State of Iowa v. Justin Deal ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-0602
Filed February 17, 2021
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JUSTIN DEAL,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marshall County, Kim M. Riley,
District Associate Judge.
Justin Deal appeals his prison sentence. AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Stephan J. Japuntich,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee.
Considered by Mullins, P.J., and May and Schumacher, JJ.
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MAY, Judge.
Justin Deal appeals his prison sentence. We affirm.
The State filed three trial informations against Deal. Ultimately, Deal was
convicted of the following: (1) driving while barred as a habitual offender in case
AGCR094875; (2) driving while barred as a habitual offender and theft in the
second degree in case FECR095276; and (3) theft in the second degree and
burglary in the third degree, both with the habitual offender enhancement, in case
FECR095308. For each of these convictions, the court imposed a prison
sentence. The court ran most of the sentences concurrently. As to the driving
while barred conviction in AGCR094875, however, the court said this:
As to case number AGCR094875, on the sole count of driving
while barred, again, the court will state its reasons and rationale
shortly. But suffice it to say I think that a two-year prison term is
appropriate on the driving while barred. There are at least, according
to the PSI, seven prior driving while barred convictions. And the
court also detected approximately [eighteen] prior driving under
suspension convictions. Thus far, nothing that the court has done by
way of imposing sanctions has been an adequate deterrent. And I
think nothing short of incarceration, frankly, will stop Mr. Deal from
driving while his license is no good. This being a recidivist situation,
I think that the prison term is appropriate. Also, because this event
occurred separately from the other two events, and represented
separate facts, the court believes that the sentence imposed for case
number [AGCR0]94875 should run consecutively to the sentence
imposed in case number FECR095308.
(Emphasis added.)
On appeal, Deal claims the district court provided inadequate reasons for
imposing consecutive sentencing. “We review the district court’s sentence for an
abuse of discretion.” State v. Hill, 878 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Iowa 2016) (citation
omitted).
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“Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.23(3)(d) requires the district court to
‘state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence.’” Id. at 273.
“Rule 2.23(3)(d) applies to the district court’s decision to impose consecutive
sentences.” Id. Our supreme court has said the purpose of requiring the
sentencing court to state its reasons is to ensure “defendants are well aware of the
consequences of their criminal actions” and to allow us “the opportunity to review
the discretion of the sentencing court.” Id. (citation omitted). “A terse and succinct
statement is sufficient . . . when the reasons for the exercise of discretion are
obvious in light of the statement and the record before the court.” State v. Thacker,
862 N.W.2d 402, 408 (Iowa 2015).
Deal acknowledges the district court stated its reasons for consecutive
sentencing, namely, that one of his crimes (driving while barred in AGCR094875)
“occurred separately” and “represented separate facts” from some of his other
crimes (theft and burglary in FECR095308). But Deal claims the district court was
obligated to take an additional step and “adequately explain why separate facts
call for consecutive sentences.” (Emphasis added.) We disagree. Consecutive
sentencing is based on “the principle that each separate and distinct criminal act
should receive a separately experienced punishment.” 24 C.J.S. Criminal
Procedure and Rights of Accused § 2313 (2020 update). We think this is widely-
understood. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1259, 1263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(describing this principle as a “moral principle”). The district court was not required
to explain it further.
AFFIRMED.