Shawn Michael Plucar v. Tiffany Grafton ( 2022 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 22-0441
Filed November 17, 2022
SHAWN MICHAEL PLUCAR,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
TIFFANY GRAFTON,
Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Andrew B. Chappell,
Judge.
Shawn Plucar appeals the district court’s order denying his application for
rule to show cause requesting that Tiffany Grafton be held in contempt.
AFFIRMED.
Katelyn Simon of Cordell Law, L.L.P., Des Moines, for appellant.
Tiffany Grafton, Cedar Rapids, self-represented appellee.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Greer and Schumacher, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Presiding Judge.
Shawn Plucar and Tiffany Grafton divorced. Under the dissolution decree,
Grafton was awarded “sole right, title and possession of” a 2015 Chevrolet
Silverado with the associated debt and was to “hold [Plucar] harmless from this
debt.” Plucar was to receive a cell phone and the associated debt.
Less than one month after the dissolution decree was finalized, Plucar filed
an application for rule to show cause, alleging in part that Grafton “failed to transfer
title of the Silverado in her name or refinance the vehicle in her own name” and
“stopped making payments on the vehicle.” He also alleged Grafton “failed to give
[him] the cell phone that he was awarded.” The district court denied the application
following an evidentiary hearing. While the court found that Grafton “fail[ed] to
comply with the” decree in not removing Plucar’s name from title and loan
documents for the Silverado, the court determined Plucar’s evidence on whether
the omission was willful fell “far short of the mark.” The court concluded:
[Plucar] has not proven by even a preponderance of the
evidence, let alone beyond a reasonable doubt, that between the
times the Decree was entered and the date of the contempt
proceedings [Grafton] had the financial wherewithal to cover the
amount of the loan . . . .
[Plucar] provides no actual evidence to demonstrate that
[Grafton] has the ability to pay the debt on the Silverado or that she
had that ability sometime after the Decree was entered but failed to
do so. Absent this, [Grafton’s] failure to comply with the Decree
cannot be found to be willful. If [Grafton] has not acted willfully, she
cannot be found to be in contempt of court.
3
On appeal,1 Plucar contends the district court “gross[ly] abused its
discretion in finding that [Grafton’s] actions were not a willful violation of the court’s
decree.” See In re Marriage of Swan, 526 N.W.2d 320, 327 (Iowa 1995) (stating
“unless this discretion is grossly abused, the [trial court’s] decision must stand”
(alteration in original) (citation omitted)); see also Iowa Code § 598.23(1) (2021)
(“If a person against whom a temporary order or final decree has been entered
willfully disobeys the order or decree, the person may be cited and punished by
the court for contempt . . . .” (emphasis added)). We disagree. The court
summarized the evidence supporting Grafton’s claimed inability to pay the vehicle
loan, some of which was offered by Plucar. As for the cell phone, it was returned
to Plucar at the time of the hearing.
We conclude the district court did not grossly abuse its discretion in
declining to find Grafton in contempt, and we affirm the court’s denial of the
application for rule to show cause.
AFFIRMED.
1Plucar filed a petition for writ of certiorari. Citing Patterson v. Keleher, 365
N.W.2d 22, 24 (Iowa 1985), the supreme court ordered the petition treated as an
appeal.