
    Police and emergency medical response met Sheeder around 3:20 a.m.
    When paramedics began attempts to revive J.M., they found he had no pulse, felt
    cold to the touch, and was turning blue. He was pronounced dead. Sheeder was
    interviewed outside of the gas station. Her stories to multiple police officers and
    sheriff’s deputies were inconsistent.     Sheeder was transported to the Jasper
    County Sheriff’s Office and was interviewed by multiple law-enforcement
    authorities for the next several hours.
    In July, Sheeder was arrested and charged with murder in the first degree
    in violation of Iowa Code sections 707.1 and .2(1)(b) (2018), robbery in the first
    degree in violation of Iowa code sections 711.1 and .2, and accessory after the
    4
    fact in violation of Iowa Code section 703.3. Her proceedings were severed from
    Stendrup’s, and trial was held in May 2019. A jury convicted Sheeder on all three
    counts. Sheeder moved for new trial, arguing the verdicts were contrary to the
    evidence, allegedly improper hearsay was admitted, prosecutorial error occurred,
    and her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The motion was denied.
    Judgment and sentence were entered in October 2019. Sheeder appeals.
    II.    Standard of Review
    Sheeder argues the State failed to prove she knew Stendrup intended to
    commit an assault and, thus, insufficient evidence was provided to support that
    she committed or aided and abetted in the robbery. “Sufficiency of evidence claims
    are reviewed for a correction of errors at law.” State v. Sanford, 
    814 N.W.2d 611
    ,
    615 (Iowa 2012). “The jury’s findings of guilt are binding on appeal if the findings
    are supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Leckington, 
    713 N.W.2d 209
    , 213
    (Iowa 2006). “Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational trier of fact the
    defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Henderson, 
    908 N.W.2d 868
    , 875 (Iowa 2018).       “In making determinations on the sufficiency of the
    evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state.” 
    Id.
    “The standard of review with respect to the admission of hearsay evidence
    is for correction of errors at law.” State v. Huser, 
    894 N.W.2d 472
    , 495 (Iowa 2017).
    But, a statement “made by the party’s [co-conspirator] during and in furtherance of
    the conspiracy” is excluded from the rule against hearsay.             Iowa R. Evid.
    5.801(d)(2)(E). Before co-conspirator statements may be admitted,
    the trial court must make a preliminary finding, by a preponderance
    of evidence, that there was a conspiracy, that both the declarant and
    the party against whom the statement is offered were members of
    5
    the conspiracy, and that the statements were made in the course and
    in furtherance of the conspiracy.
    
    Id.
     The district court’s preliminary findings are reviewed for substantial evidence.
    Huser, 894 N.W.2d at 504.
    “Our standard of review of a sentence of the district court is for an abuse of
    discretion.” State v. Wickes, 
    910 N.W.2d 554
    , 564 (Iowa 2018). “An abuse of
    discretion occurs when the district court exercises its discretion on grounds that
    are ‘clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.’” State v. Moore, 
    936 N.W.2d 436
    , 439 (Iowa 2019) (quoting State v. Hill, 
    878 N.W.2d 269
    , 272 (Iowa
    2016)).
    III.   Discussion
    A.     Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    Sheeder argues she was provided ineffective assistance of counsel
    because her trial counsel failed to object to prosecutorial error. To the extent the
    claim runs afoul of Iowa Code section 814.7 (Supp. 2019), Sheeder argues the
    claim should be heard on direct appeal because the 2019 amendment
    (1) improperly restricts the role and jurisdiction of Iowa appellate courts and
    (2) denies her equal protection under the law.
    Iowa Code section 814.7 was amended to read,
    An ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a criminal case shall be
    determined by filing an application for postconviction relief pursuant
    to chapter 822. The claim need not be raised on direct appeal from
    the criminal proceedings in order to preserve the claim for
    postconviction relief purposes, and the claim shall not be decided on
    direct appeal from the criminal proceedings.
    2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 31. The amendment took effect on July 1, 2019. State
    v. Damme, 
    944 N.W.2d 98
    , 109 (Iowa 2020). Because judgment and sentence
    6
    were entered in October 2019, after the effective date of the amendment, we do
    not have the authority to consider the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim on
    direct appeal.   
    Id.
       And the supreme court has already rejected Sheeder’s
    separation-of-powers and equal-protection claims. See State v. Treptow, 
    960 N.W.2d 98
    , 103–07 (Iowa 2021).
