State of Iowa v. Tondalaya Bridges ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1855
Filed February 5, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
TONDALAYA BRIDGES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Joel A.
Dalrymple, Judge.
Tondalaya Bridges appeals her conviction and sentence for first-degree
burglary. CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson and Tyler J. Buller,
Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ.
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DOYLE, Presiding Judge.
In February 2017, Tondalaya Bridges forced her way into Ashley Martin’s
apartment without permission and hit Martin on the head with a bottle. The State
charged Bridges with one count of first-degree burglary. A jury found her guilty as
charged, and the court sentenced Bridges to serve an indeterminate term of
incarceration not to exceed twenty-five years. Bridges appeals.
Bridges first alleges her trial counsel was ineffective in failing to move for a
new trial because the jury’s verdict was against the weight of the evidence. 1 We
review ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims de novo. See Lamasters v. State,
821 N.W.2d 856, 862 (Iowa 2012). To succeed, a defendant must show counsel
breached a duty and prejudice resulted. See State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860,
869 (Iowa 2003).
A motion for new trial should be granted only in exceptional cases. See
State v. Ary, 877 N.W.2d 686, 705 (Iowa 2016). In evaluating the weight of the
evidence, the court considers whether a greater amount of credible evidence
supports the verdict than supports the alternative verdict. See id. at 706. The
weight-of-the-evidence standard
is broader than the sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard in that it
permits the court to consider the credibility of witnesses.
Nonetheless, it is also more stringent than the sufficiency-of-the-
evidence standard in that it allows the court to grant a motion for new
trial only if more evidence supports the alternative verdict as opposed
to the verdict rendered. The question for the court is not whether
there was sufficient credible evidence to support the verdict rendered
or an alternative verdict, but whether “a greater amount of credible
1Our supreme court decided recent amendments to Iowa Code section 814.7 that
prohibit consideration of ineffective-assistance-of counsel claims on direct appeal
apply only prospectively and not to cases, like this one, pending on July 1, 2019.
See State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 235 (Iowa 2019).
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evidence” suggests the verdict rendered was a miscarriage of
justice.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Bridges argues the verdict went against the weight of the evidence because
she could not form the necessary intent to commit the crime based on her
intoxication. To commit first-degree burglary, a person must have the specific
intent to commit a felony, assault, or theft. See Iowa Code § 713.2 (2017).
Intoxication may provide a defense if it negates the specific-intent element of the
crime. See id. § 701.5. But mere drunkenness or use of intoxicants is not enough.
See State v. Guerrero Cordero, 861 N.W.2d 253, 259 (Iowa 2015), overruled on
other grounds by Alcala v. Marriott Int’l Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699, 708 (Iowa 2016).
The level of intoxication must render the accused incapable of forming the specific
intent to commit the crime. See id. at 261. Because there is rarely direct evidence
of intent, we may infer it from the circumstances and the defendant’s actions. See
State v. Keeton, 710 N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 2006).
During the altercation, Martin stabbed Bridges in the chest and neck. After
her transport to the hospital for treatment of injuries, Bridges’s blood alcohol level
tested at .150. And though she claims she drank alcohol laced with the ecstasy,
a screen of Bridges’s urine was negative for drugs. The emergency-room doctor
who treated Bridges testified he “was somewhat surprised” by her blood alcohol
level because he typically sees the degree of unresponsiveness exhibited by
Bridges with “a much higher level of blood alcohol.” He also testified that the
amount of blood Bridges lost from the stabbing could have contributed to the
decline in her responsiveness. Bridges’s level of intoxication does not
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preponderate heavily against the verdict because the evidence shows she could
still form specific intent.
Bridges’s conduct on the night in question shows she had specific intent to
commit an assault when she entered Martin’s apartment. Bridges and Martin had
fought earlier in the night. After the first fight, Bridges went to Martin’s apartment
while Martin was out and upended Martin’s belongings. When she returned to the
apartment later, Bridges overpowered Martin’s daughter to force her way inside
and hit Martin in the head with a bottle she had been holding when she entered.
See State v. Finnel, 515 N.W.2d 41, 42-43 (Iowa 1994) (finding that the
defendant’s intent to commit an assault could be inferred from evidence of his
“violent, nonconsensual entry” into another’s apartment, knowledge that the
complaining witness wanted no contact with him, prior threats of violence against
her, and assaultive actions after entry). Because a finding that Bridges had the
specific intent to commit an assault is not against the weight of the evidence,
counsel had no duty to move for new trial. See State v. Ortiz, 905 N.W.2d 174,
183 (Iowa 2017) (noting counsel has no duty to raise a meritless issue).
Bridges also challenges her sentence because the district court ordered her
to pay court costs without first considering her reasonable ability to pay. 2 Under
Iowa Code section 910.2(1), the sentencing court must order an offender to pay
2 The State argues this challenge is premature because the plan of restitution is
not complete. We disagree. Although the supreme court has stated “[r]estitution
orders entered by the court prior to the final order are not appealable as final
orders,” State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144, 161 (Iowa 2019), both of Iowa’s
appellate courts have often vacated restitution-related orders absent a final
restitution order. See State v. Moore, No. 18-1877, 2019 WL 4297255, at *5 n.3
(Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 11, 2019) (collecting cases), affirmed in part and vacated in
part on other grounds, State v. Moore, 936 N.W.2d 436, 440 (2019).
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fees and costs as restitution “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to
pay.” See also State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144, 159 (Iowa 2019). Because the
district court ordered Bridges to pay court costs without first considering her
reasonable ability to pay as outlined in Albright, we vacate this portion of the
sentencing order and remand the matter to the district court to impose restitution
consistent with Bridges’s reasonable ability to pay. See State v. Headley, 926
N.W.2d 545, 553 (Iowa 2019).
CONVICTION AFFIRMED, SENTENCE VACATED IN PART, AND
REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.