In the Interest of D.K., Minor Child ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-2019
Filed August 21, 2019
IN THE INTEREST OF D.K.,
Minor Child,
K.E., Mother,
Petitioner-Appellee,
B.S., Father,
Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Appanoose County, William
Owens, Associate Juvenile Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his minor child.
AFFIRMED.
Monte McCoy of McCoy Legal Services, Centerville, for appellant father.
Alan M. Wilson of Miles Law Firm, Corydon, for appellee mother.
Jonathan Willier, Centerville, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child, D.K.,
who was four years old at the time of the termination hearing. The district court
terminated the father’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 600A.8(3)(b)
(2018). On appeal, the father argues the termination of his parental rights is
supported by insufficient evidence.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The mother and father were eighteen and seventeen years old
respectively when D.K. was born. D.K., the parents, and some members of the
mother and father’s families all lived together in Galva, Illinois. In March or April
2015, the mother and her family decided to leave Galva with D.K. and move to
Centerpoint, Iowa, where the mother’s family had lived in the past. The father did
not want the mother to take D.K., and either he or his family contacted law
enforcement to prevent the mother from moving D.K. to Iowa. The father was
informed that, because he was a minor, the mother was D.K.’s “legal custodian”
and could move D.K. to Iowa without his permission.
On April 15, 2015, the mother applied for relief from domestic abuse. On
May 11, 2015, the district court entered a protective order granting the mother
temporary legal custody of D.K. subject to the father’s right to arrange visitation
with D.K. at the home of R.E., D.K.’s maternal grandmother. The parents agreed
to arrange times for the father to visit D.K. by contacting R.E. through social
media. The protective order did not specify how the father was supposed to
contact R.E. The district court renewed the protective order for another year on
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May 26, 2016, and the renewed order adopted the same custody and visitation
provisions.
The father only visited D.K. once between April 2015 and the November
2018 termination hearing. The visit occurred on Easter 2016 and lasted for one
hour. The father and his family asked R.E. about arranging two other visits, but
R.E.’s health did not permit either visit to take place. The mother and R.E.
offered to pay for the father’s train ticket to visit D.K., but the father declined. The
father had no other contact with D.K. throughout the termination proceedings.
Once the renewed protection order expired on May 16, 2017, R.E. either
blocked or unfriended the father on social media. While the parties dispute
whether R.E. blocked or unfriended the father, undisputed testimony suggests
the father would be able to message R.E. if she unfriended him, but would not be
able to message R.E. if she blocked him. The parties also dispute whether the
father could contact the mother or R.E. through other means. The father had
gone to R.E.’s house for the Easter 2016 visit, although he testified that he had
forgotten where she lived. He also knew R.E.’s phone number, although at the
termination hearing he testified she had blocked his phone number and his
mother’s phone number. Both the mother and R.E. testified the father never tried
to contact them after the renewed protection order expired.
The mother filed the petition to terminate parental rights, and a hearing
took place in August 2018. The mother testified the father had only sent her
$600 in child support, and had not sent D.K. any presents or cards for D.K.’s
birthday or for any holidays. The father admitted he made no other
arrangements to visit D.K. besides the Easter 2016 visit. The district court
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determined the father had abandoned D.K. under Iowa Code section
600A.8(3)(b) and granted the mother’s petition to terminate the father’s parental
rights. The father appeals.
II. Standard of Review
We review termination of parental rights proceedings under Iowa Code
chapter 600A de novo. In re Q.G., 911 N.W.2d 761, 769 (Iowa 2018). “Although
we are not bound by them, we give weight to the trial court’s findings of fact,
especially when considering credibility of witnesses.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d
489, 491 (Iowa 2000).
III. Discussion
The district court terminated the father’s parental rights under Iowa Code
section 600A.8(3)(b). The father argues the mother did not meet her burden to
prove that he had abandoned D.K. under chapter 600A by clear and convincing
evidence. “The grounds for termination of a parent’s rights must be established
by clear and convincing evidence.” In re T.S., No. 18-1333, 2019 WL 325042, at
*1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 23, 2019) (quoting In re C.A.V., 787 N.W.2d 96, 100 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2010)). We conclude the mother has proven the father abandoned D.K.
by clear and convincing evidence.
A. Abandonment under Iowa Code section 600A.8(3)(b)
The first step in the analysis is to determine whether the mother has
shown grounds for terminating the father’s parental rights to D.K. exist. Chapter
600A defines “[t]o abandon a minor child” as when a parent “rejects the duties
imposed by the parent-child relationship . . . which may be evinced by the
person, while being able to do so, making no provision or making only a marginal
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effort to provide for the support of the child or to communicate with the child.”
