Darlene Janssen v. Merry Lanes, Inc. and Firstcomp Insurance ( 2016 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 15-1511
Filed September 14, 2016
DARLENE JANSSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
MERRY LANES, INC. and
FIRSTCOMP INSURANCE,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Osceola County, Nancy L.
Whittenburg, Judge.
An employee appeals the district court’s ruling on judicial review upholding
the workers’ compensation commissioner’s determination that she was entitled
benefits for a “scheduled” injury rather than industrial disability benefits.
AFFIRMED.
Willis J. Hamilton of Hamilton Law Firm, P.C., Storm Lake, for appellant.
Sasha L. Monthei and Kent Smith of Scheldrup Blades, Cedar Rapids, for
appellees.
Considered by Danilson, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Tabor, JJ.
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DANILSON, Chief Judge.
An employee appeals the district court’s ruling on judicial review upholding
the workers’ compensation commissioner’s determination that she was entitled
benefits for a “scheduled” injury under Iowa Code section 85.34(2)(o) rather than
industrial disability benefits under section 85.34(2)(u) (2009). Because
substantial evidence supports the commissioner’s findings and its application of
law to the facts is not wholly unjustifiable, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
Darlene Janssen sustained an injury to her hamstring when she slipped
and did the splits on October 30, 2010, while working as a bartender for the
employer, Merry Lanes, Inc. Janssen filed a petition for workers’ compensation
benefits with the Iowa Workers’ Compensation Commissioner. The employer
and its insurer denied Janssen sustained an injury to her body as a whole, and
instead maintained her injury was limited to her leg, a scheduled injury.
An arbitration hearing was held before a deputy commissioner, who
issued a ruling on February 3, 2014, finding Janssen sustained an injury to her
body as a whole and was permanently and totally disabled. On interagency
appeal, the acting commissioner determined Janssen had failed to prove she
sustained a whole-body injury and that the evidence demonstrated Janssen’s
injury was limited to her left lower extremity. The commissioner ruled Janssen
was entitled to 72.6 weeks of permanent-partial-disability benefits and no penalty
benefits.
Janssen sought judicial review in the district court, which affirmed the
commissioner. Janssen now appeals.
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II. Standard of Review.
The district court considering a petition for judicial review acts in an
appellate capacity and may reverse or modify an agency’s decision if the
agency’s decision is erroneous under a section of the Iowa Administrative
Procedure Act and a party’s substantial rights have been prejudiced. Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10) (2013).
When dealing with the issue of whether substantial evidence
supports the agency’s findings, the district court and the appellate
court can only grant relief to a party from the agency’s decision if a
determination of fact by the agency “is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record before the court when that record is viewed
as a whole.”
Gits Mfg. Co. v. Frank, 855 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Iowa 2014) (quoting Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10)(f)). “Substantial evidence supports an agency’s decision even if
the interpretation of the evidence may be open to a fair difference of opinion.” Id.
“Just because the interpretation of the evidence is open to a fair difference of
opinion does not mean the [agency’s] decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. An appellate court should not consider evidence insubstantial merely
because the court may draw different conclusions from the record.” Arndt v. City
of Le Claire, 728 N.W.2d 389, 393 (Iowa 2007) (citations omitted). When we
review a district court decision that reviewed an agency action, our task is to
determine if we would reach the same result as the district court in applying the
Act. Gits, 855 N.W.2d at 197. If we reach the same result, we affirm; if not, we
reverse. Mike Brooks, Inc. v. House, 843 N.W.2d 885, 889 (Iowa 2014).
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III. Discussion.
We reject Janssen’s claim that the issue before us is a matter of
erroneous statutory interpretation. Janssen contends that the “essence” of prior
decisions by the appellate court is “that the nerves and veins are system wide
and extend beyond a scheduled member and are not listed as scheduled
members and are therefore compensated industrially.” She relies upon this
court’s rulings in Collins v. Department of Human Services, 529 N.W.2d 627(Iowa Ct. App. 1995), and First Fleet Corp. v. Hannam, No. 14-1254, 2015 WL
4158941 (Iowa Ct. App. July 9, 2015). Janssen mischaracterizes the case
holdings.
The question presented in both cases was whether the agency’s factual
findings were supported by substantial evidence. See Collins, 529 N.W.2d at
628-29; Hannam, 2015 WL 4158941, at *4. In Collins, we found substantial
evidence supported the commissioner’s finding that the employee’s depression
was related to her work-related injury and was compensable by determining the
employee’s industrial disability. 529 N.W.2d at 629. Having “already found
Collins is entitled to compensation for industrial disability,” we did not address the
issue of whether her diagnosis of reflex sympathetic dystrophy1 was a second
injury compensable by industrial disability. Id. at 629-30. In Hannam we ruled,
“The commissioner’s determination that Hannam suffered nervous system injury
compensable as an unscheduled disability is supported by substantial evidence,
and the district court erred in ruling otherwise.” 2015 WL 4158941, at *4.
1
“Reflex sympathetic dystrophy is a dysfunction of the sympathetic nervous system.”
Collins, 529 N.W.2d at 629.
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Here, however, the commissioner concluded Janssen had suffered a
scheduled-member injury. As an appellate court, our task “is not to determine
whether the evidence supports a different finding; rather, our task is to determine
whether” there is substantial evidence supporting the findings the commissioner
“actually made.” Cedar Rapids Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Pease, 807 N.W.2d 839, 845
(Iowa 2011). The question presented then is whether there is substantial
evidence to support the commissioner’s finding that Janssen suffered a
scheduled-member injury. There is.
On January 20, 2011, Dr. Gary Miller performed an electrophysiologic
(EMG) study which was described as abnormal. Dr. Miller’s report indicates the
EMG showed “irritation of the sciatic nerve in the area of the biceps femoris
muscles consistent with injury and irritation localized in that area” and that
“[t]here is no clear evidence of lumbosacral radiculopathy.” On April 25, 2011,
Dr. James Case performed a new EMG, which revealed a “severe partial sciatic
neuropathy to the sciatic branch supplying the right lower extremity lateral
hamstring groups.” Dr. Case also found no indication the injury extended beyond
the leg. Citing these expert opinions, the commissioner determined:
In the present case, claimant’s injury is confined to the leg.
There is no question claimant suffered a right proximal hamstring
tear causing damage to the sciatic nerve. The sciatic nerve injury
was limited to the section of the lateral upper hamstring. Objective
testimony showed the sciatic nerve injury did not extend into the
low back.
There is substantial evidence in the record supporting the agency’s finding
that Janssen’s injury does not extend beyond her right lower extremity. And the
commissioner’s conclusion that the injury is compensable as a scheduled-
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member injury is not “irrational, illogical, or wholly unjustifiable.” See Iowa Code
§ 17A.19(10)(m).
Having found no merit to Janssen’s contention that the agency erred in
concluding she suffered a scheduled-member injury, we need not address her
claim she should have been awarded penalty benefits based on that purported
error. We affirm.
AFFIRMED.