Euric Abray Fountain v. State of Iowa ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1391
Filed November 2, 2022
EURIC ABRAY FOUNTAIN,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Samantha Gronewald,
Judge.
Euric Fountain appeals the denial of his eighth application for postconviction
relief. AFFIRMED.
Erica A. Nichols Cook and Elaina Steenson of State Public Defender’s
Office, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Heard by Bower, C.J., Badding, J., and Potterfield, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2022).
2
BADDING, Judge.
Since a jury found him guilty of first-degree murder thirty-four years ago,
Euric Fountain has maintained his innocence in a series of proceedings
challenging his conviction. Fountain had some partial success on appeal from his
most recent postconviction-relief challenge. In that appeal, we concluded the
district court erred in granting the State’s motion for summary disposition under
Iowa Code section 822.3 (2017) as to two witnesses who authored affidavits
recanting their trial testimony because the court applied the newly-discovered-
evidence test instead of the new-ground-of-fact test. See Fountain v. State,
No. 17-2024, 2019 WL 5424928, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 23, 2019).
On remand, the district court skipped the question of whether the affidavits
satisfied the ground-of-fact exception to the three-year time bar in section 822.3
and instead dismissed the application on its merits, concluding Fountain could not
meet his burden under the newly-discovered-evidence test. Fountain appeals,
claiming the court erred in failing to address the statute-of-limitations question
before reaching the merits. He asks us to decide that issue in his favor and remand
“for trial to determine if the claim of new material evidence is sufficient to probably
change the result of the trial under Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(d).”
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
The background of Fountain’s eighth application for postconviction relief
was summarized in the prior appellate decision as follows:
Fountain and two other men, William Ridley and Will Howard, were
charged with first-degree murder in relation to the 1987 death of
Theodore Wilt. A jury found Fountain guilty of first-degree murder,
Howard was separately convicted, and Ridley pled guilty to a charge
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of second-degree murder. This court affirmed Fountain’s conviction
on direct appeal. Procedendo issued in 1990.
In 1996, Howard sent the attorney representing Fountain in
the appeal of the denial of his first [postconviction-relief] application
a letter, in which Howard stated his willingness to testify, under oath,
that Fountain was not involved in Wilt’s death. Also in 1996, Fountain
filed his second [postconviction-relief] application, citing Howard’s
purported testimony as newly discovered evidence. In 1997, the
attorney representing Fountain in relation to his second
[postconviction-relief] application wrote a letter asking Fountain
whether he wanted to pursue a new trial upon Howard’s statements,
which “completely vindicates [Fountain] and indicates [he was] not
even a participant in the murder.” The attorney advised he did not
believe Howard’s testimony, alone, would result in a new trial for
Fountain. The attorney also advised if he pursued a new trial using
Howard’s testimony, there was a possibility he could not use it in
conjunction with other new evidence uncovered in the future.
Fountain agreed to not pursue a new trial upon Howard’s testimony,
and the second application was ultimately dismissed for failure to
prosecute.
At the murder trial in 1988, Dennis Daggett testified Ridley
came to his residence and reported he and his cousin Euric had killed
someone. Blanch[e] Carr testified she saw Fountain, Howard, and
Ridley at a bar she worked at the evening of the murder. She further
testified at around 8:00 p.m., the three left the bar together. Carr
testified the three returned to the bar together around midnight.
While speaking with Howard thereafter, Carr observed dark spots on
Howard’s clothing that he reported was blood, and Howard indicated
to her that they had killed someone. Carr also observed a blood
smear on Howard’s palm. Ridley and Fountain left the bar together
about thirty or forty-five minutes after their return. Ridley
unequivocally testified that he, Howard, and Fountain were involved
in the murder. Ridley’s remaining trial testimony was generally in line
with that of Carr and Daggett.
In 2015, Carr and Daggett authored affidavits in which they
recanted some of their testimony. Daggett’s affidavit is somewhat
illegible, but he appears to have asserted he was coached to tell
police and later testify Fountain was involved in the murder. Carr
recanted her testimony that Fountain left the bar with Ridley and
Howard prior to the murder. However, she did state she later
observed the three return to the bar together. She also recanted her
testimony that Howard told her about a murder and that she
observed blood on him. Howard also authored an affidavit in which
he again stated Fountain was not involved in Wilt’s death.
In 2017, Fountain filed the instant [postconviction-relief]
application in which he argued new evidence of material facts require
vacation of his conviction. In a subsequent brief, he argued the
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alleged new evidence supported a claim of actual innocence. The
State moved for summary disposition on statute-of-limitations
grounds. The court granted the motion, concluding the information
from Howard was not newly discovered and the 2015 affidavits were
not credible.
