Blasdell v. Linnhaven, Inc. ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1968
Filed July 20, 2022
LINNHAVEN, INC., and ACCIDENT FUND NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY/UNITED HEARTLAND,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
ROGER BLASDELL, SURVIVING SPOUSE OF HEATHER BLASDELL,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.
An employer appeals from a district court ruling that reversed the decision
of the workers’ compensation commissioner. AFFIRMED.
Laura Ostrander, Assistant General Counsel, Lansing, Michigan, for
appellants.
Thomas Wertz and Mindi M. Vervaecke of Wertz Law Firm, Cedar Rapids,
for appellee.
Heard by Bower, C.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
2
SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Linnhaven, Inc. and its insurer, Accident Fund National Insurance
Company/United Heartland (referred to together as Linnhaven), appeal from a
district court ruling that reversed the decision of the workers’ compensation
commissioner. The district court found Roger Blasdell was not barred from
receiving workers’ compensation benefits for the death of his wife, Heather
Blasdell, based on desertion without fault of Heather. The commissioner’s
decision was not supported by substantial evidence within the meaning of Iowa
Code section 85.42(1)(a) (2017). We affirm the decision of the district court.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Roger and Heather were married in 2008. They lived together in Iowa with
Heather’s son, first in Ryan, and then in Delhi.1 Heather lost her job in December
2010 and could not find another job in the area. In January 2011, Heather moved
to Clinton. She took only her clothes and vehicle. She later moved to Cedar
Rapids and obtained employment at Linnhaven. Heather’s son remained living
with Roger, and the two of them moved to Manchester. Roger listed himself as
single on a W-4 form in 2011 and 2015. In 2011 and 2012, Roger filed his taxes
as married filing separately.
On November 5, 2012, Heather sustained an injury while working at
Linnhaven. Heather was deposed on January 21, 2014. She stated that she was
separated from Roger and the reason they had not divorced was “money.”
1 Heather and Roger are also the parents of a daughter. For reasons not clear
from the record, their daughter lived with the maternal grandmother.
3
Heather’s marital status was not an issue in the workers’ compensation
proceedings.
A deputy workers’ compensation commissioner determined Heather was
permanently and totally disabled as a result of the work injury, noting “[a]s a result
of the work injury to her right heel she sustained physical impairment coupled with
a more severe psychological impairment, which has rendered her unable to work.”
She was awarded workers’ compensation benefits for as long as she remained
permanently and totally disabled. The deputy’s decision was affirmed by the
commissioner.2
On September 9, 2016, Heather died as a result of an overdose of
prescription medication.3 Roger filed a claim for death benefits as Heather’s
surviving spouse. He also sought reimbursement for Heather’s burial expenses,
which he had paid. Linnhaven asserted that Roger was not entitled to death
benefits under section 85.42(1)(a), which provides that a surviving spouse is not
entitled to death benefits “[w]hen it is shown that at the time of the injury the
surviving spouse had willfully deserted deceased without fault of the deceased,
then such survivor shall not be considered as dependent in any degree.”4
In a deposition taken on April 3, 2018, Roger stated that at the time of the
November 5, 2012 injury, Heather was the beneficiary of his life insurance policy,
was listed as a driver on his car insurance, and was listed as an emergency contact
2 The commissioner delegated the authority to issue the final agency decision to a
deputy workers’ compensation commissioner.
3 The issue of whether Heather’s death was intentional is not before our court in
this appeal.
4 Linnhaven also claimed Roger did not show Heather’s death was caused by a
work-related injury. That issue is not part of this appeal.
4
at his work. Roger asserted that Heather would stay in Manchester with him and
her son from time to time. He and Heather did not have an intimate relationship.
He stated they did not get divorced because “[w]e never fully wanted it.” Roger
continued to see Heather “[a]lmost weekly” and gave her money. They exchanged
telephone calls and text messages.
Roger’s former girlfriend, Angela, was also deposed on April 3. Angela
stated that she was dating Roger at the time of Heather’s injury on November 5,
2012, but she was not dating Roger at the time of the deposition. Angela and
Roger cohabited for a time. Angela knew that Roger and Heather were married
and that they continued to communicate.
A hearing was held on May 15, 2018. Roger’s testimony was similar to his
deposition testimony. He stated that he and Heather separated in January 2011
mainly for financial reasons. He stated that they maintained contact from the time
they separated until Heather’s death. Roger provided Heather weekly financial
assistance. He testified Heather also helped him financially about five times per
year.
