State of Iowa v. Jennifer Sue Mohlis ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0965
Filed March 18, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JENNIFER SUE MOHLIS,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Bremer County, Chris Foy, Judge.
Jennifer Mohlis appeals her sentence for first-degree theft. AFFIRMED.
Kevin D. Engels of Correll, Sheerer, Benson, Engels, Galles & Demro, PLC,
Cedar Falls, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
Jennifer Mohlis pled guilty to first-degree theft in connection with the
embezzlement of over $161,000 from the company with which she was employed.1
See Iowa Code § 714.2(1) (2017). The prosecutor recommended “the defendant
be sentenced to a ten-year prison term, that [the] prison term be suspended, and
[Mohlis] be placed on probation for a period of two to five years.” The prosecutor
noted that Mohlis “agreed to pay victim restitution of $162,999.73” and had placed
in trust with the clerk of court “the amount of $161,622.97.” Defense counsel
expressed “agreement with the State’s recommendation.” The preparer of the
presentence investigation report similarly recommended “suspension of the period
of confinement.” The district court sentenced Mohlis to a prison term not
exceeding ten years but declined to suspend the sentence.
On appeal, Mohlis contends the district court “consider[ed] facts not in
evidence as a reason supporting its sentencing decision.” “We will not reverse the
decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in the
sentencing procedure.” State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002).
Mohlis takes issue with the district court’s references to the proliferation of
embezzlement crimes and the likelihood that the trend would continue if the court
simply imposed suspended sentences. The pertinent language was as follows:
[I]n sentencing somebody, the court needs to make sure it’s a
sentence that will let the community at large know what’s happened
here is serious and carries serious consequences. And my general
sense has been that these types of crimes have become more
1 The supreme court lifted a stay of the appeal after concluding recent changes to
Iowa Code section 814.6 that limit direct appeals from guilty pleas do “not apply to
a direct appeal from a judgment and sentence entered before July 1, 2019.” See
State v. Macke, 933 N.W.2d 226, 228 (Iowa 2019).
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common. And I don’t have any empirical data in this to back that up,
ma’am; but I do believe that over the last five, ten years, I have
observed, presided over many more cases where an employee has
embezzled or stolen from an employer than what I observed, what
my memory is from when I started as an attorney back in the late
‘80s and early ‘90s.
And I can’t in good conscience, ma’am, totally suspend your
sentence. I feel fairly confident that you will be rehabilitated. I
believe that you are sincerely remorseful and sorry for what you’ve
done. But this is, in my opinion, probably the only opportunity I get
to make sure the deterrence goal of sentencing is accomplished.
And it is my opinion that if I would grant you a fully suspended
sentence, your sentence will serve as no deterrent to anyone else.
And as I say, the crime that you’ve committed here took planning,
and it took intent over a period of time. And typically that’s how these
types of crimes are committed. Somebody is a trusted employee,
they take advantage of that trust and then go on to benefit
themselves at the cost of their employer. My sense is that if
somebody else sees that as a possible way to get a little more
spending money for their—for their family, for whatever purpose, and
they feel that worst case scenario I’m going to get a suspended
sentence, I don’t know that we’re going to be able to—going to see
anything different happening to the trend of more and more
embezzlements taking place. So ma’am, I’m not saying that I believe
the full indeterminate term allowed by law is appropriate. I’m going
to specifically provide for the possibility of reconsideration of the
sentence after a period of time. But I think unless and until the public
realizes that this type of crime carries with it the real likelihood of a
prison sentence, the financial sting or the damage to somebody’s
reputation by itself is just not enough to avoid a reoccurrence of this
type of crime.
As the court stated, deterrence of others is a legitimate sentencing
consideration. See Iowa Code § 901.5 (authorizing consideration of the sentence
that “will provide maximum opportunity . . . for the protection of the community from
further offenses by the defendant and others”). At the same time, a court cannot
apply a “fixed policy to govern every case.” See State v. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d
393, 396 (Iowa 1979) (quoting State v. Jackson, 204 N.W.2d 915, 916 (Iowa
1973)).
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The court came perilously close to applying a fixed policy against
suspended sentences in embezzlement cases, when the court stated “if . . . they
feel that [in the] worst case scenario I’m going to get a suspended sentence, I don’t
know that we’re going to be able to—going to see anything different happening to
the trend of more and more embezzlements taking place” and “the financial sting
or the damage to somebody’s reputation by itself is just not enough to avoid a
reoccurrence of this type of crime.” But the court stopped short of saying
suspended sentences would not be granted in those types of cases. We have
declined to vacate sentences where courts used similar language. See State v.
Horst, No. 17-1171, 2018 WL 542638, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2018)
(determining “the sentencing court did consider community deterrence” when the
court stated “[w]e have a problem in this country and it’s no secret that texting while
driving . . . is causing a lot of accidents . . . . [a]nd so from a deterren[ce] standpoint
I’m not—I’m not very comfortable with the idea of probation because I think it sends
the wrong message to the community about this type of crime” but concluding the
court “did not place too much weight on that factor alone and considered all
pertinent matters in determining Horst’s sentence”); State v. Horak, No. 16-1697,
2017 WL 4324791, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2017) (declining to vacate
sentence where court stated a refusal to impose consecutive sentences “sends
the wrong message to you and the wrong message in general” after concluding
“[t]he sentencing court’s consideration of deterrence falls within its mandate to
impose a sentence that ‘protect[s] . . . the community from the further offenses by
the defendant and others’” (citation omitted)); cf. Hildebrand, 280 N.W.2d at 395
(vacating sentence where court stated, “I have the policy that when there is an
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accident involved, I do not and will not grant a deferred sentence”); State v. Nasr,
No. 19-0740, 2020 WL 824182, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2020) (concluding
the court’s statements that it “generally reserve[d] deferred judgments for [certain]
defendants” and the court’s comparison of his situation to other defendants who
were denied deferred judgment amounted to a “categorical policy”); State v. Ross,
No. 18-1188, 2019 WL 2872324, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July 3, 2019) (concluding
“[t]he district court’s comments concerning ‘an automatic prison sentence’ and the
declaration that ‘I would never have given a deferred on a burglary charge’
evidence a lack of consideration of the individual circumstances of a defendant.
Instead, the court applied a fixed sentencing policy”); State v. Kirk, No. 16-1930,
2017 WL 2875695, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 6, 2017) (concluding the district court
applied a fixed policy when the court stated, “[T]here are some crimes that are so
serious that it’s not appropriate even for someone that doesn’t have a prior criminal
history to receive a [d]eferred judgment”); State v. Wygle, 12-1307, 2013 WL
2145771, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 15, 2013) (concluding district court abused its
discretion when court stated, “The fact that you yourself had been abused causes
the Court concern. I couldn’t cite you the particular statistics but the Court’s
understanding is that somebody who has been abused as a child is significantly
more likely to then abuse others and abuse other children than somebody who
didn’t undergo that kind of abuse as a child”). We conclude the court did not apply
a fixed policy and we affirm the district court’s sentence.
AFFIRMED.