Id. at *1–2 (footnotes omitted).1
Although not mentioned in our prior opinion, the State’s motion for summary
disposition also asserted that Fountain’s newly-discovered-evidence claim failed
on the merits, though its arguments on those separate issues were combined. In
resistance, Fountain asserted the ground-of-fact exception to section 822.3
applied and argued genuine issues of material fact existed on the merits of his
newly-discovered-evidence claim. Following the State’s lead, the district court’s
summary disposition ruling did not separately address the two issues. Instead, the
court cited section 822.3 and the newly-discovered-evidence test before
concluding that because Fountain had Howard’s letter “for many years and chose
not to act upon it,” that evidence was “not newly discovered.” As for the affidavits
from Daggett and Carr, the court found neither recantation would have “resulted in
an acquittal.”
In Fountain’s appeal from that ruling, we framed the issue as whether “the
district court erred in concluding [his] application was barred by the three-year
statute of limitations.” Id. at *1. We agreed the information from Howard “was not
newly discovered because Fountain knew of the information for many years and
chose not to act upon it.” Id. at *2. So that evidence did “not serve to toll the
1 Howard did not testify at Fountain’s trial, although Ridley did.
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statute of limitations” as a new ground of fact that could not have been raised within
the applicable time period. Id.; accord Iowa Code § 822.3.
As “to the 2015 affidavits of recantation by Daggett and Carr stating that
they provided false testimony upon being pressured by law enforcement and the
prosecution,” we found:
The district court concluded, on the merits, that the affidavits lacked
credibility and the recanted testimony generally had no effect on
Fountain’s murder trial. The court made no express finding as to
whether the information contained in the affidavits amounted to
grounds of fact that could not have been raised within the limitations
period. See Iowa Code § 822.3. Instead, the court concluded on the
merits that the evidence would not change the result if a new trial
was granted, given the other evidence of guilt presented. Our
supreme court has explicitly and specifically rejected any
requirement that an applicant must show the ground of fact would
likely or probably have changed the outcome of the underlying
criminal case in order to avoid a limitations defense. Courts are not
to reach the merits of a claim based on a new ground of fact in
deciding whether the exception to the three-year statute of limitations
applies. That is exactly what the district court did here, which we
conclude was error.
Id. at *4 (cleaned up). We accordingly “reverse[d] the summary disposition ruling
as to the 2015 affidavits,” and remanded “the matter to the district court to properly
determine whether the affidavits amount to newly discovered evidence and
thereafter proceed in accordance with Iowa law.” Id. (footnote omitted). In a
footnote, we stated: “We take no position on whether the 2015 affidavits qualify as
newly discovered evidence sufficient to toll the statute of limitations.”
Following remand, a trial date was set with discovery deadlines. After the
trial date was set, the district court set a hearing on the State’s original motion for
summary disposition. In the lead-up to that hearing, Fountain applied for and was
granted funds for an investigator at the State’s expense. He served multiple
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subpoenas and secured several continuances of the hearing date so that he could
complete his investigation before the summary disposition hearing date.
Once the hearing date arrived, Fountain’s attorney laid out a narrow
interpretation of our remand order, telling the court at the start of the hearing that
“this is not a proceeding regarding the substantive claim of Mr. Fountain in regard
to the credibility or the merit of the two affidavits.” Instead, according to Fountain,
the sole purpose of the hearing was to determine whether the affidavits met the
ground-of-fact exception to section 822.3. The State, on the other hand,
advocated for a broad interpretation, asserting the case was remanded “for the
Court to make a determination of whether there was newly discovered evidence in
this case.” According to the State, “That’s a substantive . . . claim. It’s one that
contains a number of elements, and if any of those elements is wholly absent from
the undisputed record in this case, that’s an appropriate basis for summary
judgment.” In response, Fountain asserted “that you have to determine statute of
limitations time bar issue before you can get to merits.”
After hearing Fountain’s evidence,2 the district court sided with the State’s
broad interpretation of our remand order. As a result, the court did not address the
2 That evidence included Fountain’s testimony that he was transferred to the
Newton Correctional Facility in March 2014 where he stayed until August 2015.
While there, he met fellow inmate Matthew Kauffman, who turned out to be
Daggett’s brother. “[A] couple days or so” later, Kauffman provided Fountain with
affidavits written by both himself and Daggett. Although Daggett was also an
inmate at the prison, Fountain never encountered him there. He did, however,
meet Damiko Carr while at Newton, who Fountain learned is Blanche Carr’s
grandson. Fountain gave Damiko a copy of Carr’s testimony. After reading it,
Damiko told Fountain: “That’s messed up. I’ll contact my grandma and talk to her
about it.” About a week later, Damiko provided Fountain with an unsigned affidavit
from Carr. Fountain sent a copy to his brother, Larry Quinn, who tracked down
Carr in 2015 and had her sign it.
