State of Iowa v. Pedro Olea Camacho ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-0903
Filed September 17, 2014
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PEDRO OLEA CAMACHO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Muscatine County, Mark D. Cleve
(motion to suppress) and Thomas G. Reidel (trial and sentencing), Judges.
Pedro Olea Camacho appeals his conviction. REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
Kent A. Simmons, Davenport, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, Alan Ostergren, County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Bower, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, P.J.
Pedro Oleo Camacho appeals his judgment and sentence for six counts of
second-degree sexual abuse. He contends the district court should have
suppressed statements he made to police following his arrest.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
A teenager was admitted to a hospital after overdosing on sleeping pills.
When asked why she took the pills, she said she was sexually assaulted as a
young child. She identified the perpetrator as Camacho.
A sergeant with the Muscatine County Sheriff’s office began an
investigation which led to the filing of a complaint against Camacho and the entry
of an attorney’s appearance on his behalf. On discovering that Camacho did not
live in Iowa, the sergeant asked the county attorney what to do. He advised her
to continue investigating.
The investigation uncovered similar complaints by the teenager’s older
sister. Camacho was arrested and returned to Iowa.
On his arrival in Muscatine, Camacho was interrogated at the jail. The
interrogation was audio-recorded. The sergeant conducted the interrogation
entirely in English. Camacho’s native language is Spanish.
After some preliminary questions, the sergeant read Camacho his
Miranda1 rights in English. Camacho responded, “Well, I got my lawyer, but I
don’t know when, when I go to court. I don't know when.” The sergeant then
1
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), the United States Supreme Court
held that a suspect subjected to custodial interrogation must be warned of “the right to
remain silent,” anything said “can be used against [the suspect] in a court of law,” “the
right to the presence of an attorney,” and if the suspect “cannot afford an attorney one
will be appointed . . . prior to any questioning” if so desired.
3
said, “Okay, Okay. Um, you’re willing to talk to me? Yes?.” There was no
audible answer.
Camacho signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and the sergeant
questioned him about the sex abuse allegations. During the questioning, the
sergeant told Camacho they had DNA samples that implicated him. This
statement was false. Camacho provided an explanation of how his semen might
have been found on the children. His explanation did not include a confession to
the crimes.
At this juncture, the sergeant asked Camacho to draft and sign an
“apology” letter. Camacho responded that he could not write English. The
sergeant suggested statements for inclusion in the letter, confirmed them with
Camacho, and wrote them down. She then read the full statement to Camacho
and had him sign it.
Camacho entered an initial appearance the following day. A subsequent
order noted his retention of the same attorney who previously entered an
appearance.
The State charged Camacho with six counts of second-degree sexual
abuse. Camacho moved to suppress the recorded statement and the letter.2 He
asserted the evidence was obtained in violation of his right against self-
incrimination and right to counsel guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well analogous rights under
2
The motion was untimely, but the prosecutor advised the court that neither he nor
defense counsel became aware of the recording until shortly before the motion was filed.
For that reason, he did not interpose an objection to the late filing.
4
Article I, sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Iowa Constitution. Following an evidentiary
hearing, the Court denied the motion.
The letter and the recording were admitted during the State’s case-in-
chief. After the State presented its case, Camacho testified and essentially
retracted the explanation he gave during the interrogation. A jury found
Camacho guilty of all six counts of second-degree sexual abuse. The district
court imposed sentence and this appeal followed.
I. Suppression Ruling
A. Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
“The Miranda warnings protect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination ‘ensuring that [] suspects know[] that [t]he[y] may choose not to
talk to law enforcement officers, to talk only with counsel present, or to
discontinue talking at any time.’” State v. Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d 244, 249 (Iowa
2009) (quoting Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 574 (1987)). Miranda requires
“meaningful advice to the unlettered and unlearned in language which [the
suspect] can comprehend and on which [the suspect] can knowingly act.” State
v. Blanford, 306 N.W.2d 93, 96 (Iowa 1981) (citing Coyote v. United States, 380
F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1967)). While no strict formulation is required, the
“crucial test is whether the words in the context used, considering the age,
background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear
understandable warning of all of his rights.” Id.
Camacho contends that, because English is not his native language, the
sergeant should have given him the Miranda warnings in Spanish. Reviewing
5
the totality of the circumstances, including the recording, we agree with the
district court that Camacho had
a very good command of spoken English, and that during the
course of the interview he was consistently able to engage in a
genuine two-way conversation with [the sergeant] in English,
although he does have a heavy Spanish accent which sometimes
required [the] [s]ergeant [] to ask him to repeat certain words.
