Ronald D. Hay, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 3-1208 / 13-0209
Filed February 19, 2014
RONALD D. HAY,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Buchanan County, Todd A. Geer,
Judge.
Ronald Hay appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. AFFIRMED.
John J. Sullivan of Sullivan Law Office, P.C., Oelwein, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney
General, Shawn M. Harden, County Attorney, and Dustin S. Lies, Assistant
County Attorney, for appellee State.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Potterfield, JJ.
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POTTERFIELD, J.
Ronald Hay appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction
relief. He argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness and
in failing to object to or request a jury instruction. He argues his postconviction
counsel was ineffective in failing to obtain the testimony of a different witness.
Finally, he argues the prosecutor committed misconduct in surprising him at trial
with an aiding and abetting theory. We affirm.
I. Facts and Proceedings.
This is the second time we have heard Hay’s case on appeal. We set
forth the facts here as written in the direct appeal:
On September 30, 2005, a deputy sheriff came to Hay’s
home to talk to him about a motorcycle of his that was stolen. The
deputy saw an overhead garage door was open and he walked
inside looking for Hay. He noticed two LP tanks with altered fittings
and valves and a bottle of Red Devil Lye drain opener. Eventually
Hay came to the door of his home and told the deputy his brother
was with him. At the deputy’s request Hay stepped out and, when
questioned, told the deputy the garage and the things in it were his.
The two men went to the garage where the deputy inspected the
tanks. There was a glass Frank’s Sauerkraut jar containing liquid
on a shelf, coffee filters, and white sediment. Hay denied the
deputy’s request to search his house and garage and a search
warrant was obtained. Subsequently the officers additionally found
Rooto drain opener, a garden hose, Red Devil Lye, an open lithium
battery pack containing alkaline batteries, coffee filters, an empty
starter fluid can, a light bulb smoking device, a Mason jar with
Coleman fuel, a Mountain Dew bottle containing a white mixture
with a rag in the bottle and a hose, four ketchup bottles containing
salt, a box of glass tubes and beakers, a self-contained-breathing-
apparatus mask, miscellaneous glassware, a notebook with Hay’s
name on it, three hypodermic needles, a spoon with white residue
and a cotton ball, a finger scale, plastic baggies some marked with
“25” and “100,” a can of Coleman fuel, a scale with a small quantity
of methamphetamine on it, a snort tube, and a shaving cream can
with a false bottom that contained several small clear baggies.
Three items were taken to the DCI laboratory. A criminalist
with the division explained at trial the process of manufacturing
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methamphetamine using the lithium-ammonia reduction method.
She examined the three items seized from Hay. The items
included a bilayer of liquid with coffee filters and solids. She took
samples of the upper layer of the liquid and found it contained
methamphetamine. She examined the lower level, which she found
consistent with engine starting fluid and it contained ether in
addition to methamphetamine, CMP [a by-product of manufacturing
methamphetamine], and a precursor, pseudoephedrine. She
examined a metal spoon containing a fiber wad and residue. She
found the spoon had crystalline reside containing
methamphetamine and dimethyl sulfone which is a veterinary
product used as a cutting agent. There was a plastic bag
containing a white crystalline substance and dimethyl sulfone.
State v. Hay, No. 06–1032, 2008 WL 2902172, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 30,
2008).
Hay was arrested and a charged by trial information with manufacturing
more than five grams of methamphetamine as a second offender. Trial before a
jury commenced May 10, 2006. Hay testified and presented as his defense
evidence the material in his garage belonged to another person. The jury found
Hay guilty as charged on May 15, 2006. Hay appealed to this court. and we
affirmed the trial court on July 30, 2008. See id. Hay filed an application for
postconviction relief, alleging several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
and prosecutorial misconduct. Hay’s original trial counsel died between the trial
and postconviction proceedings. Hay and his mother testified at the
postconviction proceeding, along with the trial court judge. The depositions of
two police witnesses were submitted to the court after the hearing. On January
30, 2013, the postconviction court dismissed Hay’s application. He appeals.
II. Analysis.
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. Ledezma
v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). To demonstrate he was provided
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with ineffective assistance, Hay must show both that his counsel performed
deficiently and that but for this deficiency, there is a reasonable probability that
the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 142–43. We need
not look to whether counsel’s performance was deficient if Hay cannot
demonstrate prejudice. See id. at 143. “[T]he nature of the ineffective
assistance as well as the nature and strength of the evidence produced by the
State at trial are important factors” when determining whether a defendant was
prejudiced by his counsel’s alleged deficiencies. Id. at 148.
