State of Iowa v. Thaddeus John Ellenbecker ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 3-968 / 12-2229
Filed May 14, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
THADDEUS JOHN ELLENBECKER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Winnebago County, Stephen P.
Carroll (suppression) and DeDra L. Schroeder (trial), Judges.
Thaddeus Ellenbecker appeals his second-degree arson and second-
degree burglary convictions. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Timothy L. Lapointe of The Law Offices of Timothy L. Lapointe, P.C.,
Mason City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Tyler J. Buller and Scott D. Brown,
Assistant Attorneys General and Adam D. Sauer, County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
2
BOWER, J.
Former Forest City Police Officer Thaddeus Ellenbecker appeals his
convictions for second-degree arson (police building) and second-degree
burglary (another officer’s gun). See Iowa Code §§ 712.1, .3, 713.1, .5(1) (2011).
Ellenbecker claims the district court erred in declining to suppress statements he
made to agents of the Iowa Department of Criminal Investigation (DCI) in
violation of his constitutional rights.1
We conclude Ellenbecker was in custody when a DCI agent seized him
and pinned him against the wall of his apartment complex before a second agent
shot him in the leg. Ellenbecker was still in custody when the DCI agents later
questioned him in the hospital without advising him of his Miranda rights.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
In July 2009 Ellenbecker was hired as a police officer by the Forest City
Police Department. Ellenbecker moved from Minnesota to Forest City, but his
wife and children maintained a residence in Minnesota. Shortly thereafter,
Ellenbecker reported the Iowa house he was renting in a remote area had been
the subject of a drive-by shooting. In November 2010, after Ellenbecker helped
Officer Carrie Seiberlich start her patrol car, a rifle was stolen from her locked car
trunk.
In early September 2011, the Forest City police station was vandalized,
including a spray-painted statement, “Pigs Will Die.” On October 1, 2011, shortly
1
We need not address the other arguments Ellenbecker raises on appeal because we
conclude the custody issue is dispositive, requiring a remand for a new trial.
3
after Ellenbecker finished his work shift, a fire occurred in the evidence room of
the Forest City police station. Three days after the fire, on October 4,
Ellenbecker reported he had been assaulted in the police station’s garage.
Based on the above incidents, the Forest City Chief of Police requested
the DCI conduct an investigation of Ellenbecker. All of the DCI interviews were
recorded.
A. October 10—First Interview. After the fire, the Forest City police
department operated out of the county’s law enforcement center temporarily. On
October 10, 2011, DCI Agent Callaway asked Ellenbecker to answer some
questions and met with him at the center. Agent Callaway recognized
Ellenbecker as a 2010 participant in a three-day training seminar Callaway co-
taught on “suspect interviews”—exploring circumstances when Miranda warnings
are required. Ellenbecker did not make any incriminating statements and denied
involvement in the fire.
B. October 20—Second Interview. On October 20 Callaway again
asked Ellenbecker to answer questions. Callaway agreed to meet Ellenbecker at
the law enforcement center. Ellenbecker voluntarily came to the building.
Ellenbecker needed to “buzz in” to enter the building, but he could exit at any
time by pushing on an exit door. Callaway testified2 Ellenbecker was familiar with
the building. Callaway did not have a visible weapon, and he asked Ellenbecker
to check his gun. Ellenbecker checked his gun without complaint and received
2
References to the testimony of DCI Agents Callaway, Peterson, Krapfl, Turbett,
Hedlund, or Thiele, refer to the agents’ testimony at the June 18, 2012 hearing on
Ellenbecker’s motion to suppress evidence.
4
the key to the lock box holding his gun. Ellenbecker possessed his cell phone at
all times.
After a discussion about the assault, which Ellenbecker alleged occurred
on October 4, Ellenbecker agreed to take a polygraph test. DCI Agent Peterson
conducted the test and testified Ellenbecker was agreeable to testing. Peterson
told Ellenbecker “he was free to leave, the door was unlocked, [and] you can
leave anytime you want to.” Ellenbecker took and failed the polygraph test.
After the test, Agent Callaway resumed his conversation with Ellenbecker,
who repeatedly asked if he was under arrest and whether he could leave.
Callaway repeatedly stated Ellenbecker was not under arrest and was “free to
go.” Callaway described Ellenbecker’s decision to leave the building: “One of the
last times [Ellenbecker] asked if he was free to go and I responded, yes, you are,
he gathered up his stuff and walked out, walked down the steps and out the front
door.” Ellenbecker left his gun behind in the lock box.
