Mercy Hospital, Iowa City and Cambridge Integrated Services v. Susan Goodner ( 2014 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 13-1748
Filed October 15, 2014
MERCY HOSPITAL, IOWA CITY and
CAMBRIDGE INTEGRATED SERVICES,
Petitioners-Appellants,
vs.
SUSAN GOODNER,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Robert Hutchinson,
Judge.
The employer and its insurer appeal from the district court’s entry of
judgment upon Susan Goodner’s petition for enforcement of the workers’
compensation commissioner’s award. AFFIRMED.
Peter M. Sand, Des Moines, for appellants.
Paul J. McAndrew of Paul McAndrew Law Firm, PLLC, Coralville, for
appellee.
Heard by Danilson, C.J., and Vogel and Bower, JJ.
2
DANILSON, C.J.
The employer, Mercy Hospital, and its insurer, Cambridge Integrated
Services,1 appeal from the district court’s entry of judgment upon Susan
Goodner’s petition for enforcement of the workers’ compensation commissioner’s
award. The commissioner entered the following award:2 “Defendants [Mercy]
shall pay unto the claimant [Goodner] permanent total disability benefits at the
rate of [$996] per week from January 18, 2000, except for any periods of time
claimant returned to employment, and during the time claimant remains
permanently and totally disabled.” On appeal, Mercy contends the district court
“did not properly construe the award when entering judgment.” Finding no error,
we affirm.
I. District Court’s Authority.
Under Iowa Code section 86.42 (2013),3 a district court is “bound to enter
a judgment in conformance with the workers’ compensation award.” Rethamel v.
1
Unless otherwise specified, our use of the term “Mercy” will refer to both the employer
and the insurer.
2
Adopting the deputy’s arbitration ruling, but modifying the rate, which was capped by
statute.
3
Iowa Code section 86.42 provides:
Any party in interest may present a file-stamped copy of an order
or decision of the commissioner, from which a timely petition for judicial
review has not been filed or if judicial review has been filed, which has not
had execution or enforcement stayed as provided in section 17A.19,
subsection 5, or an order or decision of a deputy commissioner from
which a timely appeal has not been taken within the agency and which
has become final by the passage of time as provided by rule and section
17A.15, or an agreement for settlement approved by the commissioner,
and all papers in connection therewith, to the district court where judicial
review of the agency action may be commenced. The court shall render
a decree or judgment and cause the clerk to notify the parties. The
decree or judgment, in the absence of a petition for judicial review or if
judicial review has been commenced, in the absence of a stay of
execution or enforcement of the decision or order of the workers’
compensation commissioner, or in the absence of an act of any party
3
Havey, 679 N.W.2d 626, 628 (Iowa 2004) (Rethamel I). The district court’s role
in rendering judgment on a commissioner’s award determination is a “ministerial
function.” Id. at 629; Rethamel v. Havey, 715 N.W.2d 263, 265 (Iowa 2006)
(Rethamel II).
“General jurisdiction is not given to a court to determine any
question of fact or law necessary to support the award as rendered
by the Workers’ Compensation Board or Commission in the first
instance; at the time application is made to enter judgment on the
record the rights of claimant have been established.
“The court must render a judgment in accordance with the
award. The court has no power to change the award, it cannot
review, or reverse or modify the award, or construe the statute. . . .”
....
On an application for entry of a judgment, a court may,
however, construe the award.
Rethamel I, 679 N.W.2d at 628-29 (citations omitted).
II. Standard of Review.
We review the district court’s entry of judgment for errors of law.
Rethamel II, 715 N.W.2d at 266.
III. Discussion.
In an earlier appeal to this court, we set out the background facts. See
Mercy Hosp. Iowa City v. Goodner, No. 12-0186, 2013 WL 104888, at *1-6 (Iowa
Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2013). There we affirmed the commissioner’s award of
permanent total disability benefits to Goodner, finding “[t]here was substantial
reliable medical evidence to support the agency’s conclusion that Goodner’s
mononucleosis and subsequent chronic fatigue syndrome arose out of and in the
which prevents a decision of a deputy workers’ compensation
commissioner from becoming final, has the same effect and in all
proceedings in relation thereto is the same as though rendered in a suit
duly heard and determined by the court.
4
course of her employment. There is also substantial evidence supporting the
agency’s conclusion that Goodner is permanently and totally disabled as an odd-
lot employee.” Id. at *18.
