State of Iowa v. James M. Heginger ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1657
Filed November 3, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JAMES M. HEGINGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Colleen D.
Weiland, Judge.
James Heginger appeals from a sentencing order requiring registration as
a sex offender for a term of life. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Greer, P.J. and Schumacher and Danilson, JJ.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2021).
2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
After entering a guilty plea to one count of assault with intent to commit
sexual abuse and one count of prostitution, the district court sentenced James
Heginger to an indeterminate five-year term of incarceration. Part of the
sentencing order included a requirement that Heginger comply with Iowa Code
chapter 692A (2020) “for a term of life.” Heginger appeals, claiming the court
lacked the authority to order him to register as a sex offender for life. Because the
determination of the length of any required registration is an administrative
decision of the Iowa Department of Public Safety, we vacate the portion of the
sentencing order that defines the length of the registry requirement, striking five
words—“for a term of life.”
As a preliminary matter, the State argues this court lacks jurisdiction to hear
Heginger’s claim on direct appeal. Iowa Code section 814.6 requires a defendant
to show “good cause” for a direct appeal from a judgment imposed after a guilty
plea. Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3). The defendant bears the burden of establishing
good cause for an appeal of a guilty plea. State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 104
(Iowa 2020). Good cause exists “when the defendant challenges his or her
sentence rather than the guilty plea.” Id. at 105. “[A] sentencing error invariably
arises after the court has accepted the guilty plea.” State v. Tucker, 959 N.W.2d
140, 153 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105). Our court has held
that the sentence must be “neither mandatory nor agreed to.” State v. Riley, No.
19-1317, 2021 WL 1662419, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 28, 2021) (emphasis
omitted) (quoting Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 105).
3
Heginger does not challenge his guilty plea. Instead, he alleges the district
court exceeded its statutory authority by imposing a sentence that included an
order to register as a sex offender for life. While Heginger agreed to the plea, he
contends the sentence—the portion containing the sex offender registration—was
illegal. Consequently, Heginger has shown good cause for appeal, and we may
consider it. See State v. Ritchie, No. 20-1181, 2021 WL 3074495, at *1-2 (Iowa
Ct. App. July 21, 2021).
I. Background & Proceedings
Heginger pled guilty on October 27, 2020, to one count of assault with intent
to commit sexual abuse and one count of prostitution. On December 14, he was
sentenced to a two-year term and a five-year term to be served concurrently.1 The
sentencing order included, in relevant part, “Defendant must comply with the sex
offender registration requirements of Iowa Code Chapter 692A for a term of life.”
Heginger timely appealed from the sentencing order.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Heginger argues the district court lacked the authority to
sentence him to register as a sex offender for life and doing so constituted a
violation of the separation-of-powers doctrine.
We review sentencing decisions for a correction of errors at law. Iowa R.
App. P. 6.907; State v. Letscher, 888 N.W.2d 880, 883 (Iowa 2016). “We will not
reverse the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some
defect in the sentencing procedure.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa
1 Heginger has a prior conviction for a sexual offense.
4
2002). Constitutional arguments are reviewed de novo. State v. Briggs, 666
N.W.2d 573, 575 (Iowa 2003).
In its judgment and sentencing order, the district court ordered Heginger to
comply with registration requirements under Iowa Code chapter 692A for a term of
life. Heginger correctly cites “the determination of the length of any required [sex
offender] registration is an administrative decision initially committed to the
Department of Public Safety.” Barker v. Iowa Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 922 N.W.2d
581, 585 (Iowa 2019) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Bullock, 638 N.W.2d
728, 735 (Iowa 2002)). As such, Heginger asserts the district court lacked
authority to order Heginger to register for life.
In Bullock, the supreme court stated, “because sex offender registration is
an administrative process that does not commence for an incarcerated individual
until he is released from prison,” the matter is not ripe for review. 638 N.W.2d at
734; see also Iowa Code § 692A.107(1). Until the Department of Public Safety
makes a determination on the length of Heginger’s term of registration, there is no
controversy.2 See id. at 735 (“Any adjudication by the district court prior to an
administrative decision and a request for judicial review of that decision is
premature.”). The Bullock court remanded for entry of a judgment of conviction for
burglary in the first degree and sexual abuse in the second degree and for
sentencing on both convictions. See id. The supreme court instructed “[t]he
court’s sentencing order shall not include any determination of the defendant’s
responsibility to register as a sex offender.” Id.
2 The State concedes that to the extent the district court ordered Heginger to
register as a sex offender for life, the district court lacked the authority to do so.
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Most recently, this issue has been squarely addressed by our supreme
court. The court found the portion of the sentencing order that specified a duration
for the defendant’s sex-offender registration was illegal. See State v. Goodson,
958 N.W.2d 791, 806 (2021).3
III. Conclusion
“Generally, in criminal cases, where an improper or illegal sentence is
severable from the valid portion of the sentence, we may vacate the invalid part
without disturbing the rest of the sentence.” State v. Keutla, 798 N.W.2d 731, 735
(Iowa 2011). Given the recent supreme court guidance, we vacate the portion of
the sentencing order that requires Heginger to register for a term of life. We affirm
the remainder of the sentencing order.
AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART.
3Having resolved this appeal on other matters, we need not address Heginger’s
separation-of-powers argument. Simmons v. State Pub. Def., 791 N.W.2d 69, 73-
74 (Iowa 2010) (stating that “we look to statutory issues first in order to avoid
unnecessary constitutional questions”).