Martaves Deshone Keys v. State of Iowa ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0218
Filed March 4, 2020
MARTAVES DESHONE KEYS,
Applicant-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IOWA,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Kellyann M.
Lekar, Judge.
Martaves Keys appeals from the district court’s denial of his application for
postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Francis Hurley of Phil Watson PC, Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
A jury found Martaves Keys guilty of two counts of first-degree murder in
connection with the shooting deaths of two individuals. This court affirmed his
judgment and sentence. State v. Keys, No. 09-0522, 2010 WL 5050557, at *1
(Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 8, 2010). Keys filed a timely postconviction-relief application,
which languished for several years. Following a hearing, the postconviction court
denied the application.
On appeal, Keys contends the postconviction court erred in “failing to rule
on [his] effort to set [a] new and more stringent standard for postconviction relief
pursuant to the Iowa Constitution” and in “declining to reach the issue of cumulative
error.” Keys also contends the court should not have denied his claims that his
trial attorneys were ineffective in (a) making a brief opening statement, (2) failing
to file a motion for change of venue, and (3) failing to request a jury instruction on
officer credibility.
We begin with the standard for evaluating ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims. The postconviction court applied the long-extant Strickland standard. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Keys acknowledges the court
was “bound by precedent to apply the existing standard.” He asks this court to
“overturn” Iowa Supreme Court precedent and apply a more stringent standard.
We are not at liberty to do so. See State v. Miller, 841 N.W.2d 583, 584 n.1 (Iowa
2014) (“Generally, it is the role of the supreme court to decide if case precedent
should no longer be followed.”).
We turn to the court’s handling of Keys’ allegation of cumulative error. The
district court found “that none of the allegations against [his] counsel demonstrate
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ineffectiveness and therefore the issue of whether errors can be viewed
cumulatively need not be reached.” Again, Keys acknowledges the postconviction
court “correctly applied the binding precedent” of State v. Clay, 824 N.W.2d 488,
500 (Iowa 2012) (“Under Iowa law, we should look to the cumulative effect of
counsel’s errors to determine whether the defendant satisfied the prejudice prong
of the Strickland test.”). He asks this court to “find broader protection under the
Iowa Constitution” and declare that “[e]ven if each individual instance of ineffective
assistance of counsel is not a failure of an essential duty, all ineffective acts and
omissions should be taken together to find a failure of an essential duty.”
In Clay, the court held:
If the defendant raises one or more claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel, and the court analyzes the prejudice prong of Strickland
without considering trial counsel’s failure to perform an essential
duty, the court can only dismiss the postconviction claim if the
alleged errors, cumulatively, do not amount to Strickland prejudice.
824 N.W.2d at 501–02. We are not at liberty to change the law.
We are left with Keys’ challenges to the postconviction court’s resolution of
several ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. On direct appeal, this court
observed, “Where the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, we will find no prejudice.”
Keys, 2010 WL 5050557, at *4 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696 (“[A] verdict or
conclusion only weakly supported by the record is more likely to have been affected
by errors than one with overwhelming record support.”)). We resolved two
ineffective-assistance claims on this basis. We stated:
[T]he evidence of Keys’s guilt was overwhelming. In addition to the
properly admitted confession, an underwater search and recovery
team located the gun used in the shooting at a point in the
Wapsipinicon River where Keys said he threw it. A shell casing
recovered from the vehicle in which the shootings took place was
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positively identified as coming from the recovered gun. DNA profiles
of blood taken from a home Keys went to after the shootings
essentially matched the profiles of the two individuals who were shot
and killed. Based on this evidence, we conclude Keys cannot
establish Strickland prejudice and his ineffective-assistance-of-
counsel claim necessarily fails.
Id. The postconviction claims suffer the same fate. Because the trial record
contains overwhelming evidence of guilt, Keys cannot establish Strickland
prejudice. That is the case even if the alleged errors are considered cumulatively.
See Clay, 824 N.W.2d at 501–02.
In her opening statement, defense counsel did not dispute significant
portions of the State’s case. Nonetheless, she encouraged jurors to “keep an open
mind throughout the whole case” because they would “not hear the rest of the story
until almost toward the end.” At the postconviction hearing, counsel testified she
did not want to over-promise the jurors something; she simply wanted to
underscore that “there’s more evidence that’s coming.” Given Keys’ confession
and the evidence corroborating his confession, there is no reasonable probability
that the outcome would have changed had counsel delved more deeply into the
evidence during her opening statement.
We turn to Keys’ claim that counsel should have filed a change-of-venue
motion. At the postconviction hearing, counsel testified,
[B]ecause of the sensational nature of it, we asked for a jury
questionnaire to get a feel for the current jury we had, if they would
be—have preconceived ideas or opinions about the case. And at
that point in time, if those questionnaires came back indicating they
were tainted because of the pretrial publicity, I would have asked for
a change of venue.
The questionnaires of the twelve seated jurors were admitted as an exhibit.
Although several saw a newspaper article the night before completing the
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questionnaire and some heard about the case on the news, all twelve denied they
had formed an opinion of the case. Because Keys could not establish actual
prejudice on the part of the jury, there is no reasonable probability counsel would
have succeeded in changing venue. See State v. Morgan, 559 N.W.2d 603, 611
(Iowa 1997) (requiring defendant to show “either actual prejudice or ‘that the
publicity attending the case was so pervasive and inflammatory that prejudice must
be presumed’” (citation omitted)); Borushaski v. State, No. 01-1683, 2003 WL
183284, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 29, 2003) (rejecting ineffective-assistance claim
based on failure to file a motion for change of venue where transcript of voir dire
showed no actual prejudice).
We are left with Keys’ claim that the jury should have received an instruction
stating police officers were “no more credible tha[n] any other person.” One of
Keys’ attorneys testified she did not seek the instruction because it was an issue
she usually covered “in jury selection” and “it was not a stock instruction.” More
pertinently, the jury received a general credibility instruction stating jurors could
“believe all, part, or none of any witness’s testimony.” In light of that instruction, a
specific credibility instruction on law enforcement officers was unnecessary and
would have been cumulative, precluding a finding of Strickland prejudice.
We conclude there is no reasonable probability of a different result had
counsel given a lengthier opening statement, filed a motion for change of venue,
and requested an instruction on officer credibility. Having found no cumulative
prejudice, we conclude the district court appropriately denied the postconviction-
relief application.
AFFIRMED.