State of Iowa v. Allix James Inez Betsinger ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 21-1734
Filed November 17, 2022
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALLIX JAMES INEZ BETSINGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Emmet County, Nancy L.
Whittenburg, Judge.
Allix Betsinger appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.
Peter Ickes of Stowers & Nelsen PLC, West Des Moines, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Timothy M. Hau, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Heard by Bower, C.J., and Greer and Badding, JJ.
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BOWER, Chief Judge.
Allix Betsinger appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence.
Because the initial evidence was not obtained as a result of an illegal search and
Betsinger has no standing to challenge the search of another person, we affirm.
I. Background Facts & Proceedings.
At 2:47 in the morning on May 23, 2020, Deputy Sheriff Merwald was driving
west and saw an east-bound vehicle cross over the center line into his lane of
traffic. Deputy Merwald conducted a traffic stop of the vehicle and approached
from the passenger side—away from traffic. Donald Dorenkamp was driving the
vehicle; Betsinger, who owned the vehicle, sat in the front passenger seat. As the
deputy approached the vehicle, he observed through the windows evidence of a
road trip—a duffle bag, sleeping bag, blankets, pillows, and energy drinks.
Betsinger rolled down the passenger window. Deputy Merwald leaned
down to speak with the occupants of the vehicle, and he placed his arms on top of
the lowered window with his head by the open window. Deputy Merwald noticed
both Dorenkamp and Betsinger appeared nervous, with shaky hands.
Dorenkamp’s face was flushed, and his voice was shaky. As Betsinger handed
over his vehicle registration, the deputy “observed the odor of marijuana come from
the vehicle.” The deputy asked for both men’s identification. He saw a large
amount of cash in Betsinger’s wallet. The deputy recognized Betsinger’s name
from a previous case where an informant indicated Betsinger “was involved in the
sales of narcotics.”
The deputy asked Dorenkamp to step out of the vehicle and come back to
the patrol vehicle, as was his customary practice in traffic stops. Dorenkamp forgot
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to place the car in park and the vehicle started to roll. The deputy asked to pat
down Dorenkamp before they got into the patrol car, and Dorenkamp consented.
The deputy located an item in Dorenkamp’s front pocket and asked what it was,
recognizing it as a legal marijuana container.1 Dorenkamp confirmed it was a
marijuana container but stated it was empty. Once in the front seat of the patrol
vehicle, Dorenkamp told Deputy Merwald they had just left Fort Dodge. However,
the vehicle was heading in the wrong direction for that to be true.
The deputy called for backup. Both Dorenkamp and Betsinger were
detained. The deputy and his backup searched the vehicle, finding THC and CBD
vape cartridges; receipts from Colorado dispensaries; cash; a vacuum-sealed
substance that appeared to be cocaine; and a heavy, padlocked duffle bag that
smelled of marijuana. Deputy Merwald called for the vehicle to be towed. The
deputy applied for a search warrant of Betsinger’s vehicle. The search yielded
marijuana, THC edibles, and some MDMA in addition to the previously listed
items.2 Deputy Merwald then applied for a warrant of Betsinger’s house, where
more marijuana and drug paraphernalia was found.
Betsinger filed a motion to suppress “all evidence found as a result of the
traffic stop and subsequent search of his home” under the Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.
1 Deputy Merwald explained that in other states, marijuana wax used in a vape pen
can be legally purchased in a container like the one in Dorenkamp’s pocket. He
described it as “a small cylinder-type container. It’s got a real thin rimmed lid on it.
And usually it’s got some edges where you place your fingers. You squeeze the
top. It’s a thinner plastic so that, when you squeeze the top, it bends enough to
pop the top open.”
2 Neither Betsinger nor Dorenkamp claimed ownership of the padlocked duffle bag
or a suitcase located in the trunk containing marijuana and edibles.
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Specifically, Betsinger argued “Deputy Merwald exceeded the scope and duration
of the traffic stop,” “conducted an illegal search of the vehicle,” and “conducted an
illegal pat-down search” of Dorenkamp. He reasoned, because the evidence
obtained from the traffic stop should be suppressed, there was not probable cause
to support the search of his home.
