State of Iowa v. Jeremy John Round ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1174
Filed September 23, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JEREMY JOHN ROUND,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Floyd County, Rustin T. Davenport,
Judge.
The defendant appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver (methamphetamine). AFFIRMED.
Peter Stiefel, Victor, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson and Genevieve
Reinkoester, Assistant Attorneys General, and Ryan Benn, Law Student, for
appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., and Mullins and Greer, JJ.
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GREER, Judge.
A jury convicted Jeremy Round of possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver (methamphetamine), in violation of Iowa Code sections
124.40(1)(b)(7) and 124.413 (2018). Round appeals his conviction on two
grounds: (1) that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal,
and (2) that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new trial
based on the weight of the evidence.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
In May 2018, Round was stopped in a vehicle at a convenience store in
Charles City, Iowa. Shortly after, Lieutenant Bradley Worrall of the Charles City
Police Department arrived on the scene in response to a dispatch call regarding
the validity of Round’s driver’s license. Lieutenant Worrall observed Round sitting
in the driver’s side of the vehicle and a female, later identified as Stacey Otten,
exited the convenience store and entered the Jeep on the front passenger side.
Lieutenant Worrall approached the Jeep and questioned Round about the
ownership of the vehicle and whether Round had registration or proof of insurance.
Round confirmed his ownership of the Jeep to the officer. But he did not have
registration or proof of insurance because it was registered in his wife’s name as
he could not register a vehicle in Iowa. Lieutenant Worrall testified Round
appeared “irritated” because he did not have the registration or proof of insurance.
He also testified Otten appeared “extremely nervous,” “she was sweating,” and
she became agitated when he approached the Jeep. In the midst of this
conversation, Otten exited the Jeep and left the scene, taking the keys to the Jeep
with her. Round was eventually arrested, and the Jeep was towed and impounded.
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After a search warrant was obtained, several officers searched the Jeep.
Lieutenant Worrall searched the rear cargo compartment and rear seats and found
them “completely full of clothing, men’s clothing, laundry basket, work items, tools,
[and] other miscellaneous tools.” Lieutenant Worrall testified he believed the items
seized from the rear compartment of the Jeep belonged to Round, “There were
tools, jacks, men’s boots, men’s pants, men’s shirts. There were several items
that were men’s clothing consistent with the size that Mr. Round is.”
While searching the rear cargo compartment, Lieutenant Worrall found a
magnetic key holder on the rear hatch hidden between some weather stripping
and the frame of the Jeep. Lieutenant Worrall testified that the magnetized key
holder was “underneath the hood of the hatch but above the weather strip . . . it
could not be accessed from outside or inside. It could only have been accessed
when [the hatch] was open.” Lieutenant Worrall opened the key holder and found
a baggie containing 6.81 grams of methamphetamine. Lieutenant Worrall stated
that, in his experience, the placement of the magnetic key holder was consistent
with a “high hide,” meaning it was high enough above the ground that a drug
sniffing canine would have trouble finding it. The search of the rear cargo area
also yielded two digital scales. At Round’s trial, Lieutenant Worrall testified the
plastic baggies, digital scales, and the amount of methamphetamine found pointed
to a person dealing methamphetamine.
Officer Dario Gamino was in charge of searching the front passenger area
where Otten sat, where he found a woman’s purse on the floorboard of the front
passenger seat containing various items consistent with methamphetamine use.
During that search, Officer Gamino also found an eyeglass container underneath
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the front passenger seat that contained a used pipe with white residue. Lastly,
Officer Gamino found a small black bag with a “Disney Cars” emblem under the
front passenger seat. The “Cars” bag contained various items, including: two
plastic bags containing a combined 42.62 grams of methamphetamine, a clear
plastic baggie filled with smaller plastic baggies, a small digital scale, and a
syringe. At Round’s trial, Officer Gamino testified that the methamphetamine,
digital scales, and baggies fit with a person dealing methamphetamine.
After the State presented these findings in its case, Round moved for a
judgment of acquittal, arguing that the State had “not proved all elements of this
charge at this time and has not created a question for the jury.” Specifically, Round
claimed the State had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly
possessed methamphetamine because it provided no information that he knew of
or possessed any of the items found in the Jeep. Similarly, Round argued the
State had not proved he had the intent to deliver methamphetamine.