    B.     Sufficiency of the Evidence
    Sheeder argues she did not have knowledge of Stendrup’s intent to commit
    an assault. If Sheeder’s argument is correct, it would mean she did not possess
    the requisite intent for the charges of aiding and abetting in robbery and felony
    murder. Our review of the record will focus on whether sufficient evidence was
    presented to support the jury’s findings. Leckington, 713 N.W.2d at 213. If the
    evidence presented “would convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty
    beyond a reasonable doubt,” we will affirm. Henderson, 908 N.W.2d at 875. Our
    review considers all of the evidence, including both inculpatory and exculpatory
    facts. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d at 615.
    The jury was provided with the following instructions relevant to the
    sufficiency-of-the-evidence claim raised on appeal.
    Instruction Number 16
    All persons involved in the commission of a crime, whether
    they directly commit the crime or knowingly “aid and abet” its
    commission, shall be treated in the same way.
    “Aid and abet” means to knowingly approve and agree to the
    commission of a crime, either by active participation in it or by
    knowingly advising or encouraging the act in some way before or
    when it is committed. Conduct following the crime may be
    considered only as it may tend to prove Jaycie Sheeder’s earlier
    participation. Mere nearness to, or presence at, the scene of the
    crime, without more evidence, is not “aiding and abetting.” Likewise,
    7
    mere knowledge of the crime is not enough to prove “aiding and
    abetting.”
    The guilt of a person who knowingly aids and abets the
    commission of a crime must be determined only on the facts which
    show the part he or she has in it, and does not depend upon the
    degree of another person’s guilt.
    If you find the State has proved Jaycie Sheeder directly
    committed the crime, or knowingly “aided and abetted” other persons
    in the commission of the crime, then Jaycie Sheeder is guilty of the
    crime charged.
    Instruction Number 27
    The State must prove all of the following elements of Murder
    in the First Degree:
    1. On or about the 21st Day of June, 2018, Jaycie Sheeder,
    or someone she was aiding and abetting, participated in the crime of
    Robbery in the First or Second Degree.
    2. During the course of the robbery, Jaycie Sheeder, or
    someone she aided and abetted, struck [J.M].
    3. [J.M.] died as a result of being struck.
    4. Jaycie Sheeder, or someone she aided and abetted, acted
    with malice aforethought.
    If the State has proved all of the elements, Jaycie Sheeder is
    guilty of Murder in the First Degree. If the State has failed to prove
    any one of the elements, Jaycie Sheeder is not guilty of Murder in
    the First Degree.
    Instruction Number 28
    “Malice” is a state of mind which leads one to intentionally do
    a wrongful act to the injury of another out of actual hatred, or with an
    evil or unlawful purpose. It may be established by evidence of actual
    hatred, or by proof of a deliberate or fixed intent to do injury. It may
    be found from the acts and conduct of Jaycie Sheeder, or someone
    she aided or abetted, and the means used in doing the wrongful and
    injurious act. Malice requires only such deliberation that would make
    a person appreciate and understand the nature of the act and its
    consequences, as distinguished from an act done in the heat of
    passion.
    “Malice aforethought” is a fixed purpose or design to do some
    physical harm to another which exists before the act is committed. It
    does not have to exist for any particular length of time.
    8
    Instruction Number 29
    Malice may be inferred from the commission of Robbery which
    results in death.
    Instruction Number 30
    Malice aforethought may be inferred from the use of a
    dangerous weapon.
    Instruction Number 33
    The State must prove all of the following elements of Robbery
    in the First Degree:
    1. On or about the 21st day of June, 2018, Jaycie Sheeder, or
    someone she aided and abetted, had the specific intent to commit a
    theft.
    2. To carry out that intention or to assist her, or someone she
    aided and abetted, in escaping from the scene, with or without the
    stolen property, Jaycie Sheeder, or someone she aided and abetted:
    a. Committed an assault on [J.M.]; or
    b. Threatened [J.M.] with, or purposely put [J.M] in fear
    of immediate serious injury; or
    c. Threatened to immediately commit murder.
    3. Jaycie Sheeder, or someone she aided and abetted:
    a. Purposely inflicted or attempted to inflict a serious
    injury on [J.M.]; or
    b. Was armed with a dangerous weapon.
    ....
    If the State has proved all of the elements, Jaycie Sheeder is
    guilty of Robbery in the First Degree. If the State has failed to prove
    any one of the elements, Jaycie Sheeder is not guilty of Robbery in
    the First Degree . . . .