Given Camacho’s conversance with the English language, the sergeant had no
obligation to use the Spanish translation of the warnings she concededly had in
her possession.
Camacho next points to the speed at which the warnings were read to
him. We agree the sergeant proceeded through the warnings at a fast clip. But
the warnings were clear and intelligible to someone who spoke and understood
English and Camacho acknowledged he understood his rights.
We are left with Camacho’s assertion that the sergeant should have
clarified the scope of his right to counsel after he stated he had a lawyer but did
not know when he was going to court. This statement, it is contended, raises
doubts about whether Camacho understood he was entitled to the presence of a
lawyer “at the jail for questioning.”
Absent an unequivocal assertion of a right to counsel, an officer does not
have a Fifth Amendment obligation to stop interrogating a suspect. See Davis v.
United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)).
[T]he suspect must unambiguously request counsel. . . . [The
suspect] must articulate [a] desire to have counsel present
sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the
circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for
an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of
clarity, Edwards [v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981)] does not require
that the officers stop questioning the suspect.
6
Id.; see also State v. Harris, 741 N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2007) (holding suspect’s
statement, “I don’t want to talk about it. We’re going to do it with a lawyer. That’s
the way I got to go,” was a clear and unequivocal request for counsel); State v.
Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603, 608 (Iowa 1997) (holding “I think I need an attorney”
insufficient to invoke right to counsel). When a suspect makes an ambiguous or
equivocal request for counsel, the Fifth Amendment does not require an officer to
“ask clarifying questions,” although these types of questions “will often be good
police practice.” Davis, 512 U.S. at 461.
Appellate counsel concedes Camacho’s statement “certainly did not
express an unequivocal decision to have his attorney present at the jail.” In light
of this concession, the sergeant had no Fifth Amendment obligation to stop
questioning him or to ask clarifying questions before proceeding with questioning.
We turn to whether Camacho’s waiver of his right to counsel was knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary. See Ortiz, 766 N.W.2d at 252; State v. Hajtic, 724
N.W.2d 449, 453-54 (Iowa 2006). To make this determination, “we must inquire
if the suspect knew that he or she did not have to speak to the police without
counsel and understood that statements provided to the police could be used
against him or her.” Ortiz, 76 N.W.2d at 252.
Camacho came to the United States in the early 1980’s and, as noted,
was able to speak and understand English. He received accurate and intelligible
Miranda warnings that he acknowledged he understood, and he signed a waiver
of his Miranda rights. Although the officer used deceit, the deception occurred
after Camacho waived his rights. Under the totality of the circumstances, we
7
conclude Camacho’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent, and
voluntary.
B. Article I, Section 9 of the Iowa Constitution
Camacho next contends Article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution
requires “a meaningful conversation . . . between the officer and detainee,”
including an explanation that “the suspect has a right to have counsel present
before and during police interrogation.” The Iowa Supreme Court addressed this
issue in Morgan, as follows:
As a final challenge to the confession evidence, Morgan asks this
court to impose, under the due process clause of the Iowa
Constitution, a requirement that police must ask clarifying questions
when faced with an equivocal request to consult with counsel and
that suspect interrogations must, where feasible, be recorded.
Requiring law enforcement personnel to record interrogations or to
ask such clarifying questions are issues that may be argued both
pro and con as matters of public policy. We are confident,
however, that such procedures are in no way mandated by any
provision in the Iowa Constitution. We reject Morgan's contention
that they are.
Morgan, 559 N.W.2d at 609. Morgan is controlling.
Camacho acknowledges Morgan but cites a special concurrence in State
v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 897 (Iowa 2009), characterizing Morgan as “wobbly
precedent that may not survive a direct attack.”
Effler does not overrule Morgan. Addressing a challenge to the district
court’s denial of a motion to suppress a confession, the opinion failed to garner a
majority of votes. Because six justices were equally divided on the question of
whether the defendant’s request for counsel was equivocal and whether the
officer needed to ask clarifying questions, the district court’s ruling was affirmed
8
by operation of law. While certain justices wrote separate opinions, those
opinions carry no precedential weight.
We are left with Morgan, which explicitly rejected the argument Camacho
now raises. We conclude Article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution did not
require the sergeant to ask Camacho clarifying questions to determine whether
he wished to have counsel present during the interrogation.
C. Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an
accused the right “to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.” The right
attaches upon the initiation of adversarial criminal proceedings. State v.
