In the Interest of K.M., Minor Child ( 2019 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 19-0503
    Filed July 3, 2019
    IN THE INTEREST OF K.M.,
    Minor Child,
    R.R., Mother,
    Appellant,
    S.M., Father,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cedar County, Gary P. Strausser,
    District Associate Judge.
    A mother and father separately appeal the termination of their parental
    rights to their child. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
    Sara Strain Linder of Bray & Klockau, Iowa City, for appellant mother.
    Lisa Renee Jones of Norton, Baumann & Surls, PLLC, Lowden, for
    appellant father.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee State.
    Don W. Schroeder of Schroeder Law Firm PLC, West Liberty, attorney and
    guardian ad litem for minor child.
    Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
    2
    MAY, Judge.
    The juvenile court terminated a mother and father’s parental rights to their
    child, K.M.      On appeal, both parents contend the juvenile court erred (1) in
    concluding the statutory requirements for termination were satisfied. Additionally,
    the mother contends the juvenile court erred (2) in declining to provide her with an
    additional six months to work toward reunification, (3) in finding termination is in
    K.M.’s best interest, and (4) in terminating despite a strong parent-child bond and
    K.M.’s placement with a relative. We affirm the juvenile court.
    I. Background Facts and Proceedings
    K.M. was born in 2017. Prior to K.M.’s birth, the parents’ drug use led the
    Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) to become involved with respect to
    their older children.1      The mother continued to use methamphetamine while
    pregnant with K.M. The mother gave birth to K.M. three weeks early; as a result,
    K.M. had to stay in the neonatal intensive care unit for one week. K.M.’s umbilical
    cord blood tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine. The mother
    also tested positive for amphetamines.
    The juvenile court issued an emergency order removing K.M. from both
    parents’ care. The court then adjudicated K.M. as a child in need of assistance
    and placed K.M. in the custody of a maternal aunt.
    DHS experienced difficulty in providing services to the parents.                 The
    parents’ phones were shut off at one point, preventing communication with DHS.
    And the parents failed to meet with the social worker tasked with compiling their
    1
    K.M.’s mother has a child with another man. K.M.’s father has three other children.
    3
    social history. Likewise, both parents often arrived late or failed to attend visitation,
    though the mother attended more often than the father. During visitation, the
    mother sometimes exhibited signs of stimulant crash, such as sleeping so soundly
    that the care coordinator had to wake her up.
    Animosity also began to grow between the mother and her sister, K.M.’s
    placement. The mother believed her sister intended to “steal[]” K.M. The mother’s
    sister grew suspicious that the mother continued to abuse methamphetamine. She
    also felt the mother had become belligerent toward her and did not respect her or
    her husband. As a result, the sister ultimately refused to supervise any additional
    visitation for the parents.
    Shortly after K.M.’s birth, the mother sought intensive outpatient substance-
    abuse treatment, but she failed to attend individual appointments or group therapy.
    This prompted the treatment facility to recommend the mother be reevaluated to
    determine her treatment options. The mother showed signs of drug use at a
    January 2018 meeting. She tested positive for methamphetamine in March 2018.
    However, the mother began substance-abuse treatment that same month.
    According to a July 2018 letter from her care provider, the mother continued to
    progress in treatment up to that point in time.
    Meanwhile, the father also struggled with substance abuse, testing positive
    for amphetamines and methamphetamine in December 2017. And he exhibited
    signs of drug use at the January 2018 meeting. In February 2018, the father
    completed a substance-abuse evaluation, which recommended extended out-
    patient treatment. In March 2018, he again tested positive for methamphetamine.
    4
    The father entered substance-abuse treatment in April 2018 but did not complete
    the program.
    The juvenile court held a termination hearing in July 2018. The parents
    arrived late without explanation. The juvenile court ordered both parents to submit
    to drug testing, which was available in the courthouse. The mother’s results were
    negative, but the father tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines.
    On March 14, 2019, the juvenile court terminated both the mother and
    father’s parental rights to K.M. pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(e), (h),
    and (l) (2018). Both parents appealed. Our supreme court transferred the case to
    this court.
    II. Standard of Review
    We review termination proceedings de novo. In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    , 40
    (Iowa 2010). “We examine both the facts and law, and we adjudicate anew those
    issues properly preserved and presented.” In re C.S., No. 13-1796, 
    2014 WL 667883
    , at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2014). “Although we are not bound by them,
    we give weight to the trial court’s findings of fact, especially when considering
    credibility of witnesses.” In re C.B., 
    611 N.W.2d 489
    , 492 (Iowa 2000).
    III. Analysis
    We generally use a three-step analysis to review the termination of a
    parent’s rights. In re A.S., 
    906 N.W.2d 467
    , 472 (Iowa 2018). First, we must
    determine whether a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been
    established. 