    Instruction 36
    A person commits theft when the person takes possession or
    control of the property of another, or property in the possession of
    another, with the intent to deprive the other thereof.
    Instruction 39
    An Assault is committed when a person does an act which is
    meant to either:
    1. Cause pain or injury;
    9
    2. Result in physical contact which will be insulting or
    offensive;
    3. Place another person in fear of immediate physical contact
    which will be painful, injurious, insulting or offensive to another
    person when coupled with apparent ability to do the act.
    Our supreme court has long held that “[w]hen intent is an element of the
    crime charged, a person may be convicted as an aider and abettor by participating
    either with the requisite intent or with the knowledge that the principal possesses
    the required intent.” State v. Tangie, 
    616 N.W.2d 564
    , 573 (Iowa 2000). We must
    examine whether Sheeder had the requisite intent to aid or abet Stendrup in the
    crime of robbery in the first degree.
    Our review of the record reveals the following facts. J.M. deprived Sheeder
    and Stendrup of property that belonged to them but later communicated with
    Sheeder that he would help her regain that property. Sheeder and Stendrup went
    to Colfax with the intent to communicate with J.M. about the location of the
    property. Stendrup entered the Colfax residence alone, but Sheeder went directly
    to the van J.M. was known to drive to search for her property that was in J.M.’s
    possession. These facts are sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find beyond a
    reasonable doubt that Sheeder intended to voluntarily go to the scene with
    Stendrup to stage a surprise confrontation with J.M.
    The record also reveals that Sheeder was in contact with Stendrup, the
    associate, and J.M. in setting the meeting that occurred in the early morning hours
    of June 22. Sheeder transported Stendrup to the Colfax residence for the purpose
    of learning the location of the stolen property or finding it herself. The associate
    who occupied the residence testified that he saw J.M. attempt to flee to the kitchen
    when Stendrup entered. When the associate was able to see Stendrup, he was
    10
    carrying a baseball bat.      Fingerprint evidence also established that Stendrup
    handled the bat. The associate saw Stendrup swing the bat at J.M. and attempted
    to seek help from Sheeder, telling her either that J.M. could be hurt or that J.M.
    could be killed. The associate’s testimony also revealed that Sheeder could hear
    the violent incident on her phone1 and refused to engage when asked for help.
    When the incident was over, Sheeder transported Stendrup away from the
    residence. Sheeder admitted that she had a baseball bat in her car in the days
    prior to the incident and that she held it at her side in a prior situation that placed
    her in fear for her safety. Both Sheeder and Stendrup were frustrated that their
    property was stolen and had already engaged in self-help attempts to reclaim the
    property. Although minimal attempts to involve law enforcement were made, the
    parties engaged in self-help methods by enlisting others to intimidate parties in
    possession of the property.
    On our review of the record, we find the evidence presented was sufficient
    to allow a reasonable jury to find that Stendrup entered the home with the baseball
    bat for the purpose of, at a minimum, threatening injury to J.M. and had the
    apparent ability to inflict that injury. The evidence was sufficient to prove that
    Stendrup possessed the requisite intent to commit an assault.                 See 
    id.
    Furthermore, Sheeder’s conduct transporting Stendrup to and from the scene,
    communicating with the others to arrange the surprise meeting, searching the van
    while Stendrup confronted J.M., and ability to hear the altercation and refusing to
    1 Sheeder apparently was on a phone call with J.M. when Stendrup entered the
    residence, and the phones were still connected during the assault.
    11
    intervene are sufficient to convince a reasonable jury that she possessed
    knowledge of Stendrup’s intent to commit the assault. See 
    id.
    C.     Co-conspirator Statements
    Sheeder argues the district court erred in admitting co-conspirator
    statements made by Stendrup to a friend, J.L.             The State contests error
    preservation. In a hearing on pretrial motions, Sheeder argued the testimony
    provided by J.L. was hearsay and that any evidence she provided was irrelevant.
    Sheeder then filed a motion in limine to exclude J.L’s testimony as hearsay, and
    oral arguments were presented at a hearing.
    J.L.’s testimony at trial began with an offer of proof and was followed by oral
    arguments on the admissibility of her testimony. The court’s ruling included the
    following statements:
    I’m going to allow some of the statements. I don’t want a long-
    drawn-out history of drug use and everything else to come in. I think
    it’s fair to start with things were taken, to keep it very simple, and
    then to move on from the people in Colfax reached out to [Stendrup].