Peterson, 663 N.W.2d 417, 426 (Iowa 2003). After the right attaches, the State
may not deliberately elicit incriminating statements from the defendant absent
counsel or a valid waiver. Id. (citing Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 456-61
(1986)). The relevant inquiry for our purposes is (1) had the right to counsel
attached at the time of the Camacho’s interrogation, and if so, (2) did Camacho
effectively waive his right to counsel? Id. at 426.
The State’s assertion notwithstanding, Camacho’s right to counsel had
attached at the time of the interrogation. See State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417,
434 (Iowa 1982) (concluding sixth amendment right to counsel attached prior to a
second interview, which took place after a complaint was filed and a warrant
procured at the county attorney’s behest). The State filed a complaint almost
three weeks before the interrogation. An attorney for Camacho filed an
appearance two weeks before the interrogation. An arrest warrant on a
complaint was signed by a magistrate eleven days before the interrogation.
9
Camacho was arrested pursuant to the warrant on the day he was interrogated.
Finally, the county attorney was apprised of the investigation and provided input
during its early stages. As the district court found,
the State had made a firm decision to institute adversarial criminal
proceedings against the Defendant at the time the interview was
effected, and that in combination with the prosecutor’s significant
prior involvement in the case, the Defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had attached at the time he was interviewed.
We turn to whether Camacho knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived his sixth amendment right to counsel. See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556
U.S. 778, 786 (2009) (“Our precedents also place beyond doubt that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel may be waived by a defendant, so long as
relinquishment of the right is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.”).
“[W]hen a defendant is read his Miranda rights (which include the right to
have counsel present during interrogation) and agrees to waive those rights, that
typically does the trick [under the Sixth Amendment], even though the Miranda
rights purportedly have their source in the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 786-787.
The reason for accepting the Fifth Amendment waiver in the Sixth Amendment
context is as follows:
“As a general matter . . . an accused who is admonished with the
warnings prescribed by this Court in Miranda . . . has been
sufficiently apprised of the nature of his Sixth Amendment rights,
and of the consequences of abandoning those rights, so that his
waiver on this basis will be considered a knowing and intelligent
one.”
Id. (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296 (1988)). As the Court
explained:
What matters is that these cases . . . protect the right to have
counsel during custodial interrogation—which right happens to be
10
guaranteed (once the adversary judicial process has begun) by two
sources of law. Since the right under both sources is waived using
the same procedure, Patterson, supra, at 296, 108 S. Ct. 2389,
doctrines ensuring voluntariness of the Fifth Amendment waiver
simultaneously ensure the voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment
waiver.
Id. at 795.
We have already found that Camacho knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently waived his Fifth Amendment rights. Based on that conclusion, we
further conclude he knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to
counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
The real question Camacho raises is whether the waiver was valid. Citing
State v. Newsom, 414 N.W.2d 354, 358-59 (Iowa 1987), Camacho argues the
waiver was not valid because the sergeant “initiated further questioning after
learning [he] was represented.”
Newsom did indeed hold that “the State’s further interrogation of the
defendant, when he was represented by counsel affirmatively circumvented
defendant’s sixth amendment rights,” nullifying “any waiver that defendant may
have made.” Newsom, 414 N.W.2d at 359. However, Newsom partially relied on
a United States Supreme Court opinion that has since been overruled. See
Montejo, 556 U.S. at 794-95, 797 (overruling Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625
(1986)).
In Jackson, the United States Supreme Court held, “if police initiate
interrogation after a defendant’s assertion, at an arraignment or similar
proceeding, of [the] right to counsel, any waiver of the defendant’s right to
counsel for that police-initiated interrogation is invalid.” 475 U.S. at 636. The
11
Montejo Court rejected this prophylactic rule, stating: “The upshot is that even on
Jackson's own terms, it would be completely unjustified to presume that a
defendant's consent to police-initiated interrogation was involuntary or coerced
simply because he had previously been appointed a lawyer.” Montejo, 556 U.S.
at 792. The Court minced no words in holding “Michigan v. Jackson should be
and now is overruled.” Id. at 797. While the Court’s reasoning was partially
pegged to the fact that Montejo did not voluntarily elect to retain counsel but was
automatically appointed counsel—which is not the case here3—the Court also
found the prophylactic rule of Jackson unnecessary in light of existing Fifth
Amendment protections.4
The Court’s overruling of Jackson calls into question Newsom’s holding
under the Sixth Amendment. Accordingly, we decline to rely on Newsom’s Sixth
Amendment analysis to hold that Camacho’s waiver of his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was invalid.
3
The record reveals that Camacho made an election to retain counsel the day after
the filing of the first complaint. The attorney was privately paid.
