State of Iowa v. Alexander Douglas Blaess ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1518
Filed March 4, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALEXANDER DOUGLAS BLAESS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Howard County, John J.
Bauercamper, Judge.
The defendant appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Greer, JJ.
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GREER, Judge.
Police officers executed a search warrant on Alexander Blaess’s home and
recovered methamphetamine that Blaess ultimately admitted was his. But Blaess
moved to suppress, arguing the search warrant was unsupported by probable
cause, which the district court denied. Afterward, Blaess agreed to a bench trial
on a stipulated record. He was convicted of possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine). See Iowa Code § 124.401(5) (2017).
On appeal, Blaess challenges the denial of his motion to suppress,
reiterating his argument the search warrant was unsupported by probable cause.
See U.S. Const. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”); Iowa Const. art. I, § 8 (“[N]o
warrant shall issue but on probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons and things to be
seized.”).
The path to obtaining a search warrant follows long-standing case law. “Our
review of challenges to a ruling on the merits of a motion to suppress is de novo
because such claims implicate constitutional issues.” State v. Baker, 925 N.W.2d
602, 609 (Iowa 2019). “We use the totality-of-the-circumstances standard to
determine whether officers established probable cause for issuance of a search
warrant.” Id. at 613. “We do not, however, make an independent determination of
probable cause; we merely decide whether the issuing judge had a substantial
basis for concluding probable cause existed.” State v. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d 360,
363 (Iowa 1997). “We draw all reasonable inferences to support the judge’s finding
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of probable cause and decide close cases in favor of upholding the validity of the
warrant.” Baker, 925 N.W.2d at 614. We take this deferential stance because
“[w]e have . . . generally endorsed the warrant-preference requirement.” See State
v. McNeal, 867 N.W.2d 91, 100 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Ochoa, 792 N.W.2d
260, 285 (Iowa 2010)).
The test for whether probable cause exists to issue a search warrant is:
“whether a person of reasonable prudence would believe a crime
was committed on the premises to be searched or evidence of a
crime could be located there.” Probable cause to search requires a
probability determination that “(1) the items sought are connected to
criminal activity and (2) the items sought will be found in the place to
be searched.”
State v. Shanahan, 712 N.W.2d 121, 131–32 (Iowa 2006) (citations omitted). “In
determining whether a substantial basis existed for a finding of probable cause,
we are ‘limited to consideration of only that information, reduced to writing, which
was actually presented to the [judge] at the time the application for warrant was
made.’” Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 363 (alteration in original) (quoting State v.
Godbersen, 493 N.W.2d 852, 855 (Iowa 1992)). “In reviewing the warrant
application, we interpret the affidavit of probable cause in a common sense, rather
than in a highly technical manner.” Baker, 925 N.W.2d at 614. We recognize “[t]he
issuing court must make a probability determination that the items sought are
connected to criminal activity and the items will be found in the place to be
searched.” Id. at 613.
The question Blaess asks is whether there is sufficient evidence in the
warrant application to establish probable cause of his possession of controlled
substances, drug paraphernalia, or evidence of drug trafficking in his home when
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the officers applied for the search warrant. To support his contention there was
not, Blaess argues (1) the informant relied upon by police, Daniel Andersen,1
lacked credibility and reliability, (2) the information provided established “mere
suspicion” of a crime rather than probable cause, and (3) there was an insufficient
nexus between the information given to support an underlying crime and the
location searched—Blaess’s home.
According to the warrant application, Police Officer Shannon Cox came
across Andersen in the lobby area of the law center. At the time, Cox saw
Andersen “getting confrontational with” Blaess, who was known by the officer.
Officer Cox asked to speak with Andersen on another issue. Based on the officer’s
observations, it appeared clear that Andersen was under the influence of a
controlled substance. Andersen then admitted use of methamphetamine several
times since his release from police custody less than one week before. He told
the officer that one of the times he used the drug, it was with Blaess. According to
Andersen, Blaess came into the residence Andersen was at “with possession of
methamphetamine and they used that narcotic via a syringe.” With these
1
In his appellate brief, Blaess claims another witness, Travis Klimesh, lacked
credibility and reliability. This specific issue was not both raised to and decided by
the district court, so we do not consider it on appeal. See Taft v. Iowa Dist. Ct.,
828 N.W.2d 309, 322 (Iowa 2013) (“Even issues implicating constitutional rights
must be presented to and ruled upon by the district court in order to preserve error
for appeal.”). Because Blaess asks us to consider anything we find unpreserved
under an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel framework, we preserve this claim for
possible postconviction relief. See State v. Biddle, 652 N.W.2d 191, 203 (Iowa
2002) (“Generally, we do not resolve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on
direct appeal. Rather, we preserve such claims for postconviction relief
proceedings, where an adequate record of the claim can be developed and the
attorney charged with providing ineffective assistance may have an opportunity to
respond to defendant’s claims.” (citation omitted)).
