State of Iowa v. Jacob A. Boothby ( 2020 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 19-0085
    Filed February 5, 2020
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    JACOB A. BOOTHBY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jackson County, Nancy S. Tabor,
    Judge.
    Jacob Boothby appeals the sentence imposed upon his conviction for
    assault with intent to inflict serious injury. AFFIRMED.
    Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Ashley Stewart, Assistant
    Appellate Defender, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Israel Kodiaga, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Greer, JJ. Tabor, J., takes no
    part.
    2
    BOWER, Chief Judge.
    Jacob Boothby pleaded guilty to assault with intent to inflict serious injury.
    On appeal, he asserts the sentencing court improperly considered his failure to
    sign a release of information for mental-health and substance-abuse treatment.1
    Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the sentence.
    Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Avalos
    Valez, 
    934 N.W.2d 585
    , 588 (Iowa 2019). An abuse of discretion will only be found
    when “the district court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons that were
    clearly untenable or unreasonable.” State v. Thompson, 
    856 N.W.2d 915
    , 918
    (Iowa 2014).
    Iowa law requires the sentencing court to take into account all pertinent
    information in order to select the sentencing option that provides “maximum
    opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the
    community.”2 Iowa Code § 901.5 (2018).
    1 The State argues Boothby has no right to appeal his sentence based on the newly
    enacted amendments to Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a) (2020). Because
    Boothby’s appeal was pending before the effective date of the amendment—July
    1, 2019—it is not applicable here. See State v. Macke, 
    933 N.W.2d 226
    , 231 (Iowa
    2019).
    2 Avalos Valez, though not directly on point, provides guidance:
    Immigration status per se is not a relevant sentencing factor, but
    immigration status may impact an otherwise relevant sentencing
    factor and, to that extent, may be considered. Such a procedure
    does not violate due process or equal protection. To the contrary, it
    complies with Iowa law, which requires the court to take into account
    all pertinent information in order to select the sentencing option that
    provides “maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the
    defendant, and for the protection of the 
    community.” 934 N.W.2d at 593
    (citation omitted).
    3
    Here, the presentence investigation (PSI) report noted Boothby had several
    problematic incidents during his pretrial incarceration, he had been placed in
    segregation at least once, and an anti-depressant was being used to address his
    “outbursts and anxiety.” Boothby had been ordered to obtain mental-health and
    substance-abuse evaluations. The PSI report also noted that during the last month
    of his pretrial incarceration, Boothby had refused taking his prescribed mental-
    health medication. The PSI report recommended incarceration.
    The State sought a term of imprisonment and a five-year protective order
    for the victim of the offense.
    The defense requested supervised probation. The defense noted Boothby
    had a history of mental-health issues and self-medication, which counsel argued
    should mitigate against imprisonment:
    He’s got mental health and substance abuse issues that can be
    addressed in the community. His rehabilitation certainly can be
    addressed with the least restrictive means, which in this case
    wouldn’t actually be the least restrictive because obviously with
    supervised probation, the court could put pretty strict rules on what
    Mr. Boothby would be doing while in the community.
    With this back drop, our reading the court’s statements concerning
    Boothby’s refusal to sign releases of information for his mental-health and
    substance-abuse treatment is that the court was properly considering information
    relevant and pertinent to what sentence would be most appropriate. The court
    stated:
    What I consider about that is your thought processes and how you
    react to authority and how you react to the system, and that tells me
    whether you’re a good candidate or not for probation, and there’s a
    lot of things in this PSI that show me you’re not, you’ve got an anger
    issue, clearly, that you’re not taking care of.
    4
    . . . [Y]ou have an absolute right not to sign a release of information.
    However, when you don’t do that, we can’t program you. We can’t
    provide you the substance abuse treatment you need. We can’t
    provide you the mental health you need without those releases of
    information, and your response to the request not to do that and your
    decision not to do that is another thing that I consider as to whether
    you’re [going to] be a good candidate for probation.
    The court ultimately imposed a prison sentence but suspended that
    sentence:
    I do, however, find good cause to suspend that sentence, and I’m
    going to place you on probation with some conditions, okay? . . . I’m
    going to order that you do give releases to the probation officer for
    your mental health treatment and for your substance abuse so we
    can get you the right treatment, and it might mean that you have to
    give us the medical stuff too so we can be sure we’re getting you the
    right treatment so you’re not in this position again.
    Finding no abuse of the court’s sentencing discretion, we affirm.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-0085

Filed Date: 2/5/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/5/2020