State of Iowa v. Paul Ryan Knudsen ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-2049
Filed January 21, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
PAUL RYAN KNUDSEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Grundy County, Joel A. Dalrymple,
Judge.
A defendant appeals following a jury verdict that found he is an individual
with a prior conviction of sexual abuse. AFFIRMED.
Chad R. Frese of Kaplan & Frese, LLP, Marshalltown, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Kyle Hanson, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and May and Schumacher, JJ.
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.
Paul Ryan Knudsen appeals a jury finding that he is an individual with a
prior sexual conviction, arguing insufficiency of the evidence. He also alleges the
district court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a mistrial following the
admission of evidence that lacked proper foundation. We find the record contains
substantial evidence to support the jury’s verdict. We also find the district court
did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. Facts & Proceedings
In 2006, following a guilty plea, Knudsen was convicted of third-degree
sexual abuse in Polk County, Iowa. In 2015, Knudsen was charged in Grundy
County with three counts of sexual abuse in the third degree and one count of
lascivious conduct with a minor. In 2017, following a trial on the Grundy County
charges, a jury found him guilty on all four counts. Knudsen admitted he had been
previously convicted of sexual abuse, subjecting his sentence to the enhancement
under Iowa Code section 901A.2(1) (2015). He was sentenced to life
imprisonment on each of the sexual-abuse convictions and to an indeterminate
term not to exceed two years on the lascivious-conduct-with-a-minor conviction,
subject to the enhancement of section 901A.2(1).
Knudsen appealed his conviction and sentence. This court affirmed the
jury’s guilty verdict but found deficiencies in the district court’s sentencing
enhancement colloquy. We vacated Knudsen’s sentenced and remanded for
correction of the sentencing defect. See State v Knudsen, No. 17-0531, 2018 WL
4922954, at *5–11 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 7, 2018).
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On remand, Knudsen demanded a trial by jury to establish his prior
conviction. A two-day jury trial commenced on October 30, 2019. The jury found
Knudsen to be an individual with a prior conviction of sexual abuse. On
December 2, Knudsen was sentenced to three concurrent terms of life in prison
and an indeterminate term not to exceed two years subject to the enhancement of
section 901A.2(1).
Knudsen appeals from his sentencing enhancement hearing, arguing the
evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding and that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
A. Standard of Review
Sufficiency of evidence claims are reviewed for correction of errors at law.
State v. Sanford, 814 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2012). A verdict is binding upon this
court and will be upheld unless it is not supported by substantial evidence. State
v. Tipton, 897 N.W.2d 653, 692 (Iowa 2017). Substantial evidence is evidence
that would convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Id. If evidence raises only suspicion, speculation, or conjecture,
it is not substantial. State v. Howse, 875 N.W.2d 684, 688 (Iowa 2016). We
consider all evidence in the record, not just the evidence supporting guilt. Tipton,
897 N.W.2d at 692. We view all relevant evidence in the light most favorable to
the State. Id.
B. Merits
Knudsen claims the evidence is insufficient to prove he is the same Paul
Ryan Knudsen convicted of sexual abuse in 2006. At trial, extensive documentary
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evidence connecting Knudsen to the 2006 conviction was presented. However,
Knudsen contends this was insufficient because no witness who was familiar with
the Paul Ryan Knudsen convicted in 2006 identified Paul Ryan Knudsen—the
defendant in the courtroom—as being the same person.
We reject this argument. Knudsen cites no legal authority supporting his
proposition that positive in-court identifications by a witness are required to prove
a prior conviction. Documentary evidence connecting a defendant to a prior
conviction may be sufficient to prove identity. See State v. Sanborn, 564 N.W.2d
813, 816 (Iowa 1997) (finding name on prior judgment in connection with other
identifying information sufficient to prove identity of prior conviction); State v
Jordan, 663 N.W.2d 877, 882 (Iowa 2003) (finding name on prior convictions
corresponding to prison terms and inmate identification number sufficient to prove
habitual offender status).
Substantial evidence establishing Knudsen was previously convicted of
sexual abuse was presented at trial. Clerk certified records from Knudsen’s 2006
conviction, including the preliminary complaint, order accepting guilty plea, and
sentencing and probation order, were submitted into evidence. Also submitted
were multiple notices of sex offender registration bearing Knudsen’s name and
signature as well as other biographical information such as date of birth, address,
and social security number. The jury received ten mugshots of Knudsen, taken
during the years since his prior conviction as required by his sex offender status.
Ward Ingham, a fingerprint expert from the Iowa Department of Criminal
Investigation, compared fingerprint cards taken from Knudsen’s 2006 and 2017
convictions and testified that the fingerprints came from the same person. Finally,
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Deputy Timothy Wolthoff, who is responsible for registering sex offenders when
they move to the county, positively identified the defendant in the courtroom as the
same person who registered under the name Paul Ryan Knudsen.
We find the record contains substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding
that Knudsen is an individual with a prior conviction for sexual abuse.
III. Motion for a Mistrial
Knudsen contends the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motion for a mistrial. He argues the court’s curative instruction following testimony
concerning evidence lacking proper foundation was insufficient to mitigate its
prejudicial impact.