In Round’s view, the State’s evidence linked Otten to the
methamphetamine, scales, and baggies found in the search. Round also asserted
that the only scant evidence that pointed to him was the fact that he was driving
the car. But, the court denied Round’s motion, stating, “[T]he Government’s case
does contain sufficient evidence supporting each of the elements. The court’s
looking at the record drawing all reasonable inferences that support a verdict of
guilty.”
On day two of the trial, Round’s wife, Angela, testified as a witness for the
defense. Angela confirmed she owned the Jeep; it was registered in her name
and the car insurance was in her name. However, her husband had been driving
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the jeep for “probably a two-week period” before his arrest. A few weeks after the
Jeep was impounded and searched, police returned several items from the Jeep
to Angela, including men’s and women’s clothing. She testified that none of the
items returned were hers or her husband’s and all the clothing items were not her
husband’s size. Further, she testified she did not recognize the “Cars” bag, she
had never seen Round with the bag, and the bag did not belong to any of their
children. Angela also stated she had never seen the magnetic key holder that was
found hidden in the rear hatch of the Jeep. Without giving specifics, she testified
that she had personally seen people other than herself and Round driving the
Jeep, including Otten, in the weeks before Round’s arrest.
At the close of Angela’s testimony, Round renewed his motion for judgment
of acquittal on the same grounds as his first motion. The court denied Round’s
renewed motion on the same grounds as the first.
The State conceded in its closing argument that “there is no proof of actual
possession in this case. . . . The State has not proven that the defendant, Jeremy
Round, had methamphetamine upon his person.” Thus, the State asked the jury
to convict Round on a theory of constructive possession.1 The State also
acknowledged that “a person’s mere presence at a place where a thing is found or
proximity to the thing is not enough to support a conclusion that the person
1 As to possession, the jury was instructed, in part:
A person who, although not in actual possession, has both the
power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or
control over a thing, either directly or through another person or
persons, is in constructive possession of it. A person’s mere
presence at a place where a thing is found or proximity to the thing
is not enough to support a conclusion that the person possessed
the thing.
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possessed the thing.” Still the State maintained there was considerable
circumstantial evidence showing that Round knowingly possessed the
methamphetamine with intent to deliver.
Ultimately, the jury found Round guilty of possession with intent to deliver
methamphetamine. Following his conviction, Round moved for a new trial on the
grounds that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. Round’s
motion was denied.
Round now appeals on two grounds, asserting (1) there was insufficient
evidence to support his conviction for possession of methamphetamine with intent
to deliver, and (2) the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a new
trial when it concluded that the verdict was not contrary to the weight of the
evidence.
II. Scope/Standard of Review
“We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of
errors at law.” State v. Albright, 925 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Iowa 2019). “In reviewing
challenges to the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict, courts
consider all of the record evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the State,
including all reasonable inferences that may be fairly drawn from the evidence.”
State v. Reed, 875 N.W.2d 693, 704 (Iowa 2016) (citation omitted). “A jury verdict
finding of guilt will not be disturbed if there is substantial evidence to support the
finding.” State v. Robinson, 859 N.W.2d 464, 467 (Iowa 2015). Evidence is
substantial if it would “convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted).
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We review a district court’s denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of
discretion. State v. Reeves, 670 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Iowa 2003). “Trial courts have
broad discretion in passing on motions for new trial.” State v. Atley, 564 N.W.2d
817, 821 (Iowa 1997). Abuse of discretion occurs when the district court
“exercised its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent
clearly unreasonable.” Id. (citation omitted). “On a weight-of-the-evidence claim,
appellate review is limited to a review of the exercise of discretion by the trial court,
not of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence.” Reeves, 670 N.W.2d at 203.
III. Analysis
Round first claims there was insufficient evidence to find that (1) he
possessed methamphetamine and (2) he had the intent to distribute.
A. Is there sufficient evidence Round possessed methamphetamine?
The State conceded at trial that Round was not in actual possession of the
methamphetamine found during the search of the Jeep and relied on a theory of
constructive possession. “Constructive possession exists when the evidence
shows the defendant has knowledge of the presence of the controlled substance
and has the authority or right to maintain control of it.” Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 706
(quoting State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Iowa 2008)).