4
See generally United States v. Rojas, 553 F. App’x. 891, 893-94 (11th Cir. 2014)
(“Although he attempts to distinguish his case from Montejo based on the fact that he
retained private counsel, rather than having an attorney appointed for him, the distinction
is irrelevant. The Court in Montejo emphasized a defendant's ability to clearly assert,
and thus sufficiently safeguard, his right to counsel at any critical stage following
indictment, and it rejected the notion that the acquisition of counsel affected the ability or
rendered it irrelevant. Likewise, Rojas's retention of counsel in no way limited his ability
to clearly express a desire to have his attorney present for the post-arrest interview.”)
(internal citations omitted); Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Interrogation and the Roberts Court,
63 Fla. L. Rev. 1189, 1229 (2011) (“The Montejo Court’s overruling of Jackson has
dramatically opened up the doctrinal landscape. It is now unclear whether there is any
Edwards-type rule in the Sixth Amendment context for a charged defendant not in
custody.”).
12
D. Article I, Section 10 of the Iowa Constitution Claims
Camacho next claims the sergeant violated his right to counsel under
Article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution by continuing to question him after
he told her he had a lawyer. The Iowa Supreme Court directly addressed this
issue in Newsom. The court stated:
We also agree with defendant’s claims under the Iowa
Constitution. Independent of our sixth amendment analysis, we find
that defendant's right to counsel under the Iowa Constitution, article
I, section 10, was also violated. In so doing, we rely on our own
interpretation of our state constitution. We broadly construe this
provision to effectuate its purpose, which was to correct the
imbalance between the position of an accused and the powerful
forces of the State in a criminal prosecution. . . . An accused that is
represented by counsel should not be subjected to a tug-of-war
between defense counsel and agents of the State. We hold that
our constitution prohibits agents of the State from initiating any
conversations or dealings with an accused concerning the criminal
charge on which representation of counsel had been sought. A
violation of this prohibition by the State shall preclude any waiver,
by an accused, of the right to counsel.
Newsom, 414 N.W.2d at 359 (emphasis added). Because the court decided the
Iowa constitutional issue “independent[ly]” of its Sixth Amendment analysis,
Montejo does not call this portion of the opinion into question. Accordingly, we
agree with Camacho that the court’s holding under the Iowa Constitution is
directly on point and is controlling.5
We reach this conclusion notwithstanding the State’s assertion that this
court’s holding in State v. Findling, 456 N.W.2d 3 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990) is
inconsistent with Newsom. In Findling, the court was asked to decide whether a
suspect’s waiver of his Miranda rights was sufficient to waive his right to counsel
5
See State v. Bevel, 745 S.E.2d 237, 246 (W. Va. 2013) (“[A]lthough Montejo has
altered the benefits of the right to counsel on the federal level, it has not changed the
right in such a way that conflicts with the right as guaranteed by [our State precedent].”).
13
under Article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution. 456 N.W.2d at 6. Although
the court cited Newsom, it did so only for the proposition that we broadly
construe the state constitutional right to effectuate its purpose. Id. The court
adopted the “rationale and ruling” of the United States Supreme Court in
Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), and concluded “the Miranda warning
sufficiently informed Findling of his right to counsel under the state constitution.”
456 N.W.2d at 7.
This was not the issue in Newsom. There, the court was asked to decide
whether the Iowa Constitution prohibited agents of the State from initiating
conversations with an accused once the right to counsel attached. Newsom, 414
N.W.2d at 357. The court answered yes to this question. Id. at 359. Findling did
not call this holding into question.
Based on Newsom, we conclude the sergeant violated Camacho’s right to
counsel guaranteed by Article I, section 10 of the Iowa Constitution when she
continued to question Camacho after she learned he had a lawyer. While
Newsom recognized an accused could elect to initiate conversation with the
police after the right to counsel attached, the court imposed “a heavy standard of
proof on the State to prove that the defendant initiated further conversation.” 414
N.W.2d at 359. We are not convinced the State satisfied the heavy standard
because the sergeant, not Camacho, initiated substantive questioning after
Camacho said, “Well, I got my lawyer, but I don't know when, when I go to court.
I don't know when." While she asked Camacho whether he was willing to talk,
she did not receive an audible answer to this question before proceeding.
14
Because the sergeant initiated a substantive conversation following
Camacho’s disclosure that he had an attorney, the evidence of the interrogation
should have been suppressed. Our conclusion would also require suppression
of the apology letter dictated toward the end of the interrogation.
