State of Iowa v. Charles A. Mace Jr. ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0283
Filed January 21, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
CHARLES A. MACE JR.,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cass County, Amy Zacharias, Judge.
The defendant challenges his sentence of incarceration. AFFIRMED.
Krisanne C. Weimer of Weimer Law, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Sheryl Soich, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Greer, JJ.
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GREER, Judge.
Charles Mace Jr. pled guilty to one count of lascivious acts with a child, in
violation of Iowa Code section 709.8(1)(d) (2018), which is a class “D” felony.1 At
sentencing, Mace urged the court to suspend any prison sentence and impose
probation, but the court sentenced Mace to a term of incarceration not to exceed
five years. On appeal, Mace claims the court abused its discretion in sentencing
him to time in prison rather than granting his request for probation.
Before we reach the merits of Mace’s claim, we must consider whether he
is entitled to bring this appeal. Disposition was entered in his case in February
2020, after Iowa Code section 814.6(1)(a)(3) (Supp. 2019) took effect on July 1,
2019. Section 814.6(1)(a)(3) requires “good cause” for a defendant to appeal from
a guilty plea in all cases except class “A” felonies. After the new statute took effect,
our supreme court considered whether good cause existed for the defendant to
challenge the sentence imposed following her guilty pleas to two third-degree
thefts in State v. Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98 (Iowa 2020). The court, noting “good
cause” was undefined in the statute and was ambiguous, held “that good cause
exists to appeal from a conviction following a guilty plea when the defendant
challenges his or her sentence rather than the guilty plea.” Damme, 944 N.W.2d
at 105. The State argues the circumstances of Mace’s guilty plea are
distinguishable from the circumstances in Damme and that we should conclude
1It is unclear what year the criminal act took place. The trial information alleged
Mace committed the crime sometime between November 2016 and November
2018. The pertinent code section has not been amended; we choose to use the
2018 code.
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Mace does not have good cause for his appeal.2 But we do not believe Damme is
meant to be applied as narrowly as the State suggests. And Mace, like the
defendant in Damme, “received a discretionary sentence that was neither
mandatory nor agreed to as part of [the] plea bargain.” Id. Mace has good cause
for his appeal, so we consider the merits.
Mace generally contends the district court abused its discretion in
sentencing him too harshly. He highlights mitigating factors he believes the court
should have placed more weight or emphasis on when deciding his sentence, such
as his “minimal” prior criminal history and his steady employment. Additionally, he
suggests the court put too much emphasis on the effect Mace’s crime had on the
victim and the fact that, if he received probation, he would be in a similar living
situation as he was when this crime occurred.
During sentencing, the court noted that Mace’s conviction stemmed from
him soliciting sex acts from his former wife’s fifteen-year-old sister, who was living
in their home at the time. This occurred while he was on probation with the State
2 The State points to Mace’s signed plea agreement, which includes provisions
that “[t]he defendant understands there is no automatic right of appeal of a guilty
plea” and “agrees not to appeal.” We recognize that a defendant may expressly
waive the right to appeal as part of their plea agreement. See State v. Loye, 670
N.W.2d 141, 148 (Iowa 2003). But it is unclear to us if Mace’s waiver was meant
to encompass an appeal of his sentence as well as his guilty plea. And we will not
infer a waiver. See State v. Hinners, 471 N.W.2d 841, 845 (Iowa 1991). Plus, at
his sentencing hearing, the court advised Mace of his right to appeal, stating:
You should have been advised at the time that you entered into this
plea of guilty that you have no right to appeal the actual guilty plea in
this case, but you have the right to appeal the sentence in this case.
That notice of appeal must be on file within 30 days.
(Emphasis added). No one spoke up to inform the court Mace had waived his right
to file any appeal—regarding his guilty plea and his sentence—which we think
supports our understanding that Mace’s earlier waiver applied only to an appeal
challenging the plea.
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of Missouri. The court then expressed concern about granting Mace’s request for
probation in light of his living situation, stating:
[A]dditional information was provided about your living situation, the
fiancée that you had, the children that are living in your home. In
particular there is a child in your home that is not yours, that is not
that much younger, frankly, than the victim in this case was at the
time that these offenses took place. And I can’t tell you that I am
not concerned for that child should you not complete treatment or
that you not be successful on probation and you’re living in the exact
same role that you lived in previously.
We review a sentence imposed in a criminal case for correction of errors at
law. State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 724 (Iowa 2002). “We will not reverse
the decision of the district court absent an abuse of discretion or some defect in
the sentencing procedure.” Id. And “[a]n abuse of discretion will not be found
unless we are able to discern that the decision was exercised on grounds or for
reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.” Additionally, when the
sentence imposed by the district court is within the statutory limits, it “is cloaked
with a strong presumption in its favor.” Id.Here, the court sentenced Mace to a term of incarceration not to exceed
five years, which is within the statutory limits for a class “D” felony. See Iowa Code
§ 902.9(1)(e). The court is tasked with exercising its discretion in determining
which of the authorized sentences “will provide maximum opportunity for
rehabilitation of the defendant, and for the protection of the community from further
offenses by the defendant and others.” See id. § 901.5. “In applying discretion,
the court” should consider “the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances,
defendant’s age, character and propensities and chances of his reform.” State v.
August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 744 (Iowa 1999) (citation omitted). The court should also
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consider the defendant’s prior criminal record, employment status, and family
circumstances. Damme, 944 N.W.2d at 106 (citing Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725).
But the “sentencing court need only explain its reasons for selecting the sentence
imposed and need not explain its reasons for rejecting a particular sentencing
option.” State v. Crooks, 911 N.W.2d 153, 171 (Iowa 2019). And, the court is not
“required to specifically acknowledge each claim of mitigation urged by the
defendant.” State v. Boltz, 542 N.W.2d 9, 11 (Iowa Ct. App. 1995).
Mace’s claim on appeal boils down to a complaint that the court did not
balance the various factors in the way he wanted. He believes we should place
more emphasis on the factors that support granting probation and less on those
that suggest incarceration is the more appropriate option. But it is the right of the
sentencing court “to balance the relevant factors in determining an appropriate
sentence.” State v. Wright, 340 N.W.2d 590, 594 (Iowa 1983). And Mace failed
to prove the district court abused its discretion when deciding his sentence.
AFFIRMED.