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statute-of-limitations issue under section 822.3 at all, instead jumping directly to
the merits of whether the 2015 affidavits amount to newly discovered evidence
based on the following considerations: whether (1) the evidence was discovered
after the verdict, (2) it could not have been discovered earlier in the exercise of
due diligence, (3) it is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching, and (4) it
would have changed the result of the trial. See Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d
509, 516 (Iowa 2003) (citation omitted) (stating that in order to prevail on a newly-
discovered-evidence claim, an applicant must prove those four elements).
The court found Fountain satisfied the first two elements. As to the third
and fourth elements, the court found the differences between Daggett’s testimony
and his affidavit “have impeachment value only and,” as such, “lack materiality in
the context of a newly-discovered evidence claim.” Considering “the entirety of the
evidence presented at trial,” the court also found “it cannot be said that the
information contained within the affidavit would have probably changed the
outcome of the trial.” The court reached the same conclusions about Carr’s
affidavit. Finding Fountain did not meet his burden to establish his claim of newly
discovered evidence, the court dismissed the application.
Fountain appeals. He argues the court applied the wrong legal standard in
determining whether his application was excepted from the statute of limitations.
He also argues summary disposition was improper because genuine issues of
material fact remain and preclude the State’s entitlement to judgment as a matter
Fountain’s younger brother, Mark, later signed an affidavit in 2021 stating
he knows Carr and learned she now has dementia or Alzheimer’s. Carr’s daughter
submitted an affidavit stating the same. Other affidavits stated Daggett and
Kauffman could not be located. And Damiko Carr is now deceased.
8
of law. Lastly, he argues the court “failed to analyze the effect of the new evidence
on the evidence at trial,” which seems to be a claim that the new evidence probably
would have changed the result of the trial.
II. Analysis
A. Scope of Remand Ruling
At the outset, we must determine the scope of our remand mandate since
that guides our resolution of the claims Fountain raises on appeal. See In re
Marriage of Davis, 608 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Iowa 2000) (“When . . . an appellate court
remands for a special purpose, the district court upon such remand is limited to do
the special thing authorized by the appellate court in its opinion and nothing else.”).
Was the district court limited to deciding whether the affidavits met the ground-of-
fact exception to the statute of limitations in section 822.3, as Fountain contends,
or could the court adjudicate Fountain’s newly-discovered-evidence claim on its
merits, as the State asserted? To answer this question, we need to first clarify the
two different tests lurking in the background on these separate issues.
Our postconviction-relief statute contains a three-year statute of limitations
for filing postconviction relief applications, though the “limitation does not apply to
a ground of fact or law that could not have been raised within the applicable time
period.” Iowa Code § 822.3. An applicant relying on the ground-of-fact exception
must show: (1) “he or she could not have raised the ground of fact within the
limitations period” and (2) “a nexus between the asserted ground of fact and the
challenged conviction.” Moon v. State, 911 N.W.2d 137, 143 (Iowa 2018) (citation
omitted). The nexus requirement involves a showing that the ground of fact is
relevant to the conviction, meaning “the ground of fact must be of the type that has
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the potential to qualify as material evidence for purposes of a substantive claim
under section 822.2.” Id. (quoting Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 521). In attempting
to overcome the time-bar, an applicant does not need to “show the ground of fact
would likely or probably have changed the outcome of the underlying criminal
case.” Id. (quoting Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 521). That determination “must
await an adjudication, whether in a summary proceeding or after trial, on the
applicant’s substantive claim for relief.” Id. (quoting Harrington, 659 N.W.2d
at 521).
When determining the merits of a newly-discovered-evidence claim, the
court must consider the four-part test laid out by the district court in its summary
disposition ruling. The first two elements focus on the timing of when the evidence
was discovered, while the last two consider whether “the evidence is material to
the issues in the case and not merely cumulative or impeaching” and whether “the
evidence probably would have changed the result of the trial.” Id. at 151. The
court in Harrington, and then again in Moon, emphasized “the ground-of-fact
exception pursuant to section 822.3 is not the same as a substantive claim for
postconviction relief based on newly discovered evidence pursuant to
section 822.2(1)(d).” Id. at 143. Fountain’s argument kicks in here—he complains
the district court did not properly conduct a nexus analysis but instead “erroneously
conducted a merits analysis.”