After the appeal and issuance of the procedendo, Mercy paid no additional
benefits. In response, Goodner filed an action in the district court seeking entry
of judgment. The district court questioned whether the present issue should be
remanded to the agency. Upon Mercy’s insistence that the matter was properly
decided by the district court and should not be remanded, the court entered a
ruling first describing the contested proceedings:
As difficult as it is to believe, the issues before the Court are
the remnants of a dispute between the parties dating back to
Goodner’s work-related injury in January 2000. The original
disputes between the parties came in alternate care proceedings, in
which [Mercy] admitted Goodner had suffered a work-related injury,
accepted responsibility for her expenses and sought to control her
medical care. [Mercy and its insurer] paid benefits, which they
characterized as healing period benefits, temporary partial disability
benefits and permanent partial disability benefits, from January
2000 through May 13, 2007. [Mercy and its insurer] then chose to
terminate payment of benefits and tried to contest that Goodner
had suffered a work-related injury and that they were responsible
for paying benefits to her. The Commissioner, district court, and
Court of Appeals all ruled that [Mercy and its insurer] were barred
from contesting these issues by the doctrine of judicial estoppel,
having admitted the injury was work-related and their own
responsibility for that injury in the alternate care proceedings.
[Mercy and its insurer] further contested the Commissioner’s
finding and conclusion that Goodner was permanently and totally
disabled. Once again, the district court and Court of Appeals
affirmed the Commissioner’s ruling. Finally, [Mercy and its insurer]
argued that some of Goodner’s medical expenses were not related
to the work-related injury. On this issue, [Mercy and its insurer]
enjoyed their sole success, with the Court of Appeals holding that
[they] did not have to pay for Goodner’s bariatric surgery.[4] The
4
This court affirmed the agency’s finding that Mercy need pay only one-half the cost of
family therapy—that portion of the therapy that benefitted Goodner. Goodner, 2013 WL
104888, at *18.
5
Court of Appeals decision was entered January 9, 2013, and
procedendo issued soon thereafter.
Despite their lack of success on virtually every issue
presented to the Commissioner and the courts, [Mercy and its
insurer] continued to resist responsibility for the award sought by
Goodner. On May 8, 2013, Goodner filed an application for
judgment, seeking a determination from the Court as to the exact
amounts owed by [Mercy and its insurer] to her. [Mercy and its
insurer] resisted the application, leading to the hearings on August
5 and August 30, 2013.
The district court then explained its view of the issue and summarized the
parties’ positions:
Central to the primary dispute between the parties is the following
language from the deputy’s decision: his order required [Mercy and
its insurer] to pay [Goodner] weekly benefits from the date of injury
forward, “except for any periods of time Claimant returned to
employment, and during the time Claimant remains permanently,
totally disabled.”
In order to put the present dispute in context, it is necessary
to understand the facts before the deputy at the time of the original
hearing. The record evidence was that from and after the date of
injury in January 2000 until the hearing on April 30, 2009, Goodner
had at times worked full time, at times part time, and at times not at
all. The deputy lauded Goodner for her efforts in trying to return to
work, and to find work that would be compatible with her symptoms.
However, the deputy ultimately concluded that whenever Goodner
returned to work at any level, her symptoms were aggravated. He
concluded as a result that Goodner was totally and permanently
disabled from the date of the original injury in January 2000—
despite the fact she had worked for significant time periods
between January 2000 and April 2009. That specific finding was
affirmed by the Commissioner, the district court, and the Court of
Appeals, and remains the law of the case.
At the outset of the hearing on August 5, 2013, counsel for
the parties advised the Court there were two remaining issues: (1)
when exactly Goodner had worked between January 2000 and
April 30, 2009; and (2) whether Goodner was entitled to any weekly
benefits during periods when she was working part time between
January 2000 and April 30, 2009. [Mercy and its insurer] conceded
that they owed benefits for any time Goodner was not working at
all, and respondent conceded she was not entitled to benefits
during any time period she was working full time. However, the
parties disagreed as to the effect of the deputy’s ruling, quoted
6
above, that she would not receive benefits for any time period she
returned to employment.
The parties ultimately reached a stipulation as to the exact
days Goodner had worked between the dates of her injury and final
hearing. However, they continued to disagree as to the meaning of
the deputy’s ruling with regard to the times when Goodner was
working part time. The Court expressed concern about its role in
interpreting the decision of the deputy, and inquired about the
possibility of remanding the case to the Commissioner for that
express purpose. However, [Mercy and its insurer] advocated—
and respondent ultimately agreed—that it was the Court’s duty to
interpret the Commissioner’s decision, and not to remand the case.