A. Standard of Review
The denial of a mistrial and the giving of a cautionary instruction are
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 811 (Iowa
2017) (citing State v. Wade, 467 N.W.2d 283, 285 (Iowa 1991)). “When assessing
a district court’s decision for abuse of discretion, we only reverse if the district
court’s decision rested on grounds or reasoning that were clearly untenable or
clearly unreasonable.” Id. “Grounds or reasons are untenable if they are ‘based
on an erroneous application of the law or not supported by substantial evidence.’”
Id. (citation omitted).
B. Discussion
Knudsen takes issue with testimony concerning two sets of exhibits. The
first is State’s exhibit 56, which includes a clerk of court certificate and the
preliminary complaint, trial information, and order accepting guilty plea from
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Knudsen’s 2006 conviction.1 The second is State’s exhibit 57, which includes
three pages from Knudsen’s 2006 sentencing order.2
To introduce the exhibits, the State called Cheryl Nolan, a custodian of
records at the Iowa Sex Offender Registry Unit. In laying the foundation to admit
the exhibits, Nolan testified the documents came from Knudsen’s sex-offender-
registry file in her office. The exhibits were admitted through Nolan as a
foundational witness. Nolan continued her testimony and described the
documents, noting they contained identifying information such as name, date of
birth, and social security number. However, later in her testimony, Nolan corrected
herself and stated that the documents appeared to be certified copies from the
clerk of court and the copies marked as exhibits did not come directly from her
office’s file.
Following Nolan’s correction, Knudsen moved for a mistrial based on the
exhibits being introduced through improper foundation. Before ruling on the
motion, the court excused the jury and called Nolan for voir dire to determine which
documents were contained in Knudsen’s registry file. It was established that
Nolan’s file contains copies of Knudsen’s 2006 sentencing order; however, the
documents marked and submitted as State’s exhibits 56 and 57 did not come
directly from her office’s file and were supplied by the State.
Having established that Nolan was not a proper foundational witness for the
admitted exhibits, Knudsen argued a mistrial was necessary because Nolan’s
1 The exhibit’s individual documents were marked for trial as State’s exhibits 56 -
A, B, D, and E, respectfully.
2 Individual pages in the exhibit were marked for trial as State’s exhibit 57 - A, B,
and C.
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testimony concerning the documents was highly prejudicial and could not be
mitigated. The State responded by arguing that despite the foundational confusion
with Nolan, the exhibits were admissible as self-authenticating public records and,
therefore, testimony regarding its contents could not have prejudiced Knudsen.
After hearing the arguments, the district court denied the motion for a
mistrial. To correct its prior ruling, the court removed the exhibits from evidence,
and the judge issued a curative explanation to the jury. The court stated,
Ladies and gentlemen, in light of some of the issues that came up
yesterday, and the various discussion we’ve been having over the
course of yesterday and this morning, the court has reconsidered a
previous ruling that it made.
I advised for the record that Exhibits 56 - A, B, D, and E, as
well as 57 - A, B, and C would be admitted. With that
reconsideration, at this point in time they are not admitted, and we’re
going to proceed accordingly.
Immediately following, the State sought to re-admit the exhibits as self-
authenticating public records, and they were received. See Iowa Rs. Evid.
5.803(8)(A)(i), 5.902(4); see also Iowa Code § 622.53.
C. Analysis
A district court has broad discretion when ruling on a motion for mistrial, and
a defendant “bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a clear abuse of discretion
on the part of trial court.” Wade, 467 N.W.2d at 285 (quoting State v. Brown, 397
N.W.2d 689, 699 (Iowa 1986)). Here the jury heard testimony concerning
documents initially introduced through an improper foundational witness and
Knudsen moved for a mistrial. Rather than grant the motion, the district court
explained to the jury that it was correcting its prior ruling and removed the
evidence. The same evidence was then later admitted on alternative grounds.
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On our review, we find no abuse of discretion. “Generally, a district court’s
decision not to grant a mistrial but to offer a cautionary instruction instead is entitled
to broad deference.” Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801 at 811. The district court took prompt
remedial action following Nolan’s corrective statement. The court immediately
excused the jury, further examined the witness, removed the exhibits from
evidence, and offered a curative explanation to the jury. “Cautionary instructions
are sufficient to mitigate the prejudicial impact of inadmissible evidence ‘in all but
the most extreme cases.’” Id. (quoting State v. Breitbach, 488 N.W.2d 444, 448
(Iowa 1992)).
Additionally, the prejudice resulting from the contested testimony was
minimal. The State offered considerable evidence to prove its case and the
challenged evidence heard by the jury was cumulative. The exhibits at issue were
later admitted as self-authenticating public records and Knudsen does not
challenge this on appeal. The alleged prejudice from the evidence initially being
improperly introduced was mitigated upon later admittance and in light of the
State’s case. Id. at 815 (stating “the stronger the State’s evidence of [the
defendant’s] guilt is, the less prejudicial the effect of the challenged testimony.”)
Any prejudice that resulted did not rise to such a level as to require a mistrial.
IV. Conclusion
We find the record contains substantial evidence to support the jury’s finding
Knudsen is an individual previously convicted of sexual abuse and that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial.
AFFIRMED.