The problem with the district court’s first ruling on the State’s motion for
summary disposition was that in deciding the ground-of-fact exception under
section 822.3, the court “concluded on the merits that the evidence would not
change the result if a new trial was granted.” Fountain, 2019 WL 5424928, at *4.
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We reversed on that ground because “[c]ourts are not to ‘reach the merits of a
claim based on a new ground of fact in deciding whether the exception to the three-
year statute of limitations applies.’” Id. (citation omitted).
The district court on remand did not make that same error. Unlike the first
time around, the court’s remand ruling did not mention the statute of limitations or
ground-of-fact exception in section 822.3. Instead, the court analyzed the State’s
alternate ground for summary disposition—that there were no genuine issues of
material fact on the merits of Fountain’s newly-discovered-evidence claim. This
was permissible. See, e.g., Brian R. Means, Postconviction Remedies § 25:3
(Aug. 2022 update) (“Generally, the question of whether a claim is timely is decided
by the court before reaching the merits of the substantive federal claim . . . .
Nevertheless, a district court is not required to rule on whether an asserted
limitations defense applies if the habeas petition may be denied on simpler
grounds.” (footnotes omitted)).3 And it fell within our remand mandate, which
3 While our unpublished decisions could be read to mandate consideration of
timeliness before consideration of the merits, that language tends to appear in
decisions where the State wins on the timeliness issue and the district court’s
decision on the application of the statute of limitations is not tied to the merits
analysis. See, e.g., Cole v. State, No. 15-0344, 2016 WL 7395722, at *2 (Iowa Ct.
App. Dec. 21, 2016); Whiteside v. State, No. 15-0534, 2016 WL 4051578, at *3 n.4
(Iowa Ct. App. July 27, 2016); Zaabel v. State, No. 15-0220, 2016 WL 4035236,
at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. July 27, 2016). But such a reading would not be an entirely
accurate interpretation of chapter 822. While the statute of limitations is often
raised in a motion for summary disposition, chapter 822 provides two separate
avenues for early determination, one by dismissal based on the statute of
limitations in section 822.3, and one by summary disposition on the merits without
a trial when one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law in section 822.6.
See, e.g., Anderson v. State, No. 16-0394, 2016 WL 7393900, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App.
Dec. 21, 2016). Here, the State raised both avenues. While it is true that it
normally makes more sense to consider timeliness first, it is not required. Even if
it was, the district court here issued findings tantamount to concluding Fountain
survived the time-bar.
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directed the court “to properly determine whether the affidavits amount to newly
discovered evidence and thereafter proceed in accordance with Iowa law.”4
Fountain, 2019 WL 5424928, at *4 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
That the district court on remand did not first engage in a nexus analysis
before proceeding to the merits is of no consequence because a consideration of
the merits would logically follow a conclusion that Fountain established the nexus
requirement and overcame the time-bar of section 822.3. See Moon, 911 N.W.2d
at 144–45, 151–53 (proceeding to a merits analysis of newly-discovered-evidence
claim after concluding “the alleged exculpatory evidence has the potential to qualify
as material evidence”); Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 521 (“Because Harrington
asserted a relevant ground of fact or law ‘that could not have been raised within
the applicable time period,’ this action is not time barred. The district court erred
in making a contrary ruling. That brings us to the merits of Harrington’s application
for postconviction relief.” (citation omitted)).
Even if the failure to complete the nexus analysis was error, “[n]o error
requires reversal absent the showing of prejudice.” Daniels v. State, No. 01-0296,
2002 WL 100600, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 28, 2002). Fountain’s argument on
this point appears to be that the ground-of-fact test is all that he had to meet to
4 We recognize that some confusion may have been generated by our generic use
of the phrase “newly discovered evidence” in this remand mandate and
accompanying footnote. But when the mandate is considered within the context
of the proceedings, it is clear the district court was to reconsider the State’s motion
for summary disposition using the correct tests. See Davis, 608 N.W.2d at 769(“The court on remand should interpret the mandate in ‘accordance with the
context of the proceedings’ and should ‘tak[e] into account the appellate court’s
opinion and the circumstances it embraces.’” (alteration in original) (citation
omitted)).
12
survive summary disposition and proceed to a full-blown trial on the merits. But
Moon and Harrington don’t go that far; they only say that the ground-of-fact test is
all that is required to avoid summary disposition based on a limitations defense.
Both recognized that a determination of whether evidence is newly discovered
under section 822.2(1)(d) can be made “in a summary proceeding,” with the court
in Moon affirming summary disposition on the merits of the claim. Moon, 911
N.W.2d at 143; Harrington, 659 N.W.2d at 521. While Fountain suggests he had
a right to engage in discovery after overcoming the time-bar hurdle, he was given
that opportunity before the summary disposition hearing. The trial scheduling
order entered after remand set discovery deadlines. Fountain applied for and was
granted an investigator at the State’s expense. He secured several continuances
of the summary disposition hearing so that he could engage in further investigation.