Round was not the legal owner of the Jeep and Otten was in the passenger
seat at the time of the stop. Round’s wife testified that other people sometimes
drove the Jeep, although there was no other evidence offered to support her
testimony. We will not recognize an inference creating a rebuttable presumption
of possession involving vehicles when it has been established that multiple
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individuals had equal access to the vehicle. See State v. Kemp, 688 N.W.2d 785,
788 (Iowa 2004). “However, a determination of constructive possession still
requires we draw some inferences based on the facts of the case.” State v. Dewitt,
811 N.W.2d 460, 475 (Iowa 2012).
Factors guiding our inquiry include:
(1) incriminating statements made by the person; (2) incriminating
actions of the person upon the police’s discovery of a controlled
substance among or near the person’s personal belongings; (3) the
person’s fingerprints on the packages containing the controlled
substance; and (4) any other circumstances linking the person to the
controlled substance.
Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d at 194.
Additionally, in a motor-vehicle case, a court may also consider these
factors: (1) was the contraband in plain view, (2) was it with the
defendant's personal effects, (3) was it found on the same side of the
car seat or next to the defendant, (4) was the defendant the owner
of the vehicle, and (5) was there suspicious activity by the defendant.
Kemp, 688 N.W.2d at 789.
All the factors listed merely act as a guide in determining whether constructive
possession has been established. Id. “Even if some of these facts are present,
we are still required to determine whether all of the facts and circumstances . . .
allow a reasonable inference that the defendant knew of the drug’s presence and
had control and dominion over the contraband.” State v. Cashen, 666 N.W.2d 566,
571 (Iowa 2003). Lastly, a defendant’s mere proximity to contraband cannot
support a finding of constructive possession. Reed, 875 N.W.2d at 693. .
So, there were competing facts for the jury to weigh. See State v. Sanford,
814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012) (“Inherent in our standard of review of jury
verdicts in criminal cases is the recognition that the jury [is] free to reject certain
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evidence, and credit other evidence.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted)). The
strongest evidence linking Round to the methamphetamine was his wife’s
testimony that he had been driving the Jeep for roughly two weeks before his
arrest. Although Round was not the owner of the Jeep, he first told the police the
Jeep was his. His control of the Jeep in the two weeks before the arrest supports
an inference that he was aware of the presence of nearly fifty grams of
methamphetamine, three digital scales, and plastic baggies in the vehicle. And
while Round’s wife testified that other people, including Otten, had recently driven
the Jeep, no other evidence corroborated her claims to specifically dispute
Round’s exclusive control in that two-week period.
In addition, the two digital scales found among Round’s personal belongings
in the rear cargo compartment of the Jeep also link him to the methamphetamine
and other contraband. Round told Lieutenant Worrall that he had all his tools in
the vehicle, and the rear seats and cargo compartment was cluttered with tools,
work boots, men’s clothing, and various other items. The two scales in the rear
cargo area were found after all these items were removed. There was conflicting
testimony from Lieutenant Worrall and Round’s wife about whether the clothing
found in the Jeep was Round’s size. Still, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, the jury could reasonably find Round constructively
possessed the items in the vehicle. See State v. Neitzel, 801 N.W.2d 612, 624
(Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (finding sufficient evidence supports the defendant’s
conviction where he claimed there was contradictory evidence because “the
credibility of witnesses is for the factfinder to decide except in rare circumstances
where the testimony is absurd, impossible, or self-contradictory”). Further,
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because Round stated that the vehicle was his and he had been driving it for at
least two weeks, it is fair to assume that at least some of the items found during
the search belonged to Round.
The location of the magnetized key holder containing 6.81 grams of
methamphetamine also points to Round. Lieutenant Worrall testified that the key
holder, which was hidden in the rear hatch of the Jeep, could not be accessed from
inside or outside the Jeep unless the hatch was open. The jury could infer only a
regular driver like Round would know to hide the key holder in such a specific
location. And because the rear compartment of the Jeep contained items
belonging to Round, and the key holder could not be accessed without opening
the hatch, the jury could infer Round was aware of and had access to the key
holder hidden in the hatch of the Jeep.
We acknowledge Round’s connection to the other drugs and contraband
found during the search is more tenuous. But even setting aside the drugs and
contraband found in the “Cars” bag, there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s finding that Round possessed at least five grams of methamphetamine. The
digital scales were found among Round’s tools and other items in the rear
compartment, and police found the magnetic key holder containing 6.81 grams of
methamphetamine in a spot that could only be accessed when the hatch was open.