The State resisted, asserting the traffic stop was still in progress when the
deputy detected the smell of marijuana, Dorenkamp consented to the pat down,
and the deputy knew what the container in Dorenkamp’s pocket was based on its
shape and size.
After hearing testimony from Deputy Merwald, watching the body-cam
footage of the stop, and hearing the parties’ arguments, the court denied the
motion to suppress.3
Betsinger waived a jury trial. The court tried Betsinger on the minutes of
testimony with a stipulated record. The court found him guilty of twelve assorted
drug offenses.
Betsinger appeals the denial of his motion to suppress, arguing the deputy
illegally intruded into his vehicle and exceeded the scope and duration of the traffic
stop and, without that intrusion, the deputy would not have probable cause to pat
down Dorenkamp or obtain warrants to search Betsinger’s home.
II. Standard of Review.
We review the district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
based on the deprivation of a constitutional right de novo. In our
review, we must make “an independent evaluation of the totality of
the circumstances as shown by the entire record.” “We give
deference to the district court’s fact findings due to its opportunity to
3 The suppression hearing was a joint hearing for both Betsinger and Dorenkamp.
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assess the credibility of witnesses, but we are not bound by those
findings.”
In re Pardee, 872 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa 2015) (quoting State v. Tyler, 867 N.W.2d
136, 152 (Iowa 2015)).
III. Analysis.
Betsinger does not contest the validity of the initial traffic stop, instead
arguing the deputy’s actions exceeded the scope of the stop and thus were
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.4 Recently, our supreme court has
noted inconsistent application of the Fourth Amendment in federal jurisprudence
and opted to apply the Iowa Constitution in a more textual fashion. See State v.
Wright, 961 N.W.2d 396, 411–12 (Iowa 2021) (plurality opinion).
We use “a two-step approach to determine whether there has been a
violation of the Fourth Amendment or article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution.”
State v. Lowe, 812 N.W.2d 554, 567 (Iowa 2012). The first step is to determine
whether the individual challenging the search had a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the area searched. Id. An alternative method to meet the first step
occurs “when, without a warrant, the officer physically trespasses on protected
property.” Wright, 961 N.W.2d at 416 (majority opinion); State v. Wilson, 968
N.W.2d 903, 913, 915–16 (Iowa 2022) (recognizing and applying both Wright’s
trespass alternative and the expectation-of-privacy test). If the first step is met, we
then “decide whether the State unreasonably invaded the protected interest.”
4Article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution states, “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable
seizures and searches shall not be violated.”
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Lowe, 812 N.W.2d at 567–68; see Wright, 961 N.W.2d at 418–19 (evaluating a
citizen’s privacy interests in their discarded trash).
A. Trespass exceeding scope of stop. Betsinger alleges the deputy “broke
the plane,” trespassing into protected property by leaning into the open window of
the vehicle and exceeding the scope of the traffic stop. See Wilson, 968 N.W.2d
at 916 (ruling an officer who placed his foot across the threshold to prevent the
home’s occupant from terminating an encounter committed a trespass); Wright,
961 N.W.2d at 412 (plurality opinion) (holding “a peace officer engaged in general
criminal investigation acts unreasonably under article I, section 8 [of the Iowa
Constitution] when the peace officer commits a trespass against a citizen’s house,
papers, or effects without first obtaining a warrant”). Betsinger argues because
the intrusion into the vehicle impermissibly exceeded the scope of the traffic stop,
any resulting evidence from the initial vehicle search should be suppressed.
The scope and duration of a traffic stop includes not only determining
whether to issue a traffic ticket, but also “checking the driver’s license, determining
whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the
automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575
U.S. 348, 355 (2015). “[A]n officer ‘may conduct certain unrelated checks during
an otherwise lawful traffic stop’ but ‘may not do so in a way that prolongs the stop,
absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining an
individual.’” Pardee, 872 N.W.2d at 393 (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355);
accord State v. Warren, 955 N.W.2d 848, 865 (Iowa 2021) (noting questions
related to the traffic violation and related safety concerns are permissible).
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A search occurs “whenever the government commits a physical trespass
against property, even where de minimis, conjoined with ‘an attempt to find
something or to obtain information.’” Wright, 961 N.W.2d at 413 (plurality opinion).
