State of Iowa v. Emmanuel E. Spann ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1456
Filed November 2, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EMMANUEL E. SPANN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Michael J.
Schilling, Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction for first-degree murder based on a theory
of aiding and abetting. AFFIRMED.
Kent A. Simmons, Bettendorf, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Benjamin Parrott, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., Tabor, J., and Carr, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2022).
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CARR, Senior Judge.
Emmanuel Spann appeals his conviction for first-degree murder based on
a theory of aiding and abetting. Spann claims the district court erred in admitting
certain evidence, his conviction was not supported by substantial evidence, and
the court should have granted his motion for new trial. After considering all of the
issues raised by Spann in this appeal, we affirm his conviction.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
The jury could find the following facts from evidence presented at Spann’s
trial. In 2017, A.J. Smith offered $10,000 for someone to kill Demarcus Chew.1
Spann and his friend, Andre Harris, drove to Burlington, Iowa, from Chicago,
Illinois, on September 8, 2017. Harris testified he went to Burlington to purchase
drugs from Antoine Spann, who is Spann’s nephew. For purposes of clarity, we
will refer to Antoine Spann as Antoine. Harris stated Spann came along on the
drive to Burlington just “to hang out.”
Spann and Harris met up with Antoine, Derrick Parker, and Caesar Davison,
who were already in Burlington. The men all grew up in the same neighborhood
in Chicago as Smith. All of the men, including Spann, knew about the bounty on
Chew and would “spout off” about it, saying, “I’ll do it.”
On September 9, Spann, Harris, Antoine, Parker, and Davison were at a
nightclub in Gulfport, Illinois, when they noticed Chew was at the same location.
The men kept an eye on Chew. According to Antoine, although there was not a
specific conversation, he agreed that “[a]t some point . . . there [was] an
1 Previously, Chew’s brother, Timothy Chew, was charged with non-fatally
shooting Smith. Smith died in 2018, before the trial in this case.
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understanding that was come to about actions to be taken against Demarcus
Chew.” Antoine also stated, “I mean, you could say that I kinda figured what was
going on, but I didn’t really think it was going to happen.”
When Chew left the nightclub in the morning on September 10, the men
followed Chew in two vehicles. Antoine was driving one of the vehicles, Harris was
in the front passenger seat, and Davison and Spann were in the backseat. Chew
drove to Burlington. While the first vehicle followed Chew, Antoine stated Spann
and Davison told him to go a different direction. He stopped where they told him,
which was near Chew’s home. Davison got out of the vehicle, and Spann followed.
According to Harris, they were gone for about two minutes and he did not hear
anything unusual. Antoine testified that about five seconds after Spann got out of
the vehicle, he heard three or four shots.
Antoine stated that when Davison and Spann returned to the vehicle, he
drove off quickly. Harris saw Davison give a gun to Spann. Antoine saw Spann
wiping something off. Harris later testified, “I’m not sure who said what, but it was
asked, did you get him, and [Davison] responded, I was close up.” Antoine
explained, “Once we got going, I think I heard [Davison] say his ass gone.” At
some point, Antoine stopped the vehicle. Spann got out to “get rid of the gun,”
then returned to the vehicle.
Antoine stated Spann used Antoine’s phone to call Smith. All of the men
met up again at a house in Burlington. Parker took Davison’s sweater and threw
it in the garbage in the alley behind the house. Antoine called Smith, who told him
to come to Smith’s house in Illinois. Antoine stated that instead of $10,000, which
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they expected to receive for the death of Chew, Smith gave him $1000 and a pound
of methamphetamine.
Harris went back to Chicago after a fairly short time. Spann and Davison
left in a different vehicle at about the same time. Antoine also returned to Chicago
and gave the money and methamphetamine to Davison. Spann was with Davison
when Davison received the cash and drugs.
Chew died as a result of multiple gunshot wounds. A witness saw a tall
person leaving the scene. Spann is six feet, two inches tall. Spann later told
Antoine that he observed the shooting of Chew.