E. Harmless Error
The State contends even if Camacho’s federal or Iowa right to counsel
was violated, the error was harmless. “To establish harmless error, the State
must ‘prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not
contribute to the verdict obtained.’” Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 431 (quoting
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)). There are two steps in the
harmless error analysis:
First, the court asks what evidence the jury actually considered in
reaching its verdict. Second, the court weighs the probative force
of that evidence against the probative force of the erroneously
admitted evidence standing alone. This step requires the court to
ask “whether the force of the evidence is so overwhelming as to
leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that
evidence would have been the same without the erroneously
admitted evidence.”
State v. Walls, 761 N.W.2d 683, 686-87 (Iowa 2009) (internal citations omitted).
The State was required to prove that Camacho performed sex acts with
children under the age of twelve. The State called the two complaining
witnesses. The younger testified that, when she was five years old, she lived
with her grandmother and Camacho. She provided a detailed description of sex
acts Camacho performed on her while her grandmother was at work. The older
child similarly testified that Camacho performed sex acts on her when she was
six to nine years old.
15
A physician testified the older child visited a hospital for urinary tract
infections. She opined that urinary tract infections could be caused by digital
penetration of the genitals and fondling, but she acknowledged the infections
also could have been caused by non-criminal conduct.
This duly admitted evidence was probative of sexual abuse but, for
constitutional harmless error purposes, the State is obligated to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that “there is ‘no reasonable possibility’ the falsely admitted
statements contributed to the conviction.” Walls, 761 N.W.2d at 688 (quoting
Peterson, 663 N.W.2d at 434). The children testified to events occurring a
decade earlier. The physician’s testimony was equivocal at best.
The interrogation evidence admitted during the State’s case-in-chief
altered the landscape. After the sergeant deceived Camacho into believing the
police had DNA evidence implicating him, Camacho said he might have
inadvertently transferred his DNA to the children when he showered them
following sex with his wife. He apologized for taking showers with them, washing
them, and touching their private parts. While he did not confess to the crimes,
his incendiary explanation could only be viewed as highly probative on the
question of whether he committed sex acts with the children.
The State points out, however, that Camacho elected to testify in his
defense, was impeached with his prior statement, and “substantively confirmed
most of what was contained on the tape, making its admission duplicative and,
thus, harmless.” We recognize a statement to police taken in violation of the
right to counsel can be admitted to impeach a defendant’s inconsistent trial
testimony. See Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350-51 (1990). But we are
16
still obligated to evaluate the probative force of the erroneously admitted
evidence. Walls, 761 N.W.2d at 686-88. See also People v. Polk, 118 Cal. Rptr.
3d 876, 889 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 2010) (“[P]rejudice should be evaluated on the
basis of the evidence actually presented, while excluding the improperly admitted
evidence.”)
On direct examination, Camacho referred to certain potentially inculpatory
portions of his prior statement but, contrary to the State’s assertion, he did not
“confirm” those portions. He denied taking showers with the children, denied
doing anything inappropriate when he gave them baths, denied that the children
slept in this bed, denied having semen on his hand and touching one of the girls,
and denied having any sexual contact with either of the children. While the
prosecutor impeached him with certain assertions he made in his prior statement,
he only covered a fraction of the entire conversation and he may have been
precluded from admitting the statement had it not already been admitted during
the State’s case-in-chief. See Iowa R. Evid. 5.608(b) (precluding admission of
extrinsic evidence for impeachment purposes). We conclude the discussion of
the prior statement in the defense case did not duplicate the contents of the
audio recording.
As in Walls, the importance of Camacho’s interrogation statement cannot
be overstated. In closing argument the prosecutor said:
The innocent man who is asked can you—what would you say if I
told you we found your semen on these girls would say, that’s a
mistake. You can’t possibly have found that. I have no idea what
you’re talking about. The guilty man tries to come up with some
explanation as to, oh, they found my semen. Well, what am I
gonna say?
17
And he comes up off the seat of his pants with this story
about having semen on his hand and touching the girls. The
innocent man doesn’t do that. The guilty man does.
While the prosecutor went on to characterize the statement as “extra . . . icing,”
he did not move to the cake. Within moments he said, “[T]he very fact that
[Camacho] felt the need to explain how his semen could have been on both girls
goes a long way to feeling comfortable that we are beyond his presumption of
innocence based on the evidence that we have heard.” He continued,
“[Camacho’s] the one who comes up with the showering. He’s the one who’s
searching for an explanation as to how the semen could be there.”
Based on this record, we conclude the State failed to prove the admission
of the interrogation evidence during the State’s case-in-chief was harmless error.
We reverse and remand for a new trial. In light of our conclusion, we find it
unnecessary to address the remaining issues raised by Camacho.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.