Based upon the parties’ joint assertion that the Court and not the
Commissioner should decide the meaning of the deputy’s ruling,
and the authority cited by the parties, the Court agreed to take up
the remaining issue and held the final hearing on August 30, 2013.
Goodner’s argument is simple and straightforward. She
contends that the deputy could not have intended to penalize her in
effect for attempting to return to work between January 2000 and
April 2009 by ruling that she would receive no weekly benefits
during any week in which she had worked at all during that time
period. That is indeed the effect of [Mercy’s] argument; regardless
of how many hours [Goodner] had worked in a given week, if she
worked at all she would receive no weekly benefits for that week
under [Mercy’s] interpretation of the deputy’s ruling.
[Mercy and its insurer] admit that the result of their argument
is harsh, but argue that it is justified not only by the language of the
deputy’s ruling but the logic inherent in the deputy’s ruling.
The district court rejected Mercy’s construction of the commissioner’s
award, as do we. Mercy’s position would deny Goodner any benefits even if she
was capable of only working one hour per week, though under workers’
compensation provisions she is entitled to benefits if she is partially disabled,
temporarily or permanently. See Iowa Code §§ 85.33, .34. The district
concluded this result was clearly contrary to the commissioner’s ruling and to the
goals of the workers’ compensation provisions, which is to benefit the worker.
Grundmeyer v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 649 N.W.2d 744, 750 (Iowa 2002);
McSpadden v. Big Ben Coal Co., 288 N.W.2d 181, 188 (Iowa 1980).
7
The district court also noted that Iowa case law supports the proposition
that the commissioner may find permanent total disability, even though the
employee has worked to some extent in the past or is capable of working to
some extent in the future. See IBP, Inc. v. Al-Gharib, 604 N.W.2d 621, 633 (Iowa
2000) (stating “total disability does not mean a state of absolute helplessness”);
see also Acuity Ins. v. Forman, 684 N.W.2d 212, 219-20 (Iowa 2004) (affirming
finding of total permanent disability where employee continued to be employed),
abrogated on other grounds by Kohlhaas v. Hog Slat, Inc., 777 N.W.2d 387, 391-
92 (Iowa 2009). The district court concluded, based upon this rationale, the
commissioner could have awarded Goodner weekly benefits for the entirety of
the period between January 2000 and April 30, 2009, without any credit to Mercy
for the wages Goodner in fact earned but instead “chose to follow a different
course” and gave the employer credit.
In addition, the district court found Mercy should be judicially estopped
from asserting a position inconsistent with its earlier position that it should be
entitled to credit for any and all time periods Goodner was working between
January 2000 and April 2009, which times were included in a stipulation made at
the arbitration hearing.5 See Winnegago Indus., Inc. v. Haverly, 727 N.W.2d
567, 574-75 (Iowa 2006). We find it significant that this same principal was
5
The district court observed that Mercy stipulated on the arbitration hearing report with
Goodner and before the hearing deputy in open hearing that “[p]rior to hearing, claimant
was paid indemnity as shown in Claimant’s Exhibits 48 and 49.” Exhibits 48 and 49 are
itemized statements of the money-benefits (i.e., indemnity) paid by Mercy before
hearing. Mercy’s current position was contrary to its stipulation that the itemization of
indemnity set forth in Claimant's Exhibits 48 and 49 are to be honored and used to
determine proper amounts of indemnity paid before hearing.
8
invoked in the original appeal from the award. See Goodner, 2013 WL 104888,
at *10.
