State of Iowa v. Rodney C. Henricksen ( 2020 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0890
Filed September 2, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RODNEY C. HENRICKSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeffrey Farrell, Judge.
Rodney Henricksen appeals his conviction of murder in the second degree.
AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., Mullins, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2020).
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MAHAN, Senior Judge.
Rodney Henricksen appeals his conviction of murder in the second degree,
raising claims with regard to his justification defense and the admission of
testimony from a lip-reading expert. Upon our review, we affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
On the evening of January 17, 2018, a violent altercation between
Henricksen and Joshua Sadlon broke out in a crowded Urbandale bar. Sadlon
appeared to be unconscious after Henricksen threw him onto a table and landed
several punches to his face. Sadlon was pronounced dead the following day.
The State filed a trial information charging Henricksen with murder in the
second degree. Henricksen pled not guilty and later filed a notice of justification
defense pursuant to the “stand your ground” amendments to chapter 704 (2018).
He requested a pretrial evidentiary hearing on his claim of statutory immunity.
Following a hearing, the district court denied Henricksen’s request.
Prior to trial, Henricksen moved to exclude testimony from a lip-reading
expert regarding what she saw Henricksen say in audio-less surveillance videos
from the bar on the night of the altercation. The district court ruled to allow the
testimony.
The case proceeded to trial. At the close of the State’s case, Henricksen
moved for judgment of acquittal, claiming the State failed to prove he lacked
justification. The district court denied the motion. The jury found Henricksen guilty
as charged. The district court denied Henricksen’s motion for new trial and arrest
of judgment. The court sentenced Henricksen to an indeterminate term of
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imprisonment not to exceed fifty years with a seventy percent mandatory minimum.
Henricksen appealed. Facts specific to his claims on appeal will be set forth below.
II. Expert Lip-Reading Testimony
Henricksen appeals the district court’s decision to allow Telina Quintana to
provide testimony as an expert witness on lip reading. We review evidentiary
rulings, including the admission of expert testimony, for abuse of discretion. State
v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d 136, 152 (Iowa 2015). “Iowa is generally ‘committed to a
liberal view on the admissibility of expert testimony.’” Id. at 153 (citation omitted).
A qualified expert “may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert’s
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.702. “An
expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been
made aware of or personally observed.” Iowa R. Evid. 5.703.
The State explored Quintana’s qualifications at trial. Quintana testified she
“was born deaf” and had been reading lips for forty-four years. When she did not
have an interpreter, Quintana relied on lip reading, writing notes, and gesturing to
communicate, including during high school, college, and her employment.
Quintana had not testified in court as a lip reader before. She stated, “General
research shows that the average deaf person can understand when they’re lip
reading about thirty percent, depending on their background, depending on where
they went to school, depending on environment.” But she opined “[t]hat
percentage would increase” if she was able to “see what the person was saying
over and over.”
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Quintana was provided copies of the surveillance video zoomed in to 150
percent and 200 percent, as well copies in color and black and white. She testified
“[t]he closeup was much clearer” because she “was able to see their lips better,”
and “[t]he black and white was definitely easier to lip read.” Quintana spent “sixty
hours” reviewing the video. She testified she saw Henricksen say “Go home” twice
and “I want to beat him” twice. Quintana also testified she did not see Sadlon
threaten Henricksen, but she acknowledged she “was better able to lip read
[Henricksen]” than Sadlon because Sadlon’s face was “dark” and he had a beard.
Henricksen challenges the reliability of Quintana’s testimony, “due to her
lack of qualifications and the lack of any standards for assessing the accuracy of
lip reading in general or Quintana’s lip reading in particular.” As noted, Quintana
acknowledged that general studies showed that “lip-reading is about thirty percent
reliable,” but she believed her review of the video was “approximately eighty
percent” accurate. Quintana also acknowledged that she had no “formal training
in lip-reading” and “no way of verifying” if what she transcribed from the video was
correct, but she explained her procedure of lip-reading the video in this case as
follows: “I would write it down. And then I would watch it again to make sure it was
clear that I got it. And I would document it, and then I would watch it again and
make sure, verify, that that is, indeed, what I caught.” She further testified, “I
wanted to make absolutely sure that the word that I caught, that I understood from
what they said was, indeed, the word that was out of their mouth. It’s important to
me that I was accurate.”
