State of Iowa v. Jenna Lea DeBrower ( 2020 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 19-0071
    Filed March 4, 2020
    STATE OF IOWA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    vs.
    JENNA LEA DEBROWER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County, Rose Anne
    Mefford, District Associate Judge.
    Jenna Lea DeBrower appeals her convictions for possession of alprazolam,
    possession of methamphetamine, operating while intoxicated, and possession of
    prescription drugs without a prescription. AFFIRMED.
    Fred Stiefel, Victor, for appellant.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
    General, for appellee.
    Considered by Tabor, P.J., Greer, J., and Carr, S.J.*
    *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
    (2020).
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    CARR, Senior Judge.
    On appeal from her convictions for possession of alprazolam, possession
    of methamphetamine, operating while intoxicated, and possession of prescription
    drugs without a prescription, Jenna Lea DeBrower challenges the denial of her
    motions to suppress evidence she claims the State obtained in violation of her
    constitutional rights.
    DeBrower’s convictions stem from events at a Grinnell gas station, where
    her odd behavior while trying to pump gas caught the attention of another customer
    and the gas station clerk. DeBrower then slumped over unconscious in her vehicle
    for a time. When she regained consciousness, she slurred her speech, had trouble
    keeping her eyes open, and swayed while walking. Concerned that DeBrower was
    under the influence of alcohol or drugs, the customer called 911. The officers who
    responded found DeBrower groggy, lethargic, confused, and unable to answer
    questions with clarity. When asked if she would share the contents of a Crown
    Royal bag that was visible in her vehicle, DeBrower held the bag upside down in
    a manner that suggested she was trying to conceal some of its contents. But when
    a towel with burn marks consistent with drug use fell out of the bag, the officers
    suspected the bag contained contraband. DeBrower admitted she had a drug
    pipe, and they arrested her for possession of drug paraphernalia. A search led to
    the discovery of two rocks of methamphetamine inside the Crown Royal bag, as
    well as twelve alprazolam pills and three hydromorphone pills inside her vehicle.
    DeBrower filed two motions to suppress evidence, which the trial court
    denied. On appeal, she claims the court erred in denying her motions to suppress
    because (1) the inventory search of her vehicle was improper; (2) the police seized
    3
    her without probable cause to believe a crime had been committed; and (3) she
    did not voluntarily admit possession of a drug pipe. We review rulings on motions
    to suppress de novo. See State v. Fogg, 
    936 N.W.2d 664
    , 667 (Iowa 2019). In
    doing so, we review the entire record and make an independent evaluation based
    on the unique circumstances of the case. See 
    id.
    We reject DeBrower’s claim that the search of her vehicle was an improper
    search under State v. Ingram, 
    914 N.W.2d 794
     (Iowa 2018). The supreme court
    in Ingram determined that law enforcement violated the defendant’s constitutional
    rights by searching a closed cloth bag without a warrant. 914 N.W.2d at 820. But
    Ingram involved warrantless inventory searches. Id. The search of DeBrower’s
    vehicle was not part of a vehicle inventory but was based on the officer’s
    reasonable belief that the vehicle contained contraband. Because the search fell
    under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, the trial court properly
    denied DeBrower’s motion to suppress. See State v. Storm, 
    898 N.W.2d 140
    , 145
    (Iowa 2017) (noting the “‘specifically established and well-delineated’ exception to
    the warrant requirement for searches of automobiles and their contents” when
    there is probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband (citation
    omitted)).
    We find no merit in DeBrower’s contention that the officers lacked probable
    cause to believe she had committed a crime. “The standard for probable cause is
    whether a person of reasonable prudence would believe a crime has been
    committed or that evidence of a crime might be located in the particular area to be
    searched.” State v. Naujoks, 
    637 N.W.2d 101
    , 108 (Iowa 2001). DeBrower claims
    the evidence showed she was dehydrated rather than under the influence of a
    4
    controlled substance. We disagree. DeBrower told the officers she had nothing
    to eat or drink while working in a shed during the heat of the day, and as a result,
    they called an ambulance to check DeBrower for dehydration. But although the
    ambulance crew informed the officers that her symptoms fit with dehydration, they
    did not opine that DeBrower suffered from dehydration, nor did they treat her for
    dehydration. DeBrower’s symptoms tracked both those of a dehydrated person
    and someone under the influence of a controlled substance. Both the store clerk—
    who had EMT training—and the customer believed DeBrower was under the
    influence, and the officers observed behavior consistent with drug use. Coupled
    with the towel with burn marks, DeBrower’s evasive actions, and her admission
    that she had a drug pipe, there was probable cause to support the arrest and
    search.
    Finally, DeBrower contends that her statement about the drug pipe was
    involuntary because the officers did not first inform her of her rights under Miranda
    v. Arizona, 
    834 U.S. 436
    , 479 (1966). But a person must be in custody before
    Miranda warnings apply. See State v. Tyler, 
    867 N.W.2d 136
    , 171 (Iowa 2015). A
    person is in custody once law enforcement limits that person’s “freedom of action”
    to a “degree associated with formal arrest.”      
    Id.
       In determining custody, we
    consider the factors enumerated in State v. Countryman, 
    572 N.W.2d 553
    , 558
    (Iowa 1997), which include “(1) the language used to summon the individual; (2)
    the purpose, place, and manner of interrogation; (3) the extent to which the
    defendant is confronted with evidence of her guilt; and (4) whether the defendant
    is free to leave the place of questioning.” These factors preponderate against a
    5
    finding DeBrower was in custody. The officers did not have to give DeBrower
    Miranda warnings.
    We affirm DeBrower’s convictions.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-0071

Filed Date: 3/4/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/4/2020