State of Iowa v. Davon Antwon Wright ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1550
Filed November 17, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DAVON ANTWON WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mark R. Lawson,
Judge.
The defendant appeals his sentence, alleging failure to give credit for
extended time served—pursuant to supreme court COVID-19 pandemic
supervisory orders—amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. AFFIRMED.
Joel E. Fenton of Law Offices of Joel E. Fenton, PLC, West Des Moines,
for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sharon K. Hall (until withdrawal)
and Nicholas E. Seifert, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., Schumacher, J., and Blane, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206
(2022).
2
BLANE, Senior Judge.
Davon Antwon Wright appeals his sentence following conviction for escape
from custody as a habitual offender, a class “D” felony. The district court, applying
Iowa Code section 903A.5(1) (2021), found he was not entitled to receive credit
for time served. Wright asserts the supreme court COVID-19 supervisory order
extending the speedy trial deadline resulted in him being detained an additional
236 days and this constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. He argues his
sentence is inconsistent with the legislative intent of section 903A.5(1) because
the legislature did not contemplate significant extensions of the speedy trial
deadline that occurred during the pandemic. He further argues applying the statute
as written, alongside the speedy trial extension, constituted a grossly
disproportionate sentence. We affirm.
I. Facts and Prior Proceedings
In May 2020, Wright was on parole for a 2016 conviction for eluding as a
habitual offender. That month, he absconded from work release and wasn’t back
in custody until August 29.1 The State charged him by trial information, on
November 23, with escape from custody as a habitual offender. At his
arraignment, Wright demanded speedy trial. That normally ninety-day deadline
would have run on February 21, 2021. But on November 10, 2020, the supreme
court entered a COVID-19 pandemic supervisory order that extended the speedy
trial deadline to 120 days for defendants in custody with trial informations filed
before February 1, 2021, and restarted the speedy trial clock on that date. See In
1Wright was arrested for eluding on August 29. He was not returned to custody
of the department of corrections until November 17.
3
the Matter of Ongoing Provisions for Coronavirus/COVID-19 Impact on Court
Services ¶ 3 (Nov. 10, 2020). This extended Wright’s speedy trial deadline to June
21, 2021.
In the interim, Wright’s trial was continued several times. In May, one week
before his scheduled trial date, he was appointed new counsel. Counsel moved
to continue so that he could get up to speed.2 So on May 19, the district court
entered orders finding good cause both to continue the trial and to bypass Wright’s
speedy trial deadline3 until July 12.
The next month, Wright filed a written guilty plea. He was sentenced on
October 15 to an indeterminate term of five years. But before the sentencing
hearing, Wright moved to ensure he received credit for the time he served awaiting
trial. Wright asserted the supervisory order extending the speedy trial deadline
resulted in him being detained an additional 236 days—the days between the
running of his initial speedy trial deadline and his sentencing date. He argued
denying him credit for the time served was cruel and unusual punishment.
Applying Iowa Code section 903A.5(1), the court determined that because Wright
committed this offense while he was in custody on another offense, he was not
eligible to get credit for time served. This included any additional time attributable
to the supreme court’s supervisory order extending the speedy trial deadline. And
2 Trial counsel reported receiving appointments in six new cases, taking over from
a prior attorney who evidently had little contact with those clients and ultimately
withdrew.
3 The court order cites June 1 as the speedy trial deadline. But, as the State points
out, 120 days from February 1 is June 21.
4
finally, the court found this did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment. Wright
appeals.
II. Scope and Standard of Review
Wright raises a constitutional claim, which we review de novo. See State v.
Oliver, 812 N.W.2d 636, 639 (Iowa 2012). A defendant can raise a claim that their
sentence is illegal, whether on constitutional or statutory grounds, at any time.4 Id.We review questions of statutory interpretation for errors at law. Brooks v. State,
975 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Iowa Ct. App. 2022).
III. Analysis
Central to the issue on appeal is Iowa Code section 903A.5(1), which
provides that at sentencing a confined inmate “shall be given credit for the days
already served upon the term of the sentence.” But “if a person commits any
offense while confined in a county jail, municipal holding facility, or other
correctional or mental health facility, the person shall not be granted credit for that
offense.” Iowa Code § 903A.5(1).
Wright recognizes that the court had no discretion under the mandatory
language of the statute to grant him time-served credit.5 He instead argues his
4 Iowa Code section 814.6 requires a defendant who appeals following a guilty
plea, excepting pleas to class “A” felonies, to establish good cause to appeal.
“[G]ood cause exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the
defendant challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.” State v.
Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 105 (Iowa 2020).
5 Wright also seems to acknowledge that section 901.8 requires that “If a person
is sentenced for escape under section 719.4 or a crime committed while confined
in a detention facility or penal institution,” the sentence must run consecutive to
any existing sentence. The court ordered Wright’s sentence to be run
consecutively, and Wright does not challenge that determination on appeal.
