In the Interest of A.D., Minor Child ( 2020 )


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  •                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
    No. 19-2092
    Filed March 4, 2020
    IN THE INTEREST OF A.D.,
    Minor Child,
    D.D., Father,
    Appellant.
    ________________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Colin J. Witt, District
    Associate Judge.
    A father appeals the termination of his parental relationship with his three-
    year-old daughter. AFFIRMED.
    Dale Mays of Mays and Clausen Law Office, Newton, for appellant father.
    Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Meredith L. Lamberti, Assistant
    Attorney General, for appellee State.
    Paul White, Juvenile Public Defender’s Office, Des Moines, attorney and
    guardian ad litem for minor child.
    Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Mullins and Schumacher, JJ.
    2
    TABOR, Presiding Judge.
    A.D. has been in a kinship placement for two of her three years of life. Her
    parents lost custody because their substance abuse prevented them from
    providing a safe and stable home for her. But by the time of the hearing on the
    termination of parental rights, her father—Devin—was seeking treatment and had
    been sober for nearly a year. Facing a difficult decision, the juvenile court found it
    was in A.D.’s best interests to terminate parental rights so she could find
    permanency through adoption. Devin appeals that decision.
    Although it is a close call, after our full review of the record, we reach the
    same conclusion as the juvenile court.1 The prospect of waiting another six months
    for permanency is not in A.D.’s best interests.
    I.     Facts and Prior Proceedings
    A.D. tested positive for methamphetamines at her birth in September 2016.
    Because of that test, the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) removed
    A.D. from her parents’ custody at the hospital and placed her with the foster family
    who adopted her half-siblings.2 The birth parents received court-ordered services,
    and the DHS returned A.D. to their home in September 2017.
    But one year later, a welfare check on A.D. revealed her parents were
    caring for her while extremely intoxicated. Police found both parents passed out.
    1 We review child-welfare cases de novo. In re M.W., 
    876 N.W.2d 212
    , 219 (Iowa
    2016). The juvenile court’s fact findings do not bind us, but we give them weight,
    particularly on credibility issues. 
    Id.
     Our top concern is A.D.’s best interests. See
    In re L.T., 
    924 N.W.2d 521
    , 529 (Iowa 2019).
    2 The foster parents explained the DHS considered their family to be a kinship
    placement because they had adopted the older children of A.D.’s mother. The
    older children have a different father.
    3
    Devin’s blood alcohol content tested at 0.315—more than three times the legal
    limit for operating while intoxicated (OWI). In October 2018, A.D. went back to the
    same foster home, where she stayed for the remainder of the case. A few months
    later, Devin picked up his third OWI conviction.
    Throughout 2019, A.D. struggled with transitions between parental visits
    and her foster home. Her foster mother reported A.D. saying she was “scared”
    and hiding when the FSRP (family safety, risk and permanency) worker arrived to
    transport her to visitation. A.D. also grappled with her emotions after returning
    from those visits. A.D.’s play therapist likewise noticed her ambivalence about
    continuing to see her parents. In a November 2019 letter, the therapist described
    the theme of A.D.’s sessions as a “consistent sadness regarding visitation” with
    her parents. While A.D. wanted to have visits, the girl said they lasted “too long.”
    At the termination-of-parental-rights hearing in November 2019, both
    parents acknowledged they were not in a position to resume care of A.D. See
    
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (1)(h)(4) (2019). Devin was living at a rehabilitation center.
    But he had lined up a new residence at a “recovery house” and secured
    employment at an upscale restaurant. The juvenile court applauded Devin for his
    current commitment to therapy. The juvenile court also recalled the parents’
    progress in 2016 and 2017 but emphasized: “They relapsed, hard and quickly and
    significantly. Resulting in [A.D.] not being supervised by sober and safe caretakers
    in fall 2018.” The court had “no doubt” the parents loved A.D. Yet the court
    decided her best interests were served by remaining in the foster home with her
    biological siblings where her physical and emotional needs were being met. See
    