    I don’t expect [J.L.’s] testimony to be drawn out. And I can’t give
    more specifics.
    And [defense counsel], you are certainly welcome to object
    during direct. Okay?
    I do think that there is a prima facie case for the co-conspirator
    exception. Every crime or most crimes have a concealment phase.
    Sometimes it turns on whether concealment was planned as part of
    the original crime.
    But certainly the evidence so far has established that Ms.
    Sheeder was not entirely forthright as far as we can tell at this point
    when—the next morning when Mr. Stendrup was making these
    statements.
    I will entertain objections. And I expect this to be on a tight
    leash. Okay?
    Sheeder objected to the entry of Facebook messages exchanged between
    Stendrup and J.L. on relevance grounds; the objection was overruled. Sheeder
    12
    also objected to the phrasing of a question about whether Stendrup attempted to
    involve law enforcement to retrieve the stolen property; the question was
    rephrased.
    “It is a fundamental doctrine of appellate review that issues must ordinarily
    be both raised and decided by the district court before we will decide them on
    appeal.” Meier v. Senecaut, 
    641 N.W.2d 532
    , 537 (Iowa 2002). “When a district
    court fails to rule on an issue properly raised by a party, the party who raised the
    issue must file a motion requesting a ruling in order to preserve error for appeal.”
    
    Id.
    The transcript reveals that the following rulings were definitively made: (1) a
    prima facia case for the co-conspirator exception was established for some
    statements, (2) the Facebook messages were relevant, and (3) a question needed
    to be rephrased. Other than those rulings, the only record we have indicates that
    “some statements” were admissible as co-conspirator statements and the judge
    would hear objections throughout J.L.’s testimony. It does not appear that a written
    ruling was ever rendered on the motion in limine. “Where a motion in limine is
    resolved in such a way that it is beyond question whether or not the challenged
    evidence will be admitted during trial, there is no reason to voice objection at such
    time during trial.” Tangie, 
    616 N.W.2d at 569
     (quoting State v. Miller, 
    229 N.W.2d 732
    , 768 (Iowa 1975)). The district court’s statements that it could not be specific
    about which messages and testimony would be admitted and that objections would
    be entertained clearly show that objections and further arguments were necessary
    when Sheeder felt testimony was inadmissible. See 
    id.
     Accordingly, we find the
    only final rulings made were on the existence of a prima facie case for the co-
    13
    conspirator exception for some of Stendrup’s statements, the relevance of the
    Facebook messages, and the phrasing of one question. No further ruling was
    made on any of the other statements admitted because Sheeder’s counsel never
    made an objection, as they were instructed. Error is not preserved. See Meier,
    
    641 N.W.2d at 537
    .
    D.     Sentencing
    Sheeder argues the district court erred in imposing a mandatory sentence
    for her conviction of first-degree robbery when it had discretion to lower the
    mandatory sentence from seventy to fifty percent of the maximum, pursuant to
    Iowa Code section 902.12(3). The State concedes that the district court failed to
    exercise discretion. We vacate the sentence for first-degree robbery and remand
    for resentencing of Sheeder for her conviction of first-degree robbery.
    The parties noted a scrivener’s error in the sentencing order entered by the
    district court, stating that Sheeder was convicted of “Count 1: Murder in the First
    Degree in violation of Iowa Code section(s) 707.1, 707.2(1)(a) . . . .” The parties
    agree that Sheeder was convicted pursuant to Iowa Code sections 707.1 and
    707.2(1)(b). On remand, the district court shall correct the scrivener’s error to
    reflect Sheeder’s conviction pursuant to sections 707.1 and 707.2(1)(b).
    IV.    Conclusion
    On our review of the record, we find sufficient evidence was presented to
    support the jury’s guilty verdict for murder in the first degree. The district court’s
    vague comments about the admissibility of co-conspirator statements and
    announcement that objections would be entertained render any arguments on
    statements that did not receive an objection unpreserved for our review. The State
    14
    concedes that the district court did not exercise discretion when imposing the
    sentence for first-degree robbery; we vacate that sentence only and remand for
    resentencing and correction of the code section for Sheeder’s murder conviction.
    CONVICTION AFFIRMED; SENTENCE VACATED IN PART AND
    REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-1716

Filed Date: 10/20/2021

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/20/2021