State of Iowa v. Cassandra K. Greenway ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1461
Filed September 23, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CASSANDRA K. GREENWAY,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Andrea J. Dryer,
Judge.
Cassandra Greenway appeals the district court order denying her motion in
arrest of judgment following her guilty plea. AFFIRMED.
Curtis Dial of Law Office of Curtis Dial, Keokuk, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Martha E. Trout, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Mullins and Ahlers, JJ.
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AHLERS, Judge.
Cassandra Greenway appeals the district court order denying her motion in
arrest of judgment following her guilty plea to one count of possession of a
controlled substance in a detention facility, in violation of Iowa Code section
719.7(4)(b) (2018), and one count of possession of a controlled substance, second
offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 124.401(5). On appeal, Greenway
argues her motion should have been granted because her guilty plea was not
knowingly and voluntarily entered. She asserts her attorney was unprepared to go
to trial, so she had no choice but to plead guilty.
Before addressing the merits of the appeal, we must first resolve the
question of whether we have jurisdiction to hear it.1 The State argues the 2019
amendment to Iowa Code section 814.6 negates our jurisdiction to hear this
appeal. As amended, Iowa Code section 814.6 now reads, in pertinent part:
1. Right of appeal is granted the defendant from:
a. A final judgment of sentence, except in the following cases:
(1) A simple misdemeanor conviction.
(2) An ordinance violation.
(3) A conviction where the defendant has pled guilty. This
subparagraph does not apply to a guilty plea for a class “A”
felony or in a case where the defendant establishes good
cause.
2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140, § 28. The 2019 amendment added “a conviction where
the defendant has pled guilty” to the types of cases for which there is no right to
appeal. Id. The amendment took effect July 1, 2019. In this case, Greenway
pleaded guilty before July 1, 2019, but judgment and sentence was imposed after
1 We requested, and the parties provided, supplemental briefing to address the
jurisdiction issue.
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that date. The State cites State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 2019), in
support of its contention that, because judgment and sentence were entered after
the effective date of the amendment, the amendment applies and negates our
jurisdiction. Interestingly, Greenway also cites Macke but argues its holding
supports the conclusion that, because Greenway’s guilty plea was entered before
the amendment took effect, it cannot be used to negate Greenway’s statutory right
to appeal that existed before the amendment.
We find Greenway has the better of the jurisdictional arguments. In Macke,
in support of its conclusion the 2019 amendments would be applied prospectively
only, our supreme court stated, “Missing from the amendments to Iowa Code
sections 814.6 . . . is any language stating the provisions apply retroactively to
cases pending on direct appeal on July 1, 2019, or to guilty pleas accepted before
that date.” 933 N.W.2d at 233 (emphasis added). We find the emphasized
language dispositive and conclude the 2019 amendments to section 814.6 do not
apply to guilty pleas accepted before July 1, 2019. Since Greenway’s guilty plea
was accepted before that date, the amendments do not apply, Greenway has the
statutory right to appeal, and we have jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
There is one additional hurdle to clear before getting to the merits, and that
is the issue of error preservation raised by the State. We choose to bypass that
hurdle and proceed without resolving it, as Greenway’s appeal fails on the merits.
“We review challenges to denials of motions in arrest of judgment for an
abuse of discretion.” State v. Petty, 925 N.W.2d 190, 194 (Iowa 2019). “We will
only find an abuse of discretion if the trial court exercised its discretion on clearly
untenable or unreasonable grounds.” Id.4
Greenway argues her “fundamental and Constitutional rights” were violated
because her counsel lied to her, did not provide her with discovery documents,
and filed a motion alleging Greenway was not competent to stand trial. To the
extent this is an attempt to assert an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, we
are unable to address it because Greenway has not cited authority or to the record
in support of such a claim. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3) (requiring the
appellant’s brief to contain citations to authority and references to the record
supporting the appellant’s arguments). Moreover, the record is insufficient for us
to decide this issue on direct appeal, and counsel should be given the opportunity
to explain counsel’s actions. See State v. Carroll, 767 N.W.2d 638, 641 (Iowa
2009) (“We will address on direct appeal claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
only if we determine the development of an additional factual record would not be
helpful and these elements can be decided as a matter of law.”); State v. Bentley,
757 N.W.2d 257, 264 (Iowa 2008) (noting counsel is entitled to defend counsel’s
actions through postconviction relief proceedings).
To the extent Greenway is not asserting an ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim but arguing instead that her motion in arrest of judgment should have
been granted on the merits, the record demonstrates no abuse of discretion by the
district court. The district court found Greenway’s guilty plea to have been given
freely, voluntarily, and intelligently. Before accepting Greenway’s guilty plea, the
district court held a long colloquy with Greenway. Greenway acknowledged she
was “choosing to enter a plea of guilty instead of going to trial,” and she understood
she was pleading guilty without a plea agreement. She also told the district court
she was pleading guilty “voluntarily and of [her] own free will,” it was her decision
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to plead guilty, and she was actually guilty of the two charged offenses. Based on
this record, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Greenway’s
motion in arrest of judgment.
AFFIRMED.