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2). Devin contests that decision on appeal.
    4
    II.    Analysis
    Devin advances two contentions: (1) we should delay permanency for six
    months and (2) termination of his parental rights is not in A.D.’s best interests. We
    will address each claim in turn.
    A.     Six-Month Delay
    To continue a child’s placement for an additional six months, Iowa Code
    section 232.104(2)(b) requires the court to determine the need for removal will no
    longer exist at the end of the extension. Devin argues A.D. would not suffer
    additional harm if the court granted a six-month extension to provide him time to
    show he had “gotten his alcoholism under control.”
    Devin compares his situation to In re K.M., where our court found a child
    would not experience disruption from a delay in permanency. No. 16-0795, 
    2016 WL 4379375
    , at *7–9 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 17, 2016). As we said in K.M., “A good
    deal of prognostication is required in termination cases.” Id. at *9. There, the
    twenty-year-old mother had completed several substance-abuse and life-skills
    programs in prison to prepare for parenting her child upon her imminent release.
    We expressed optimism she had matured and would succeed in her reunification
    efforts. Id. In the meantime, K.M. was secure in her grandmother’s care. Id.
    Neither we nor the juvenile court could predict a similar resolution here.
    Devin’s past performance gives insight into the quality of future care he is capable
    of providing. See In re L.L., 
    459 N.W.2d 489
    , 493–94 (Iowa 1990). After regaining
    custody of A.D in 2017, his dramatic relapse in the fall and winter of 2018 is
    testament to the continued danger his substance abuse poses to A.D. Unlike the
    mother in K.M., Devin cannot attribute his alcohol-related difficulties to the bad
    5
    judgment of a juvenile. He was thirty-nine years old when A.D. was born. The
    DHS case supervisor believed “Devin has minimized the trauma that [A.D.’s] two
    removals and his incarceration during this case has caused her.” And Devin has
    not demonstrated his ability to maintain long-term sobriety outside a prison or
    treatment setting. Under these circumstances, we cannot muster confidence that
    the need for removal would no longer exist at the end of a six-month extension.
    B.     Best Interests
    Meanwhile, A.D. continued to be anxious about visiting her birth parents,
    according to her therapist and her foster mother. That therapist stressed the
    importance of establishing a stable environment for A.D. Delaying permanency
    contradicts those therapeutic recommendations.
    Still, Devin argues termination of his rights is not in A.D.’s best interests
    because she has “demonstrated a bond with her father.” He emphasizes he has
    displayed good parenting skills during supervised visits. Devin makes valid points.
    But, while important, his positive relationship with A.D. is not the only consideration
    in our best-interest assessment.
    In making the best-interests determination, we give primary consideration
    to the child’s safety, the best placement for furthering her long-term nurturing and
    growth, as well as her physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. See
    In re P.L., 
    778 N.W.2d 33
    , 37 (Iowa 2010). That consideration includes a child’s
    integration into her foster family and their willingness to adopt. See 
    Iowa Code § 232.116
    (2)(b). Safety and the need for a permanent home mark the “defining
    elements” in a child’s best interests. In re J.E., 
    723 N.W.2d 793
    , 802 (Iowa 2006)
    (Cady, J., concurring specially).
    6
    At the termination hearing, A.D.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) supported the
    State’s termination petition and stressed “the length of time this child has been out
    of the care of the parents is significant.” The GAL appreciated the efforts of the
    foster parents as going “above and beyond” in caring for A.D. and her siblings. We
    give weight to that professional opinion. At the same time, we recognize Devin
    has taken positive steps toward being a stable parent. It’s just that those steps
    come late in the life of the case and do not show a durable stability. Under these
    circumstances, termination of parental rights serves A.D.’s best interests. See In
    re D.W., 
    791 N.W.2d 703
    , 707 (Iowa 2010) (declining to gamble with a child’s future
    by asking her to “continuously wait for a stable biological parent,” particularly at a
    tender age).
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-2092

Filed Date: 3/4/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021