State of Iowa v. Rodney Jackson ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1361
Filed December 15, 2021
RODNEY JACKSON,
Defendant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Tod Deck, Judge.
Applicant appeals from the denial of his application for postconviction relief.
AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ.
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GREER, Judge.
After a finding of guilt on a charge of third-degree harassment, a simple
misdemeanor, Rodney Jackson appealed his conviction. His application for
discretionary review was denied by the supreme court. With that backdrop, in this
appeal, Jackson asserts the district court erred by denying his request for
postconviction relief (PCR). He argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to adequately prepare for trial and that this failing prejudiced him. Because
he makes only conclusory statements of prejudice, we affirm the district court’s
denial of the PCR application.
I. Background and Facts.
To begin, Jackson was charged with first-degree harassment in February
2018. The charge stemmed from harassing phone calls he was making to B.M.,
the mother of his adult daughter. B.M. called the police after Jackson told her over
the phone that he planned to go to her workplace and kill her, along with other
threatening messages. A few days later, police located and arrested Jackson.
Jackson had counsel appointed for him. Counsel informed Jackson that the
State was willing to reduce the charge to a simple misdemeanor if he pled guilty.
Jackson was not interested in accepting the plea and instead wanted to go to trial.
Even so, the State still reduced the charge to third-degree harassment. Jackson
and his counsel met once in person to prepare for the trial and traded phone calls
before meeting again on the day of trial. At the bench trial, the State called B.M.
and the arresting officer, both of whom Jackson’s counsel cross-examined.
Jackson was found guilty, and his counsel mailed him a copy of the order. The
district associate court found the State’s witnesses credible and imposed both a
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$100 fine and a no-contact order for five years. Jackson stated that he wanted to
appeal. However, before counsel could file his drafted notice of appeal with the
district court, Jackson appealed pro se claiming ineffective assistance of counsel.
The district court denied the appeal, but indicated the PCR claim was preserved.
Jackson appealed this ruling and the district court directed the clerk of court to
“treat the Defendant's filing of June 19, 2018, as a Notice of Appeal of the Court's
‘Ruling on Defendant's Appeal of Conviction.’” To help with the appeal, Jackson
requested new counsel. After the court appointed new counsel, the appeal was
ultimately denied1 and procedendo issued.
Next, Jackson filed for PCR alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. He
argued that trial counsel was ineffective because he (1) failed to challenge the
legality of Jackson’s arrest, (2) failed to prepare for trial, (3) failed to lodge
objections during trial, (4) conducted insufficient cross-examination, and (5) failed
to file a notice of appeal. After a hearing on the application, the district court found
that, while Jackson felt unsatisfied with his provided counsel, he did not prove that
counsel failed to perform an essential duty or that he had been prejudiced because
of it. See State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008) (citing Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)) (laying these components out as
requirements for proving ineffective assistance of counsel). As a result, Jackson’s
application for PCR was denied. He now appeals.
1 The supreme court addressed Jackson’s filing as an application for discretionary
review and denied the application for failing to demonstrate why extraordinary relief
of discretionary review should be granted. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.106(1).
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II. Analysis.
On appeal from the denial of an application for PCR, our review is generally
for correction of errors at law. Villa Magana v. State, 908 N.W.2d 255, 259 (Iowa
2018). Claims that counsel’s assistance was ineffective and, therefore,
unconstitutional are reviewed de novo. Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 862
(Iowa 2012). Both parties agree that error was properly preserved for our review.
To succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, an applicant
must prove both prongs of the Strickland test—(1) that counsel failed to perform
an essential duty and (2) this failure resulted in prejudice. State v. Lorenzo
Baltazar, 935 N.W.2d 862, 868 (Iowa 2019). “[I]f the claim lacks prejudice and can
be decided on that ground alone, we need not address whether the attorney failed
to perform an essential duty.” State v. Webster, 865 N.W.2d 223, 231 (Iowa 2015).
Prejudice is established when an applicant can “show a reasonable probability that
the result of the trial would have been different.” State v. Kuhse, 937 N.W.2d 622,
628 (Iowa 2020) (quoting State v. Ambrose, 861 N.W.2d 550, 557 (Iowa 2015)).
In his appeal, Jackson argues only that his counsel was ineffective because
he did not adequately prepare for trial. Jackson contends his trial counsel failed
to discuss trial preparation with him and instead focused on advising him to plead
guilty.2 Now on appeal, the only argument relating to prejudice that Jackson
proffers is that “[t]he lack of trial preparation negatively affected the appellant’s
chance of success at trial.” These types of “‘conclusory claims of prejudice’ are
not sufficient to satisfy the prejudice element.” State v. Tate, 710 N.W.2d 237, 241
2 At the PCR hearing, trial counsel testified he and Jackson discussed trial strategy,
for example, the “pitfalls” of Jackson’s request to subpoena police officers for trial.
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(Iowa 2006) (quoting State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 579 (Iowa 2002)). On our
de novo review, with no more than this meager assertion and no indication that the
outcome at trial would have been different with more preparation, we cannot find
that Jackson was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged inaction.
III. Conclusion.
As Jackson proved no prejudice by his counsel’s alleged lack of preparation
for trial, we affirm the district court’s denial of his PCR application.
AFFIRMED.