Callaway followed Ellenbecker down the steps and continued to talk with
him outside the building. Callaway was concerned about Ellenbecker’s “fatalistic”
demeanor. When Ellenbecker started walking away from the building, Callaway
walked with him. Callaway testified he did not know where Ellenbecker was
going but accompanied him due to his hope Ellenbecker “would come back in
and talk to me, that I could persuade him to come back in and tell the truth. That
was the initial part of the walk.”
The walk lasted “about seven blocks.” Callaway testified Ellenbecker
talked about being a failure but also stated “he wasn’t going to hurt his wife or his
5
kids.” As they walked, Callaway continued his efforts to “persuade [Ellenbecker]
to come back and talk,” telling Ellenbecker his situation is “not as bad” as he
“might think it is.” Callaway explained:
Q. Were you concerned about [Ellenbecker’s] personal
physical safety? A. Yes.
Q. Why is that? A. Just from twenty-one years of law
enforcement and thousands of contacts with the public . . . . I felt
he was at the point where . . . he was talking about being a failure,
very, very depressed.
During the walk Ellenbecker used his cell phone to call his wife but did not
reach her. Callaway saw Ellenbecker brighten up when the walk ended at the
parking lot of Ellenbecker’s apartment complex and Ellenbecker saw his wife’s
car. Callaway testified Ellenbecker stated, “Let me go in and talk to my wife and
then I’ll come back out and talk to you.” Callaway asked Ellenbecker if he had
any guns inside. Ellenbecker said he did not and entered the apartment
complex.
Callaway stayed outside and called Agent Peterson, telling him
Ellenbecker wanted to continue talking after speaking with his wife. Callaway
asked Peterson to come to the apartment complex.
After Ellenbecker had been inside about six minutes, Callaway saw him
come outside with his wife and two young children. The couple put the children
into a car. Callaway heard Ellenbecker tell his wife to leave. Ellenbecker then
yelled to Callaway to come over and talk to his wife. As this conversation was
starting, Ellenbecker walked away, heading toward the apartments. Callaway
testified because he did not know what Ellenbecker had already told his wife, he
asked Ellenbecker to come back. In response, Ellenbecker “stopped and pivoted
6
. . . and pulled his coat back.” Callaway then saw Ellenbecker had a handgun.
Callaway again asked Ellenbecker to stop and come back, and Ellenbecker
turned and walked away. Callaway ran, caught up to Ellenbecker near the
building, and “pinned him against the door of the apartment complex.” Callaway
and Ellenbecker struggled as Callaway attempted to prevent Ellenbecker from
“pulling his gun out of his holster.” Callaway testified he took these actions
because he was concerned about what Ellenbecker intended to do inside the
apartment.
Agent Peterson testified he heard yelling when he arrived at the complex
and then as he approached the struggling men. Peterson observed Ellenbecker
had a firearm on his hip and Callaway had Ellenbecker “pushed up against this
back door of the apartment.” Peterson testified as the Callaway-Ellenbecker
struggle moved from the alcove’s door to the corner, he saw Ellenbecker’s “hand
go toward his gun.” Peterson shot Ellenbecker in the leg and called 911.
Numerous officers arrived, including Iowa State Trooper Duenow.
Callaway secured Ellenbecker by holding his hands while they waited for
the ambulance. After Callaway was provided with a pair of handcuffs, he
handcuffed Ellenbecker. Callaway explained: “Once we had secured his gun and
gotten that away from him, once we secured the scene, made sure nothing else
was going to happen, the ambulance personnel took over the first aid . . . and the
handcuffs were removed.”
7
Ellenbecker was placed in the ambulance and taken to the hospital in
Mason City. During the ambulance ride, Ellenbecker was not in handcuffs, but
he was accompanied by Trooper Duenow.3
At the suppression hearing, Callaway testified he did not place
Ellenbecker under arrest and told “everybody”—Ellenbecker, Ellenbecker’s wife,
the responding police officers, and the ambulance crew.
C. Third Interview. At the Mason City hospital, Ellenbecker was treated
in the emergency room and then moved to a hospital room. Ellenbecker was not
restrained while in the hospital.
