In the Interest of A.C., Minor Child ( 2021 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 20-1592
Filed April 14, 2021
IN THE INTEREST OF A.C.,
Minor Child,
K.C., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dallas County, Virginia Cobb, District
Associate Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child.
AFFIRMED.
Alexis R. Dahlhauser of Neighborhood Law Group of Iowa, P.C., West Des
Moines, for appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Gretchen Witte Kraemer, Assistant
Attorney General, for appellee State.
Kayla A. Stratton of Des Moines Juvenile Public Defender, Des Moines,
attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and Doyle and Mullins, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The State
removed the child at three months of age when a search warrant led to the
discovery of drugs in the home along with “dozens of unlicensed guns,” “some of
them loaded, including an AR-15 propped up near [the child]’s crib.” The father
was arrested on federal charges and remained in custody throughout the juvenile
court proceedings. At the time of the termination hearing, the father testified that
he had pled guilty and was awaiting sentencing on charges of “conspiracy to
distribute cocaine and marijuana and possession of firearms in furtherance of a
drug trafficking crime.” He faces a maximum sentence of ten years in prison with
a mandatory minimum sentence of five years.
The State petitioned to terminate the father’s parental rights under Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(b), (d), (e), and (h) (2019). The juvenile court found the
State proved the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(h) by clear and
convincing evidence. In stating the findings or conclusions he disagrees with, the
father only “disputes that termination was necessary in this situation, as a
guardianship would have been appropriate,” rather than challenging the grounds
for termination. Because the father makes no cogent argument challenging the
evidence supporting termination of his parental rights, he has waived this issue.1
See L.N.S. v. S.W.S., 854 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa Ct. App. 2013) (“Where a party
has failed to present any substantive analysis or argument on an issue, the issue
has been waived.”); see also Richardson v. Neppl, 182 N.W.2d 384, 390 (Iowa
1 We address his argument below in analyzing whether to apply section
232.116(3)(a).
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1970) (“A proposition neither assigned nor argued presents no question and need
not be considered by us on review.”).
The father next challenges the finding that termination is in the child’s best
interests. He claims termination is not in the child’s best interests because he, “by
all accounts, loves his child.” But this is not determinative of the child’s best
interests. In making the best-interests determination, we “give primary
consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-
term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The “defining
elements” are the child’s safety and “need for a permanent home.” In re H.S., 805
N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted). We must “consider what the future
likely holds for the child if returned to [the] parents. Insight for this determination
can be gained from evidence of the parent’s past performance, for that
performance may be indicative of the quality of the future care that parent is
capable of providing.” In re B.H.A., 938 N.W.2d 227, 233 (Iowa 2020) (citation
omitted) (discussing the best-interest framework outlined in chapter 232).
There is clear and convincing evidence to show that termination is in the
child’s best interests given the child’s young age and need for permanency. The
Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS) worker testified that the sooner
permanency occurs, the better it is for the child. Although the court may terminate
parental rights under section 232.116(1)(h) after six months, a total of fifteen
months had passed between the child’s removal and the termination hearing. The
father has been in jail that entire time and faces a five-year mandatory minimum
sentence with the possibility of a ten-year prison sentence. Meanwhile, the child
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has been in the care of the maternal grandparents for all but the first three months
of life. The DHS worker testified that the child is “very well cared for” by and
bonded to the maternal grandparents, who have passed a home study and are
eligible to adopt the child once parental rights have been terminated. We agree
that allowing adoption by the maternal grandparents, who have been the child’s
regular caregivers for almost the child’s entire life, is in the child’s interests. We
also have concerns about the quality of care the father can provide as the father’s
testimony downplayed the potential harm that the drugs found in the home
presented to the child by and blamed the mother for his actions.
The father’s main argument on appeal centers on Iowa Code section
232.116(3)(a), which states that the court “need not terminate the relationship
between the parent and child” when “[a] relative has legal custody of the child.” He
argues a guardianship would be appropriate, noting the maternal grandparents will
likely allow the child continued contact with him. But an otherwise appropriate
decision to terminate “is not to be countermanded by the ability and willingness of
a family relative to take the child.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 475 (Iowa 2018)
(citation omitted). Again, the determination is made by considering the child’s best
interests. See id.We decline to apply section 232.116(3)(a) to avoid terminating the father’s
parental rights. Guardianship does not afford the same permanency that adoption
affords. The maternal grandparents are providing for all of the child’s needs while
the father is incarcerated due to choices he made. To allow the possibility for
disruption in the child’s life after a period of five to ten years would be to put the
father’s needs above the child’s. See In re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct.
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App. 2009) (noting that “at some point, the rights and needs of the child[] rise above
the rights and needs of the parent”). We therefore affirm the termination of the
father’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.