No evidence linked Otten to the scales and magnetic key holder in the rear
compartment and hatch of the jeep.
In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
sufficient evidence supports that Round possessed over five grams of
methamphetamine.
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B. Is there sufficient evidence Round possessed methamphetamine with
intent to deliver?
“Because it is difficult to prove intent by direct evidence, proof of intent
usually consists of circumstantial evidence and the inferences that can be drawn
from that evidence.” State v. Adams, 554 N.W. 2d 686, 692 (Iowa 1996). Intent
to deliver a controlled substance “may be inferred from the manner of packaging
drugs, from large amounts of unexplained cash, as well as from the quantity of
drugs.” Id. (citations omitted). “We have also recognized that in controlled-
substance prosecutions opinion testimony of law enforcement personnel
experienced in the area of buying and selling drugs may be offered as evidence
for purposes of aiding the trier of fact in determining intent.” State v. Grant, 722
N.W. 2d 645, 648 (Iowa 2006).
The items discovered during the search of the Jeep constitutes ample
evidence supporting the jury’s verdict that Round had the intent to deliver
methamphetamine. In Grant, the court found that 5.38 grams of
methamphetamine was a substantial quantity, despite the defendant’s contention
that 5.38 grams was not inconsistent with personal use. 722 N.W. at 648. Here,
nearly seven grams of methamphetamine were found in the magnetic key holder,
an amount consistent with an intent to deliver. Lieutenant Worrell testified, “My
training and experience would lend me to believe that people that are in the drug
trafficking business are very ingenious about where they place their narcotics.” He
also testified that the placement of the key holder fit with a “high hide” where a
drug sniffing dog would be less likely to detect the drugs.
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The three digital scales and the plastic baggies found during the search of
the Jeep reflected an intent to deliver methamphetamine. Lieutenant Worrall
testified that “normally a person . . . with three scales is not utilizing that for
personal use.” Lieutenant Worrall also testified, “There were multiple small
baggies that are extremely consistent with the repackaging and individual sale and
use of methamphetamine.” Officer Gamino similarly testified that the narcotics,
digital scales, and small baggies aligned with a person possessing
methamphetamine with intent to deliver. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, we find that there was sufficient evidence to support the
jury’s verdict that Round possessed more than five grams of methamphetamine
with an intent to deliver.
C. Did the court abuse its discretion in finding the jury’s verdict was not
contrary to the weight of the evidence?
“Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.24(2)(b)(6) permits a district court to
grant a new trial when the verdict is contrary to law or evidence.” State v. Ary, 877
N.W.2d 686, 706 (Iowa 2016). “A verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence
only when ‘a greater amount of credible evidence supports one side of an issue or
cause than the other.’” Id. (citation omitted). The analysis is broader than the
sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis “in that it involves questions of credibility and
refers to a determination that more credible evidence supports one side than the
other.” State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006). Yet it is “also more
stringent than the sufficiency of the evidence standard in that it allows the court to
grant a motion for new trial only if more evidence supports the alternative verdict
as opposed to the verdict rendered.” Ary, 877 N.W.2d at 706. “[A] district court
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may invoke its power to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary
to the weight of the evidence only in the extraordinary case in which the evidence
preponderates heavily against the verdict rendered.” Id.
Here, we conclude the court did not abuse its substantial discretion in
denying Round’s motion for a new trial. As the trial court stated,
The alleged suspicious activities of Stacy Otten, as noted in the
motion, do not support a conclusion that a greater amount of credible
evidence supports a different verdict. The greater amount of credible
evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Round knowingly
possessed methamphetamine and that a greater amount of credible
evidence supports the conclusion that the methamphetamine was to
be used for distribution. The verdict is not contrary to the weight of
the evidence, and no miscarriage of justice has occurred.
Accordingly, the motion for new trial is denied.
This is not an “extraordinary case where the evidence preponderates heavily
against the verdict.” State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 135 (Iowa 2006). The
jury found that at least some of the drugs in the vehicle were Round’s, and “trial
courts should not lessen the jury’s role as the primary trier of facts and invoke their
power to grant a new trial.” Id. We affirm the district court’s denial of Round’s
motion for new trial.
AFFIRMED.