Danielle Becerra-Shaffer, Staci Boyer, John Douglas, Michael Prevost and Danny Wilson v. Central Iowa Hospital Corporation d/b/a Iowa Methodist Medical Center ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0273
Filed September 23, 2020
DANIELLE BECERRA-SHAFFER, STACI BOYER, JOHN DOUGLAS, MICHAEL
PREVOST and DANNY WILSON,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
vs.
CENTRAL IOWA HOSPITAL CORPORATION d/b/a IOWA METHODIST
MEDICAL CENTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Randy V. Hefner,
Judge.
The appellants appeal the district court’s decision granting summary
judgment to Central Iowa Hospital Corporation, operating as Iowa Methodist
Medical Center, on their claims of negligence and infliction of emotional distress
arising from the actions of a pharmacy technician. AFFIRMED.
Matt J. Reilly of Trial Lawyers for Justice, Decorah, for appellants.
Jack Hilmes, Kevin J. Driscoll, Erik P. Bergeland, Andrew T. Patton, and
Jeffrey R. Kappelman of The Finley Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Schumacher, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Plaintiffs appeal the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to
Central Iowa Hospital Corporation, operating as Iowa Methodist Medical Center
(IMMC), on their claims of negligence and infliction of emotional distress arising
from the actions of a pharmacy technician. The appellants concede that they were
not actually exposed to a communicable disease. We conclude their claims for
emotional distress are too remote and speculative for them to be entitled to relief
and were unreasonable as a matter of law. We conclude the district court properly
granted summary judgment to IMMC.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings
Victor Van Cleave was employed by IMMC from August 22 through
October 7, 2016, as a pharmacy technician. As part of his employment, he had
access to fentanyl and hydromorphone. As part of a plea agreement,1 Van Cleave
admitted:
While employed as described above, [Van Cleave] tampered with the
Hospital’s Fentanyl and Fentanyl vials. In particular, [Van Cleave]
inserted a syringe into multiple Fentanyl vials, removed the Fentanyl
with that syringe, and injected the Fentanyl into himself. Using a
different syringe, [Van Cleave] then replaced the Fentanyl he had
removed from the vials with a different fluid. [Van Cleave] then
placed the tampered vials back into storage at the Hospital.
Each of the plaintiffs was hospitalized at IMMC while Van Cleave was employed
there.
After Van Cleave’s actions were discovered, he tested negative for Hepatitis
B, Hepatitis C, and HIV. IMMC notified patients: (1) they may have received diluted
1 Van Cleave pled guilty to a federal charge of tampering with consumer products,
in violation of Title 18, § 1365(a)(4).
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medication while in the hospital; (2) the responsible employee tested negative for
infection; (3) IMMC believed “there [was] NO risk of infection from this employee”;
and (4) IMMC was “offering free blood testing for your peace of mind.” Patients
could receive an initial blood test and then a second one six months later.
This factual situation resulted in multiple lawsuits involving 255 plaintiffs.
The lawsuits raised claims of (1) negligence, (2) res ipsa loquitur, (3) respondeat
superior, (4) negligent hiring, (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress, (6)
negligent infliction of emotional distress, (7) medical battery, and (8) lack of
informed consent. These cases were consolidated.
Based on computer tracking of the use of fentanyl and hydromorphone at
the hospital, IMMC determined there was no possibility that seventy-six of the
plaintiffs received diluted medication.2 In the lawsuits involving these seventy-six
plaintiffs, IMMC filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming the plaintiffs could
2 In an affidavit, Brian Benson, the director of pharmacy of IMMC, stated the
seventy-six patients did not receive a diluted dose of fentanyl or hydromorphone
for these reasons:
a. The patients did not receive Fentanyl or Hydromorphone
from 2 milliliter vials during their hospitalization; [or]
b. The patients received Fentanyl or Hydromorphone from 2
milliliter vials from dispensing Omnicell machines that Victor Van
Cleave never accessed; [or]
c. The patients received Fentanyl or Hydromorphone prior to
Victor Van Cleave having accessed the dispensing Omnicell
machine; [or]
d. The Plaintiffs were not a patient at IMMC during Victor Van
Cleave’s employment; or
e. The Plaintiffs received Fentanyl or Hydromorphone from a
Pyxis machine; or
f. The Omnicell pocket from which a Plaintiff was provided
Fentanyl or Hydromorphone had been emptied after Victor Van
Cleave’s last entry of that pocket, and then the pocket was restocked
with new inventory by a different pharmacy technician before the
patient was issued medication from the pocket.