And he served multiple subpoenas to aid in the development of his claim.
For these reasons, we conclude that any error in the court’s failure to
address the nexus requirement of section 822.3 did not prejudice Fountain, so
reversal is not required.
B. Merits
Next, Fountain argues the court erred in dismissing his application because
it “applied the incorrect analysis and held that the newly discovered evidence was
not material.” He adds “dismissal is improper because material facts are in
dispute” and “the district court failed to analyze the effect of the new evidence on
the evidence at trial.” Distilled down, Fountain claims the 2015 affidavits from
Daggett and Carr recanting their trial testimony create genuine issues of material
fact as to what really happened to Theodore Wilt.
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Summary disposition may be granted “if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Moon, 911 N.W.2 at 142
(alterations in original) (quoting Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3)). The record is viewed in
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the court draws all legitimate
inferences in the party’s favor. Id.
1. Newly discovered evidence
With that summary disposition standard in mind, to prevail on his newly-
discovered-evidence claim, Fountain must show by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(1) that the evidence was discovered after the verdict; (2) that it could
not have been discovered earlier in the exercise of due diligence;
(3) that the evidence is material to the issues in the case and not
merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) that the evidence probably
would have changed the result of the trial.
Id. at 151 (quoting Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 274 (Iowa 1991)).
The district court found Fountain satisfied the first two elements but not the
third and fourth elements. In challenging the latter conclusion, Fountain claims
that the “court failed to analyze the effect of the new evidence on the evidence at
trial.” We disagree and reach the same conclusion as the district court on our
survey of the trial evidence in comparison to the new evidence.
a. Trial Evidence
The trial transcripts show the following. Wilt lived in the basement of a home
with four other apartments. A cellar door or hatch led to a flight of stairs, which in
turn led to the entry door to Wilt’s basement residence. Wilt’s boss called him the
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morning of Saturday, October 10, 1987, around 5:00 or 5:30 a.m. when he did not
show up for work. After making several calls to him throughout the day, she went
to his residence around 5:00 or 5:30 p.m. Once there, she found “a man laying in
the doorway that was all bloody.” She went home and called the police.
When Sergeant Larry Edwards arrived and viewed the scene, he observed
bloody footprints on the concrete steps down to Wilt’s basement apartment. There
was no sign of forced entry, but the room containing Wilt’s person was in a “state
of disarray,” containing “some bricks lying on the floor” that “appeared to be very
bloody” and “[n]umerous footprints and tracks in the blood.” Edwards opined Wilt
suffered a “severe beating” about the head. After being notified, Wilt’s sister went
to the apartment and noticed a portable television and telephone answering
machine were missing.
State Medical Examiner Dr. Thomas Bennett visited the crime scene and
conducted the autopsy. He concluded Wilt’s time of death to be around midnight,
with the cause of death being pre-mortum severe head injuries, at least six blows,
by beating with a heavy blunt instrument consistent with a brick or bricks.
Dr. Bennett also observed an imprint from footwear on Wilt’s chest.
At the time of the murder, Daggett was living with his girlfriend, Darla Ogg,
and her adoptive grandfather, Clarence White. White testified that, around the
time of the murder, Ridley came to the home and tried to sell him a television.
White asked if it was stolen and, when Ridley did not respond, White declined.
White recalled Ridley was “bragging . . . about him and [h]is cousin and this other
guy got this guy and for some money and stuff from him,” and Ridley mentioned
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the name “Euric[] Fountain.” White elaborated Ridley bragged “about how they did
the guy in . . . for some merchandise.”
Ogg testified she was familiar with both Ridley and Fountain, who Ridley
said was his cousin. Like White, Ogg remembered that Ridley came to the home
she was sharing with White and Daggett around the time of the murder. During
this visit, Ridley “was trying to sell a TV set, trying to get money to get out of town,”
and he told Daggett he had something “real important” to talk to him about.
Daggett and Ridley talked in a locked room together for roughly fifteen minutes.
After Ridley left, Daggett told Ogg that Ridley “told him about hurting the guy.”
According to Ogg, Ridley told Daggett “that his cousin Euric[] was with him when
it happened.” Ogg decided to call the police.
Daggett testified he has known Ridley since they were kids. As to Fountain,
Daggett testified: “Know of him. Don’t know him.” Daggett knew of Fountain
through Ridley, who had told him “they was cousins.” The day after the murder,
according to Daggett, Ridley came to his house, scared and needing to talk to him.