After Antoine was charged with first-degree murder, he entered into plea
negotiations with the State. Antoine agreed to make a telephone call to Spann
that was recorded by a police officer. During the call, Spann stated that he wiped
off the gun and stashed it in an alley near a white picket fence. Antoine expressed
concern that Parker might have seen Spann get out of the vehicle and tell officers
about it, and Spann responded, “Yeah.” Officers were able to find the gun in a
location similar to that described by Spann. Ballistics tests show the gun was used
to kill Chew.
On March 7, 2019, Spann was charged with murder in the first degree, in
violation of Iowa Code section 707.2(1)(a) (2017), under a theory of aiding and
abetting, section 703.1. He was also charged with conspiracy to commit a forcible
felony, in violation of sections 706.1 and 706.3(1). Spann’s jury trial was held in
January and February 2020. Harris and Antoine had entered into plea agreements
that required them to give truthful testimony against others involved in the incident,
5
and they testified for the State in Spann’s trial. The case was submitted to the jury
on February 7 at about 12:40 p.m.
Earlier on February 7, at 8:56 a.m., Antoine made a call from a correctional
facility, where he stated, “I ain’t testifying against [Davison], bro. I ain’t saying shit
on [Davison], bro. Imma get up there and tell them people I lied, I made all this
shit up, bro.” Davison’s trial was to start the following week, and Harris and Antoine
were expected to testify against him. Antoine also stated, “Emmanuel didn’t do
nothin’, he just got out of the car.” Antoine stated Parker planned and carried out
the murder of Chew. Antoine was aware the call was being recorded, stating, “And
it’s on the record right now. I’m on the phone with you. So it’s on the record. I
lied.”
The State did not disclose Antoine’s telephone call to defense counsel until
4:30 p.m. on February 10, after the jury found Spann guilty of first-degree murder
and conspiracy to commit a forcible felony.
Spann filed a motion for new trial and motion in arrest of judgment. He
claimed he should be granted a new trial because the State failed to disclose
important and material evidence, the State’s failure violated his right to due
process, the verdict was contrary to the law or evidence, the verdict was not
supported by substantial evidence, and he was denied his right to a fair and
impartial trial.
The State resisted Spann’s motions. The prosecutor asserted that counsel
for Davison advised her on Friday afternoon, February 7, that Antoine may have
made a telephone call. The prosecutor stated she obtained a recording of the
telephone call on Monday, February 10, and forwarded it to defense counsel. The
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State asserted that Antoine’s testimony at Davison’s trial was substantially the
same as it was in Spann’s trial. Spann replied, pointing out the State gave counsel
for Davison a recording of the telephone call at 8:51 a.m. on February 10 but did
not give counsel for Spann a recording of the call until 4:30 p.m., after the jury had
returned its verdict.
The district court issued an order on October 14, denying Spann’s motions.
The court determined there was substantial evidence in the record to show Spann
aided and abetted in the murder of Chew and conspired to commit murder. The
court also found the jury’s verdict was not contrary to the weight of the evidence.
The court found the State’s failure to timely give defense counsel a recording of
Antoine’s telephone call was not a violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,
87 (1963), because the evidence was not material, meaning the evidence did not
undermine confidence in the verdict. Additionally, considering the telephone call
as newly discovered evidence, the court found that presenting the evidence to the
jury would not probably change the result of the trial, so a new trial was not
warranted. The court stated Antoine “was attempting to avoid being labeled a
snitch.” The court concluded Spann received a fair and impartial trial.
Spann was sentenced to life in prison on his conviction for first-degree
murder. The district court merged the conviction for conspiracy to commit murder
into the conviction for murder. Spann appeals his conviction.
II. Evidentiary Rulings
Spann challenges two of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. He claims
the evidence should be excluded under Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403, because the
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probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
The Iowa Supreme Court has stated:
Whether evidence should be excluded under rule 5.403 is a two-part
test: “First, we consider the probative value of the evidence. Second,
we balance the probative value against the danger of its prejudicial
or wrongful effect upon the triers of fact.” “The relevant inquiry is not
whether the evidence is prejudicial or inherently prejudicial but
whether the evidence is unfairly prejudicial.” Unfair prejudice means
the “evidence has an undue tendency to suggest a decision on an
improper basis.” Our review of evidentiary decisions under
rule 5.403 is for an abuse of discretion. “Weighing probative value
against prejudicial effect ‘is not an exact science,’ so ‘we give a great
deal of leeway to the trial judge who must make this judgment call.’”