Iowa Code § 600A.2(20). Under section 600A.8(3)(b),
[A] parent is deemed to have abandoned the child unless the
parent maintains substantial and continuous or repeated contact
with the child as demonstrated by contribution toward support of the
child of a reasonable amount, according to the parent’s means, and
as demonstrated by any of the following:
(1) Visiting the child at least monthly when physically and
financially able to do so and when not prevented from doing so by
the person having lawful custody of the child.
(2) Regular communication with the child or with the person
having the care or custody of the child, when physically and
financially unable to visit the child or when prevented from visiting
the child by the person having lawful custody of the child.
....
“[T]he threshold element of ‘substantial and continuous or repeated
contact’ is economic contributions.” In re S.A., No. 17-0859, 2018 WL 1182889,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2018) (quoting In re. K.W., No. 14-2115, 2015 WL
6508910, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2015)). The district court determined the
father had not provided adequate financial support to D.K. within his means. On
appeal, the father highlights the district court’s determination that the mother
provided insufficient evidence to terminate his parental rights under Iowa Code
section 600A.8(4). But reasonable support “is not limited to court-ordered
support.” In re W.W., 826 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Iowa Ct. App. 2012). Other
evidence supports the district court’s conclusion that the father has not provided
reasonable support within his means, despite the child-support payments. The
father was employed building trailers for about a year. Prior to that, he was
employed either building trailers or as a general laborer at two farms. Apart from
child-support payments, he has provided no financial support to D.K. at all over
that period. He did not send D.K. any gifts or holiday presents. He did not give
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the mother any money for D.K.’s medical costs, clothing, food, or other
expenses.
Other evidence supports the determination that the father abandoned D.K.
by failing to make consistent monthly visits or maintain contact with D.K. or the
mother. The father admits he only visited D.K. once since they moved to Iowa in
April 2015, and that visit lasted only one hour. He further admits R.E. once
offered to pay for his train ticket to visit D.K., which he declined. Testimony by
R.E. also showed that she made other attempts to arrange visits, which the
father also declined.
The father argues he did not abandon D.K. because the mother and R.E.
prevented him from having contact with him. He maintains the mother and R.E.
prevented him from contacting them through social media, and R.E. blocked his
phone number. The district court heard this testimony and concluded the mother
and R.E.’s testimony was more credible. Additionally, “[t]he subjective intent of
the parent . . . unsupported by evidence of acts specified in paragraph . . . ‘b’
manifesting such intent, does not preclude a determination that the parent has
abandoned the child.” Iowa Code § 600A.8(3)(c). That same provision also
notes neither the mother nor R.E. had to encourage the father to visit D.K. Id.
(“In making a determination, the court shall not require a showing of diligent
efforts by any person to encourage the parent to perform the acts specified in
paragraph . . . ‘b’.”). We conclude the mother proved the father abandoned D.K.
under Iowa Code section 600A.8(3)(b) by clear and convincing evidence.
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B. Best Interest Analysis
Once a ground for termination has been established, “the petitioner next
must show by clear and convincing evidence termination of parental rights is in
the best interest of the child.” Q.G., 911 N.W.2d at 770. The best interest
analysis “requires that each biological parent affirmatively assume the duties
encompassed by the role of being a parent.” Iowa Code § 600A.1(2). Affirmative
assumption of parental duties includes “the fulfillment of financial obligations,
demonstration of continued interest in the child, demonstration of a genuine effort
to maintain communication with the child, and demonstration of the
establishment and maintenance of a place of importance in the child’s life.” Id.
The best interest analysis is not “a formulaic or rule-bound approach,” and
“[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts.” Q.G., 911 N.W.2d at 771.
In this case, several factors point toward termination as in the best
interests of D.K. First, there is no close relationship between the father and D.K.,
who has only seen the father once since moving to Iowa. The father has not
made a genuine effort to maintain contact with D.K., despite knowing how to
contact R.E. and R.E.’s efforts to set up visits between the father and D.K. while
the protective orders were in effect. An additional factor in the interest of D.K.’s
stability is his relationship with the mother’s fiancé. See id. (“Another factor to
consider is the fact that a stepfather is willing to provide for the children’s needs
and is willing to adopt the children.”); see also In re T.K., No. 16-0029, 2016 WL
4384869, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2016) (considering the “large role” played
by a mother’s husband in the best interest analysis). The mother and R.E. both
testified that D.K. considers the fiancé to be his father, and the mother further
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testified the fiancé would be willing to adopt D.K. if the father’s parental rights are
terminated.
Considering the evidence together, the father has not “affirmatively
assumed the duties encompassed by” being D.K.’s father and has not
maintained a place of importance in D.K.’s life. Iowa Code § 600A.1(2). We
conclude termination is in D.K.’s best interest.
AFFIRMED.