They went into White’s bedroom, where Ridley shared with Daggett “what he had
done.” Ridley also shared that “his cousin Euric[]” was involved. Daggett
specifically recalled Ridley reported “that night that he was going to this girl’s house
to see somebody, and the girl wasn’t there, and he went to the door, some guy
grabbed him, hit his head on the bannister, so he grabbed the brick and hit him on
the head.” Daggett testified that after Ridley left, he told Ogg what Ridley told him,
and she called the police. On cross-examination, Daggett testified that Ridley
never specifically mentioned Fountain was involved, as Ridley only stated it was
“him and his cousin.” On redirect and recross, after being confronted with his
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earlier deposition testimony, Daggett testified Ridley did specifically report
Fountain was involved.
Detective Larry Harris of the Des Moines Police Department interviewed
Ogg and Daggett after Ogg called the police. After those interviews, Harris
obtained a search warrant for Ridley’s residence. The search of the residence
turned up a television and a telephone answering machine, although they didn’t
seem to be the ones taken from Wilt’s residence. After the search, Ridley showed
up at the police station on his own. Ridley first denied being involved but then told
Harris essentially the same story about the evening that Harris had heard from
Daggett. Ridley told Harris two others were with him, “[h]is cousin Euric[],” and
someone who goes by the nickname of “Stu or Junior,” names that the evidence
shows Will Howard went by. Ridley stated Howard was the person who picked up
the brick and hit the landlord with it “several times.” Ridley reported the trio—being
himself, Howard, and Fountain—went to the residence of Fountain’s girlfriend,
Ethel Sloan, after the incident, and that is where the television was. Police then
obtained a search warrant for Sloan’s residence. That search did not turn up a
television, but police did confiscate two pairs of jeans, a towel, and some shoes.
During a later video-taped interview, Ridley added that both he and
Fountain, along with Howard, struck Wilt with a brick multiple times. He also
changed his story as to why they went to the residence, stating, “Euric[] came up
with a plan to go to this address to rob a dude by the name of Joe.”5 One of the
detectives asked Ridley about his shoes, and he reported his “brown leather
5 Joe Gulash lived in another apartment in the building.
17
shoes” were at Fountain’s girlfriend’s. Ridley said Fountain had been wearing
basketball shoes.
The search warrant that was obtained for Sloan’s residence was executed
in the early morning hours of October 14. Fountain was present when the warrant
was executed, and he led Moon to Ridley’s shoes that matched the description
provided by Ridley. Officers seized those shoes, which appeared to have been
recently washed, and a pair of black and red basketball shoes that were located
nearby, which Fountain identified as being his. Fountain was taken into custody.
Officers later seized the clothes and black canvas shoes Fountain was wearing
when he was arrested. Law enforcement also seized Howard’s clothes and shoes
after he turned himself into police and was taken into custody
DCI Criminalist Paul Bush testified, among other things, that the brown
leather shoes and black and red basketball shoes that were seized had no traces
of blood. Bush testified that did not mean they never had blood on them, because
the blood could have been washed off. Only Howard’s shoes had traces of blood,
and those traces matched Wilt’s blood type.
DCI Criminalist John Kilgore first compared thirteen shoe impressions found
at the scene in blood or dirt to Ridley’s size eleven brown leather shoes and
Fountain’s size nine-and-one-half black and red athletic shoes. One of the
impressions made in blood was “consistent in tread design, outsole tread design”
with Ridley’s shoes. None were consistent with Fountain’s athletic shoes. Kilgore
also reviewed fifty-one photographs taken at the scene and found twelve of them
contained footwear impressions. He used the negatives of those photographs to
create a scale impression using the measuring device in the photograph. Eight of
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those twelve impressions were consistent with the tread design of Ridley’s shoes,
but none of them were consistent with Fountain’s black and red athletic shoes.
Later, Kilgore received the “black canvas shoes” worn by Fountain when he was
arrested. Six of the thirteen blood or dirt impressions were “consistent with the
tread design” of Fountain’s black canvas shoes. One of the blood impressions
matched the right of Fountain’s black canvas shoes. Kilgore testified this match
was more than just consistency—he specifically concluded the exact shoe
submitted for comparison made the impression found at the scene. He explained
this impression not only matched the “class characteristics” of the shoe, but the
“individual characteristics” of the shoe, “cuts, scrapes, and wear patterns,” also
matched. Kilgore testified the impression made on Wilt’s chest was made by
Howard’s left shoe. When asked whether “any other shoe in the world . . . could
have made that print on the victim’s chest,” Kilgore answered, “no.”