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not have been injured by Van Cleave’s actions. Plaintiffs resisted the motion,
stating IMMC’s negligence “caused the Plaintiffs to be subject to increased pain
and suffering, increased lab and blood testing, and increased anxiety for fear of
contracting a disease, and emotional distress,” even if they had not received
diluted fentanyl or hydromorphone. IMMC replied to the resistance, claiming
plaintiffs could not recover damages related to fear of possible exposure to disease
when there was no evidence of actual exposure. It also asserted the plaintiffs were
not entitled to damages based on the method IMMC used to inform them of Van
Cleave’s conduct.
After a hearing, the district court granted the motion for summary judgment.
First, the court found the plaintiffs were not entitled to damages for emotional
distress based on possible exposure to a communicable disease when there was
no showing of actual exposure. Second, the court noted that while in some
instances there may be “potential liability for emotional distress absent physical
injury,” this applied only when the plaintiff “personally experience[d] the alleged
negligent conduct,” which did not occur in this case. Third, the court determined
the plaintiffs could not recover damages for emotional distress due to IMMC’s
notification about Van Cleave’s conduct, as IMMC did not breach its duty to provide
timely and clear notice. Fourth, the court concluded the plaintiffs could not recover
damages based on IMMC’s offer to provide blood testing.
This appeal was brought by the plaintiffs who had their claims dismissed
based on the district court’s ruling on the motion for summary judgment. While the
case was pending on appeal, all but five of the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their
appeal. The remaining appellants are Staci Boyer, Danielle Becerra-Shaffer, John
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Douglas, Michael Prevost, and Danny Wilson.3 We refer to these parties as the
appellants.
II. Standard of Review
We review a district court’s decision granting summary judgment for the
correction of errors of law. Jones v. Univ. of Iowa, 836 N.W.2d 127, 139 (Iowa
2013). The Iowa Supreme Court has stated:
A court should grant summary judgment if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. In other words, summary judgment is
appropriate if the record reveals a conflict only concerns the legal
consequences of undisputed facts. When reviewing a court’s
decision to grant summary judgment, we examine the record in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party and we draw all
legitimate inferences the evidence bears in order to establish the
existence of questions of fact.
Id. at 139–40 (quoting Pitts v. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 818 N.W.2d 91, 96–97
(Iowa 2012)). “Even if the facts are undisputed, summary judgment is not proper
if reasonable minds could draw different inferences from them and thereby reach
different conclusions.” Morris v. Steffes Group, Inc., 924 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Iowa
2019) (citation omitted). The party seeking summary judgment has the burden to
show there are no genuine issues of material fact and the party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. Id.
3 Boyer is a plaintiff in LACL137082; Becerra-Shaffer is a plaintiff in LACL137800;
and John Douglas, Michael Prevost, and Danny Wilson are plaintiffs in
LACL141079.
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III. Discussion
The appellants claim the district court improperly granted IMMC’s motion for
summary judgment. They state that even if they did not receive diluted medicine,
IMMC has not established as a matter of law that they were not harmed as a result
of IMMC’s negligence. The appellants claim IMMC negligently hired and
supervised Van Cleave. They also claim that due to IMMC’s negligence, they were
“subject[ed] to increased pain and suffering, increased lab and blood testing, and
increased anxiety for fear of contracting a disease, and emotional distress.” They
point out that they had a reasonable fear of contracting a disease, which continued
for a period of time until they learned they had not been exposed.
In general, “there can be no recovery for emotional distress ‘absent
intentional conduct by a defendant or some physical injury to the plaintiff.’” Clark
v. Estate of Rice ex rel. Rice, 653 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Mills v.