Mercy disputes Goodner’s contention that the court should construe the
award in a way that is “reasonable.” Mercy describes Goodner’s contention the
“most problematic argument.” In sum, Mercy argues the agency’s award must be
construed solely upon the legislative policy established in the code not upon a
reasonableness standard. We find no error in a reasonable reading of the
commissioner’s award. Temporary partial disability is paid to an employee “for
whom it is medically indicated that the employee is not capable of returning
employment substantially similar to the employment in which the employee was
engaged at the time of injury.” Iowa Code § 85.33(2). “Temporary benefits
compensate the employee for lost wages until he or she is able to return to work
. . . . [T]emporary partial benefits are designed to reimburse the employee while
he or she was temporarily disabled and still working for the employer (albeit in a
different position).” Mannes v. Fleetguard, Inc., Travelers Ins. Co., 770 N.W.2d
826, 830 (Iowa 2009). The district court’s construction of the commissioner’s
ruling is in keeping with the goals of workers’ compensation. Mercy paid
temporary partial benefits and the commissioner ruled it “shall be given credit for
benefits previously paid.” The district court’s ruling properly construes the award
to allow benefits to Goodner during times she was still working less than full
time—that is, when she was “not capable of returning to employment
substantially similar to the employment in which the employee was engaged at
the time of injury”—and giving Mercy credit for those payments. This is a
9
reasonable construction of the award and is mindful of the policies established by
the legislature but does not involve construing a statute or modifying the award.6
The district court entered judgment, which provides in part:
(5) Attached as “Exhibit A” is an Award Calculation. Exhibit
A accurately sets forth the amount of the compensation (i.e.,
indemnity or weekly monetary benefits) awarded by the Iowa
Workers’ Compensation Division Deputy Commissioner in his
December 30, 2009, Arbitration Decision, which compensation was
affirmed by all reviewing courts.
(6) Mercy has paid all Section 85. 2 7 expenses presented at
hearing and awarded in the December 30, 2009, Arbitration Award.
(7) Mercy has also paid all hearing costs.
(8) The parties at hearing in this Court on August 30, 2013,
stipulated to the following dates concerning Goodner’s
employment:
(a) 1/18/00–2/7/00: Goodner was working full-time at Mercy
Clinic.
(b) 2/7/00–3/6/00: Goodner was off work at this time.
(c) 3/7/00–6/30/03: Goodner was working part-time at Mercy
Clinic.
(d) 7/15/03–8/31/03: Goodner was unemployed at this time.
(e) 9/1/03–1/15/04: Goodner was working full-time at UI
Student Health.
(f) 1/16/04–2/18/05: Goodner was working part-time at UI
Student Health.
(g) 2/22/05–12/26/05: Goodner was working part-time at the
VA. (This stipulation was agreed to at the hearing before the Court
on August 9, 2013, adding 19.5 part-time weeks to Mercy’s credit).
(h) 12/27/05–9/1/2006: Goodner was working part-time for
Amish house-call service.
(i) 9/2/06–11/29/07: Goodner was not working at this time.
6
Mercy argues the district court impermissibly awarded Goodner both permanent partial
and permanent total disability benefits for the same work-related injury. Iowa Code
section 85.34(3)(b)—the section governing permanent total disability awards—states, in
part: “No compensation shall be payable under this subsection for any injury for which
compensation is payable under subsection 2 [which governs permanent partial disability
awards] of this section.” Subsection three explicitly prohibits creating a hybrid award of
permanent partial and permanent total disability benefits for the same injury. See Bell
Bros. Heating & Air Conditioning v. Gwinn, 779 N.W.2d 193, 200 (Iowa 2010) (“Any
disability that remains after stabilization of the condition gives rise to ‘either a permanent
partial or a permanent total award.’”) (quoting 4 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson’s
Workers’ Compensation Law § 80.03, at 80–4 (2009)). We do not conclude the district
court created a hybrid award.
10
(j) 11/30/06–1/23/08: Goodner was working part-time for
Unity Healthcare at this time.
(k) 1/24/08–present: Goodner was not working at this time;
(9) The Court entered its Ruling on Respondent’s Application
for Judgment Entry on October 9, 2013, directing, among other
things, that counsel for respondent/Goodner shall prepare a
judgment entry for weekly benefits consistent with the stipulation of
the parties concerning Goodner’s employment between January
2000 and April 30, 2009, and the contents of the ruling that counsel
for respondent shall prepare a judgment entry for weekly benefits
consistent with the stipulation of the parties concerning Goodner’s
employment between January 2000 and April 30, 2009, and the
contents of this ruling, obtain the signature of petitioners’ [Mercy’s]
counsel approving the ruling as to form only, and present it to the
Court for signature on or before November 1, 2013. This filing is
now made to comply with that Ruling.
The court entered judgment in favor of Goodner and against Mercy in the
principal amount $320,007.64 and for $91,134.90 in interest accrued on the
principal amount from “11/27/07–11/1/13”; and for costs in an amount to be
determined by the clerk of court.
The district court’s judgment entry properly construes the agency decision
to compensate Goodner when she was unable to work, whether that was a full
week or a partial week. However, the judgment allows Mercy to receive a credit
proportionally for the weeks when Goodner was able to work a partial week.
Finally, the judgment gives credit to Mercy for past payments in accordance with
the agency ruling.
We find no error. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Mercy.
AFFIRMED.