Sloan, Fountain’s girlfriend, testified Fountain was living with her when the
murder occurred. She recalled Fountain and Ridley left the home around 7:00 p.m.
on October 9 to go to some clubs, specifically Mickey’s Lounge. Fountain returned
at 9:30 p.m. alone. About an hour later, Ridley showed up, and he and Fountain
went out again. Fountain returned around 2:00 a.m. the next morning by himself.
Sloan recalled Fountain had been wearing “black shiny shoes.” Sloan knew
Fountain and Ridley were good friends, but she didn’t know if they were cousins
or not. Fountain’s sister, Tina, who was at Sloan’s house on October 9, testified
to a similar timeline. She also testified Fountain was wearing dress shoes.
This brings us to Carr’s testimony. She was working as a bartender at
Mickey’s Lounge on October 9. She testified to knowing Ridley, Fountain, and
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Howard “[f]rom coming into the bar.” Carr got to work around 6:30 or 7:00 p.m.,
and saw Ridley, Fountain, and Howard by the pool table. Carr testified the trio
stayed for “maybe an hour,” left, and then came back together after midnight. After
their return, Howard approached her, “he looked scared,” and “he told [Carr] what
happened.” Carr testified Howard “pointed out on his clothes and showed [her] a
dark colored stuff that he said was blood,” and she recalled observing blood on his
shoes and “smeared blood . . . on the palm of his hand.” The three left the bar
again roughly forty-five minutes after their return. In her testimony, Carr at first
thought all of them were wearing tennis shoes the night of the murder. But later in
her testimony, she said that she only got a good look at Howard’s shoes. At first,
she could not identify the black canvas shoes as what Fountain was possibly
wearing that night. Right after her testimony concluded, however, the State
recalled Carr as a witness because she “remembered something.” That
“something” was remembering Fountain had on the black canvas shoes that night.
Ridley testified he knew Fountain all of his life and considered him a cousin.
Ridley admitted that he was involved in Wilt’s murder, as were Howard and
Fountain. Ridley testified Fountain came up with the idea “[t]o rob somebody”
named Joe at the apartment building that night. He also stated they wore gloves,
both because it was cold and so as to not leave any fingerprints. When they
entered Wilt’s basement apartment, Wilt was present and told them to leave.
Ridley declined and tried to pass by, but Wilt grabbed Ridley. Ridley then punched
Wilt in the face, and the two scuffled. Eventually, Howard hit Wilt in the head or
face with a brick. Ridley testified Fountain also hit Wilt with a brick in the face or
chest. Afterward, they took a portable television and returned to Sloan’s residence,
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then they went back to Mickey’s. Ridley could not recall what shoes Fountain and
Howard were wearing but thought Fountain’s were black. Ridley testified that, on
October 11, he went to Daggett’s house, told him what had happened, and tried to
sell him and White the portable television.
Fountain’s mother, Norma, testified the black canvas shoes were not
Fountain’s, and she saw Ridley wearing them the Sunday after the murder.
Fountain’s brother, Alonzo Quinn, testified he was with Fountain and Ridley from
8:30 or 9:00 p.m. on October 9 until 2:00 a.m. on October 10. Like Fountain’s
girlfriend and sister, Alonzo stated Fountain was wearing “[s]hiny shoes.” Another
witness testified to briefly seeing Alonzo and Fountain together around 2:00 a.m.
On his own behalf, Fountain testified he was at Sloan’s on October 9 and
Ridley came over shortly after 8:00 p.m. From there, they went to Mickey’s, where
they stayed until about 10:00 p.m., when Fountain returned to Sloan’s by himself.
About an hour later, Ridley showed up and asked Fountain to go back to Mickey’s
with him. They got back to Mickey’s around 11:30 p.m. Fountain testified Alonzo
got to Mickey’s around midnight, and he was with Alonzo and Ridley at various
bars the rest of the night until about 2:00 a.m. Fountain testified that he had no
part in Wilt’s death. He said the black canvas shoes were Ridley’s, not his. And
he said the only time he ever wore them in his life was when he was arrested. He
fingered Carr as a liar as to basically all of her testimony.
b. Recantation evidence
In her affidavit, Carr stated she did not get to tell her side of the story,
allegedly because of police coercion, so she is telling it now. But the only testimony
Carr recanted as to Fountain’s whereabouts the night in question was that, instead
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of seeing all three leave the bar together initially, she saw Ridley and Howard
“leave the club together and then later on seen” Howard, Ridley, and Fountain
“come back together” and Howard “then left.” She did not state that Fountain
stayed at the bar while Ridley and Howard left. And even with this change in who
she saw leave the bar, Carr confirmed her testimony that the three were together
that night and that she later saw Fountain return to the bar with Ridley and Howard
after she saw the latter two leave. She also stated that she lied about Howard
telling her about “any murder,” and she never saw anyone’s shoes or clothes.