Heather’s son testified he was living with Heather in Cedar Rapids when
she was injured in 2012. He stated:
I know that [Roger and Heather] had frequent conversations
throughout the week. I don’t necessarily know about what they
talked about, but I know that they were in contact with each other.
And throughout—after her injury, I had been present a few different
times when they had met up with each other.
Heather’s son stated that sometimes Roger would meet Heather to give her money
“to help out with bills,” and sometimes it was just to “check up and see how
everybody was doing.”
5
Following the hearing, the deputy workers’ compensation commissioner
who presided over the hearing became unavailable. The workers’ compensation
commissioner authorized another deputy to issue a proposed decision. This
deputy relied on the record and the post-hearing briefs. On August 6, 2019, the
deputy found:
Ultimately, regardless of whether Heather was Roger’s
beneficiary or emergency contact or whether they spoke regularly
around the time of her work-related injury, I find that both Heather
and Roger intended to terminate their marital relationship in early
2011—nearly two years before Heather’s work-related injury.
Heather moved out of the home she shared with Roger, and shortly
thereafter Roger began a relationship with another woman—a
relationship that continued for the next five years and included
several years of cohabitation. Roger’s relationship with [Angela]
reflects his willful intention to separate from Heather. Further,
Heather and Roger never lived together or had any sexual
relationship after their separation in 2011. While they may have
spoken regularly at the time of Heather’s work-related injury, these
exchanges were not romantic; they were to check up on one another
and their children. For these reasons, I find Heather and Roger
ended their marriage relationship in 2011 and that Roger willfully and
intentionally separated from Heather at that time.
I also find that the cessation of Heather and Roger’s marriage
relationship in 2011 came as a result of financial hardship; not due
to any abhorrent behavior from Heather, such as alcoholism, drug
use, or physical abuse.
The deputy also found, “[T]he period of time between Heather’s work-related injury
and her death reflects a continuation of the termination of the marital relationship
between Heather and Roger.”
The deputy concluded “Roger had willfully deserted Heather without fault
by Heather as of 2011—before her underlying work-related injury.” The deputy
determined that based on the statutory language in section 85.42(1)(a), Roger was
not entitled to death benefits.
6
Roger requested a rehearing because the deputy who presided over the
hearing was not the author of the proposed decision. Roger claimed the demeanor
of the witnesses was a substantial factor in the case. The commissioner ruled,5
“in an effort to maintain the integrity of the contested case process before this
agency, rehearing is granted in this matter.”
A new hearing was held in July 2020 before the deputy who had issued the
ruling in the case. No new exhibits were permitted, and only Roger testified. He
testified it was Heather’s decision to move to Clinton and she believed she could
find employment there. Roger testified Heather could come and go from his home
whenever she wanted. He stated he sometimes stayed with Heather in Cedar
Rapids but did not live with her.
Following the rehearing, the deputy ruled:
Ultimately, given Roger’s consistent testimony throughout the
entirety of the case, I find Roger’s behavior and outward manner to
be forthcoming and straightforward. At no point on rehearing was I
given the impression that he was attempting to conceal information.
I therefore find him to be a generally credible witness and I find his
demeanor reflects positively on his case.
The deputy determined, however, that the findings on Roger’s demeanor did not
change the conclusion that Heather and Roger intended to terminate their marital
relationship in early 2011, and this remained the case at the time of Heather’s
injury in 2012 and her death in 2016. The deputy again determined that Roger
was not entitled to death benefits.
5 A deputy issued this ruling on the authorization of the commissioner.
7
Roger appealed the deputy’s decision to the workers’ compensation
commissioner.6 The commissioner determined that under section 85.42(1)(a), the
term “at the time of the injury” meant at the time of Heather’s injury in November
2012. The commissioner found Roger willfully and intentionally separated from
Heather before her injury. The commissioner also found this separation was
without the fault of Heather. The commissioner concluded Roger was not
dependent on Heather and determined he was not entitled to death benefits.
