State of Iowa v. Antoine J. Allen ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-1039
Filed March 18, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANTOINE J. ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Patrick A. McElyea,
Judge.
Antoine Allen appeals the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment after
pleading guilty to one count of second-degree robbery. AFFIRMED.
Lauren M. Phelps, Hudson, Florida, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.
Antoine Allen pled guilty to one count of second-degree robbery. Before
sentencing, he filed a pro se motion asking to “retract” from the plea agreement.
The court treated it as a motion in arrest of judgment and denied it after a hearing.
Allen challenges the denial on direct appeal, claiming he did not enter his plea
knowingly or voluntarily.
We review the district court’s denial of Allen’s motion for an abuse of
discretion. See State v. Smith, 753 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Iowa 2008). An abuse of
discretion occurs when the court exercises its discretion on untenable or
unreasonable grounds. See id. We will affirm the court’s refusal to allow Allen to
withdraw his plea if Allen understood the charge, the rights afforded by law, and
the consequences of entering the plea and did so “understandably and without fear
or persuasion.” State v. Speed, 573 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1998) (citation
omitted).
Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) sets out what the district court
must do to ensure a defendant enters a plea knowingly, voluntarily, and
intelligently. See State v. Meron, 675 N.W.2d 537, 542 (Iowa 2004). For instance,
the court must inform the defendant of and ensure the defendant understands the
plea, the mandatory minimum and maximum possible punishment, and the rights
waived by pleading guilty. See Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). The record shows the
court substantially complied with these requirements. See Meron, 675 N.W.2d at
542 (requiring substantial compliance with the rule).
Allen argues his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he
misunderstood the plea agreement. He claims that he believed the agreement
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provided his sentence would run concurrent to another and he would not be facing
charges in a third case when the agreement did not include either provision. A
misunderstanding over the plea agreement may be the basis for withdrawing a
guilty plea if the district court fails to ask the defendant about it during the plea
hearing. See Wallace v. State, 245 N.W.2d 325, 327-28 (Iowa 1976) (noting that
asking a defendant about the plea bargain when the defendant enters the plea
discloses any confusion on the part of the defendant or elicits responses that make
it impossible for the defendant to claim confusion on appeal). But the court read
the written memorandum of the plea agreement that Allen signed and asked if it
was his understanding of the plea agreement; Allen answered, “Yes, sir.” The
court asked if anyone made promises or threats to induce his plea or made
promises or predictions about the court’s sentence; Allen agreed no one had. The
court did not materially misstate the plea agreement. See State v. Philo, 697
N.W.2d 481, 489 (Iowa 2005) (noting a defendant’s plea is not voluntary if the court
makes material misstatements that induce a defendant to plead guilty without
correcting them). On this record, the district court properly exercised its discretion
in denying Allen’s motion.
AFFIRMED.