Turning to Daggett, his affidavit also submitted that he was coerced into
testifying he knew Fountain. But Daggett never gave any such testimony at trial.
He specifically testified he did not know Fountain, and he only knew of him through
Ridley. The affidavit further provided “William never said the names of other party
they told me who was involved with this case. I never said I knew them at all.”
c. Material versus cumulative or impeaching
Beginning with Carr’s affidavit, we conclude it is not material on the issue of
Fountain’s whereabouts throughout the night. The only thing Carr changed on that
issue is that she did not see Fountain leave with the others. But she confirmed the
three were together at the bar and that, “later on,” she did see Fountain return with
them. If he returned with them, chances are he was elsewhere with them, which
tracks Carr’s trial testimony that they left the bar together.
As to Carr’s retaking of the stand to testify about Fountain wearing the black
canvas shoes that evening, we conclude the recantation was merely cumulative
and impeaching. As the district court pointed out, Carr went back and forth on
whether she saw Fountain’s shoes or not and, if she did, what they were. She first
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stated he was wearing tennis shoes. Later, she stated that she did not get a good
enough look at them to identify what they were, because “[t]he bar is kind of dark
in there at night.” When she was physically shown the black canvas shoes, she
classified those as tennis shoes but did not remember anyone wearing those
shoes that night. Recalled as a witness minutes later, she testified Fountain was
wearing “them black tennis shoes” or “shoes like that” the night of the murder.
Given Carr’s back-and-forth on the shoe identification, adding her recantation
about seeing the shoes would just be further impeachment evidence and
cumulative on whether she could identify what shoes Fountain was wearing or not.
Turning to Daggett, his affidavit first said that he was coerced into saying
he knew Fountain. But at the criminal trial, Daggett expressly testified that he did
not know Fountain, so this point of his affidavit is not material. The affidavit further
provided, “William never said the names of other party they told me who was
involved with this case. I never said I knew them at all.” Similar to Carr’s
t.estimony, Daggett went back-and-forth in his testimony on whether Ridley told
him Fountain was involved with the murder. As a result, we find this recantation is
simply additional impeachment evidence that is cumulative of Daggett’s
indecisiveness on whether Ridley informed him Fountain was involved.
d. Whether the result would probably be different
Having found the recantation lacks materiality, we likewise conclude it
probably wouldn’t have changed the outcome. As to Daggett, extricating his trial
testimony on whether Ridley advised him Fountain was involved would still leave
that same evidence in the record through Ogg’s testimony about what Daggett told
her. See State v. Compiano, 154 N.W.2d 845, 850 (Iowa 1967) (“Mere recantation
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of a witness on any material matter should not necessitate a new trial if, eliminating
such evidence, there is still substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict.”);
accord Moon, 911 N.W.2d at 153.
Turning to Carr, Fountain essentially argues her affidavit negates any
corroboration for Ridley’s version of the events and “undermines the only evidence
the State used to tie Fountain to the crime—the shoes.” As to the timeline, again,
Carr only changed that she saw Fountain leave with the other culprits, yet she
confirmed they were together and the three of them returned together later on.
This does not overcome the State’s theory of the timeline in favor of Fountain’s
questionable alibi defense. And Fountain fails to mention one large piece of the
puzzle on the shoes—he was wearing the exact pair of shoes tied to the crime
scene when he was arrested mere days later. While he and others tried to say
those shoes belong to Ridley, another pair of shoes that Ridley admitted he was
wearing when he participated in the crime also had forensic ties to the scene.
Notably, Ridley wore a size eleven and Fountain wore a size nine-and-a-half.
Even without Daggett and Carr’s corroborating testimony, there was ample
other corroborating evidence connecting Fountain to the murder that is not
undermined by the recantation evidence. See Wright v. State, No. 15-1530, 2017
WL 936077, at *8 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2017) (rejecting newly-discovered-
evidence claim because “the corroborating evidence was not affected by [the
witness’s] alleged recantation”). All-in-all, we conclude the new evidence is
insufficient to reach a finding that it probably would have changed the result of the
criminal trial.
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III. Conclusion
We affirm the entry of summary disposition and conclude, based on the
undisputed facts, that Fountain cannot show the recantation evidence is material
and probably would have changed the outcome of the criminal trial as required for
a newly-discovered-evidence claim under Iowa Code section 822.2(1)(d).
AFFIRMED.