When DCI Agents Krapfl and Turbett arrived at the hospital around 11:00
p.m. on the evening of the shooting, Troopers Duenow and Knutson were in
Ellenbecker’s room. The troopers were in uniform.4 Turbett testified that he
believed Duenow was Ellenbecker’s “acquaintance or even a friend level” and
neither trooper was there at his request or, to his knowledge, at the request of a
law enforcement officer. Agents Turbett and Krapfl were unarmed and dressed
casually in blue jeans. They did not place a guard outside Ellenbecker’s room.
Agent Turbett spoke with a nurse, identified himself, stated they wanted to
talk to Ellenbecker, and asked the nurse about Ellenbecker’s medications. The
nurse told Turbett “it would be a good time,” Ellenbecker’s “ability to reason and
communicate would not be impaired.” While Turbett spoke with the nurse, Krapfl
spoke with Duenow in the hallway outside the room:
3
Agent Peterson testified: “I thought I heard someone yell for [Duenow] to jump in the
ambulance with Thad Ellenbecker.”
4
Agent Krapfl testified Duenow told him that he had been with Ellenbecker the entire
time.
8
Q. Whenever Duenow came out to talk to you, did Knutson
stay behind? A. Actually I think Trooper Knutson came out of the
room and went down the hallway, he may have been on the phone,
and somebody—one of the nursing staff went in. There was
always somebody in the room.
After Turbett and Krapfl entered Ellenbecker’s room, Turbett initially
asked, “We just wanted to talk about what happened earlier tonight and [get your]
side of the story. Would it be all right if we sit down and talk a little bit?”
Ellenbecker replied, “Yeah, Yeah.” The agents did not give Miranda warnings to
Ellenbecker. The door to his hospital room was open. Duenow stayed on the
floor but was not in the room during the interview. During the two breaks in the
interview process, Duenow returned to Ellenbecker’s room. Krapfl testified the
purpose of the breaks was so he could call “either Special Agent in Charge Larry
Hedlund or Chris Callaway” to pass on the information they obtained. Turbett
testified, “I don’t recall specifically who I spoke to.” Medical staff entered and left
the room during the interview.
Ellenbecker and the agents discussed his non-hospital medications.
Ellenbecker talked about the incident at the apartment complex, stating he told
Callaway to stay outside and “had no intentions of hurting anybody other than
[himself].” Krapfl told Ellenbecker that Callaway had been concerned about him
and that is “the only reason he put handcuffs on you. Okay. He is not mad at
you, he didn’t arrest you.” Ellenbecker made several incriminating statements,
followed by:
Ellenbecker: . . . . Am I [going to] get arrested tonight?
Agent Krapfl: I don’t know yet. We just want to get all this
stuff out and get to the truth about all this stuff and we’ll figure that
out later.
9
Agent Turbett: [We] didn’t come here to do that; we just
came to talk.
During the interview, Ellenbecker repeatedly stated he was a failure.
Krapfl told him they were going to have Duenow come in and be with Ellenbecker
to make sure he did not hurt himself while the agents took a break. When the
agents returned, Krapfl explained to Ellenbecker that the agents had talked to the
medical staff and the staff had then arranged for a medical person to be in
Ellenbecker’s room all night.
Ellenbecker’s wife and brother were in the room when the agents returned
from a break. After greetings were exchanged, Agent Turbett asked Ellenbecker,
“There [were] just a couple things I didn’t ask you; can I ask you a couple things
real quick?” Family members attempted to stop Ellenbecker from responding,
but Ellenbecker repeatedly silenced them, stating, “It’s fine.” Ellenbecker
answered the additional questions. The interview started around 11:25 p.m. and
concluded around 1:35 a.m.
D. October 21—Fourth Interview. Five hours later, on October 21 at
6:31 a.m., DCI Agent Hedlund called Ellenbecker and informed him DCI agents
were at his parents’ house in Minnesota. Hedlund asked questions, and
Ellenbecker made incriminating statements.
Later that morning, at 10:40 a.m., Hedlund and DCI Agent Anderson
arrived at the hospital to interview Ellenbecker. First, Hedlund told Ellenbecker
the lady sitting in his room was not a guard. Ellenbecker stated he understood
and knew why she was there—to make sure he did not harm himself. Shortly
thereafter, a doctor entered the room. Hedlund asked three more questions
10
before excusing himself, saying he would be right back. The doctor spoke with
Ellenbecker. Hedlund returned to the room. Ellenbecker made incriminating
statements. Ellenbecker told Hedlund that the agents who questioned him last
night “taught an interview and interrogation class.”
