In the Interest of C.B., Minor Child ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0048
Filed March 4, 2020
IN THE INTEREST OF C.B.,
Minor Child,
D.C., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Susan Cox, District
Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child.
AFFIRMED.
Aaron H. Ginkens of Ginkens Law Firm, P.L.C., West Des Moines, for
appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Karl Wolle of Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines, attorney and guardian
ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Mullins and Schumacher, JJ.
2
MULLINS, Judge.
A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor child. 1
In addition to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the statutory
grounds cited by the juvenile court, she argues termination is not in the child’s best
interests, the permissive statutory exception to termination contained in Iowa Code
section 232.116(3)(c) (2019) should be applied to preclude termination, and the
State failed to make reasonable efforts at reunification.
The mother does not specifically challenge any of the juvenile court’s
findings of fact or conclusions of law, nor does she point to any facts in the record
in support of the issues she presents. See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d) (“The
petition on appeal shall substantially comply with form 5 in rule 6.1401”); 6.1401–
Form 5(8) (“[S]tate what findings of fact or conclusions of law the district court
made with which you disagree and why, generally referencing a particular part of
the record, witnesses’ testimony, or exhibits that support your position on
appeal. . . . General conclusions, such as ‘the trial court’s ruling is not supported
by law or the facts’ are not acceptable.”).
Although the mother provides boilerplate citations to legal authorities, she
provides no argument as to how these authorities apply to the facts of this case or
how their potential application would warrant reversing the juvenile court. “To
reach the merits of this case would require us to assume a partisan role and
undertake the appellant’s research and advocacy. This role is one we refuse to
assume.” Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa 1974).
1 The father’s rights were also terminated. He does not appeal.
3
It is not our duty to “speculate on the arguments [a party] might have made and
then search for legal authority and comb the record for facts to support such
arguments.” Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876 (Iowa 1996).
The mother’s failure to mount an argument or point us to the facts she
believes support reversal waives error. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3); see
also In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all encompassing
argument is insufficient to identify error in cases of de novo review.”). Although we
acknowledge termination-of-parental-rights appeals are expedited and the
opportunity for briefing is abbreviated, see generally Iowa R. App. P. 6.201, the
mother’s arguments are not adequately formulated to facilitate our review.
In any event, a de novo review of the record reveals the following pertinent
facts. The child was born in April 2019. Prior thereto, the mother was involved in
child-welfare proceedings as to two other children; her parental rights to those
children have since been terminated. In early May, the mother tested positive for
methamphetamine; the child was removed from her care and placed in foster care,
where the child has remained. Shortly after removal, the mother tested positive
for methamphetamine and cocaine. The child tested positive for
methamphetamine as well when taken in for an assessment. The mother
continued to test positive for methamphetamine throughout the proceedings,
including mere weeks before the termination hearing in December. The mother
unwaveringly denied drug use. The mother also has significant mental-health
issues and continues to maintain an on-again, off-again relationship with a
domestic abuser. The mother never progressed beyond fully-supervised visitation.
4
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s rights under Iowa Code section
232.116(1)(g) and (h). Upon our de novo review, we find the evidence clear and
convincing to support termination under both grounds. Having given “primary
consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-
term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child,” we find termination to be in the child’s best
interests. Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We are unable to find “clear and convincing
evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child . . . due to the
closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Id. § 232.116(3)(c). As to reasonable
efforts, the mother claims she “offered exhibits and testimony at the termination of
parental rights trial” that “show by clear and convincing evidence that the State
failed to provide [her] with reasonable efforts.” The mother only offered one exhibit
at the termination trial, and it has no relation to the State’s reasonable-efforts
mandate. While the mother testified she requested bus passes from the
department and did not receive them, passively suggested her contact with the
department and child was insufficient, and stated her belief the department did not
support reunification, she agreed she otherwise “asked nothing of them.” In any
event, raising the issues at the time of the termination hearing was too late to
preserve the claim for appellate review. See In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 91 (Iowa
Ct. App. 2005). Even if the mother had preserved error, we would conclude the
State’s efforts were reasonable under the circumstances of the case.
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.