Roger petitioned for judicial review. The district court found that for Roger
to collect death benefits, “at the time of injury, [Roger] must (1) be Heather’s
spouse and (2) not have deserted her.” The court stated:
Both parties and the [commissioner] seem to treat the
questions of whether [Roger] and Heather were married at the time
of injury and whether [Roger] abandoned Heather as one in the
same. They are not. A person could abandon their spouse but they
would still be married until a divorce decree was entered as there is
no common law divorce. In re Weems’ Estate, 139 N.W.2d 922, 924
(Iowa 1966). It is undisputed that [Roger] and Heather never
received a divorce decree. Therefore, at the time of Heather’s injury,
she and [Roger] were still married.
The court also stated:
To be clear, in order for this exception [in section 85.42(1)(a)] to
apply, [Roger] had to have deserted Heather. If Heather deserted
[Roger], [Roger] would still be eligible for survivor’s benefits.
Likewise, if neither party deserted one another, [Roger] is eligible for
survivor’s benefits. If both parties deserted the marriage, then it
cannot be said Heather is without fault, so [Roger] would still collect.
Therefore, the only question the Court need decide is whether
[Roger] deserted Heather.
(Internal citations omitted).
6 A deputy was authorized to make a decision in lieu of the commissioner.
Because the deputy was acting at the direction of the commissioner, we will treat
the deputy’s decision as if it were made by the commissioner.
8
The district court found the facts did not support a finding that Roger
deserted Heather. The court noted Heather’s child remained in the marital home
with Roger, Roger tried to remain in contact with Heather, and in 2011 and 2012
he listed his marital status as “married filing separately” on his income tax forms.
The court found Roger did not have the requisite intent to desert Heather. The
court determined the case should be remanded to the commissioner for a ruling
on whether Heather’s death was barred by the willful injury exception. Linnhaven
appeals the decision of the district court.
II. Standard of Review
“When reviewing the decision of the district court’s judicial review ruling, we
determine if we would reach the same result as the district court in our application
of the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act.” Sladek v. Emp. Appeal Bd., 939
N.W.2d 632, 637 (Iowa 2020) (quoting Insituform Techs., Inc. v. Emp. Appeal Bd.,
728 N.W.2d 781, 787 (Iowa 2007)). The commissioner’s factual findings are
upheld on appeal if they are supported by substantial evidence when the record is
viewed as a whole. Evenson v. Winnebago Indus., Inc., 881 N.W.2d 360, 366
(Iowa 2016). We consider whether there is substantial evidence to support the
findings made by the commissioner, not whether the evidence could support
different findings. Larson Mfg. Co. v. Thorson, 763 N.W.2d 842, 850 (Iowa 2009).
III. Desertion of Spouse
Linnhaven claims the district court erred by finding Roger did not desert
Heather. It asserts that Roger and Heather intended to terminate their marriage
relationship when they separated in 2011, before Heather’s injury in November
2012. It points to the following testimony by Roger:
9
Q. Did you have differences over finances? A. Yes. I was
paying for a majority of everything.
Q. And was that something you didn’t want to be doing? You
didn’t want to be paying for a majority of everything? A. Yes, that’s
correct.
Q. Did you have any specific discussions when you separated
in 2011 with Ms. Blasdell regarding the reasons why you separated?
....
A. I couldn’t—I couldn’t handle paying rent by myself.
From this testimony, Linnhaven claims Roger separated from Heather because he
did not want to pay her expenses. Linnhaven claims Roger’s desertion of Heather
was not because of any fault by Heather and argues that Roger is not entitled to
death benefits based on section 85.42(1)(a).
Section 85.31(1)(a) provides:
When death results from the injury, the employer shall pay the
dependents who were wholly dependent on the earnings of the
employee for support at the time of the injury, during their lifetime,
compensation upon the basis of eighty percent per week of the
employee’s average weekly spendable earnings, commencing from
the date of death as follows:
(1) To the surviving spouse for life or until remarriage,
provided that upon remarriage two years’ benefits shall be paid to
the surviving spouse in a lump sum, if there are no children entitled
to benefits.