State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 807 (Iowa 2021) (internal citations omitted).
A. Prior to trial, Spann filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude body
camera footage from police officers that showed paramedics performing CPR on
Chew in the area where he was shot outside his home. The district court ruled the
video could be shown without audio. The State sought to introduce the video
during the trial testimony of Officer Blake Cameron of the Burlington Police
Department. Spann again objected on the ground the video was unfairly
prejudicial. Outside the presence of the jury, Officer Cameron testified the body
camera footage did not contain anything that had not already been testified to.
The court overruled Spann’s objection. The court stated,
[O]nce the audio portion is extracted and redacted, . . . in the court’s
judgment, there’s very little prejudicial effect, if any, to showing this
video, which is about two to two and a half minutes long. Because
it’s dark outside, it’s difficult to see much. You can see the
paramedics cutting the shirt and the clothes off of Mr. Chew. Under
the court’s judgment showing this to the jury is—it’s relevant and it’s
not unfairly prejudicial to Mr. Spann, so long as the audio portion is
not shown.
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The jury returned, and the court informed them “only the sight not the sound portion
of this exhibit [would] be shown.”
Spann contends the district court abused its discretion by permitting the jury
to view the body camera video. The video was relevant to show paramedics
attempted to save Chew’s life but he died. Furthermore, the video was not unfairly
prejudicial. “Prejudice occurs when evidence prompts a jury to make a decision
on an improper basis.” State v. Buman, 955 N.W.2d 215, 221 (Iowa 2021). Spann
was charged with murder, and it was not prejudicial to show Chew had died.
“Generally, we defer to the district court’s balancing of probative value against the
prejudicial effect of evidence under rule 5.403. This balancing ‘is not an exact
science,’ and ‘we give a great deal of leeway to the trial judge who must make this
judgment call.’” State v. Brown, No. 20-1098, 2022 WL 468960, at *6 (Iowa Ct.
App. Feb. 16, 2022) (internal citation omitted) (quoting State v. Thompson, 954N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2021)). We conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion.
B. In a motion in limine, Spann sought to prevent the State’s witness
Anastasia Ross from testifying that she and Chew were the parents of children.
The court ruled Ross could “testify that she knows [Chew] by virtue of being the
mother of his children without mentioning the ages or names of those children.”
The court stated, “In conducting the balancing test required by the Rules of
Evidence, the [c]ourt concludes that any prejudice, if any, associated with allowing
that limited testimony does not outweigh or exceed the probative value of the
evidence.”
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During the trial, Ross testified she knew Chew because she was “the mother
of his children.” She identified a photograph of Chew, stating, “It’s my kids’ father.”
Ross testified Chew’s nickname was “Peanut.” She also testified about the bad
blood between Smith and the Chew family.
Spann claims the court should have determined Ross’s testimony about her
children with Chew was inadmissible under rule 5.403. He states the evidence
was not relevant and it was unduly prejudicial because it raised sympathy for
Chew. Ross’s testimony that she was the mother of Chew’s children was relevant
to show how she was able to identify the photograph of Chew, knew his nickname,
and knew of the bad blood between Smith and Chew. The evidence was not
unfairly prejudicial because she only briefly mentioned the children and did not give
their names or ages. Cf. State v. Rutledge, 113 N.W. 461, 464 (Iowa 1907) (finding
a court erroneously permitted a widow to testify to the number and age of her
children—and this error coupled with many others denied Rutledge a fair trial). We
conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the limited evidence
that Chew and Ross were the parents of children.
On appeal, Spann claims the court did not state on the record its analysis
of the probative value of the evidence. He also claims the prejudicial effect of the
two evidentiary rulings should be combined. Spann did not raise these issues
before the district court, and we determine they have not been preserved for our
review. See State v. Montgomery, 966 N.W.2d 641, 650 (Iowa 2021) (“Generally,
error is preserved on an issue if (1) a party raises the issue before the district court,
(2) the district court rules upon the issue, and (3) the party again raises the issue
on appeal.” (citation omitted)).