    Id.
     at 472–73. If a ground for termination has been established, we
    must then consider “whether the best-interest framework as laid out in section
    232.116(2) supports the termination of parental rights.” Id. at 473. Finally, we
    5
    must consider “whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude
    termination of parental rights.” Id. (quoting In re M.W., 
    876 N.W.2d 212
    , 220 (Iowa
    2016)).
    A. Grounds for Termination
    Our first step is to determine if a ground of termination under section
    232.116(1) has been established. 
    Id.
     at 472–73. “The State has the burden of
    proving the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.” In re
    H.L.B.R., 
    567 N.W.2d 675
    , 677 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). “When the juvenile court
    terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the
    juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported by the record.” In re A.B.,
    
    815 N.W.2d 764
    , 774 (Iowa 2012). We choose to address grounds for termination
    under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) with respect to both parents.
    Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) authorizes termination of a parent’s
    parental rights when:
    (1) The child is three years of age or younger.
    (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of
    assistance pursuant to section 232.96.
    (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of
    the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months,
    or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home
    has been less than thirty days.
    (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child
    cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided
    in section 232.102 at the present time.
    Here, each parent challenges the fourth element. Each contends K.M. could have
    been returned to their care at the time of the termination hearing.
    We agree with the juvenile court that K.M. could not be returned to the
    father’s care.   The father was largely absent from visitations with K.M.       He
    6
    continued to abuse methamphetamine. We commend the father for eventually
    participating in substance-abuse treatment.       However, his positive drug test
    administered the day of the termination hearing demonstrates K.M. could not
    safely return to his care. See In re J.S., 
    846 N.W.2d 36
    , 42 (Iowa 2014) (“[A]
    juvenile court could reasonably determine that a parent’s active addiction to
    methamphetamine is ‘imminently likely’ to result in harmful effects to the physical,
    mental, or social wellbeing of the children in the parent’s care.”); A.B., 815 N.W.2d
    at 776 (noting “an unresolved, severe, and chronic drug addiction can render a
    parent unfit to raise children”); In re B.S., No.19-0006, 
    2019 WL 1055686
    , at *1
    (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 6, 2019) (collecting cases concluding a child cannot be safely
    returned to parent with unresolved substance-abuse issues).
    We also agree with the juvenile court that K.M. could not be returned to the
    mother’s care either. During several visitations, the mother displayed signs of a
    stimulant crash, indicating she recently used stimulants. On one occasion, she fell
    asleep while holding K.M. She smacked K.M.’s head on a table when she awoke.
    While her drug screen during the termination hearing was negative, she had
    a positive test a few months prior. We find her explanation that she used another
    person’s urine to produce a false positive for that test to be unbelievable and
    illogical.   The mother also evaded drug testing on several occasions, which
    suggests she knew testing would produce a positive result. Cf. In re C.W., No. 14-
    1501, 
    2014 WL 5865351
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2014) (noting missed drug
    screenings are presumed positive).
    The mother also struggled to comply with basic tasks such as confirming
    visitations by 8:30 a.m. the day of visitation. She explained she had difficulty
    7
    waking up in time. It is difficult to imagine she would be able to adequately care
    for K.M., an infant, when she is unable to wake up in the mornings to complete
    basic tasks. Even more concerning, two weeks prior to the termination hearing,
    the mother fell asleep while driving to a visitation with her other child. She only
    woke up after driving over roadside rumble strips. She pulled over, slept on the
    side of the road, and missed the scheduled visitation.
    Finally, given the father’s ongoing substance abuse, the mother’s continued
    relationship with the father also indicates K.M. could not be safely returned to the
    mother’s care. See In re M.M., No. 18-1028, 
    2018 WL 4361074
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct.
    App. Sept. 12, 2018) (noting a parent’s ongoing relationship with an active
    substance abuser weighed in favor of termination).
    In short, K.M could not have been returned to either parent’s care at the
    time of the termination hearing. The first step of our analysis is satisfied.2
    2
    Neither parent directly challenges the sufficiency the State’s reasonable efforts to support
    reunification, which “impacts the burden of proving [the statutory] elements of termination,
    which require reasonable efforts.” See C.B., 
    611 N.W.2d at 493
     (“The State must show
    reasonable efforts as part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the
    care of a parent.”). However, both parents allude to such a challenge in their petitions on
    appeal. Any such claims are not sufficiently developed for our review. See In re E.C., No.
    14-0754, 
    2014 WL 3513336
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 16, 2014). Further, any such claim
    is waived because neither parent brought a request for additional services to the juvenile
    court prior to the termination hearing. See In re C.H., 
    652 N.W.2d 144
    , 147 (Iowa 2002)
    (“If, however, a parent is not satisfied with DHS’[s] response to a request for other services,
    the parent must come to the court and present this challenge.”); In re A.A.G., 
    708 N.W.2d 85
    , 91 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005) (stating the parent has an obligation to demand other,
    different, or additional services prior to the termination hearing or the issue is considered
    waived for appeal).