Q. Well, if you had a guy handcuffed to the wall at the police
department, he’s in custody, right? A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And what do you have to do before you talk to
him if he’s chained to the wall or he’s in custody? A. If he doesn’t
have the option to leave, you have to Mirandize him.
Q. Right. That’s custodial interrogation. A. (Sigh)
(Unintelligible).
Q. Those agents that interviewed you last night . . . they
didn’t Mirandize you, did they? A. No.
Q. Yeah. I wouldn’t . . . have thought they did, because you
obviously weren’t in custody, you’re in the hospital. That lady’s not
here because she’s your jailer, she’s here because . . . . A.
Because she’s a good woman.
....
Q. You understand you’re not in our custody, right? A. Not
yet.
Q. Not yet. Well . . . . [Y]ou’re certainly not in custody.5
Agent Anderson asked a few questions. Near the end of the interview
Hedlund again stated, “But you’re not in custody of the police department, you’re
not in custody of the DCI, you’re not in the custody of state patrol or the sheriff’s
office or anybody. You understand that?” Ellenbecker replied, “Should be.” The
interview ended around 11:50 a.m.
At 12:35 p.m., forty-five minutes after the interview ended, Hedlund went
to the hospital room, asked Ellenbecker to wake up, and stated: “I’m officially
telling you you’re under arrest . . . . [A]s of this time you’re in custody.”
5
We apply a consistent, objective reasonable-man standard, not a subjective,
reasonable-officer standard. It is irrelevant to our analysis that Ellenbecker had received
training on custodial interrogations.
11
Three days later, on October 24, Agent Thiele went to the hospital room
and asked Ellenbecker to talk with him. Ellenbecker declined.
E. Pretrial and Trial. After Ellenbecker was charged, he filed a motion to
sever the trial on the burglary and the arson counts and a motion for change of
venue. Both motions were granted. Ellenbecker also filed a defense of
diminished responsibility.
In May 2012 Ellenbecker filed a motion to suppress,6 asserting the DCI
agents’ questioning on October 20-21 violated his “constitutional rights under
both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of
Iowa.” Ellenbecker claimed his statements were without the protection of
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (requiring suppression of
statements made “in custody” without adequate warnings).
At the evidentiary hearing on the motion, defense counsel claimed
Ellenbecker was in custody on October 20—although the agents told him he was
free to leave the law enforcement center, “he’s essentially hounded to the
doorway . . . . [Ellenbecker] is not allowed to do as he would like at that point in
time, in fact he’s shot when he tries to do what he would like.” Counsel also
6
Ellenbecker also claimed his incriminating statements were involuntary. See Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (“We hold that coercive police activity is a
necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not ‘voluntary.’”). Defense
counsel claimed if Ellenbecker seemed suicidal, then the agents were on notice “he has
some mental health issues that need to be addressed.” Counsel also claimed the
incriminating statements after Ellenbecker was given “pain medication” were involuntary.
A Mason City hospital pharmacist testified to the medications Ellenbecker received in the
hospital. On cross-examination, the pharmacist admitted he was not a part of
Ellenbecker’s treating team, the drugs given “are within normal therapeutic levels,” and
he had no idea “what specific effect” the drugs had on Ellenbecker.
12
claimed custody on October 21 is shown by Ellenbecker being “continuously”
within the presence of law enforcement at the hospital.
In September 2012 the district court denied Ellenbecker’s motion to
suppress, stating:
In summary, officers did not summon Ellenbecker to the
hospital. The agents were courteous and Agents Krapfl and
Turbett were in civilian clothes. Defendant was not handcuffed
during the interview or otherwise restrained by the officers.
Defendant was not isolated. Doctors, nurses, and family members
all had access to the Defendant. Defendant was not constrained by
the police officers. Defendant’s freedom of movement was not
restricted by the police officers but only by his medical condition.
No guards were posted at the Defendant’s hospital door until after
his arrest. They were not there during the interview. The agents
checked on the Defendant’s medical condition and on the drugs he
ingested before questioning the Defendant. The Defendant was
cooperative. In fact, at one point when admonished by his brother
not to talk to law enforcement officers, he admonished his brother,
telling him to keep quiet.
The court concluded Ellenbecker “was not in custody,” and his statements “were
made voluntarily and were free from coercion.”
Ellenbecker waived his right to a jury trial, and bench trials were held in
September (arson) and October (burglary) 2012. In separate November rulings,
the court found Ellenbecker guilty of second-degree arson and second-degree
burglary. This appeal followed.