Section 903A.5 is then consistent with section 901.8 in not allowing credit for time
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sentence is inconsistent with the legislative intent of section 903A.5(1) because
the legislature did not contemplate significant extensions of the speedy trial
deadline like those that occurred during the pandemic. He further argues applying
the statute as written, alongside the speedy trial extension, constituted an “as
applied” constitutional violation of cruel and unusual punishment.
Dealing with the first claim, Wright agrees “the legislative intent in
promulgating the statute was to apply a special categorization for individuals
committing criminal offenses while in the custody of the Iowa Department of
Corrections.” And he admits the court applied the language of the statute as
written. See Neal v. Annett Holdings, Inc., 814 N.W.2d 512, 519 (Iowa 2012)
(“When interpreting a statute, we will not look beyond the express terms of the
statute if the text of the statute is plain and its meaning clear.”). And it is true
enough that trial restrictions imposed by the supreme court supervisory orders
have affected the length of time defendants have been detained before being
brought to trial. But the supreme court ordered the speedy trial extension in
November 2020, and the legislature did not adjust the language of the statute in
response during its 2021 legislative session. “[W]hen the legislature amends a
statute, a presumption exists that the legislature intended to change the law.”
Chavez v. MS Tech. LLC, 972 N.W.2d 662, 670 (Iowa 2022) (citation omitted).
The inverse inference is that when the legislature does not amend a statute, it does
not intend to change the law. So we cannot say that the length of the pretrial
served on the escape sentence since it is served consecutively to the sentence
Wright was serving.
6
detention was outside the legislature’s contemplation, nor can we infer an intent
other than the one expressed in the unchanged language.
That conclusion does not foreclose Wright’s second argument, that his
particular sentence was unconstitutionally prolonged because of the interaction
between the supervisory order and the statute as applied to him.6 To begin, our
supreme court no longer uses the terms “facial” or “as applied” in its cruel and
unusual punishment analysis. See Oliver, 812 N.W.2d at 639–40. “Instead, the
defendant must challenge his sentence under the categorical approach or make a
gross proportionality challenge to the particular defendant’s sentence.” Sandoval
v. State, 975 N.W.2d 434, 438 (Iowa 2022) (cleaned up). We apply a three-step
test to determine whether Wright’s sentence was grossly disproportionate. Oliver,
812 N.W.2d at 647. “The first step in this analysis, sometimes referred to as the
threshold test, requires a reviewing court to determine whether a defendant’s
sentence leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.” Id. “This preliminary
test involves a balancing of the gravity of the crime against the severity of the
sentence.” Id. (citation omitted). “If, and only if, the threshold test is satisfied, a
court then proceeds to steps two and three,” which involve intra- and
interjurisdictional analysis. Id.
Balancing the relevant factors, we agree with the district court that the
sentence was not grossly disproportionate. Wright absconded from custody while
on work release and was not found for months afterward. He was given a measure
6 In his brief, Wright refers to the “federal categorical” approach to cruel and
unusual punishment analysis. But the greater portion of his brief discusses his
“as-applied” challenge and gross disproportionality argument. In any case, we find
a categorical challenge too underdeveloped to address.
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of trust and violated it. This is precisely the kind of offense for which the legislature
determined not only would the sentence be served consecutively, but also no
amount of credit should be given for time served since he was receiving credit on
the previous sentence. In addition, he was on parole following a conviction for
eluding. Wright also has an extensive criminal history. Escape from custody is a
class “D” felony, and Wright received the maximum of five years. He asserts he
spent an additional 236 days in jail before being sentenced (a total confinement of
326 days minus 90 days for the conventional speedy trial timeline), although the
State disputes that number. True, this is substantial as a proportion of his five-
year sentence. The State argues “the non-application of credit for time served is
not a disproportionate punishment so much as it is the denial of a benefit that other
offenders may qualify for.” But the reality is Wright will spend more time in prison
than he would otherwise. Still, we cannot say the sentence is grossly
disproportionate to the gravity of the crime. A successful disproportionality
challenge is exceedingly rare. See Bruegger, 773 N.W.2d at 873. And “[t]he
Eighth Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and
sentence.” Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 23 (2003) (citation omitted). Only
extreme variances will be forbidden. Id. We do not think this is one of those rare
cases.
In addition, the State disputes the number of days calculated, asserting not
all of them can be attributed solely to the supervisory order. The State points out
that it offered Wright a plea deal in January 2021 but he did not submit his plea
until July. Some of this, it appears, is due to the lack of communication with his
prior counsel. But the State also points to several defense continuances after
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appointment of new counsel. The court rightfully noted it would not “hold it against”
Wright that he entered his plea so late or that his counsel needed time to prepare
for trial. But Wright was arrested and brought back into custody after the
supervisory order went into effect. And, given that he was arrested for escaping
from custody, Wright should have known he could not by statute receive credit for
his pretrial detention when the sentence was imposed. At bottom, the fact that he
was not sentenced until October when speedy trial ran in June is not solely
attributable to the supervisory order.
IV. Conclusion
We find no error in the district court’s conclusion it had no discretion in
applying section 903A.5 to deny Wright credit. We further find the resulting
sentence was not grossly disproportionate to the offense and consequently did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
AFFIRMED.