Despite Henricksen’s concerns, we conclude the record demonstrates
Quintana was qualified to testify about her lip-reading of the surveillance video.
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See Estate of Williams v. City of Milwaukee, 274 F. Supp. 3d 860, 879 (E.D. Wis.
2017) (holding an expert lip reader was able to reliably transcribe thirty seconds of
audio-less squad car footage considering the expert’s “lifetime of practice and
decades of professional lip-reading” and stating that any concerns about accuracy
could be addressed on cross-examination by the defense), vacated on other
grounds, 902 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2018); see also State v. Belken, 633 N.W.2d 786,
800 (Iowa 2001) (noting “witnesses may acquire expert knowledge through
practical experience and training”); State v. Buller, 517 N.W.2d 711, 714 (Iowa
1994) (finding years of experience and training with dog qualified dog handler as
expert witness regarding dog’s reactions); cf. Ranes v. Adams Labs., Inc., 778
N.W.2d 677, 686 (Iowa 2010) (observing “the foundational showing of reliability for
nonscientific evidence is correspondingly lower” than that required for scientific
evidence that is “particularly novel or complex”). The video quality was clear, and
we believe the facial images were detailed enough to allow Quintana an accurate
description of certain statements, particularly upon sixty hours of review. But see
Quinn v. Pipe & Piling Supplies (U.S.A.) Ltd., No. 2:09-CV-161, 2011 WL
13124629, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 21, 2011) (declining to opine on “the admissibility
of lip reading evidence generally,” but concluding the proposed lip-reader
testimony “would not be reliable in this case due to the nature of the video,”
including “generally poor” video quality and “highly variable” speed, which
produced “distortion”). And contrary to Henricksen’s contention that “[b]ecause the
lip reading testimony was inherently unreliable, it was also unhelpful to the jury and
irrelevant,” we conclude the testimony was helpful for the trier of fact in
understanding the evidence. Belken, 633 N.W.2d at 799 (“As a general rule, we
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permit expert testimony if it consists of specialized knowledge that will aid the jury
in understanding the evidence or in deciding a material issue.”). An absence of
certainty does not render the testimony inadmissible. See Tyler, 867 N.W.2d at
153 (“A lack of absolute certainty goes to the weight of the expert’s testimony, not
to its admissibility.” (citation omitted)). We find no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s decision to allow the expert testimony at issue.
III. Justification Defense
Henricksen acknowledged striking Sadlon but claimed he acted in self-
defense because he was in fear of his life. On appeal, Henricksen claims “the
State failed to disprove his defense of justification” where “[t]he evidence
established that Henricksen had a reasonable belief that his use of force against
Sadlon was reasonable and necessary to prevent the imminent and unlawful use
of force by Sadlon.” We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for
the correction of errors at law. See State v. Serrato, 787 N.W.2d 462, 465 (Iowa
2010). The jury’s verdict will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence.
See State v. Henderson, 696 N.W.2d 5, 7 (Iowa 2005).
The jury received the following marshalling instruction on Henricksen’s
justification defense:
The Defendant claims he acted with “justification.” A person is
“justified” in the use of reasonable force when the person reasonably
believes that such force is necessary to defend oneself from any
actual or imminent use of unlawful force.
A person who reasonably believes that a forcible felony is
being or will imminently be perpetrated is justified in using
reasonable force, including deadly force, against the perpetrator to
prevent or terminate the perpetration of that felony.
The State must prove at least one of the following elements
to show that Defendant was not justified:
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1. The Defendant provoked the use of force against himself
with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict injury on the
other person.
2. The Defendant did not believe he was in imminent danger
of death or injury and the use of force was not necessary to save
him.