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III. Sufficiency of the Evidence
“Challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are reviewed for correction of
errors at law.” State v. Hansen, 750 N.W.2d 111, 112 (Iowa 2008). “[W]e are
highly deferential to the jury’s verdict. The jury’s verdict binds this court if the
verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Cahill, 972 N.W.2d 19, 27
(Iowa 2022) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to
convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Mathis, 971 N.W.2d 514, 516–17 (Iowa 2022).
In section 703.1, the legislature provided:
All persons concerned in the commission of a public offense,
whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid
and abet its commission, shall be charged, tried and punished as
principals. The guilt of a person who aids and abets the commission
of a crime must be determined upon the facts which show the part
the person had in it, and does not depend upon the degree of another
person’s guilt.
The Iowa Supreme Court has stated:
[I]n order to support an aiding and abetting theory, the record must
contain substantial evidence that the accused assented to or lent
countenance and approval to the criminal act “either by active
participation or by some manner encouraging it prior to or at the time
of its commission.” We observed, “Knowledge is essential; however,
neither knowledge nor presence at the scene of the crime is sufficient
to prove aiding and abetting.”
State v. Huser, 894 N.W.2d 472, 490–91 (Iowa 2017) (internal citations omitted).
“[A] fact finder may infer a defendant’s participation from all of the surrounding
circumstances of the illegal activity, including evidence of presence,
companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed.” Id. at
491.
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A. Spann contends there is insufficient evidence in the record to show
he aided and abetted in the murder of Chew. The evidence presented by the State
showed Spann grew up with Davison, Harris, Parker, and Antoine, who is his
relative. All five men spent the evening of the murder at the club in Illinois. All five
men knew about the bounty their friend Smith had placed on Chew, and they had
discussed it among themselves. All of the men, including Spann, knew about the
bounty on Chew and would “spout off” about it, saying, “I’ll do it.” The whole group
knew Chew was at the club that night. Video surveillance showed the men acting
in concert to keep an eye on Chew. Antoine testified that although there was not
a specific conversation, he agreed that “[a]t some point . . . there [was] an
understanding that was come to about actions to be taken against Demarcus
Chew.”
When Chew left the nightclub, the five men followed Chew in two vehicles.
While the first vehicle followed Chew, Antoine stated Spann and Davison told him
to go a different direction. He stopped where they told him to stop the vehicle.
Antoine stated he did not know the location where he stopped the vehicle but
where Spann and Davison told him to stop turned out to be near Chew’s home.
Davison exited the vehicle, and Spann quickly followed. Antoine testified that after
Spann got out of the vehicle, he heard three or four shots. Chew was shot to death
near his home. Antoine testified Spann told him that he saw the shooting happen.
When Davison and Spann returned to the vehicle, Antoine drove off quickly.
Davison handed a gun to Spann, which Spann wiped off. Harris testified, “I’m not
sure who said what, but it was asked, did you get him, and [Davison] responded, I
was close up.” Antoine testified, “Once we got going, I think I heard [Davison] say
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his ass gone.” At some point, Antoine stopped the vehicle. Spann got out to “get
rid of the gun,” then returned to the vehicle. Officers found the gun in a location
that matched where Spann stated he hid the gun.
The jury could infer Spann’s participation in the murder of Chew “from all of
the surrounding circumstances of the illegal activity, including evidence of
presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense is committed.”
See id. Spann’s conduct in cleaning and concealing the murder weapon
immediately after the killing supports this conclusion. See State v. Crawford, 974
N.W.2d 510, 518–19 (Iowa 2022). We conclude Spann’s conviction for aiding and
abetting in the murder of Chew is supported by substantial evidence.
B. Spann additionally claims the district court should have granted his
post-trial motion in arrest of judgment because the evidence presented by the
State was not sufficient to support the verdict. In his appellate brief, Spann
recognizes this issue is the same as argued above. We have already determined
the verdict is supported by substantial evidence and do not address the issue
further.
