John Robert George, Applicant-Appellant v. State of Iowa ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-0733
Filed May 11, 2016
JOHN ROBERT GEORGE,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Iowa County, Patrick R. Grady,
Judge.
John George appeals the order denying his application for postconviction
relief. AFFIRMED.
John J. Bishop, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Tyler J. Buller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.
John George appeals the order denying him postconviction relief (PCR)
for his 2012 conviction of driving while suspended. He claims his conviction must
be vacated in the interest of justice based on a material fact not previously
presented or heard. See Iowa Code § 822.2(1)(d) (2013). Stated succinctly,
George argues his conviction should be vacated because the officer who cited
him for the 2012 offense—after observing a person he believed to be George in
the driver’s seat of a vehicle—mistakenly identified and cited George for driving
while barred in 2014. The 2014 charge was dismissed on the State’s motion
after the police department advised the county attorney that the driver of the
vehicle in question was mistakenly identified as George. George now claims that
had this subsequent misidentification by the officer, made “under similar
circumstances to his initial conviction for driving under suspension, been
available to the magistrate court in making credibility determinations in arriving at
a verdict, the outcome of his trial would have been a not guilty verdict.”
A claimant who seeks PCR based on newly discovered evidence must
show:
(1) that the evidence was discovered after the verdict; (2) that it
could not have been discovered earlier in the exercise of due
diligence; (3) that the evidence is material to the issues in the case
and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) that the evidence
probably would have changed the result of the trial.
Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 516 (Iowa 2003). However, to qualify as
newly discovered evidence, the evidence must have existed at the time of the
challenged trial proceeding. See Grissom v. State, 572 N.W.2d 183, 184 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1997). The officer’s misidentification of the driver in the 2014 incident
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occurred subsequent to the trial on George’s driving-while-suspended offense
and therefore does not qualify as newly discovered evidence. Id. Recognizing
this, George attempts to invoke an exception to this rule. He asserts this is an
extraordinary case “when an ‘utter failure of justice will unequivocally result’ if the
new evidence is not considered or where it is no longer just or equitable to
enforce the prior judgment.” Id. at 185 (quoting Benson v. Richardson, 537
N.W.2d 748, 762-63 (Iowa 1995)).
After a hearing, the PCR court concluded,
Here, the new evidence is totally based on events that took
place after the trial. Further, the evidence is merely impeaching of
[the officer’s] prior identification of George as the driver of the
vehicle. Finally, [the officer’s] ability to observe George at the
library [in 2012] was significantly greater than while passing on the
road [in 2014] and, thus, knowledge of the subsequent
misidentification of George is not sufficient to establish that it would
probably have changed the verdict. Finally, this Court does not find
that there would be a failure of justice if the Court was to set aside
the conviction.
We wholeheartedly agree. The PCR court did not err in denying and dismissing
George’s application. We therefore affirm.
AFFIRMED.