Guthrie Cnty. Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n, 454 N.W.2d 846, 852 (Iowa 1990)). There
are two recognized exceptions to the rule—(1) “bystander liability based on the
breach of a duty of care by the defendant not to cause emotional distress to those
who witness conduct that causes serious harm to a close relative”; and (2) direct
infliction of emotional distress where “the nature of the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant is such that it supports the imposition of a duty of care
on the defendant to avoid causing emotional harm to the plaintiff.” Id. at 170–71.
The appellants first contend that their claims for emotional distress arose in
conjunction with a physical injury. Two of the appellants, Boyer and Becerra-
Shaffer, had blood testing done, and they claim they “experienced physical pain
as a result of the blood draw.” Also, all of the appellants contend that they come
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within the second exception to the general rule, stating, “medical professionals
have a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid causing emotional harm to patient[s]
receiving medical services.” The appellants state they had a reasonable fear of
contracting a communicable and potentially lethal disease.
In Kaufman v. Physical Measurements, Inc., 615 N.Y.S.2d 508, 508 (App.
Div. 1994), a postal clerk was pricked by a needle while sorting mail. He sued the
company that mailed the envelope, alleging physical injury and emotional distress
based on his fear of contracting AIDS. Kaufman, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 509. Both the
person for whom the needle was used and Kaufman tested negative for HIV. Id.
at 508–09. The court concluded, “there is no objective medical evidence in this
record to substantiate the concern that Kaufman has contracted or been exposed
to HIV. Therefore, the claim for emotional distress is too remote and too
speculative, and not compensable as a matter of law.” Id. at 509. The court
determined the defendant should be granted summary judgment. Id.
Similarly, in Johnson v. American National Red Cross, 578 S.E.2d 106, 107
(Ga. 2003), a medical patient was notified she received a blood transfusion from a
donor who could have been exposed to HIV. The donor and the patient
subsequently tested negative for HIV. Johnson, 578 S.E.2d at 107. The patient
became very upset and stated she lived in fear she had HIV. Id. The Georgia
Supreme Court determined the patient could not recover on her claims of
emotional distress in the absence of actual exposure to HIV. Id. at 110. The court
stated, “In the face of this complete absence of evidence of exposure, [the patient]
feared that she was infected with the virus. However, the evidence compels a
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finding that [the patient’s] fears were unreasonable as a matter of law.” Id. The
court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant. Id.
Additionally, in Pendergist v. Pendergrass, 961 S.W.2d 919, 924 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998), the Missouri Court of Appeals found, “The majority of jurisdictions that
have considered claims for infliction of emotional distress based on a fear of
contracting AIDS have determined that actual exposure to the virus is a necessary
requirement for the claim.” (Collecting cases.) The court noted, however, that a
minority of jurisdictions had “applied a more lenient approach,” and required “only
that the plaintiff’s fear be reasonable.” Pendergist, 961 S.W.2d at 925. The court
concluded, “In Missouri, general tort principles and public policy concerns dictate
the adoption of an actual exposure rule in fear of AIDS cases.” Id. The court gave
the following reasons for its conclusion: (1) “[I]t ensures that a genuine basis for
the fear exists and that the fear is not premised on public misconceptions about
AIDS”; (2) “[A]n actual exposure rule preserves an objective component in
emotional distress cases necessary to ensure stability, consistency, and
predictability in the disposition of those cases”; (3) “[T]he rule ensures that victims
who are exposed to HIV or actually contract HIV as a result of a defendant’s
negligence are compensated for their emotional distress”; and (4) “[A]n actual
exposure rule protects the justice system from becoming burdened with frivolous
litigation.” Id. at 926.
We conclude the actual exposure rule should be applied in Iowa for the
reasons set out by the Missouri Court of Appeals. See id. The appellants concede
that they were not actually exposed to a communicable disease. Their claims for
emotional distress are too remote and speculative for them to be entitled to relief.
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See Kaufman, 615 N.Y.S.2d at 509. Because the testing of Van Cleave and the
appellants was negative, the appellants’ fears of contracting a disease were
unreasonable as a matter of law. See Johnson, 578 S.E.2d at 110. We conclude
the district court properly granted summary judgment to IMMC.
We affirm the decision of the district court.
AFFIRMED.