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admissions and observations, Officer Cox placed Andersen under arrest. Officers
interviewed Andersen again the next day, and he reaffirmed the same information
about drugs and Blaess. Providing the officers details, Andersen included several
names and the various apartment units within a single building of those using
methamphetamine. “The names and locations given to the Cresco Police
Department [were] ones that are familiar with being involved in the illegal narcotics
activity.”
To bolster his first claim, Blaess maintains the application is silent on the
credibility and reliability of Andersen and so urges us to consider the warrant
application without Andersen’s statements. Even so, naming Andersen in the
warrant (as opposed to “anonymous”) tends to enhance his credibility. See State
v. Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 190 (Iowa 1990). There is also the allegation
Andersen directly witnessed Blaess in possession of methamphetamine. See id.And Andersen directly incriminated himself in the information he gave police. See
State v. Weir, 414 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Iowa 1987) (considering “whether the
information furnished was against the informant’s penal interest”). While Andersen
was under the influence of a controlled substance when he first shared the
information with the police, he shared the same information the next day, after
being held in police custody overnight. And Andersen’s information included other
individuals’ names and their corresponding home addresses, which the police
knew to be correct information. See id. (noting courts consider the specificity of
the facts detailed by the informant); see also Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d at 191 (noting
the corroboration of details of the informant’s information, even when not
inculpatory details, supports the reliability of the information). Thus there is
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sufficient information within the warrant application for the issuing judge to find
Andersen credible and to rely on his statements.
Next when considering Andersen’s statements, in relation to the other
information provided in the warrant application, we have little trouble finding the
issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed.
Andersen witnessed Blaess commit a crime; Blaess brought methamphetamine to
a residence and shared it with others. Blaess argues the “highly consumable
nature of drugs,” combined with Andersen’s belief that the drugs Blaess possessed
were already gone, means there was not probable cause there were other drugs,
drug paraphernalia, or evidence of drug trafficking could be found. We disagree.
First, even if the entirety of the drugs in Blaess’s possession were consumed, it
does not necessarily follow that one would dispose of the corresponding drug
paraphernalia. Plus, other information in the warrant application supported the
inference that Blaess’s involvement with or use of methamphetamine was ongoing.
Other support exists for the warrant. About five weeks before the warrant
application was filed, Officer Cox witnessed a vehicle linked to Blaess parked
outside the apartment building where Andersen described several individuals had
used methamphetamine. Officer Cox initiated a stop of the vehicle. The driver
reported he lived with Blaess and had dropped him off at a friend’s house. The
driver said Blaess told him he would be a while so the driver could leave. Officer
Cox observed the driver leave, go to his and Blaess’s residence, switch vehicles,
and then return to the apartment building. Blaess exited the apartment building a
short time later.
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Similarly, less than two weeks before the warrant application was filed,
Officer Cox was dispatched to the apartment building for a noise complaint.
Blaess’s fiancée was in a car parked in the alley outside the building. She told the
officer she had dropped Blaess off and was just waiting for him to come back out.
When the officer went to the apartment—the same apartment involved in the noise
complaint—the residents denied that Blaess was inside. Officer Cox reported this
to the fiancée, who tried to call Blaess without success. It was after these two
documented instances of Blaess being in the apartment building that Blaess and
Andersen ingested Blaess’s methamphetamine together.
In the end, Blaess’s continued visits to a home with known drug users and
known drug activity, combined with an informant who saw Blaess arrive with and
consume methampethamine in that home, is sufficient to establish probable cause
of Blaess’ possession of drugs, drug paraphernalia, or other evidence of drug
trafficking.
Finally, Blaess maintains even if probable cause were established that he
had involvement with illegal drugs, nothing linked those actions to his home. But
it is not necessary that an individual observe drugs or other evidence in a
defendant’s home to make the necessary connection between the illegal activity
and the location to be searched. See State v. Hoskins, 711 N.W.2d 720, 728 (Iowa
2006) (noting that while there must be a nexus between the placed to be searched
and the items to be seized, “direct observation is not required to establish the
nexus, as it ‘can be found by considering the type of crime, the nature of the items
involved, the extent of the defendant’s opportunity for concealment, and the normal
inferences as to where the defendant would be likely to conceal the items’” (citation
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omitted)). “It is reasonable to assume that persons involved with drug trafficking
would keep evidence—drugs, weighing and measuring devices, packaging
materials and profits—at their residences.” Godbersen, 493 N.W.2d at 855.
In summary, we find a substantial basis existed for concluding drugs, drug
paraphernalia, or evidence of drug trafficking would be found in Blaess’s home at
the time warrant was issued. Thus, we affirm the denial of Blaess’s motion to
suppress.
AFFIRMED.