State of Iowa v. Ricardo Rodriguez ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-2061
Filed February 17, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICARDO RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Jefferson County, Joel D. Yates,
Judge.
After pleading guilty, the defendant challenges the sentencing hearing and
his sentences. SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED FOR
RESENTENCING.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Mary K. Conroy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Greer, JJ.
2
GREER, Judge.
As part of a plea agreement in which the State dismissed other charges
against him, Ricardo Rodriguez pled guilty to the reduced charge of possession
with intent to deliver (methamphetamine), a class “C” felony; and possession, third
or subsequent offense (heroin), a class “D” felony. See Iowa Code
§ 124.401(1)(c)(6), (5) (2019). He was sentenced to a term of incarceration not to
exceed ten years on the “C” felony and a term not to exceed five years on the “D”
felony; the court ordered him to serve the two sentences consecutive to one
another. Judgment was entered on November 12, 2019. On appeal, Rodriguez
challenges his sentencing hearing and his sentence, so he has “good cause” to
appeal. See Iowa Code § 814.6(1)(a)(3) (Supp. 2019) (providing the right to
appeal from a conviction entered upon a guilty plea only when the conviction is for
a class “A” felony or the defendant establishes good cause); State v. Boldon, ___
N.W.2d ___, ___, 2021 WL 297435, at *4 (Iowa 2021) (finding “good cause” for an
appeal where the defendant does not challenge the guilty plea but “[i]nstead . . .
challenges the sentencing hearing and his sentence”).
Specifically, Rodriguez contends the district court failed to state adequate
reasons on the record for the sentence it imposed. See Iowa R. Crim.
P. 2.23(3)(d). He also maintains the court imposed an illegal sentence because
he did not have two qualifying predicate convictions to be sentenced for a third or
subsequent offense under section 124.401(5).1 We consider Rodriguez’s second
claim first. Our review is for errors at law. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d at 287.
1The State argues this claim actually attacks Rodriguez’s plea and therefore he is
barred from bringing it due to the application of section 814.6(1)(a)(3). But, as the
3
Under section 124.104(5), “[a] person who commits a violation of this
subsection and has previously been convicted two or more times of violating this
chapter . . . , is guilty of a class ‘D’ felony.” But “each offense must be complete
as to a conviction and sentencing before commission of the next in order to qualify
for the enhancement of penalty” under section 124.104(5). Id. at 291. In other
words, a defendant must be convicted of and sentenced on the first offense before
committing the second offense for both to count toward the enhancement in
section 124.104(5). As the State concedes, that did not happen here. Rodriguez
had two prior drug convictions at the time he was found to be in possession of
heroin, but judgment was entered in both of those prior cases on April 11, 2016—
not chronologically.
Because Rodriguez and the State agree the district court erred in
sentencing Rodriguez as a third or subsequent offender, the main point of
contention is the proper remedy. Rodriguez contends his sentence is void and we
must remand for resentencing. The State argues we should go further, vacating
State also recognizes, our supreme court has considered similar claims as
pertaining to the illegality of the sentence. See State v. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d 286,
291–92 (Iowa 2005) (concluding the defendant’s sentence was illegal when he
was sentenced as a third or subsequent offender under section 124.401(5)
because “the district court should not have considered [him] as a third offender,
because he did not commit his second offense after his first conviction”). Relying
on Iowa Supreme Court precedent and “the well-established principle that
sentences imposed without statutory authorization are illegal and void,” we
conclude Rodriguez’s challenge is to the legality of his sentence. State v. Louisell,
865 N.W.2d 590, 597 (Iowa 2015); see also State v. Gordon, 732 N.W.2d 41, 43
(Iowa 2007) (recognizing a defendant does not plead guilty to a sentencing
enhancement; the defendant pleads guilty to the underlying crime and then admits
previous convictions that may trigger the enhancement at sentencing).
4
Rodriguez’s pleas and the plea agreement and allowing the State to reinstate the
original charges if it chooses.
Rodriguez argues State v. Woody, 613 N.W.2d 215, 217 (Iowa 2000), is
applicable here because it is his sentence—not the pleas—that are in error. In
Woody, it was determined the habitual offender enhancement did not apply only
after the State agreed to dismiss a charge and the defendant agreed to admit to
being an habitual offender. 613 N.W.2d at 217. Like here, the State admitted on
appeal the enhancement was inapplicable and argued it should be allowed to
reinstate the original charges against the defendant. Id. Our supreme court
disagreed, concluding, “The plea was valid; only the sentence was illegal.” Id. at
218. Rodriguez points out that under the same circumstances as his case, our
supreme court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. 2 See
Freeman, 705 N.W.2d at 291–92.
The State asks us to adopt the remedy provided in Ceretti rather than the
remedy found in Woody, although somewhat conceding Woody seems more on
point. See State v. Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d at 96–98 (vacating all convictions and
sentences to allow the State to negotiate a new plea deal or try the case after the
court determined the guilty pleas to attempted murder and willful injury, as included
offenses of voluntary manslaughter, required the convictions merge into one
offense). Nonetheless, we will not ignore precedent. Ceretti addresses both an
2 This result is also logically consistent. The State insists Rodriguez has no right
to challenge his pleas on appeal due to the application of section 814.6(1)(a)(3)
but then asks for a remedy undoing those guilty pleas. Insofar as Rodriguez’s
“good cause” to appeal is limited to challenging his sentence, we think the remedy
should be similarly constrained.
5
improper conviction and an improper sentence, where here our analysis is focused
on an improper sentence, as Woody addressed. Compare Ceretti, 871 N.W.2d at
97, with Woody, 613 N.W.2d at 217. While the State cherry-picks from the
language in Ceretti to formulate a “favorable plea bargain” argument, we are not
persuaded to follow this approach. 871 N.W.2d 97-98.
After considering the arguments made and authorities cited by each, we
conclude the proper remedy is to vacate Rodriguez’s sentences and remand for
resentencing. Just as in Woody, “we think the State should bear the
consequences of a decision that was based on the State’s wrong assumption that
the [enhancement] applied.” 613 N.W.2d at 218. Thus, we vacate Rodriguez’s
sentences and remand for resentencing.3
SENTENCES VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
3 Rodriguez should be resentenced on both convictions on remand. See State v.
Keutla, 798 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011) (providing that court can, where
an improper or illegal sentence is severable from the valid portion of the sentence,
vacate just the invalid part but “[w]e are not required to do so and may remand for
resentencing”). “[I]f it is not possible to sever the illegal portion of the sentence, we
should remand for resentencing.” Id. Here, it is not possible to sever, as the State
concedes the district court failed to state adequate reasons on the record for
imposing consecutive sentences. See State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 275 (Iowa
2016).