Under section 85.42(1), a surviving spouse is presumed to be wholly
dependent on the deceased spouse. Rojas v. Pine Ridge Farms, L.L.C., 779
N.W.2d 223, 233 (Iowa 2010); Carter v. Alter Trading Corp., No. 11-1697, 2012
WL 4898275, at *2 n.6 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 17, 2012). There is an exception
“[w]hen it is shown that at the time of the injury the surviving spouse had willfully
deserted deceased without fault of the deceased, then such survivor shall not be
considered as dependent in any degree.” Iowa Code § 85.42(1)(a). The exception
would only apply if Roger deserted Heather without fault by Heather. See id.10
The exception involving a deserting spouse was discussed in James Black
Dry Goods Co. v. Iowa Industrial Commissioner, where the primary issue was
whether the wife had deserted the husband prior to his death in a work-related
accident. 173 N.W. 23, 24 (Iowa 1919). After several years of marriage, the
husband left the marital residence due to “serious financial difficulty” and traveled
to find work. Id. The husband and wife met periodically, and the husband mailed
money to the wife. Id. at 25.
The Iowa Supreme Court stated, “the dependence is presumed unless there
is desertion, where the marriage relation between husband and wife is involved.”
Id. at 24. In order to show desertion, there must be proof of these elements: (1)
“the cessation of the marriage relations”; (2) “the intent to desert”; (3) “a
continuance of the desertion during the statutory period”; and (4) “the absence of
consent or misconduct of the deserted party.” Id. Looking at the facts of the case,
the court found:
We are of opinion that the evidence falls far short of showing
desertion on the part of [the wife]. The mere fact that they did not
live together is not enough. We have held that separation and
desertion are not synonymous. . . . We have said in a divorce case
that the act is willful when there is a design to forsake the other
spouse willfully or without cause, and thereby break up the marital
union, deliberate intent to cease living with the other as spouse,
abnegation of all duties of the marriage relations, the actual ceasing
of cohabitation, and the intent to desert.
Id. at 25. The court noted that if spouses agreed to live apart, there was no
desertion. Id.
11
First, we recognize the case law on desertion, which borrowed language
from marital cases in the same timeframe, is over 100 years old.7 However, neither
party urges for modification of these standards defined by this case law. The
evidence shows Roger and Heather lived separately for financial reasons. They
rented a house in Delhi and lived there with Heather’s son. After Heather lost her
job, she looked for new employment in the area but was unsuccessful. They could
not afford the rent for the Delhi home on Roger’s income alone. Heather moved
first to Clinton, and then to Cedar Rapids looking for a job. Heather’s son remained
living with Roger, although at times he also lived with Heather. Roger also had a
girlfriend residing with him for some time, and Heather dated as well. Roger and
Heather maintained friendly relations, talking often. Roger sometimes gave money
to Heather, and sometimes she gave money to him. At the time of the November
2012 injury, Heather was the beneficiary of Roger’s life insurance policy, was listed
as a driver on his car insurance, and was listed as an emergency contact at his
work. In 2011 and 2012, Roger filed his taxes as married filing separately.
We find the facts are similar, although not identical, to those in James Black,
where the court determined there was insufficient evidence of desertion. See 173
N.W. at 25. As the court noted, “separation and desertion are not synonymous.”
Id. Furthermore, when spouses agree to live apart, there is no desertion. Id. The
evidence does not show Roger had an intent to desert Heather without the fault of
Heather. Heather left the martial home. The parties agreed to live separately due
7 As noted by the district court, the case law relied on by the parties derives from
language concerning fault divorces.
12
to their financial circumstances, and based on their mutual agreement, “there is no
desertion.” See id.
We affirm the district court. Substantial evidence does not support a finding
that Roger deserted Heather, without fault by Heather, under section 85.42(1)(a).
IV. Other Issues
Linnhaven asserts that we should affirm the district court’s conclusion the
commissioner’s designee could issue the final agency decision. Roger did not
cross-appeal and does not claim the district court erred on this issue. We conclude
there is no issue to be addressed, as both parties agree with the district court’s
decision on this matter.
Linnhaven also asserts that we should find it is not barred from raising the
defense of spousal desertion based on the doctrine of estoppel. The district court
did not address the issue, stating, “The Court passes on the question of whether
[Linnhaven] is estopped from arguing this point because the law is clear on the
matter of whether [Roger] and Heather were still legally married at the time of
injury.” Nor does Roger raise the issue of estoppel on appeal. We find there is no
need to address the issue, as no party is claiming Linnhaven is estopped from
raising the issue of spousal desertion.
V. Conclusion
We affirm the district court’s ruling. The commissioner’s decision that Roger
deserted Heather without the fault of Heather was not supported by substantial
evidence within the meaning of Iowa Code section 85.42(1)(a).
AFFIRMED.