In the Interest of B.D., Minor Child ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 23-0105
Filed March 29, 2023
IN THE INTEREST OF B.D.,
Minor Child,
A.D., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Scott Strait,
District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights AFFIRMED.
Daniel J. McGinn of McGinn, Springer & Noethe, Council Bluffs, for
appellant mother.
Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Roberta J. Megel of the Public Defender’s Office, Council Bluffs, attorney
and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
2
AHLERS, Judge.
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of both parents of B.D.
(born in 2011). Only the mother appeals. Our review is de novo. In re Z.K., 973
N.W.2d 27, 32 (Iowa 2022). We give weight to the juvenile court’s fact findings,
but we are not bound by them. Id.Although the mother mixes in references to numerous other issues, she
presents only one issue in the manner required by our rules of appellate procedure.
See Iowa Rs. App. P. 6.201(1)(d) (requiring a petition on appeal to substantially
comply with form 5 in rule 6.1401); .1401–Form 5 (requiring issues to be identified
and presented separately). She contends the State failed to make reasonable
efforts toward reunification.
While not a strict substantive requirement for termination, “[t]he State must
show reasonable efforts [toward reunification] as part of its ultimate proof that the
child cannot be safely returned to the [custody] of a parent.” In re L.T., 924
N.W.2d 521, 527 (Iowa 2019) (first alteration in original). The mother contends
such efforts were not made. The problem with the mother’s contention—besides
not identifying any efforts that should have been made that weren’t—is that raising
reasonable-efforts challenges to us on appeal, or even to the juvenile court at the
termination hearing, is too late. See In re E.H., No. 21-0467, 2021 WL 2709486,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 30, 2021). “If a parent has a complaint regarding
services, the parent must make such challenge at the removal, when the case
permanency plan is entered, or at later review hearings.” In re C.H., 652
N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002). Further, the complaint must be made to the juvenile
court, as voicing a complaint to services providers is insufficient. Id. “[I]f a parent
3
fails to request other services at the proper time, the parent waives the issue and
may not later challenge it at the termination proceeding.” Id. The mother points to
no place in the record where she challenged the reasonableness of the efforts at
removal, when the case permanency plan was entered, or at later review hearings.
And we find no such challenges following our independent review of the record. In
fact, the record shows that the juvenile court made repeated findings throughout
the underlying child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) case that reasonable efforts
toward reunification were made, and the mother made no challenge to those
findings. We find the mother has waived her reasonable-efforts challenge.
As previously noted, the mother did not properly identify, present, and
develop any other issues, but she did sprinkle references to other issues
throughout her petition on appeal. By failing to properly identify, present, and
develop those issues, the mother has waived them. See In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d
489, 492 (Iowa 2000) (“A broad, all-encompassing argument is insufficient to
identify error in cases of de novo review.”); Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 876
(1996) (“[W]e will not speculate on the arguments [a party] might have made and
then search for legal authority and comb the record for facts to support such
arguments.”); Inghram v. Dairyland Mut. Ins. Co., 215 N.W.2d 239, 240 (Iowa
1974) (“To reach the merits of this case would require us to assume a partisan role
and undertake the appellant’s research and advocacy. This role is one we refuse
to assume.”).
Due to her waiver of them, we have no obligation to review the other issues
the mother mentions. Nevertheless, we note that we have conducted a de novo
review of the record and reach the following conclusions. The State established a
4
statutory ground for termination. Although the juvenile court terminated on multiple
grounds, we focus on the ground found in Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f) (2022).
See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012) (“When the juvenile court
terminates parental rights on more than one statutory ground, we may affirm the
juvenile court’s order on any ground we find supported by the record.”).
Termination under section 232.116(1)(f) requires proof that (1) the child is four
years old or older; (2) the child has been adjudicated a CINA; (3) the child has
been removed from the parent’s custody for at least twelve of the previous
eighteen months; and (4) the child cannot be returned to the parent’s custody at
the time of the termination hearing.
The mother admitted the first three elements in her testimony. As to the
fourth element, the evidence is overwhelming that the child cannot be returned to
the mother’s custody. The underlying CINA case started due to the mother’s use
of methamphetamine while caring for the child. Over the ensuing eighteen months
leading up to the termination hearing, the mother missed five of twenty-three
requested drugs tests. See In re R.A., No. 21-0746, 2021 WL 4891011, at *1 (Iowa
Ct. App. Oct. 20, 2021) (collecting cases noting missed tests are presumed
positive for illegal substances). Of the eighteen times she submitted to testing,
she tested positive for methamphetamine sixteen times. She quit or was kicked
out of treatment twice, and she admitted last using methamphetamine the month
before the termination hearing. She also showed a remarkable lack of awareness
of the harm her methamphetamine addiction posed to the child, repeatedly
testifying that her use posed no danger to the child. See In re K.S.,
No. 21-1755,2022 WL 951034, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022) (finding a
5
parent’s ongoing use of methamphetamine and lack of awareness of how such
use affects the child supports termination under section 232.116(1)(f) because the
child cannot be returned to the parent). Statutory grounds for termination were
met.
We also conclude that termination is in the child’s best interests. The
mother’s consistent use of methamphetamine and lack of awareness of how her
use negatively affects the child supports finding that termination is in the child’s
best interests. See id. (finding termination in the child’s best interests when the
mother is unaware of how her methamphetamine use affects the child).
Additionally, the child is thriving in his placement with fictive kin. The host family
wants to adopt the child, and the child is in favor of the adoption. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(2) (providing that the willingness of a foster family to adopt and the
child’s integration into the foster family as considerations in assessing whether
termination is in the child’s best interests). Termination is in the child’s best
interests.
We have also considered whether the mother should be given additional
time to work toward reunification. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (permitting the
juvenile court to consider alternative permanency options under section 232.104 if
the court chooses to not terminate parental rights); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b)
(providing a permanency option of granting a parent an additional six months to
work toward reunification). In order to grant an extension, we must be able to
“enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which
comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from
the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.”
6
Id. § 232.104(2)(b). We conclude no such extension should be granted. After
eighteen months of services while the child was placed elsewhere, the mother is
no closer to being in a position to resume custody of the child than she was when
the child was first removed. Therefore, we are unable to discern any expected
changes that would enable us to determine that the child could be returned to the
mother’s care six months in the future.
In conclusion, the mother waived her reasonable-efforts challenge, and we
find ample evidence supporting the decision to terminate her parental rights.
Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.