II. Standard of Review
“Under both the State and Federal Constitutions,” we review constitutional
claims de novo. Ennenga v. State, 812 N.W.2d 696, 701 (Iowa 2012).
13
III. Custodial Interrogation
On appeal, Ellenbecker asserts a Miranda violation. See Miranda, 384
U.S. at 444. To bring a viable claim, Ellenbecker must have been “in custody”
during an “interrogation.” See State v. Davis, 446 N.W.2d 785, 788 (Iowa 1989).
Iowa has adopted the Miranda court’s “definition of custodial interrogation as the
‘questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any way.’” Id. (quoting
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444).
This court’s determination of “custody” is based “on the objective
circumstances of the interrogation, not on subjective views harbored either by the
officer or the person being questioned.” State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553,
557 (Iowa 1997) (stating the length of a three-hour conversation with breaks did
not render the interrogation custodial). The objective, “reasonable person” test
we apply is “whether a reasonable person in the [defendant’s] position would
understand himself . . . to be in custody.” Id. at 558. We examine the totality of
the circumstances, guided by four factors: “(1) the language used to summon the
individual; (2) the purpose, place, and manner of interrogation; (3) the extent to
which the defendant is confronted with evidence of [his] guilt; and (4) whether the
defendant is free to leave the place of questioning.” Id.The State argues Ellenbecker was not in custody because the agents’
actions at the apartment complex were necessary for “medical” and “public
interest” purposes—to insure Ellenbecker would not hurt himself. The district
court agreed and found: “Although defendant was disabled by being shot by
14
Agent Peterson, he was in that position because of his own actions. [The
agents] reacted to the defendant out of a well-grounded fear for their own safety,
the safety of the defendant, and of his family.”
The opposite conclusion was reached by the Maine Supreme Judicial
Court in State v. Grant, 939 A.2d 93, 101-02 (Me. 2008), where roadside officers
used “a considerable degree of force to subdue” Grant, including using a Taser
on him repeatedly. The officers handcuffed Grant before and during his
ambulance ride to the hospital, where he underwent surgery. Grant, 939 A.2d at
101. We agree with and adopt the Maine court’s analysis:
[T]he [district] court concluded that the restraints were simply
standard operating procedure by the police and that the custody
was “medical,” and not for law enforcement purposes. We disagree
with these legal conclusions. Whether the restraint was
accomplished pursuant to standard operating procedure is
irrelevant to a reasonable suspect’s objective understanding of the
limits on the suspect’s liberty. A defendant may be in custody when
physically restrained by law enforcement officers in an unusual
setting or when restrained according to common police policy and
practice.
Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
As in Grant, we conclude Ellenbecker was in custody from the point the
DCI agent chased him, caught him, struggled with him, and prevented him from
returning to his apartment by physical force. This custodial restraint continued
uninterrupted as Ellenbecker was shot by a different agent and physically
restrained until an ambulance arrived—including a period of restraint with
handcuffs. A trooper rode in the ambulance to the hospital. Despite the agents’
statements to the contrary during the subsequent hospital interviews, the overall
facts and circumstances unequivocally show Ellenbecker was not “free to leave”
15
and “a reasonable person in [his] position would have understood himself . . . to
be in custody”—his freedom of action was foreclosed by the DCI agents. See
Countryman, 572 N.W.2d at 558.
The State also claims Ellenbecker was not in custody in the hospital
because the only restraint imposed on his freedom of movement was his need
for medical treatment. Iowa case law attempts to distinguish “cases in which
hospital interrogation was marked by police detention and coercion and those
cases in which the patient’s detention resulted purely from ongoing medical
treatment.” State v. Cain, 400 N.W.2d 582, 584 (Iowa 1987) (ruling defendant
was not in custody during brief questioning while undergoing treatment at the
hospital emergency room—defendant had voluntarily come to the emergency
room for treatment without any prior police presence).
The district court set out factors to be considered in determining whether
Ellenbecker had been subjected to custodial interrogation in the hospital:
(1) whether non-law enforcement agents (such as medical
staff and visitors and family of the patient) were present during
questioning;
(2) whether there was a constant police presence at the
hospital, including the presence of a police guard;
(3) whether the police prevented the criminal suspect from
leaving the hospital;
(4) whether the patient agreed to the police interview;
(5) whether the suspect was under arrest at the time of the
interview;
(6) whether the interrogating officers were in uniform and
armed; and
(7) whether the defendant had been transferred to the
hospital after being previously within police custody.