IV. Motion for New Trial
A. Spann contends the district court should have granted his motion for
new trial based on the newly discovered evidence of Antoine’s telephone call on
February 7, where he stated, “Emmanuel didn’t do nothin’, he just got out of the
car.” Antoine stated Parker, rather than Davison, carried out the murder of Chew.
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(8) provides that a new trial may
be granted “[w]hen the defendant has discovered important and material evidence
in the defendant’s favor since the verdict, which the defendant could not with
13
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial.” A motion for new
trial based on newly discovered evidence may be granted if the evidence “(1) was
discovered after the verdict, (2) could not have been discovered earlier in the
exercise of due diligence, (3) is material to the issues in the case and not merely
cumulative, and (4) probably would have changed the result of the trial.” State v.
Linderman, 958 N.W.2d 211, 223 (Iowa Ct. App. 2021) (citation omitted). These
factors must be shown by a preponderance of the evidence. Moon v. State, 911
N.W.2d 137, 151 (Iowa 2018).
“Motions for new trials based upon newly discovered evidence are not
favored in the law and should be closely scrutinized and granted sparingly.” State
v. Compiano, 154 N.W.2d 845, 849 (Iowa 1967). “The trial court is generally in a
better position than we to determine whether evidence, newly discovered, would
probably lead to a different verdict upon retrial, and we have often said we will not
interfere with its ruling unless it is reasonably clear that such discretion was
abused.” Id. The district court’s ruling on a motion for new trial based on newly
discovered evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Cahill, 972
N.W.2d 19, 27 (Iowa 2022).
The district court determined Spann failed to establish the fourth factor—
that the newly discovered evidence probably would have changed the result of the
trial. See Linderman, 958 N.W.2d at 223. The court noted Antoine’s statement in
the telephone call showed Spann was present at the time of the murder and had
gotten out of the car, which is consistent with his testimony at Spann’s criminal
trial. The court found Antoine’s statements “declaring that he lied and denying that
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CJ Davison was involved in the murder would be, at best, of mixed help to the
defense.” The court also stated:
Given the context of [Antoine’s] February 7 statements, some
of which are internally inconsistent, it is difficult for this [c]ourt to
conclude that the unsworn statements are truthful. After carefully
evaluating the contents of the audio recording, and the arguments
for a new trial based upon . . . Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b) for newly
discovered evidence, the [c]ourt concludes that even after hearing
and considering the recorded statements of [Antoine], a reasonable
jury could conclude the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that
. . . Spann aided and abetted the first degree murder of Demarcus
Chew and conspired with others to commit his murder.
The court carefully considered whether the newly discovered evidence
probably would have changed the result of the trial and gave its reasons for
determining the result of the trial would not have been different even if the evidence
had been presented to the jury. The district court has “unusually broad discretion”
on this issue. State v. Jefferson, 545 N.W.2d 248, 249 (Iowa 1996). The court’s
discretion was not “exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an
extent clearly unreasonable.” See id. at 251 (citation omitted). We conclude
Spann has not shown the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion
for new trial based on newly discovered evidence.
B. Spann contends the district court should have granted his motion for
new trial because the State violated Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, when it did not timely
give him a recording of Antoine’s telephone call that was made on February 7,
2020. In order to show a Brady violation, a defendant is required to show by a
preponderance of the evidence “(1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the
evidence was favorable to the defendant; and (3) the evidence was material to the
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issue of guilt.” DeSimone v. State, 803 N.W.2d 97, 103 (Iowa 2011) (citation
omitted).
The district court focused on the third factor. For this factor, a defendant
must show that there exists “a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
State v. Barrett, 952 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Iowa 2020) (citation omitted). “A
‘reasonable probability’ is ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’” Id. (citation omitted). A district court’s ruling on claims of a Brady
violation is reviewed de novo because the claims are of a constitutional nature.
Aguilera v. State, 807 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Iowa 2011).
