Izudin Dubinovic v. Des Moines Public Schools ( 2019 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-0194
Filed May 15, 2019
IZUDIN DUBINOVIC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
DES MOINES PUBLIC SCHOOLS,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Paul D. Scott, Judge.
Izudin Dubinovic appeals the district court judicial review decision affirming
the final agency action of the workers’ compensation commissioner. AFFIRMED.
Mark S. Soldat of Soldat & Parrish-Sams, PLC, West Des Moines, for
appellant.
Anne L. Clark of Hopkins & Huebner, PC, Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ. Tabor, J.,
takes no part.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
Izudin Dubinovic sustained a mental injury while employed as a custodian
by the Des Moines Public Schools. Dubinovic filed a workers’ compensation
petition, claiming, “Cumulatively and progressively over a period of time employer’s
actions and inactions caused the development of an adjustment disorder with
mixed anxiety and depressed mood.” Following an arbitration hearing, a deputy
workers’ compensation commissioner denied the petition. The workers’
compensation commissioner affirmed the decision, as did the district court on
judicial review.
On appeal, Dubinovic contends (1) the supreme court erred in adopting a
legal causation standard in cases involving a purely mental injury, and the district
court erred in affirming the commissioner’s application of the standard, and (2) the
commissioner should have applied a modified standard applicable to mental
injuries arising from sudden traumatic events.
I. Legal-Causation Standard/Application of Standard
In Dunlavey v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 526 N.W.2d 845, 853–58
(Iowa 1995), the supreme court recognized that a purely mental injury may be
compensable under the workers’ compensation laws even in the absence of an
accompanying physical injury. The court required a claimant to prove both factual
causation and legal causation. Id. at 853. According to the court, “[F]actual
causation means medical causation, that is whether the employee’s injury is
causally connected to the employee’s employment.” Id. Turning to legal
causation, the court stated, “[F]or an employee to establish legal causation for a
non-traumatic mental injury caused only by mental stimuli, the employee must
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show that the mental injury ‘was caused by workplace stress of greater magnitude
than the day-to-day mental stresses experienced by other workers employed in
the same or similar jobs,’ regardless of their employer.” Id. at 857 (citation
omitted).
Dubinovic asks the court to overrule the supreme court’s holding in
Dunlavey. In his view, the court made a policy choice to apply two causation
standards where the injury is purely mental despite the statutory reference to a
single-causation standard: whether the injury “arises out of” employment. He
argues the choice of an appropriate standard is one for the legislature rather than
the judicial branch. He further argues the policy choice was “clearly erroneous”
because it unduly heightened the claimant’s burden.
We are not at liberty to overrule controlling precedent. Bd. of Water Works
Trs. v. Sac Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 890 N.W.2d 50, 57 (Iowa 2017) (“Revisiting
our state law precedent is our prerogative.”); State v. Eichler, 83 N.W.2d 576, 578
(Iowa 1957) (“If our previous holdings are to be overruled, we should ordinarily
prefer to do it ourselves.”). Accordingly, we decline Dubinovic’s invitation to revisit
Dunlavey.
We turn to Dubinovic’s argument that the commissioner misapplied the legal
causation standard and the district court erred in affirming the agency. The issue
he raises is not one of law. As the Iowa Supreme Court stated, “Although the
standard of legal causation involves an issue of law, the application of that
standard to a particular setting requires the commissioner to render an outcome
determinative finding of fact. A court on judicial review is bound by that fact-finding
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if it is supported by substantial evidence.” Asmus v. Waterloo Cmty. Sch. Dist.,
722 N.W.2d 653, 657 (Iowa 2006).
The deputy commissioner considered the testimony of three witnesses who
performed housekeeping duties for other employers. The deputy found “no
evidence that claimant’s work expectations were greater or unusual, just that a
quota of work to be done within a given time was stressful but common to all such
positions.” The deputy’s findings, affirmed by the commissioner in a final agency
decision, are supported by substantial evidence.
II. Alternative-Causation Standard
Dubinovic alternatively contends he proved legal causation under a
modified standard enunciated in Brown v. Quik Trip Corp., 641 N.W.2d 725, 729
(Iowa 2002). There, an employee witnessed a shooting and “had to clean up the
blood from the shooting.” Brown, 641 N.W.2d at 726. Six days later, the employee
was robbed at gunpoint. Id. The employee developed post-traumatic stress
disorder, attributable to the incidents. Id. In analyzing the employee’s work-related
mental injury, the Brown court stated the claimant did not need to satisfy the
Dunlavey legal causation test requiring proof “the stress is greater than that
experienced by similarly situated employees.” See id. at 729. The court held,
“When a claim is based on a manifest happening of a sudden traumatic nature
from an unexpected cause or unusual strain, the legal-causation test is met
irrespective of the absence of similar stress on other employees.” Id.; see also
Vill. Credit Union v. Bryant, No. 11-1499, 2012 WL 1860861, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App.
May 23, 2012) (“A different standard is applied in those situations in which the
mental injury can be readily traced to a specific event.”).
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The commissioner found Brown inapplicable to the facts of Dubinovic’s
case. The commissioner began by setting the stage: “Claimant had three meetings
with supervisors. After the third meeting, he had, what he believes to be, a nervous
breakdown. This is the basis of claimant’s contention he sustained a
mental/mental injury that arose out of and in the course of employment.” The
commissioner then stated:
Iowa cases where a claimant has been found to have a
mental/mental injury caused by a sudden, traumatic or unexpected
event, are dramatically different from those involving claimant.
All Iowa cases finding a mental/mental injury, under the Brown
v. QuikTrip analysis, involve instances where an employee is
personally physically threatened, witnessed a gruesome injury or the
death of another. That clearly is not the fact pattern in this case.
The commissioner’s refusal to apply the modified causation standard set forth in
Brown was not irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable. See Brewer-Strong v.
HNI Corp., 913 N.W.2d 235, 243 (Iowa 2018) (reviewing application of law to fact
in workers’ compensation cases under judicial review standard set forth in Iowa
Code section 17A.19(10)(m) (2016)). To the extent the commissioner’s fact
findings are implicated, those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Cf.
Cavanaugh v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 01-0594, 2002 WL 31425210, at
*2 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 30, 2002) (finding “substantial evidence in the record to
support the commissioner’s finding that the events . . . should not be characterized
as ‘sudden’” where the claimaint developed a renewed fear of heights after moving
from a first-floor office to a fifth-floor office).
We affirm the commissioner’s denial of Dubinovic’s claim for medical
benefits.
AFFIRMED.