“Within the meaning of article I, section 8, an officer acts unreasonably when,
without a warrant, the officer physically trespasses on protected property or uses
means or methods of general criminal investigation that are unlawful, tortious, or
otherwise prohibited.” Id. at 416 (majority opinion). This analysis includes
considering whether the defendant had a constitutional interest in protecting the
trespassed location under the facts presented. See Wilson, 968 N.W.2d at 915
(holding Wilson did not abandon privacy of the home beyond what could be seen
through a partially opened door). Our supreme court recently restated vehicles
have a lower expectation of privacy, and therefore a lesser protected interest,
compared to homes. See State v. Rincon, 970 N.W.2d 275, 280 (Iowa 2022)
(citing State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 2017)).
Deputy Merwald was within the initial inquiries of his traffic-stop
investigation when he leaned over to speak with both Betsinger and Dorenkamp,
putting his head at a level where he could be seen from both seats. The deputy
leaned his arm along the top of the window to speak with Dorenkamp about
crossing over a no-passing line into oncoming traffic at 2:47 a.m. The deputy
leaning a hand and arm against the window while legitimately investigating a traffic
violation was not an unlawful invasion, was not unreasonable under the
circumstances, and did not violate Betsinger’s constitutional rights.
Moreover, the deputy was not intruding into the vehicle when he smelled
marijuana. Deputy Merwald’s report and testimony indicate he first detected the
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odor of marijuana when Betsinger handed him the insurance paperwork. The
video shows the deputy is standing upright, with the frame of the window visible,
when the exchange happened. Betsinger has no protected property interest in air
that leaves his vehicle through an open window. We do not ask law enforcement
to ignore evidence they can see, hear, or smell because it is unrelated to the
specific reason for the traffic stop. See, e.g., Lowe, 812 N.W.2d at 569 (“So long
as officers make their observations from a location where they have a right to be,
they have ‘a right to see what [is] visible from that position.’” (citation omitted));
State v. Moriarity, 566 N.W.2d 866, 868–69 (Iowa 1997) (finding an alligator clip
hanging from the mirror and the smell of burnt marijuana was sufficient probable
cause to search). Nor was it outside the scope of the traffic stop and related safety
concerns when the deputy looked through the windows into the rear of the vehicle.
Because the deputy’s observations were made within the lawful scope of
the traffic stop, the smell of marijuana and resulting search of his vehicle did not
violate Betsinger’s constitutional rights.
B. Pat down of Dorenkamp. Betsinger argues the deputy conducted the pat
down of Dorenkamp without reasonable suspicion. The district court ruled the
deputy did not have sufficient reason for a protective search and the plain-view
doctrine did not apply. But, the court found the evidence should not be suppressed
based on the inevitable discovery doctrine. The court decided the deputy had
sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle because of the marijuana odor and
given the contraband in the vehicle, “Dorenkamp would have been arrested for
possession of controlled substances even if he had not been patted down first.”
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Betsinger’s challenge here fails on the first step of our analysis. “[I]n order
to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must demonstrate
that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that
his expectation is reasonable.” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998); Lowe,
812 N.W.2d at 567 (“In order to object to the evidence on constitutional grounds,
Lowe must show that his own constitutional rights, under either the state or federal
constitutions, have been violated.”). Betsinger had no property interest or
legitimate expectation of privacy in Dorenkamp’s pants pocket, and therefore the
pat down did not violate Betsinger’s constitutional rights. See Wright, 961 N.W.2d
at 415 (“Heinz’s seizure and search of the papers and effects would be
inconsequential if the papers and effects did not belong to Wright.”); State v. Dixon,
241 N.W.2d 21, 23–24 (Iowa 1976) (finding the driver had no standing to object to
the search of the passenger’s wallet).
C. Warrants. Betsinger next argues that because the initial detection of
marijuana odor and the pat down of Dorenkamp were illegal, the evidence found
from the vehicle search should be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. He
then takes the next step and argues all evidence obtained executing warrants
based on the vehicle-search evidence should also be suppressed.
Considering our rulings above, this argument is without merit, and we affirm
the district court’s denial of Betsinger’s motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.