    8
    B. Best-Interest Framework
    Our next step is to consider the best-interest framework set forth in section
    232.116(2). A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 473. Section 232.116(2) provides in relevant
    part:
    In considering whether to terminate the rights of a parent
    under this section, the court shall give primary consideration to the
    child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term
    nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and
    emotional condition and needs of the child.
    See 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2)(a), (b), (c) (identifying factors that may be relevant to
    the court’s best-interest analysis).
    Here, the father does not contest the juvenile court’s conclusion termination
    of his parental rights is in K.M.’s best interest. The mother, however, notes K.M.
    recognizes her and that she has provided for K.M.’s needs. On these grounds, the
    mother argues that termination is not in K.M.’s best interest.
    We disagree. K.M. has not lived with either parent. Neither parent has
    provided care and support for K.M. for any meaningful period of time. Rather, K.M.
    is bonded to her aunt’s family, who has cared for her since 2017. The aunt and
    uncle are willing to adopt K.M. See 
    id.
     § 232.116(2)(b). Both are working to
    maintain a relationship between K.M. and a half-sibling. Cf. In re A.M.S., 
    419 N.W.2d 723
    , 734 (Iowa 1988) (noting siblings should be raised together when
    possible). We conclude the second step of our analysis is satisfied.
    C. Exceptions
    Next, we consider section 232.116(3), which provides as follows:
    The court need not terminate the relationship between the
    parent and child if the court finds any of the following:
    (a) A relative has legal custody of the child.
    9
    (b) The child is over ten years of age and objects to the
    termination.
    (c) There is clear and convincing evidence that the termination
    would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of
    the parent-child relationship.
    (d) It is necessary to place the child in a hospital, facility, or
    institution for care and treatment and the continuation of the parent-
    child relationship is not preventing a permanent family placement for
    the child.
    (e) The absence of a parent is due to the parent’s admission
    or commitment to any institution, hospital, or health facility or due to
    active service in the state or federal armed forces.
    “[T]he parent resisting termination bears the burden to establish an
    exception to termination” under section 232.116(3). A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476. If
    the parent proves an exception, this court may conclude termination is
    inappropriate. Id. We are not, however, required to reach that conclusion. In re
    A.M., 
    843 N.W.2d 100
    , 113 (Iowa 2014). Rather, we exercise our discretion,
    “based on the unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the
    child,” to determine whether the parent-child relationship should be saved. 
    Id.
    (citation omitted).
    The father does not contend any exception to termination applies, but the
    mother does. She contends the juvenile court did not need to terminate because
    K.M. was in the custody of a relative pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(a).
    The State responds that the mother failed to preserve error because she failed to
    assert this claim in the juvenile court. We agree with the State. See A.B., 815
    N.W.2d at 773 (“[T]he general rule that appellate arguments must first be raised in
    the trial court applies to . . . termination of parental rights cases.”). Moreover, even
    if error was preserved, we find no compelling reason to apply the exception and
    10
    forego termination in this instance. Rather, for reasons already explained, we
    believe K.M.’s best interest requires termination.
    Still, the mother argues the strength of the parent-child bond should
    preclude termination pursuant to section 232.116(3)(c). We disagree and find the
    mother overstates her relationship with K.M. See In re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 709
    (Iowa 2010) (“[O]ur consideration must center on whether the child will be
    disadvantaged by termination, and whether the disadvantage overcomes [the
    parent]’s inability to provide for [the child]’s developing needs.”).
    D. Additional Time
    Finally, we consider the mother’s contention the juvenile court erred in
    declining to provide an additional six months to work toward reunification. The
    juvenile court may defer termination for a period of six months if it is able to
    “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which
    comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from
    the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.”
    
    Iowa Code § 232.104
    (2)(b).
    Here, the mother argues the need for removal will be obviated in the near
    future as she progresses through substance-abuse treatment and therapy. She
    also points to her recent improvements in attending visitation and maintaining
    stable housing.     Even so, the mother appears committed to continuing her
    relationship with the father. His confirmed substance abuse presents a serious
    risk of harm to K.M. Moreover, the mother’s “past performance is indicative of the
    quality of care [s]he is capable of providing in the future.” In re N.A.S., No. 13-
    0074, 
    2013 WL 988895
    , at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 13, 2013); accord In re C.W.,
    11
    
    554 N.W.2d 279
    , 283 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996). Her history reveals deficiencies she
    is unlikely to resolve in the near future. The juvenile court reasonably concluded
    it could not rely on the mother to turn over a new leaf within the next six months.
    IV. Conclusion
    For the reasons stated, we conclude the juvenile court properly terminated
    both parents’ parental rights.
    AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.