3. The Defendant did not have reasonable grounds for the
belief.
4. The force used by the Defendant was unreasonable.
The State has the burden to prove the Defendant was not
acting with justification.
See Iowa Code § 704.3 (2018).
At trial, Henricksen testified that Sadlon made several threats to him,
including making a “gun gesture” under Henricksen’s chin, asking who the women
in Henricksen’s group were there with, and telling Henricksen he had “been in a lot
of fights, he could kick my ass any time he wanted to.” Henricksen testified that
he told his friend, Davy Thomsen, that Sadlon “just threatened my life.” Henricksen
testified that Sadlon’s statement made him feel “[v]ery uncomfortable” and he did
not “know if he’s going to follow through with his threat.” Henricksen testified that
immediately before he threw Sadlon on the table and punched him, Sadlon had
said, “I’m going to fuck that blonde [(Michelle Easter, who had accompanied
Henricksen to the bar)]; if you try to stop me, I’ll kill you.” We observe the video
shows that just before Henricksen grabbed him, Sadlon had his hands at his sides
and was making no move toward Henricksen.
Henrickson acknowledges that “most of the patrons did not see or hear
anything that caused them any cause for concern,” but he claims “the bar was loud
from both the music playing over the speakers and crowd noise, so it was often
difficult for patrons to hear others’ conversations.” Indeed, no other witness
testified to hearing Sadlon threaten Henricksen. Thomsen’s girlfriend, Leah King,
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testified Sadlon “was touching [Henricksen] and talking closely,” but she did not
observe that Sadlon “ever pushed him.” Thomsen testified similarly, stating it was
“an uncomfortable situation” and Sadlon “was talking very close with [Henricksen],”
but he did not believe Sadlon “deserved to be beat up like that.” Easter testified
Sadlon was “all over the place,” “kept going up to [Henricksen] throughout the
whole night,” and asked Henricksen “if he was a fighter also.” Easter stated that
Henricksen told her “that [Sadlon] was trying to pick a fight with him.” She testified
that after the altercation she told another person at the bar that Sadlon was “talking
shit, being rude, but he did not deserve that.” After the altercation, Henricksen and
Easter went to a different bar, where Henricksen told a bartender that Sadlon “got
in his face, and he knocked him out.” Henricksen told another person at that bar
a similar story, and he did not mention that Sadlon had threatened him.
We believe the record before us furnishes substantial proof from which a
jury could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Henricksen’s reliance on the
justification defense was unfounded. See State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 673
(Iowa 1993) (noting the jury is free to believe or disbelieve the evidence and to
give weight to the evidence as it sees fit). The State refuted the defense with proof
that Henricksen initiated the altercation and used unreasonable force against
Sadlon. The fact that Henricksen grabbed Sadlon by his coat and threw him, rather
than withdrawing or moving to a different location at the bar, substantially weakens
any claimed belief in imminent danger of injury or death. We conclude there is
sufficient evidence in the record to show the State met its burden to disprove
Henricksen’s defense of justification, and we affirm on this issue.
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Henricksen also contends “the district court should have held a pretrial
hearing to determine the merits of [his] claim of statutory immunity.” After
Henricksen filed his brief, the supreme court addressed and rejected this precise
claim. See State v. Wilson, 941 N.W.2d 579, 581, 590–91 (Iowa 2020). The court
found “that the 2017 legislation does not require pretrial hearings. Significantly,
section 704.13 provides an immunity from ‘liability,’ not an immunity from
‘prosecution’ as in some other states with stand-your-ground laws.” Id. at 581
(internal citation omitted). Accordingly, the court determined the defendant “had
no right to a pretrial hearing on justification.” Id. at 590. Because the court’s
holding in Wilson resolves Henricksen’s claim, we affirm the district court’s denial
of his request for a pretrial hearing on statutory immunity.
IV. Conclusion
Having addressed the claims before us, we affirm Henricksen’s conviction
of murder in the second degree.
AFFIRMED.