(Emphasis added.); see Kimberly J. Winbuth, Annotation, What Constitutes
Custodial Interrogation at Hospital by Police Officer Within Rule of Miranda v.
16
Arizona Requiring that Suspect Be Informed of His or Her Federal Constitutional
Rights Before Custodial Interrogation—Suspect Hospital Patient, 30 A.L.R. 6th
103 (2008). The district court’s starting point for its analysis was the time when
Ellenbecker was in the hospital—“to begin with, Ellenbecker was not summoned
to the hospital setting. Police officers did initiate contact . . . but before they
interviewed him, they spoke with hospital personnel about his medical condition.”
We, however, turn to factor seven—whether Ellenbecker was transferred
to the hospital “after being previously within police custody.” We again find
guidance in the Grant decision:
The State accurately observes that the mere fact that a
suspect cannot leave the hospital as a result of injury or illness
does not place that person in law enforcement “custody.” In this
case, however, it is the other circumstances surrounding the
restraints on Grant’s liberty that render his interrogation custodial.
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit . . . makes this point eloquently:
This is not to say that an individual would never be “in
custody” when held for medical treatment in a
hospital. If the police took a criminal suspect to the
hospital from the scene of the crime, monitored the
patient’s stay, stationed themselves outside the door,
arranged an extended treatment schedule with the
doctors, or some combination of these, law
enforcement restraint amounting to custody could
result.
939 A.2d at 102 (quoting United States v. Martin, 781 F.2d 671, 673 (9th Cir.
1985) (concluding suspect was not in custody when “there are no facts to
indicate law enforcement officials were in any way involved in Martin’s
hospitalization”)). Many of the Grant factors are present here and show
Ellenbecker’s custody was not somehow interrupted and discontinued such that
Miranda warnings were rendered unnecessary.
17
Specifically, when he was called in for a second interview and thereafter
failed a polygraph test, it was clear Ellenbecker “was the focus of the
investigation.” See Grant, 939 A.2d at 103. Ellenbecker was in police custody at
the time he was physically restrained and shot at his apartment complex. Not
only did the DCI agents initiate contact with Ellenbecker in the hospital, their prior
custodial actions put him in the hospital and an officer accompanied him on the
ambulance ride to the hospital. Although the DCI agents were dressed casually
and did not threaten or coerce Ellenbecker during questioning, it is undisputed
there was a significant police presence at the hospital—basically he was “under
guard.” For example, two officers, one of whom rode with Ellenbecker in the
ambulance, were in the room when the DCI agents arrived. The ambulance-ride
officer remained on the floor, although he was not in the room during the agents’
questioning. But he returned to the room during both breaks the DCI agents took
in their two-hour interrogation on that first night.
Also on the first night, the DCI agents took the initiative to contact medical
staff and arrange for Ellenbecker to have medical staff constantly present in his
room after they left the hospital at 1:35 a.m. The hospital complied and the
medical staff person was in the room when different DCI agents returned in the
morning to question him. Ellenbecker was arrested at 12:30 p.m., shortly after
this questioning concluded.
While the DCI agents told Ellenbecker the arrangement with medical staff
was to insure he would not harm himself, objectively such a medical decision is
within hospital expertise. The initiation, specific direction, and arrangements for
18
staffing made by law enforcement leads to the conclusion Ellenbecker’s custody
continued uninterrupted during his hospitalization. At no point during his hospital
stay was Ellenbecker left alone in his room. Clearly, law enforcement acted to
“monitor” his hospital stay. See Martin, 781 F.2d at 673.
Based on these facts and circumstances and using an objective test, a
reasonable person in Ellenbecker’s position would have understood that he
remained in police custody at the hospital, in spite of the agents’ frequent and
continued assurances he had not been arrested when handcuffed and was not
under arrest or in custody at the hospital.7 The October 20-21 hospital
interrogations constituted custodial interrogations that needed to be preceded by
Miranda warnings. No one fact is controlling but taken together, the facts compel
this conclusion. Any statements made by Ellenbecker after he was taken into
custody at the apartment complex are therefore inadmissible. We reverse and
remand for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
7
“The [agents] doth protest too much, methinks.” William Shakespeare, Hamlet act 3,
Sc.2, line 220 (one’s excessive repetition of a statement to the point others suspect the
opposite of what one says).