The court noted the legal significance of Antoine’s statements in the
telephone call “should be measured both in the general context in which the
statements were made, i.e. concern with being labelled a snitch, but also within
the context of other statements [Antoine] made during the phone call.” Again,
Antoine stated in the call that Spann was present at the time of the shooting and
“just got out of the car.” The court found that even if the jury heard the recording
of Antoine’s telephone call, the jury could conclude Spann was guilty of aiding and
abetting in the first-degree murder of Chew. The court concluded Spann failed to
show that Antoine’s statement “could reasonably be taken to put the whole case
in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” See Barrett,
952 N.W.2d at 313 (citation omitted).
On our de novo review, we affirm the court’s ruling denying Spann’s motion
for a new trial. The State’s failure to timely give defense counsel a recording of
Antoine’s telephone call was not a violation under Brady because the evidence
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was not material, meaning the evidence did not undermine confidence in the
verdict. Antoine’s statements in the telephone call were internally contradictory
and also contradicted parts of his trial testimony. The jury could find Antoine’s trial
testimony more credible. Spann has not shown “a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” See id. (citation omitted).
C. Spann asserts the district court should have granted his motion for a
new trial on the ground that he did not receive a fair and impartial trial. See Iowa
R. Crim. P. 2.24(2)(b)(9) (providing a defendant may be granted a new trial “[w]hen
from any other cause the defendant has not received a fair and impartial trial.”). A
motion for new trial on this ground may be raised based on “the State’s late
disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence.” See State v. Spiker, No. 19-1957,
2021 WL 377120, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 3, 2021). We review the district court’s
decision on this issue for an abuse of discretion. See State v. James, No. 15-
2181, 2016 WL 7395751, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2016). “Trial courts, which
are closer to the actual trial than the appellate courts are, have discretion in
granting or denying new trials based on fair trial considerations.” State v.
LaDouceur, 366 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Iowa 1985).
On this issue, the court stated:
Here, this [c]ourt has determined that the audio recorded statements
of [Antoine] are not properly characterized as “material to the issue
of guilt.”
This [c]ourt concludes that the [d]efendant received a fair and
impartial trial. While it is most unfortunate the State of Iowa did not
immediately disclose the audio recording of [Antoine’s] February 7,
2020, statements, this [c]ourt cannot fairly conclude, for the reasons
explained herein, that the nondisclosure means that the [d]efendant
was denied a fair and impartial trial.
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We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling. The court did
not exercise its discretion “on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an
extent clearly unreasonable.” See Jefferson, 545 N.W.2d at 251 (citation omitted).
As determined above, even if the statements had been admitted during Spann’s
criminal trial, Spann has not shown the result of the proceeding reasonably would
have been different.
D. Finally, Spann claims the district court should have granted his
motion for a new trial on the ground the verdict was contrary to the weight of the
evidence. See State v. Ellis, 578 N.W.2d 655, 659 (Iowa 1998). The court has
“wide discretion” in ruling on motions for new trial on this ground. Id.[W]e caution trial courts to exercise this discretion carefully and
sparingly when deciding motions for new trial based on the ground
that the verdict of conviction is contrary to the weight of the evidence.
We have confidence in our trial courts that they will heed this
admonition; a failure to follow it would lessen the role of the jury as
the principal trier of the facts and would enable the trial court to
disregard at will the jury’s verdict.
Id.The district court “conclude[d] that the weight of the evidence presented by
the State was more than adequate to support each jury verdict.” After summarizing
the evidence, the court determined “this is not an exceptional case where the
‘evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict.’” See id.The evidence shows that shortly before the shooting, Spann and four other
men were at a nightclub in Illinois, where the murder victim, Chew, was also
present. When Chew left the nightclub, the men followed Chew in two vehicles.
When they came to Burlington, one car continued to follow Chew while the other
18
car, which contained Spann, drove to a location near Chew’s home. Spann and
Davison left the vehicle immediately before Chew was shot. They returned to the
vehicle together. Davison gave a gun to Spann, who wiped it off and hid it. Spann
later told Antoine that he witnessed the shooting of Chew. We conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion by denying Spann’s motion for new trial based on
his claim the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence.
We affirm Spann’s conviction for first-degree murder on a theory of aiding
and abetting.
AFFIRMED.