A. Failure to call witnesses.
Hay’s defense at trial consisted of alleging the methamphetamine
production paraphernalia found by police in his house belonged to various other
people. In the case of the sauerkraut jar, he argued the jar belonged to Todd
Manley, who was arrested for manufacturing methamphetamine. He argues now
that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Mike Derbyshire, who was to
testify that he helped unload Manley’s belongings into Hay’s garage. In its ruling
on Hay’s application for postconviction relief, the district court noted the evidence
presented by this witness would have been cumulative to testimony offered at
trial by another defense witness. We agree and therefore conclude Hay cannot
demonstrate the requisite prejudice to establish his ineffective-assistance claim
regarding this witness. See id. at 143.
Hay next argues his postconviction counsel was ineffective in failing to find
and depose or otherwise secure Manley’s testimony. He reasons,
“Postconviction counsel knew that Hay’s defense was that the jar and its
contents belonged to Manley. Had postconviction trial counsel secured Manley’s
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testimony, said testimony would be available for consideration by the
postconviction court.” Hay does not argue now, and did not argue before the
postconviction court, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call
Manley. It is unclear what issue Manley’s testimony could have aided the
postconviction court in deciding. Hay’s postconviction arguments were: trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to call Derbyshire, failing to object to jury
instructions, and failing to request a spoliation instruction. He also raised
prosecutorial misconduct, claiming he was excluded from conferences on jury
instructions, and that his conviction was supported by insufficient evidence. Out
of all of these claims, Manley’s testimony could only pertain to the sufficiency of
the evidence, and the district court correctly found we already determined that
issue on Hay’s direct appeal. We therefore find Hay’s postconviction counsel did
not breach an essential duty by failing to call Manley as a witness. See id. at
142.
B. Failure to object to aiding and abetting instruction and request
accessory after the fact instruction.
Hay next argues his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to an
instruction on aiding and abetting the manufacture of methamphetamine.
Instead, Hay argues his counsel should have requested an instruction on acting
as an accessory after the fact. The district court dismissed this argument, stating
the aiding and abetting instruction was appropriate in light of Hay’s defense—that
the items seized belonged to someone else. Hay relies on our rule that “[a]n
accused may not be convicted as a principal on the theory of aiding and abetting
for conduct that only supports an accessory after the fact.” State v. Hustead, 538
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N.W.2d 867, 870 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995). Hay argues he “simply testified that the
jar containing evidence of methamphetamine was not his.” However, he told
police everything in the garage was his, testified he personally moved the jar into
the garage, and he blamed others for the remaining manufacturing paraphernalia
found inside his home. He stated he, along with two other people, wrote in a
notebook containing instructions for the purchase of items to manufacture
methamphetamine. This is not a situation where the evidence only supported a
theory of Hay acting as an accessory after the fact. An objection to the aiding
and abetting instruction would not have been effective; counsel therefore had no
duty to request an accessory after the fact instruction. See State v. Maxwell, 743
N.W.2d 185, 197 (Iowa 2008) (“When the submission of a superfluous jury
instruction does not give rise to a reasonable probability the outcome of the
proceeding would have been different had counsel not erred, in the context of an
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, no prejudice results.”).
C. Prosecutorial misconduct.
Hay’s final argument is that the prosecutors committed misconduct when
they failed to notify him before trial they would request an aiding and abetting
instruction.1 He argues “The State never charged Hay under a theory of aiding
and abetting and the State’s evidence did not support an aiding and abetting
theory. Hay suffered prejudice because he was unable to adequately prepare a
1
The State argues the prosecutorial-misconduct claim can only be raised in the context
of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because it was not raised at trial. However,
the State did not argue Hay’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim was waived before the
postconviction court. The postconviction court addressed Hay’s prosecutorial
misconduct claim on the merits. We therefore consider the issue as submitted by Hay.
DeVoss v. State, 648 N.W.2d 56, 63 (Iowa 2002).
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defense that would rebut this theory.” Hay cites no authority for his claim an
aiding and abetting theory could not be raised at trial. In fact, our supreme court
has explicitly held such notice is not necessary. Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d
590, 595 (Iowa 2001) (“We do not require the theory of aiding and abetting to be
pled even in a criminal case where the loss of many fundamental interests are at
stake.”); see also State v. Black, 282 N.W.2d 733, 734 (Iowa 1979). We
therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.